0:01

You don't help the poor by

0:03

making everybody poorer. The media

0:06

has a frame, and the frame is Israel is

0:08

the oppressor, and the Palestinians are the oppressed. I

0:11

shouldn't be forced to acknowledge my privilege unless

0:13

I desire for that to be part of my

0:15

interaction with somebody else. What

0:18

I know to be true and what all of my

0:20

fellow Gen Z know to be true is

0:23

that this is the most talented

0:25

generation yet. With respect to every

0:27

indicia of disadvantage, there is still

0:29

a racial hierarchy. And though I am,

0:32

of course, an Anglo, I'm certainly not

0:35

a f***ing Saxon. Hello,

0:37

Monk listeners. Right here, Griffiths here, your host and

0:39

moderator. Welcome to this, our

0:41

continuing conversation is called the Monk Dialogues. These are

0:43

in-depth questions and answers with some of the world's

0:46

sharpest minds and brightest thinkers. On each

0:48

Monk dialogue, we go deep into the

0:50

big issues and ideas that are moving.

0:54

Public conversation. Even

0:56

by the standards of the Middle East,

0:58

it's been a tense couple of weeks.

1:01

As the war in Gaza rages on

1:03

with no end in sight, two of

1:05

the region's superpowers came close to an

1:08

all-out war. Iran,

1:10

which had never before attempted

1:12

a direct attack on Israeli

1:14

soil, fired off a

1:16

barrage of missiles and drones towards the

1:18

Jewish homeland. Israel and

1:20

its allies were able to successfully

1:22

repel the onslaught, but everyone

1:25

knew that a response was coming. And

1:27

sure enough, in the early hours of

1:29

Friday morning last week, Israel

1:32

struck back at targets in Iran.

1:35

It was a more modest response than many

1:37

anticipated. At least for

1:39

now, Iran seems content not to retaliate.

1:43

Still, one of the most volatile regions in the world

1:45

seems to be sitting on

1:47

a proverbial tinderbox. How

1:50

can the international community avoid increasing tensions between

1:52

Israel and Iran from escalating further? Is

1:56

it possible for Israel to achieve its war in Gaza without further action?

2:00

further inflaming the Middle East

2:02

or jeopardizing the possibility of

2:04

an enduring peace between Israelis

2:06

and Palestinians. It's hard

2:08

to find someone more qualified to delve

2:11

into these issues than my guest on

2:13

this week's Munk Dialogue. Ambassador

2:15

Dennis Ross played a leading role

2:17

in shaping U.S. involvement in the

2:19

region, starting with the presidencies of

2:22

H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and Barack

2:24

Obama. He also served as a

2:26

special advisor on Iran to former

2:28

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

2:31

Ambassador Ross, welcome to the Munk

2:33

Dialogues. Good to be with you,

2:35

thanks. So much to talk about,

2:37

but as a scene setter, allow our audience

2:40

to kind of begin

2:42

to think where you're thinking from, could

2:45

I have you answer for us what

2:48

you believe to be the

2:50

current state of

2:52

Israeli security or

2:54

insecurity as we enter

2:57

the seventh month of the war in Gaza?

3:01

Look, it's not only the right question,

3:04

it's an important question, because

3:07

I think Israelis are still

3:09

suffering the trauma of October 7th. It's

3:12

not just the sheer

3:14

brutality of it, it

3:17

was also the shock of it. It was

3:20

the disbelief that something like this could happen

3:22

in Israel, not

3:25

simply the surprise but the

3:28

unpreparedness, the time it

3:30

took for the IDF to respond, the

3:34

fact that you not only had unprecedented

3:37

numbers of Israelis who were killed, but 253

3:39

taken as hostages

3:42

as young as nine months old, as old as 85. And

3:46

the impact of that is still

3:50

being absorbed. And so

3:52

there's, we've often talked in the

3:54

past, when I was negotiating, it was

3:56

not only Israel's need for security, but

3:58

it was a sense of security. security. I

4:01

think what happened is Israelis lost that

4:03

sense of security and that's not a

4:05

left-right issue. Historically, you might

4:08

say the right in Israel tried to

4:10

use security as a justification to explain

4:12

all sorts of approaches and issues and

4:14

so forth. And the left

4:16

was least susceptible to

4:18

that line of argument. And

4:20

now they're the ones who are just

4:22

as much convinced

4:24

of the need to

4:27

restore a sense of security as

4:29

anyone else. And the reality that it's

4:31

still not reestablished is you

4:33

have 80,000 people evacuated from their homes in the

4:35

north and you probably have

4:37

still close to 70,000 evacuated from where they

4:41

were living in the south. So that's

4:43

a kind of constant reminder that

4:45

the sense of security has not

4:47

been restored, number one. Number two,

4:50

that Israel is contending effectively with

4:52

Iran and all of Iran's proxies

4:55

is something else that sort of cements this

4:57

notion that there's still much to be

5:00

done. So what you get is in Israel

5:02

that is still living with a body

5:04

of policy but still living with a

5:06

profound sense of insecurity. Thank

5:10

you, Dennis. If

5:13

we think of the situation right now, we've

5:16

just had this extraordinary attack

5:18

of Iran from

5:21

Iranian soil directly on

5:23

Israel, followed up by a

5:26

reprisal attack, a highly

5:29

calibrated reprisal attack by

5:31

Israel, and a

5:33

war in Gaza that seems to have

5:36

– I don't

5:38

know how to characterize it properly, Dennis

5:40

– stalemated, stalled. You pick

5:42

the euphemism. Talk

5:44

to us a little bit about where

5:46

we find ourselves right now. I

5:51

feel that the

5:54

exchange between Iran and

5:56

Israel effectively took a shadow war out of

5:58

the shadows. This is

6:01

the first time since the creation

6:03

of the Islamic Republic, since its

6:05

emergence in 1979, that

6:07

they attacked Israel directly from their

6:10

own territory. And it

6:12

was not for those who say it was meant to

6:14

be just a statement. It was

6:16

meant to be just a statement you send 10

6:18

or 15 drones and cruise

6:20

missiles or a ballistic missile. You

6:23

don't fire off 110 ballistic

6:25

missiles, 30 cruise missiles and

6:27

170 drones. This

6:29

was not meant to be just

6:31

a statement. It was a statement, but

6:34

it was designed to inflict damage.

6:37

That it failed says

6:39

more about a combination of the Israeli capability. The

6:41

fact that we were, we and others. And

6:45

that Iran is still not a match

6:48

for the Israelis technologically that the Israelis

6:50

could send three missiles in return and

6:53

take out a radar. That

6:57

guides an S 300 defense

7:00

missile system, which

7:02

is effectively the most

7:05

advanced it gotten from from the Russians

7:07

shows again the kind of a symmetry here. We

7:11

have an interesting reality that both

7:13

sides decided they

7:16

were going to use force against the other. Iran

7:19

acted because Israel did what it has

7:22

done frequently, which is to take out

7:24

Revolutionary Guard officers who are in Syria

7:27

planning all sorts of attacks against Israel. And

7:29

Iran wanted to say, okay, you can't do

7:31

that any longer with impunity. And Israel

7:33

wanted to respond by saying, we will

7:35

continue to do it with impunity. So

7:39

they combined was

7:41

amounted to both

7:43

sides saying they were going to make

7:45

a statement militarily, but

7:48

they didn't want to make the statement militarily that

7:50

was going to erupt into a wider direct war

7:52

between the two. So there was a –

7:54

this was an imbalance, but they still crossed the threshold.

7:56

So that's element number one.

7:58

Now, how about the war? war in

8:00

Gaza itself. It

8:02

does seem like it's settled in at a certain level. On

8:04

the other hand, the Israelis have basically

8:07

dismantled 19 of 24

8:09

Hamas battalions. There are five

8:11

left. One of the things I have

8:14

one of the Israelis to do, I have actually wanted the

8:16

administration to do with Israel, was to say, okay,

8:18

you're not far from achieving your

8:20

objective because you will have demilitarized

8:23

Gaza. You are never

8:25

going to eliminate Hamas any more than

8:27

we're able to eliminate ISIS. This

8:30

is an idea, an ideology.

8:32

You don't defeat ideologies militarily.

8:35

So settle on an objective that is

8:37

achievable. We and others

8:39

can assume responsibility to help ensure that

8:42

Gaza cannot be remilitarized. You

8:44

can also tie reconstruction assistance

8:46

to Hamas not being in power. Truth

8:48

is, no one is going to invest

8:50

in Gaza if Hamas is in

8:52

power because they will seek to do this again.

8:55

So it seems to me

8:57

that we are not that far from being

8:59

able to achieve an end

9:02

to the war if you define

9:04

the objective in a way that's connected to

9:06

something that the Israelis are not that far

9:09

from achieving. If you don't

9:11

redefine the objective, then this is very much as

9:13

you said, an ongoing,

9:16

you know, basically it's an ongoing humanitarian

9:18

disaster for the Palestinians who live in

9:20

Gaza. But it's not making

9:22

Israel any more secure. So for

9:25

me, it's critical

9:27

to sort of redefine or at least

9:30

define what the objective is and define

9:32

how much is enough. And as I said, I

9:34

don't think we're that far from being able to achieve

9:36

that. It

9:39

would be right to assess that seven months

9:41

into this war Israel

9:44

is now much more insecure

9:47

than it was after the

9:49

attacks of October 7th.

9:52

There now is this new doctrine

9:54

asserted by Iran of

9:56

not simply tit for tat, but it's not

9:59

simply a new doctrine. strikes but a threat

10:03

of more direct retaliation on

10:05

Israel itself for any strikes

10:08

on Iranian assets either inside

10:10

or outside Iran. There

10:12

seems to be Dennis incredible reporting this week

10:14

that Israel had

10:17

ideas for a bigger counter-strike that

10:19

in no small part were

10:22

dialed back because of fears about

10:25

Hezbollah increasing the

10:28

war in the north the intensity

10:30

of it and the large missile

10:32

reserves that Hezbollah has that could

10:34

threaten Israel proper

10:36

not just the northern border and then

10:39

Sinwar unfortunately

10:43

continues to survive intact with a

10:45

number of battalions in

10:48

Rafa. Dennis

10:50

is it is it right to say that Israel

10:53

has kind of you know

10:55

through errors of a mission and Commission has backed

10:57

itself into an increasingly

10:59

deteriorating situation when it comes to

11:01

its own security. I

11:04

actually think there's a duality here on

11:07

the one hand I said earlier the

11:09

whole issue of sense of security is

11:11

has not been reestablished and

11:14

there is Israel is effectively fighting what amounts to

11:16

a kind of seven front war but

11:19

that also that also connects

11:21

you to something that is new

11:23

and different we've had two I would say

11:25

two developments that are unprecedented one

11:27

is Iran deciding that it will attack Israel

11:30

with a large barrage from its own

11:32

territory but the other unprecedented reality is

11:35

that one third of what the Iranians

11:37

launched the cruise missiles and the

11:39

drones to be specific were

11:41

not intercepted by the Israelis they were intercepted by the

11:43

US through central command with

11:46

the British and the French and

11:48

air participants in in central command playing

11:51

a role. Israel has

11:53

always prided itself both as a source of

11:55

pride but also even as a moral principle

11:58

That it will fight its own battle. The nobody fight

12:00

for it. Yeah, we defend herself by

12:03

ourselves and yet for the first time

12:05

ever. It turned out that a

12:07

third of all was launched against Israel

12:09

was intercepted by others. One of the

12:11

reasons Israel didn't it it restricted. what

12:13

it did was precisely because there was

12:15

pressure from us. To

12:18

say. You. Know he can't do

12:20

this. And that here is

12:22

that this to again I'll say two

12:24

elements that are that are knew him.

12:27

One is that in effect.

12:30

When others contribute to Israel's defense,

12:32

not in terms of will provide

12:34

you. Your material support but

12:36

you do everything with limited military's the

12:39

material sport. When we actually play an

12:41

active role and others by active role

12:43

in Israel's defense, they have a right

12:45

to say to the drill. Okay, we

12:47

put a natural news fence You have

12:49

to take into account armies are concerns

12:52

and arduous as well. That's. New.

12:54

But. It also reflects something else that from

12:57

an Israeli stamp line. Should

12:59

be positive. Which. Is the

13:01

idea of original coalition of which

13:04

Israel's the part. That. Will

13:06

counter. The. Iranian

13:08

what I call the they call themselves

13:10

the axe resistance. I calm the axis

13:12

of misery because. Wherever. The

13:15

Iranians are connected to a country and

13:17

have major influence that countries either fail

13:19

failing a paralyzed. With. No

13:21

prospect for the future. Here is

13:24

a coalition that Israel can be a part

13:26

of, and it's not an abstraction. Maybe.

13:28

Before this would be a theoretical

13:30

possibility. Now. We've seen in

13:32

practice that it's not a theoretical

13:35

possibility and that actually can contribute

13:37

to Israel's security and then allows

13:39

Israel to have a strategy that

13:41

can be more effective in terms

13:43

of countering the threats to it.

13:46

Especially when there's so many of them. Fascinating

13:49

analysis doesn't really. it rings true,

13:51

so apply that to then to

13:54

the the war in Gaza. If

13:56

there is a kind of dawning

13:58

on Israel's security establishment, the fact

14:01

they have. More enable willing

14:03

allies that they might have realize,

14:06

including possibly a Saudi Arabia that

14:08

might. Ah, welcome

14:10

an opportunity to. Proceed.

14:13

With the previous plans that

14:15

where the rail to officially

14:17

recognize Israel on restore some

14:19

form of. Diplomatic

14:22

in. Long. Term economic

14:24

relations and how could this

14:26

map over Gaza war the

14:28

benefit of everyone? I

14:31

do see a connection here. Are.

14:34

The. By demonstrating, the Saudis are

14:36

not backing away from the idea

14:39

of. Brokerages normalization video

14:41

the Saudis are requiring, however

14:43

that there be either end

14:46

of the war least be

14:48

some kind of unmistakable ceasefire

14:50

pause. I. Mean I have

14:52

to be an enduring one for the AS

14:54

to be, they're not gonna try to negotiate

14:56

finalizes deal so long as the war's going.

14:59

There is an interesting for me, there

15:01

is a kind of logic connection here.

15:06

I. Would like to see. An.

15:08

Extended pause cause a ceasefire

15:11

cessation of hostilities. To.

15:13

Allow that negotiation to take

15:15

place. It

15:17

I understand there is problematic in some

15:20

respects from Israeli Stamp Point Burgers and

15:22

Breathe. Policies. Are still being

15:24

held in. One of the things we've learned now is it.

15:27

A leash? Yeah, Kissin Wire has very little

15:29

interest in releasing them. With

15:31

you had a Us compromise proposal. Again

15:35

where I think. Present Biden.

15:38

I. See. Pressured.

15:41

Bibi Netanyahu. To.

15:44

Not just on the humanitarian issue,

15:46

that specifically on t issue giving

15:49

his negotiators a mandate. A.

15:51

Broader mandate to be able to negotiate.

15:53

That was done. And. I'll age

15:55

Really did respond to the compromise American

15:58

proposal and a loss normally would. It

16:00

it but day hardener terms. They

16:02

said instead of a little supposed to be

16:05

forty Houses is released. For. Forty

16:07

Five Day. Cause.

16:10

I our secession. And.

16:13

I'm. Asking bags and will will release

16:15

twenty. Not. Forty. And

16:18

there had been previously. They.

16:20

Had agreed through cut or. That.

16:23

They would. there would be three

16:25

phases to complete all this. They

16:28

would be a clear link between the cease

16:30

fire and the release of hostages. And

16:34

the first day didn't require.

16:36

A commitment to a complete an

16:39

enduring ceasefire That would be a

16:41

second phase. In. His proposal

16:43

a mass. Also. Not only

16:45

reduce the number of us you that would be

16:47

released they'll suffer. The for had to be the

16:49

commitment to the Enduring Ceasefire in the for space

16:51

for they walked back with they had previously. Been.

16:54

Prepared to accept. And

16:56

so that indicates that they're They're

16:58

not. Listen, or maybe the political

17:00

leadership of a last is more interested

17:02

but similar. Who's the guy who holds

17:04

the Us to is effectively he is

17:07

not. So. If you're not

17:09

gonna get what. What did the Initiation

17:11

I think in many ways had built

17:13

a strategy around a hostage deal. that

17:15

crazy forty five day pause with the

17:17

get go and they could negotiate. Despite.

17:20

All the with the Saudis get breakthrough it would

17:22

require the Israelis. To. Have a passing

17:24

component. To. This day the Saudis

17:26

wanna see a political rise and they want to

17:28

be able to say. We have achieved

17:30

something for the past season has not been achieved in

17:33

the past. What that precisely is

17:35

hasn't been defined at least the two

17:37

sides that this Us and Saudis have

17:39

revealed in public. Is. A

17:41

long one way of saying. It.

17:43

Seems to me that. If

17:45

you're not going to get a hostage deal, But.

17:48

You still need a pause. Why?

17:50

Not do the pause. Unilaterally.

17:54

It is true you breaking this link that says

17:56

by releasing hostages. The. One I think

17:58

you're doing is you can address. this pause

18:00

period, the 45 days, let's

18:03

say it's 45 days, you

18:06

can put it in place on the ground, not

18:08

just the ability to get humanitarian

18:11

assistance in, which has gone

18:13

dramatically up since the Biden-Nekonyao

18:15

phone call, but there's still a problem

18:17

with the distribution of it within Gaza

18:20

so that it gets to the people who most need it. There's

18:23

still an issue with how do you

18:25

secure the distribution. You could

18:27

use this 45-day period to

18:30

basically put all that in place. You

18:33

could use this 45-day period to

18:35

be able to negotiate

18:38

and try to produce this breakthrough.

18:41

And at a certain level,

18:43

I would ask the question, what is,

18:46

it's not clear to me, Israel is giving something

18:48

up. The argument that they need to increase the

18:50

military pressure on Hamas to get

18:52

the hostages released, when they

18:54

had five divisions in Gaza, which was

18:56

true in November, it was pretty

18:58

clear there was a lot of pressure there. Now they have one

19:01

brigade. So

19:04

there's no way that brigade puts the same

19:06

amount of pressure on that was

19:08

previously the case, number one. Number

19:10

two, Israel has pledged

19:13

to the Biden administration, it

19:15

will not go after the four battalions in

19:17

Rafah unless they've evacuated

19:20

the 1.3 million, 1.4 million

19:22

Palestinians in Rafah. Well, they

19:24

can't do that. That will take at least six to

19:26

eight weeks, at least maybe more. So

19:28

they're not going to be going into Rafah

19:30

in that period anyway. So

19:33

if that's the case, it's not clear to me

19:35

exactly what they would be giving up. It's clear

19:37

to me there's a lot that could be potentially

19:39

gained. And if Israel calls

19:41

a pause and Hamas still doesn't release any

19:43

hostages, then the focus and

19:45

only shifts much more on the Hamas. I would

19:48

have always liked to have seen that to be

19:50

the case, but the simple reality

19:52

is that has not been the case. The focus has

19:54

been more on Israel. So it seems

19:56

to me there is a way to connect all these. I

19:58

would like to see. this

20:00

kind of, I'd like to see the administration propose

20:03

to the Israelis a unilateral pause because I

20:05

see all the potential benefits from it and

20:08

the reasons not to do it strike me as

20:10

not being particularly compelling when Israel isn't going to

20:12

be acting in Rafah anyway. If

20:19

you're enjoying the Monk Debates

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follow the links. Thanks in advance

21:01

for joining our community. One

21:05

of the counter arguments

21:07

to, you know it

21:10

well, to the idea of a cessation

21:12

of hostilities is that without

21:14

the military destruction of

21:16

Hamas and

21:19

the capture of Sinwar and the

21:21

other kind of leadership

21:23

cadres of the organization Hamas

21:25

will reconstitute itself. That it

21:28

has enough fighters,

21:32

enough supporters

21:35

in the population, certainly a minority

21:37

now, and they will

21:39

be a formidable terrorist

21:42

organization operating throughout the

21:45

Strip, sorting whatever

21:49

ambitions Israel, the United States,

21:52

the Gulf States might have for

21:55

some kind of future for the

21:57

region because that future amongst those

22:00

partners does not constitute a future

22:02

for Hamas. It's

22:05

a it's a fair point. But

22:07

as I said before, the Israelis have dismantled

22:09

19 of the 24 battalions Hamas is already

22:11

no longer a military. It's

22:14

reverted to what it was before a militia, but it's

22:16

not it's not a coherent militia.

22:19

These units that no longer exist doesn't mean

22:21

all the fighters were killed or captured. Nobody

22:25

knows the exact number who have been killed. But

22:28

we do know is they no

22:30

longer have a command control structure. They no longer

22:32

have units that are organized. They

22:35

have lost most of their military industrial

22:37

base. So the things

22:39

that made them a military and made them

22:42

a formidable threat, that has

22:44

already been largely dismantled. They

22:46

still exist. Obviously, they still

22:48

can cause trouble clearly just

22:51

because they're no longer organized into

22:53

units. There's still are plenty of Hamas who are

22:55

armed. Now,

22:58

having said that, and your point is

23:00

fair, but having said that, we

23:02

also know that there are. There

23:06

are a number of

23:08

Arab states are prepared to play an unprecedented

23:10

role. I've spoken earlier about we've seen a

23:12

number of thresholds across a number of things,

23:15

a number of steps that are unprecedented. The

23:18

Iranian strike from its own territory, but

23:21

a coalition that actually actively comes to

23:23

Israel's defense. Now, if there's

23:25

a breakthrough on the

23:27

Saudi frankly, even if there isn't. I know

23:30

from my own conversation with Arab leaders, there is

23:33

a readiness for Arabs to go in to

23:35

manage that a transitional administration and

23:38

even security with forces on the ground. If

23:43

there's either a political horizon,

23:46

which would be part of a breakthrough

23:48

with the Saudis, or at

23:50

least an unmistakable effort at reform

23:53

on the palace, the Palestinian authority. Why

23:55

is the ladder so important, Because

23:58

those Arabs who are in the middle of the. Come

24:00

in on the ground. Don't want

24:02

to be in Gaza forever. And they

24:04

want to be able to be in a position where

24:06

they can hand off. To. Of

24:09

Housing Alternative. To. Hamas.

24:12

The combination of i think sheer

24:14

exhaustion, Of the past season

24:16

Garzon. The level of

24:18

destruction and the requirement for reconstruction.

24:21

And Arabs force administrative

24:23

scary probably with some

24:26

local Palestinians under there.

24:28

Have. Been folded into this. Maybe with

24:30

some security contractors as well? That

24:33

combination altogether I think would make it

24:35

difficult for Hamas to resist. Given.

24:38

The fact that they're weaker. Given. The

24:40

fact that the public itself. I

24:42

think will react fairly negatively. To

24:44

Hamas trying to because to sell in

24:47

that circumstance especially if it's gonna cost

24:49

reconstruction because as I said, they will

24:51

not be investment and reconstruction. If Hamas

24:54

in any way looks like a can

24:56

divert materials, it can in any way

24:58

we cast itself is. It just means

25:00

we'll revisit this all over again. So

25:03

I think there's an interesting combination of

25:05

factors here. It. Would preclude Hamas

25:07

from be able to come back in

25:09

control and would limit it's trouble making

25:12

capabilities the price of a massive of

25:14

trying to do that in a circumstance.

25:17

Where. You have. Arabs. Coming

25:19

in and population craving. The

25:22

ability to begin to restore life.

25:24

I. Think all this together gives you

25:27

the possibility there is this point

25:29

I was making. shouldn't be. Underestimated.

25:33

It focus on the issue public. Rise back

25:35

and tell you from my talks with Arab

25:37

leaders. They. Want to

25:40

see a Reform Housing Authority? They.

25:42

Understand it might be twelve eighteen months

25:44

before they could be considered themselves or

25:46

reform wait so they could then come.

25:49

To gossip. And be the

25:51

alternate to Hamas. So there is a needs

25:53

it is need to build a bridge. From.

25:56

The time when this conflict ends.

25:58

To. When you have. a Palestinian

26:00

Authority that assumes that kind of responsibility.

26:04

That is a critical element. We haven't seen

26:06

it. We've seen a new Prime Minister announce

26:08

we've seen no sign of any reform at

26:10

this point yet. And that has

26:13

to be a part of a

26:16

process that gets us beyond Hamas.

26:20

Otherwise, what I fear is you're going to end up with a

26:22

vacuum in

26:24

Gaza. Maybe that makes it

26:26

possible for Hamas to come back. Maybe it makes

26:28

other forces emerge. One thing we know

26:30

from a lot of experiences is that when there are

26:32

vacuums in the Middle East, moderate forces

26:34

never tend to fill it. I

26:37

appreciate you letting us pressure test.

26:40

You know, some really interesting thinking here, how to

26:42

bring this conflict, if not

26:45

to a resolution, to some

26:47

better state for everyone. But

26:49

just to continue on this pressure testing,

26:53

talk to us a little bit about the

26:55

political realities in Israel. How

26:59

would they play into this type

27:01

of thinking, the type of solution

27:03

that you're proposing? Is

27:06

this predicated on a

27:08

new government in Israel? Do we simply

27:10

have to acknowledge that there will be –

27:12

there has to be a change in the

27:14

current Israeli coalition

27:18

that is supporting Netanyahu and that

27:20

forms the basis of his authority within

27:22

the war cabinet? Look,

27:25

there's no doubt in my mind that ministers

27:29

Ben Gavir and Smotrich will

27:32

oppose everything I was just outlining from

27:36

basically start to finish

27:38

the idea of a unilateral pause. They

27:41

will oppose. A breakthrough with

27:43

the Saudis that is predicated on a passing

27:46

component, they will oppose. The

27:50

fact that Prime Minister Netanyahu depends

27:52

on them now is one thing.

27:55

What I'm, in effect, suggesting

27:58

is there are – ways

28:00

out of this, but unless

28:03

he makes a choice, you're

28:05

going to find it difficult to proceed. For sure,

28:07

there's going to be a political reckoning in Israel.

28:11

That's a matter of time. I

28:13

can't tell you exactly when it's going to come, but it's a

28:15

matter of time. There's no

28:17

way that you've already seen today

28:19

the head of

28:22

military intelligence, who

28:25

from the beginning assumed responsibility, said

28:28

that he's offering his resignation and he will

28:30

leave as soon as the replacement is found

28:32

for him. He will not

28:34

be the last of the military

28:36

leaders to resign.

28:39

You will see the chief of staff. You probably see

28:42

the head of intelligence, Shin Bet. You'll

28:45

see others resign and they will assume

28:48

responsibilities. That will sharpen

28:50

the issue that it can't be only

28:52

the military and security elements

28:54

that assume responsibility because after all, they were

28:56

carrying out a policy. So

28:59

they'll have to be the political

29:01

echelon. You're going

29:03

to see, if not resignations, there

29:05

will be a pressure point that produces

29:08

an election at some point. And

29:12

maybe if there's a

29:14

breakthrough with the Saudis and the administration

29:16

is presenting the Prime Minister Netanyahu, here's

29:19

what it takes to finalize this on the

29:21

Palestinian side. Then he

29:23

makes a choice. My

29:26

expectation is if there is a clear choice

29:28

that there's a deal here, he

29:31

then has to think in terms of

29:34

legacy from the standpoint, does he want his legacy

29:36

to be October 7th or does he want his

29:38

legacy to be that he presided over a transformation

29:41

of the Middle East and Israel's changing,

29:44

in a sense, the coalition

29:47

that is much better equipped

29:51

to counter the Iranians over the long haul. as

30:00

we've discussed, has articulated a new

30:02

doctrine. What they

30:04

call, what they've characterized as

30:07

harsh and severe retaliation against

30:09

Israel on the basis of

30:12

attacks on

30:14

Iranian military and

30:17

other assets, not only in

30:19

Iran, but they seem to

30:21

imply the doctrine extends to territories

30:24

outside of Iran. We

30:27

know, Dennis, don't we, that Hamas

30:30

was able to turn itself into a

30:32

functioning military because

30:35

of Iranian assistance,

30:38

persistent Iranian assistance.

30:41

What do you see as a threat

30:43

here for Iran to try to undo

30:45

whatever progress might be made in a

30:48

Gaza undergoing a ceasefire

30:50

and then contemplating options beyond that?

30:53

How could those

30:55

threats be thwarted? I

30:59

think this is a really critical question

31:04

because in a sense, these

31:07

more positive future we've been discussing is

31:09

obviously a negative future from the standpoint

31:12

of the Iranians and will

31:14

they do nothing in the

31:16

face of that? I think you have to

31:18

assume that they're unlikely to

31:20

sit back and do nothing. Now, having said that, I'm

31:24

not sure we've seen a real change

31:26

in Iranian risk-taking propensity. I

31:29

think part of the reason

31:31

for what they did was

31:34

a perception that Israel was

31:36

alone, that there seemed to be signs

31:38

of dissonance with the United States and

31:40

this was a moment where it could carry it off. And

31:43

yet, this doctrine, as

31:45

you could describe it, of harsh retaliation, Israel

31:49

in the end, hid in Syria

31:51

in response, may have

31:54

hit in Iraq, it's not entirely clear,

31:57

but it certainly hit in Iran

31:59

even if highly calibrated and

32:02

Iran said basically

32:05

acted as if nothing had happened, which is to say

32:07

the Iranians decided

32:10

they really weren't interested in

32:12

continuing this. So my

32:15

guess is their efforts at trying

32:17

to thwart the

32:20

kind of scenario I was outlining will

32:22

again revert to use

32:25

of proxies and different

32:27

kinds of terror threats. The

32:30

question is, is that enough? The fact that the Saudis,

32:32

as part of this breakthrough, what do the Saudis want?

32:35

The core is a defense treaty with the United

32:37

States. And that's

32:39

because the Saudi priority is Vision 2030,

32:42

internal development and transformation. And

32:45

they look to a security guarantee from

32:47

the United States that is formalized as

32:50

providing a deterrent against what

32:52

the Iranians would do. So

32:55

my guess is Iran will

32:58

probe to see what it can do to try to thwart

33:00

this. But it clearly doesn't

33:02

want a direct confrontation with the United States. And

33:05

it clearly we've just seen is hesitant to

33:07

really have a direct confrontation with Israel. Now,

33:10

does it decide, okay, now's the time

33:13

to unleash Hezbollah? Well, the

33:15

only problem with that is that Hezbollah

33:17

does have its own equities within Lebanon.

33:20

The level of opposition to Hezbollah in Lebanon

33:23

has never been greater between

33:25

the Druze, the Christians, and the Sunnis. And

33:28

I can tell you, having spoken to a recently

33:33

Lebanese, not official, but someone who's

33:36

pretty well connected, he

33:38

was asking me how likely was

33:40

it that Israel would really come in and go

33:42

after Hezbollah? And I said, not very likely. And

33:44

I could see the kind of disappointment because

33:47

the sense was this

33:49

is a point where Hezbollah has real

33:51

vulnerability within Lebanon. One

33:54

thing we know about Iran, it was never

33:56

prepared to trade Hezbollah

33:58

for Hamas. And

34:01

even now, I mean, Hamas, Sinwar probably got

34:03

an interesting object lesson in terms of what

34:05

just happened. Iran never did

34:07

anything directly in response to what

34:10

Hamas has done. It did something

34:12

directly only when it paid a certain

34:14

price and it then sought to impose

34:16

a price on Israel. And then when Israel responded, it

34:18

chose not to do anything. So

34:20

the lesson there for Hamas is Iran

34:24

will support you verbally

34:26

and materially, but don't count on anything beyond

34:29

that. Is Iran

34:31

really willing to put

34:33

at risk Hezbollah? And

34:36

I'm not so sure, because Hezbollah,

34:38

for a lot of it, it's not

34:40

just that Hezbollah is the one that

34:42

trains and helps build up all of

34:44

these local, military industrial bases for Hamas

34:46

and the Houthis and the proxy

34:49

militias within Iraq. It's

34:52

the ultimate deterrent against the Israelis

34:54

going after Iran's nuclear infrastructure because

34:58

of 150,000 rockets. Do

35:01

they really want to potentially lose that? And

35:05

which is, as I said, the kind of insurance

35:07

policy for something they've invested

35:09

the last 40 years in developing. There

35:12

is, however, a factor here. Do the

35:14

Iranians decide in this context to

35:17

suddenly go for a nuclear weapon? That

35:21

I'm not – I mean, I don't think

35:23

that's a scenario we should dismiss. So

35:25

I do think there – look, even

35:28

as I can paint a more hopeful picture, I'm

35:30

mindful of some of the risks that are inherent

35:32

in trying to produce it. Final

35:36

pressure testing question. The Palestinian people

35:38

themselves, what

35:41

is their willingness to contemplate

35:44

an alternative future with

35:46

the state of Israel, a

35:48

future that recognizes its legitimacy,

35:50

its right to exist, the

35:54

necessity for cooperation, for

35:56

dialogue, for giving up on the issue

35:59

of the future? I

36:02

guess, Dennis, the skeptics

36:05

listening might say, look, this whole conflict

36:07

has just played into the hands of

36:10

the radicals, of the supremacists, and

36:13

that it will be very difficult, if

36:15

not impossible, to

36:18

convince the Palestinian people. You

36:21

could say, arguably, after the traumas

36:23

of Gaza, to commit themselves to

36:26

a peace process inside Gaza, and

36:29

by default, would not that peace

36:31

process in Gaza require some

36:34

larger form of rapprochement between

36:38

the peoples of Israel and Palestine? This

36:42

is another crucial

36:45

question, not always crucial.

36:47

In many

36:49

ways, it goes to the heart of what has

36:51

to happen on both sides. I think we have

36:53

to understand there's been a trauma on each side.

36:55

I started off by talking about the trauma in

36:57

Israel. And when you're

36:59

suffering from trauma, you are

37:02

aware only of your own pain. You're

37:04

absorbed by your own pain. It's

37:07

not a criticism. It's a reality. Well,

37:09

it's just as true for the Palestinians. There's

37:12

been a trauma on the Palestinian side. And

37:16

the pain is not imaginary. It's real.

37:19

It's physical, but it's also psychological. You

37:22

have parallel sets of

37:24

trauma with each side incapable

37:26

of looking at the other

37:28

and appreciating the level of suffering

37:30

on the other side. That

37:33

absence means that it's almost impossible to contemplate

37:35

the idea that you will make a concession

37:37

to the other side. So

37:39

the context doesn't lend itself to being able to

37:41

suddenly say, gee, we're going to transform this. We're

37:43

going to make peace. There's going to be reconciliation.

37:46

We're going to bring them together. I'm going to

37:48

sing kumbaya. That's

37:50

not on the horizon. So

37:53

we have to think a little bit differently. One

37:55

of the things we have to think about is, can

37:57

we use, again, something like this? a

38:00

breakthrough with the Saudis as a way of

38:02

getting the Israelis to make some choices. Now

38:05

the Israelis can make some choices. Palestinians, you put

38:07

your finger up. Palestinians will also have to make

38:09

some choices. For one thing, just internally,

38:11

what do they want their identity to be? Do

38:14

they want their identity to be an

38:16

Islamist armed resistance

38:19

identity? Or

38:21

do they want their identity to be a

38:23

secular national identity?

38:27

That has to be sorted out before anything else can

38:29

happen. There has to be

38:31

real reform. I've said it before

38:34

in the Palestinian Authority. If it is to

38:36

have a future and if it is

38:38

to be capable of being

38:40

able not only to assume a responsibility

38:42

in Gaza, but if you don't politically

38:45

reunify Gaza in the West Bank,

38:48

how can you even talk about a Palestinian state? So

38:51

that's another essential element here.

38:54

Can we use this kind of

38:56

Arab role on a

38:59

transitional basis within Gaza, investment

39:02

in Gaza and in the West Bank, and

39:05

its relationship with the Israelis, can we use

39:07

the Arabs to help promote

39:10

a process? They've

39:12

never, I've been using the word unprecedented,

39:16

at least on three occasions so far. I'm going to

39:18

do the fourth one now. I

39:20

can tell you from having worked in

39:23

this issue and been the American negotiator

39:25

for multiple decades, we've

39:29

never had the Arab consumer

39:31

responsibility. Never. Partly

39:35

in the past it was, it would always say

39:37

it's up to the Palestinians, but

39:40

it was also a way never to be

39:42

responsible. I

39:44

think their role has to change now. Not that

39:46

they can make peace for the Palestinians, but they

39:49

can help create a process that

39:51

affects the Israelis and it also affects

39:53

the Palestinians. We have

39:55

to create some building blocks before we can

39:57

get to real peacemaking between Israelis and Palestinians.

40:01

We have to start with some

40:03

low-level forms of cooperation that are purely

40:05

functional. You know, look,

40:07

we know issues like health don't

40:10

respect borders. Environment don't

40:12

respect borders. You know,

40:15

there we need to start

40:17

focusing on restoring functional

40:20

forms of cooperation between Israelis

40:22

and Palestinians. Again, just to show

40:24

it can happen. There

40:26

already is a little bit of it even now, but

40:29

that has to be part of the building blocks. This

40:35

is an enormously difficult

40:38

process to put together. It's a little bit like

40:40

a Rubik's Cube, where all the

40:42

different pieces have to fit together, and being able

40:44

to orchestrate that is going to be

40:46

difficult. But we know what the alternative is. People

40:49

often ask me, you know, why

40:52

still make an effort on this?

40:54

And obviously, I'm still sort of active on the side. Why

40:56

still make an effort on this? And

40:58

for me, you know, a part of it is once

41:00

you get invested, it's hard to sort of

41:03

disinvest, even

41:05

emotionally. But second,

41:08

my answer always is, what's the alternative?

41:12

We've just seen – we've got a picture of

41:14

what the alternative looks like. And

41:16

for those who say, look, one state

41:18

outcome, one state solution – there

41:20

is no such thing as a one-state solution. There

41:23

are two national movements and two distinct

41:25

national identities. They're competing for the same

41:28

space. They will not coexist in

41:30

one state. If you

41:32

think Libya, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria,

41:35

even Iraq is

41:37

what makes sense, that's

41:39

what you want for the Israeli-Palestinian future. Basically,

41:42

you're saying one state means

41:44

a forever conflict. So

41:47

it's hard to put together two states.

41:49

It's even harder now. In

41:51

a lot of ways, we're back to 1948 in terms

41:54

of the next central nature of the conflict. But

41:58

there isn't an alternative. And

42:01

there may be, in my mind, new

42:04

elements here, especially with the Arabs,

42:07

that give you possibilities with both the

42:09

Israelis and the Palestinians. And

42:12

I don't think we have the luxury of not making

42:14

the effort. Well,

42:16

Dennis, just on behalf of our 100,000 MUNC

42:19

members, just to thank

42:22

you for your remarkable efforts

42:24

over a remarkable career of

42:26

diplomacy and dedicating

42:28

yourself to the cause of peace

42:30

and very difficult situations

42:33

like the one today. And your

42:35

continued commitment to this issue is

42:38

clearly heartfelt and greatly appreciated. So,

42:40

Dennis Ross, thank you so much

42:42

for coming on the MUNC dialogues

42:44

today. Really a pleasure. Thank

42:46

you. Well, that wraps up today's

42:48

dialogue. I want to thank our guests. Dennis

42:50

Ross has certainly given us a lot to

42:52

think about. If you have questions or feedback

42:54

on what you've just heard on this and

42:56

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