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Mike Pesca on How the Media Got Polarized

Mike Pesca on How the Media Got Polarized

Released Saturday, 27th April 2024
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Mike Pesca on How the Media Got Polarized

Mike Pesca on How the Media Got Polarized

Mike Pesca on How the Media Got Polarized

Mike Pesca on How the Media Got Polarized

Saturday, 27th April 2024
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0:01

The caricature of objectivity, I think, does

0:03

a lot of work in battling

0:05

and arguing against the benefits of

0:07

objectivity. The word objectivity is fraught.

0:09

Many listeners of this conversation will

0:11

say, come on, there is no

0:13

objectivity. So call it fairness, call

0:16

it non-predetermined conclusions, call it

0:18

many, there are many synonyms that

0:20

would convey the idea that the

0:22

journalist's job is not to have

0:25

one conclusion that they've decided beforehand

0:27

and that they can't get knocked

0:29

off their conclusion. You have to be

0:31

curious and be able to give up your

0:33

premises as you do your reporting. And now

0:36

the good fight with Yasha Monk. My

0:44

guest today is Mike Peska. Mike is

0:46

the host of the podcast The Jist,

0:48

which has a lovely spirit. He invites

0:50

people from all over the political spectrum

0:53

and pushes back on all of them

0:55

in a really thorough way. We talked

0:58

about the transformation of American

1:00

media in general and radio

1:02

in particular. Mike used to work a lot for

1:05

NPR. We were then

1:07

at Slate together for a little

1:09

while at the same time, but

1:11

he views very critically how those

1:13

media platforms have evolved. We also talked

1:15

about a host of other issues, including

1:17

touching on the upcoming US elections. And

1:20

Mike interrogating me a little bit about

1:22

how we should feel about the populist

1:25

threat to democracy about 10 years after

1:27

I first raised the alarm about it.

1:30

Mike Peska, welcome to the podcast. Oh, thanks for

1:32

having me. I've heard dozens of these. And to

1:34

be honest, it's sort of a dream come true,

1:36

like the time I was on Jeopardy. You

1:40

on Jeopardy? I came in third

1:42

place. I was leading going into Final Jeopardy.

1:44

And you know, it's a long story,

1:46

but I wound up crossing out the answer Barbara

1:48

Streisand. And at the last minute I realized it

1:50

was right, but I didn't have enough time to

1:52

write Streisand. That is

1:54

my own personal Streisand effect, losing Jeopardy.

2:00

I feel like I've always moved around too much to

2:02

do well on a question in any one country

2:04

because they're quite culturally specific. Perhaps at this point

2:06

I've been in the United States long enough that

2:08

I would stand a chance. If I went back

2:10

to Germany, for example, I would do quite badly

2:12

because any German pop culture reference over the last

2:14

20 years, I would just completely miss. There we

2:17

go. We've just figured out

2:19

a new game show. It's called The

2:21

Internationalists, and it's people who don't have

2:23

permanent citizenship anywhere. So you have

2:25

to know a little bit about the English Premier League

2:27

and a little bit about Bavarian hops, and then we're

2:29

good. I think if you're

2:31

looking for a way to get media more hated

2:33

than it already is, you've ducked men to find

2:35

it. No, but

2:37

then the guy who becomes the world

2:40

sweetheart is the cop, the bobby from

2:42

London, or

2:45

the Nigerian middle-class worker who just

2:47

happens to know all this stuff.

2:50

He shows this snooty, it's a whole slobs

2:52

versus snobs thing on an international scale. I

2:55

don't know if we've created a game show

2:57

or a sitcom. It would

2:59

be kind of amazing to have a show where you

3:01

get people from around the world discussing

3:04

issues that are going on. It would be

3:06

hard to find issues that are going to

3:08

be relevant to various audiences. And you find

3:10

really likable people of completely different perspectives, and

3:12

they're just like sitting around talking

3:14

about these things in a genuinely intercultural perspective, but not

3:16

in a kind of feel-good. I mean, it would have

3:19

to feel good in the sense that it would have

3:21

to be sort of smart, likable people, but not feel

3:23

good in a kind of like, they all agree and

3:25

hug it out, right? That they sort of go at

3:27

it, but in a way that's likable. That'd be kind

3:29

of fun. As you know, I started a podcast, I

3:31

have a podcast called The Jist, and it's been going

3:34

on for, I don't know, maybe by the time this

3:36

airs literally 10 years. I

3:38

started a podcast called Not Even Mad, and

3:40

it wasn't people from around the world. It

3:42

was just the classic idea of a lefty

3:45

person, a righty person. I was in the

3:47

center moderating, but also giving my ideas. And

3:49

it didn't work. And among the

3:51

reasons it didn't work, I do think the audience is

3:53

there, and there's just such a lack of that kind

3:55

of discussion. So the general

3:57

discussion podcast has three people agreeing.

4:00

But the one big reason is it didn't

4:02

work is you have to do it with

4:04

people who have been friends for like 10

4:06

years right where they're where the Disagreements of

4:08

the podcast and then what's interesting is the

4:11

groups that the three individuals or

4:13

four individuals associate with

4:16

the tribes don't pull

4:18

the Depth of

4:20

the friendship apart. That's the only

4:22

way that's the only glue to

4:24

survive the dynamic of the individual

4:26

tribes You know pulling the left

4:28

from the right until it becomes

4:30

acrimony That's interesting So

4:33

listen, we're sort of in the heart

4:35

of what I want to talk to

4:37

you about which is that you see anybody

4:39

who's been at NPR for a long

4:41

time NPR for Non-American listeners is the

4:43

abbreviation for National Public Radio and it's

4:45

really a very important institution In

4:47

the United States when you're publishing a book for

4:49

example getting on the right NPR Show is the

4:52

thing that your publicist will worry about probably the

4:54

most more than you know We all excerpt

4:56

in the New York Times and so on

4:58

so forth and then you've been running this

5:01

Debate podcast for 10 years first. It's late

5:03

where we were contemporaries for a little while and

5:06

then under your own eagles

5:08

How has this space changed

5:11

in the last 15 years? How is

5:13

the market journalism changed in the last

5:15

15 years and how is NPR specifically

5:17

changed? There was a much shared story

5:19

by Yuri Berliner in the free press

5:21

a little while ago You mentioned to

5:23

me that he was sometimes your editor

5:25

at NPR and she made the case

5:27

that NPR has really Gone from

5:29

a place that always had a kind of left lean like the

5:31

New York Times had a kind of left lean But

5:34

was listened even in the early 2010s Was

5:37

listened to by a very broad range of people

5:40

ideologically a lot of moderates a lot of conservatives

5:42

used to listen to NPR and

5:44

the station tried to Portray

5:47

the world in a kind of balanced

5:49

way and now the listenership to NPR

5:52

has not only reduced But

5:54

it has come to skew very very liberal and

5:56

in fact very very far left According

5:58

to surveys and you're very in assessor, this is

6:00

because NPR has kind of given up on some of

6:02

the commission of what public media used to

6:05

be. You know, as somebody who was at NPR for a

6:07

long time in a prominent position, what do you make of

6:09

that? I think there was

6:11

a conscious choice to change and then

6:13

just running along with

6:15

the river, the stream

6:18

of societal change, but not really recognizing

6:20

how much the waters had

6:22

increased their rapidity. So what I mean by

6:24

that is NPR, you're right, it was always

6:26

a liberal place, you know, liberal

6:29

in both the best sense, but also, you

6:31

know, that was its lean. I would seriously

6:33

doubt that if you surveyed the people who

6:35

worked at NPR and said, who'd you vote

6:37

for since the time of their founding, which

6:39

was during the Watergate trials to the time

6:42

I left, you'd get more than, you know,

6:44

any Republican presidential candidate getting maybe 10%, maybe

6:46

15% of the vote. But

6:49

that's not the end all be all of

6:52

the definition of journalism. And the best anecdote

6:54

I tell about this is my longtime colleague

6:56

and head of the New York bureau was

6:58

a woman named Margo Adler. And

7:00

Margo was, I don't know if they

7:02

have a real hierarchy of this, but

7:04

she was essentially the chief Wiccan goddess

7:07

of the United States. She was a

7:09

big Wiccan and not to stereotype. She

7:11

also had the politics of what you

7:13

expect a Wiccan would have. And she

7:15

was into protesting and she was into

7:17

activism and she found it all delightful.

7:20

But she reported, you would

7:22

listen to her reports and you wouldn't

7:24

be shocked to know that Margo had

7:26

been to many, many protest marches in

7:28

the sixties, but she played it straight in

7:31

her reports. Part of that was she had editors who,

7:33

if she would ever go over the line, would pull

7:35

her back. And part of that

7:37

was that she knew and whatever over the

7:39

line was, she knew and appreciated that she

7:41

was operating in this system. And I think

7:44

she also appreciated, she has since passed away,

7:46

the fact that the editors were there to

7:49

buttress her credibility. And she also was

7:51

a great storyteller and someone who was

7:53

really curious about all aspects of the

7:55

human condition. I don't know who the

7:57

equivalent or what the equivalent of Margo

7:59

Adams. would be today, but I do

8:01

think that she would be, or

8:04

that kind of person, would

8:06

not have the editorial oversight. And the

8:08

message wouldn't be that you have to

8:10

put on a radio broadcast that could

8:12

very much appeal to people who disagree

8:14

with you. That whole idea is

8:16

out. And part of that is the people when I

8:19

was there in 2007, 2012, people who disagreed with

8:25

you were, or who might be

8:27

listening to NPR were, something like

8:29

a Mitt Romney Republican, or

8:32

a professor at the university who

8:34

was a professor of business and

8:36

had Republican leanings but was a

8:38

smart, furious person. Now I think

8:40

the conception is, and it's changed

8:43

a bit, that the person who

8:45

disagrees with you if you are

8:47

presenting progressive coded content is

8:49

a crazy insurrectionist who owns a number

8:52

of assault rifles, and you don't care

8:54

at all about their opinion. And if that

8:56

is the person that you're quote unquote trying

8:59

to appeal to, I understand jettisoning the idea

9:01

or the ideal of, oh, let's say some

9:03

things that a conspiracy theorist would like. But

9:06

what I think is, and this is one of the

9:08

reasons why I say local news has been hurt so

9:10

much, and that the splintering of news and the siloing

9:12

of news and the ideological silos hurt us is, you

9:15

know, it used to be the case that if you

9:17

were the Sacramento Bee and you put out your paper,

9:19

it was going to be read by, even if you

9:21

had a mostly liberal editorial slander, it was going to

9:23

be read by everyone in the community. And

9:26

if you said crazy things that offended

9:28

the business owners, like if you had

9:30

many articles valorizing the idea of defunding

9:32

the police, you were going to upset

9:34

your very reasonable members of the community.

9:37

Now I think that members of the

9:39

community, the people who do the

9:41

radio and do media are mostly

9:43

younger. They've ingested ideas of activism

9:45

that I think go against traditional

9:47

media. And I know you've talked

9:50

about this, the older editors who

9:52

were raised in a system where

9:54

there was such an idea as if we don't call

9:56

it, we don't have to call it objectivity, but there

9:58

was a fairness and there was an ideal of

10:01

even the person who disagrees with you, were

10:03

they gonna recognize the truth in that? They've

10:05

been cowed. Part of this

10:07

was the tumult of Trump, a

10:09

greater accelerant was the 2020 George

10:11

Floyd protests, but it came to

10:14

a situation where NPR

10:16

really stopped caring about being believable

10:18

to anyone outside. And this is

10:20

not always true, but it is

10:23

true in many cases. They stopped

10:25

caring about being credible and believable

10:27

to people who weren't very much

10:29

ideologically captured by what we could

10:31

say as a progressive ideology. But

10:33

one more point, you can say

10:36

the Democratic Party, you know, there's

10:38

another thesis about this, and this

10:40

is probably true with Slate. I used to always

10:42

say, well, Slate was always somewhere where the Democratic

10:44

Party was, and as the Democratic Party got

10:46

more left, let's say Slate got more left.

10:49

The thing is, there are

10:51

ways, there are elections, and what

10:53

elections do is it actually in

10:55

some way inserts the truth about

10:57

where the public really is. So

10:59

in 2020, the theory of the Democratic

11:02

Party was everyone was positioning themselves to the left

11:04

of everyone else, and there was one guy who

11:06

didn't do it, it was Joe Biden, he got

11:08

the election. He got the nomination. My line about

11:10

Joe Biden for a long time has been that

11:13

he became the nominee of the Democratic Party and

11:15

then president because he was too old to get with

11:17

the program. Everybody else, like the

11:19

smart money the Democratic Party was, you

11:21

have to compete for votes on Twitter

11:23

and outbid all the other competitors of

11:25

how far left you are. And

11:28

Joe Biden just didn't get the memo and wasn't

11:30

able to do it. And so he was the

11:32

last man standing in the sort of moderate center-left

11:35

space, and boom, he became the nominee despite being

11:37

scoffed at by the establishment of

11:39

the party actually, and certainly the media

11:41

establishment. He didn't evolve, and I don't

11:43

know if this is true, but in

11:45

zoology, there's this idea of the Irish elk that

11:48

it evolved, its antlers grew so big

11:50

that it could no longer lift its

11:52

head and it died out. It's

11:55

probably a folk tale, but as an analogy,

11:58

Where sometimes you can evolve. Quote

12:00

Unquote so much that you right to

12:02

tell of your destruction. Season of analogy

12:05

Mo added as there's a kind of

12:07

slightly apocryphal story about the effect of

12:09

the Two thousand and Eight financial crisis

12:11

on various types of banks. and Buddha

12:14

speaking, the idea was know, fuel Goldman.

12:16

You really know what's going on and

12:18

you're plugged in enough and smart enough

12:20

to get rid of all of those

12:23

subprime mortgages. The for the music stops

12:25

so you get to the crisis. Sort

12:27

of. Okay, If. You are a German

12:29

bank is plugged into the international financial system

12:32

enough that you know you can like fly

12:34

over to New York and your colleagues from

12:36

Goldman. gonna give you a great time and

12:38

take out for a lovely dinner and possibly

12:40

to a strip club and then they'll save

12:42

you a bunch of goods that they say

12:45

amazing been included enough to realize that the

12:47

actually we not very good goods into some

12:49

of the thanks really ended up in trouble

12:51

because they got stuck holding the back and

12:53

of Italian banks those so out of the

12:55

loop they didn't even notice could go to

12:58

New York. And have of the time and

13:00

be sold the bad goods and so they actually

13:02

came out ahead in some ways and path to

13:04

biden a segment hallion but. That's. A

13:06

good analogy, but unfortunately both of

13:08

analogies zoological and monetary are perhaps a

13:10

little apocryphal, but they do right underline

13:13

the point. That and this is what

13:15

happened with Npr Npr last thirty percent

13:17

of it's listenership. All media has suffered

13:20

to some extent, But if you

13:22

look at compare radio to Radio, the

13:24

radio listenership of say, Sean Hannity of

13:26

Add the most popular radio show before

13:29

Twenty Nineteen Stores most popular radio

13:31

show when it's still around sixty million

13:33

listeners, right? Others have fallen off Dave

13:36

Ramsey. has done a little bit better

13:38

my point is dr time radio listenership

13:40

overall has fallen but it hasn't fallen

13:42

by twenty percent and it's npr wanted

13:44

to replace stairs of logic this is

13:46

not the logic of politics or of

13:48

most media were younger is better in

13:50

terms of advertising but in terms of

13:52

what npr is doing and just in

13:54

terms of audience if you want to

13:56

replace every sixty year old with a

13:58

thirty year old that me good business

14:00

sense. Even if you want to replace every 60-year-old

14:02

with .8 30-year-olds, you're doing

14:06

yourself a favor. But they didn't do

14:08

that. There's no evidence that they're getting

14:10

younger was anything other than jettisoning, lopping

14:12

off like cream from the top. The

14:15

older listeners or the listeners have

14:17

been with it a long time. And

14:19

one of the striking things, which of course

14:21

goes to the popular misconception about what I

14:25

call the identity trap or the identity synthesis, the

14:27

ideology that has led us into this trap, is

14:30

that NPR wanted to diversify its audience and

14:32

its listenership. And that makes sense given the

14:34

change in demographics of the United States. But

14:36

they haven't actually succeeded in doing so. So

14:38

they managed to attract an audience

14:40

that is much more ideological. So

14:43

it's less diverse than ideological terms because it

14:45

skews much more towards the left and the

14:47

far left. But they haven't meaningfully managed to

14:49

diversify the audience in ethnic terms.

14:52

It's still overwhelmingly white. That's true.

14:54

But this is the interesting thing.

14:56

Some of their press materials, and

14:58

I've actually seen this at the

15:00

member station, so NPR is a

15:02

complicated structure. But they do brag

15:04

that our audience has gotten more

15:06

diverse. But that is, I see

15:08

no evidence contradicting the analysis that

15:10

that is entirely a function of

15:12

the older and whiter audience just

15:14

leaving. So congratulations, your audience got

15:16

more diverse. But you didn't add

15:18

a discernible number. You certainly didn't replace

15:21

the old audience as the aggregate numbers

15:23

show. But you also didn't really diversify

15:25

in the best sense of the term.

15:27

Diversification isn't just throwing away a bunch

15:29

of older white people who used to

15:31

like you and now don't. So

15:35

here's one thing I was pausing about. If you're

15:37

looking at different media

15:39

outlets that go in a much more

15:42

progressive direction, there's a normative point of

15:44

view and a business point of view.

15:46

From a normative point of view, I

15:48

worry about the New York Times basically

15:50

becoming the mouthpiece of the five million

15:52

subscribers to the New York Times who

15:54

are among the more progressive people

15:56

in the country. Even if you look at readers'

15:58

comments, comments on

16:00

various Quincote, New York Times articles are well to

16:02

the center or well to the right if you

16:04

want on the average New York Times writer, which

16:06

is interesting in itself. So I worry about the

16:08

way in which the New York Times ceases to

16:11

be a newspaper of record and

16:13

becomes more like a more successful version

16:15

of The Guardian, like a full-time voice

16:17

of the American left, just because I

16:19

think that we need some newspaper of

16:21

record, some outlet that actually is able

16:23

to be a fair

16:25

arbiter and that has some amount

16:27

of respect in different realms

16:30

of the United States, including among what written including

16:32

along the center right. And so I worry that

16:34

the New York Times is giving up on that

16:36

very important historical role. But in

16:39

a purely business sense, what the New York Times has

16:41

done seems to be working very well. They

16:43

have a lot of subscribers, a lot of them

16:45

have come from other daily newspapers that are declining

16:48

as a result, that it has managed to build

16:50

a bigger newsroom, cover more things in many ways,

16:52

add cooking and games and other kinds of things,

16:54

which is part of its appeal. But

16:56

it's thriving as a business. So you've got to give it

16:58

to them in that sense. The MPI is not

17:00

thriving. It is losing audience. Why

17:03

is that? Now, one difference is that the New York

17:05

Times now has to compete with Substack, but

17:07

perhaps it's not the same kind of competition. And

17:10

piano has to compete with podcasts, like this podcast

17:12

and your podcast. I think a lot of high-information

17:14

people don't want to switch on the radio and

17:16

listen to whatever is being told to them. They

17:19

say, hey, I know exactly what kind of show

17:21

I want and when I want to listen to

17:23

it. And I want to be able to press

17:25

pause and resume it. And the easiest way

17:28

to do that is to go to podcasts, which I

17:30

didn't manage to corner. I think there's a second

17:32

reason as well, which is that I am annoyed

17:35

by the New York Times, a good part

17:37

of it home. But I subscribe to the

17:39

New York Times. I'm a subscriber and I read the

17:41

New York Times. And when I want to know what's

17:44

going on in the world, I still go to nytimes.com

17:46

or to the app. So

17:48

even though there are things about it

17:51

that I find to be

17:53

irksome, it creates

17:55

a product that I can actually still be on

17:58

board with. I

18:00

pay them my money and I pay them my money for a reason.

18:02

But NPR somehow,

18:04

I find harder to

18:06

listen to. And I found a

18:08

few friends have said the same thing. There's

18:10

something about the moralizing, lecturing tone of NPR

18:13

that's somehow worse than the New York Times.

18:15

And I'm having trouble putting

18:17

my finger on where exactly

18:19

the difference lies. Is it just having somebody

18:21

in your ear saying stuff that you find

18:23

ideologically annoying? Is that somehow worse than seeing

18:26

somebody on the page? Or is it that

18:28

there's sort of two different gradations

18:30

here where the New York Times has sort

18:32

of veered from the historical role it's played,

18:34

but it still is living up to some

18:37

kind of standards and the opinion

18:39

pages run some stuff that I think is

18:41

silly, but also some stuff that I think

18:43

is very good. NPR has more OneNote, it

18:45

has more monochrome, it has more extreme in

18:47

how it perceives the world through an ideological

18:49

lens. Help me puzzle through the

18:51

difference that righty or wrongy I perceive between

18:53

something like the New York Times and NPR.

18:56

First of all, on the monetary front or

18:58

on the success, on the question of why

19:00

as the New York Times, perhaps

19:02

alone Wall Street Journal also been a

19:04

successful news organizations, there's the idea of

19:06

network effects and as other news organizations

19:08

fail, one will rise and they're able

19:11

to hire all the best people from

19:13

the other news organizations who are out

19:15

there because they're done. We also can't

19:17

overlook the fact that everything we're talking

19:19

about, maybe we're gonna talk about journalism,

19:21

we're gonna talk about audience capture, we're

19:23

gonna talk about all these concepts. It

19:26

might redound to just Wordle and some cooking

19:28

apps. Those have been extremely successful

19:30

for the New York Times and the subscription

19:32

model has supplanted the advertising model.

19:34

So but for Wordle, it is

19:36

possible that none of the stuff,

19:39

the praise I'm about to give to the New

19:41

York Times will be true as this successful business

19:43

model. But the big reason, I

19:45

think there is something about the amount of

19:48

breath that a huge newspaper and the amount

19:50

of articles that the Sunday New York Times

19:52

can do, the length

19:54

of the articles, a radio piece. I have

19:57

friends who are a married couple and one

19:59

was a... radio reporter and one was

20:01

a print reporter and they would both

20:03

cover the same thing. The print reporter

20:05

would file a 2,000 word piece and

20:07

be or maybe a 1,500 word piece and

20:09

be in bed by midnight. The radio

20:11

reporter would work for two days on that

20:14

and it would come out to the

20:16

equivalent of 500 words. They're just less information

20:18

although the texture and maybe the human

20:20

feel is different from a radio piece.

20:22

But I think the biggest thing is that

20:25

the New York Times specifically after

20:27

going through a lot of tumult

20:30

at the same time that NPR and

20:33

other news organizations did, the New York

20:35

Times made a lot of mistakes

20:37

and they fired James Bennett but then they pulled

20:39

back. And I think it was a monetary

20:42

consideration, I think it was a

20:44

business consideration, but you know A.G.

20:46

Salsberger, the publisher, last year about

20:48

a year ago today wrote in

20:50

the Columbia Journalism Review an article

20:52

called Journalism's Essential Value and he

20:55

essentially embraced objectivity. There was a

20:57

lot of time being spent about

21:00

how the problems without objectivity, the

21:02

history of objectivity, the word objectivity,

21:04

he rebranded it as some

21:07

multi-hyphenate, multi-syllabic phrase. But

21:10

they've essentially said in order to work

21:12

with the trust of the audience that

21:14

we've always had, we have to get

21:16

back to an idea very close to,

21:19

perhaps in different clothing, but very close

21:21

to objectivity. We have to do this

21:23

for our audience, we have to do

21:26

this for believability. They've changed the comportment

21:28

and composure of the op-ed page to

21:30

reflect that. So there was a reckoning

21:32

or you'd call it a counter reckoning

21:35

within the New York Times. The opposite,

21:37

I think, has taken place at NPR.

21:39

I don't have extreme visibility. But all

21:42

they seem to do publicly and they

21:44

don't have a family owner, they don't

21:46

have one CEO, they cycle through CEOs

21:49

and even leaders of the newsroom. But

21:51

they have mostly talked

21:53

about diversity being their North Star. If you

21:55

said the word or phrase North Star and

21:58

NPR, everyone know, ah, that's our diversity. Initiative,

22:00

and they've been successful at that. Good,

22:02

I say. As far as

22:04

objectivity, they just reject the premise from

22:06

what I could tell. They have done—I'm

22:09

going to do a piece on the gist

22:11

about this—they've done many, many segments over the

22:14

years questioning the idea of objectivity. It's kind

22:16

of a straw man at its worst form

22:18

to say, well, no human being can be

22:20

objective, therefore we have to get rid of

22:22

the idea that we're going to do

22:26

our journalism with the idea of

22:29

impartiality or fairness or all these

22:31

other fought over phrases in mind. But they

22:33

really say, it seems to me, that the

22:35

people who make the editorial decisions really

22:38

think that there is an inherent

22:40

problem with the old ideas of

22:42

objectivity, whereas the New York Times

22:44

knows that the word objectivity will

22:46

get attacked. In journalism schools, it

22:48

doesn't matter what you call it,

22:51

that whole idea of objectivity will

22:53

get attacked, but they've gotten down

22:55

to—they've returned to their roots, and

22:57

their editor has embraced that. For

23:00

people who are less in the weeds about this debate, let's

23:02

delve into it a little bit and give a little bit

23:04

of context. Obviously,

23:07

there was always

23:09

an idea of trying to describe the

23:11

world in academia and journalism as it

23:13

is. There's an old concept in a

23:15

certain kind of geographical school of how

23:18

historians have comport themselves, which is to

23:20

write history, wie es eigenlichte wiesner, as

23:22

it really was. The old slogan of

23:24

the New York Times, all the news

23:27

that's fit to print, has a kind

23:29

of whiff of that, I

23:31

think. Now, this standard of objectivity

23:34

was held very high in American newsrooms

23:36

in particular. I think English newspapers always

23:38

had a slightly more partisan tradition and

23:41

lean. It's always been a slightly different

23:43

approach. With the important exception of the

23:45

BBC, that had a legal mandate on

23:47

neutrality. But it came under attack

23:50

in two kinds of ways, I think. The first

23:52

is that the palliative

23:54

to objectivity could lead to

23:57

a slightly silly kind

23:59

of— of two sides

24:01

reporting that didn't really

24:04

help the reader understand debates, right?

24:06

So if you had a conversation

24:08

about climate change, you would just

24:10

always find people in two sides of the issue, right?

24:12

So you write a story about climate change, you have

24:14

to find this is the calculator, at least somebody who

24:16

says climate change is real and somebody who says climate

24:18

change is not real. It doesn't matter whether

24:20

the position that says climate change is not real or

24:22

scientifically serious or not. The way you

24:25

approach it is simply to have one voice in

24:27

one direction, one voice in the other direction. There

24:29

is obviously something formulaic about this. It often

24:31

I think makes for not very good

24:33

journalism. It makes for difficulty

24:35

of readers actually understanding the situation. So

24:37

that was one line of attack. And

24:40

then the second line of attack came

24:42

particularly after the election of Donald

24:44

Trump where objectivity was contrasted with

24:47

a call for moral clarity. And

24:50

the idea here was that journalists should

24:53

fight for the right

24:55

moral causes and let

24:57

that moral clarity inflect

24:59

everything they're doing. Now of

25:01

course the concern with that

25:03

is two things. First, what does moral

25:05

clarity actually mean? Right? That

25:07

goes beyond we want to be factual

25:10

and being factual doesn't always mean having

25:12

equal opinion quotes from two sides. It

25:14

means actually helping readers understand the lay

25:17

of the land, right? Moral

25:19

clarity means I have my values and I'm going to impose

25:21

you impose them on the reader. And

25:24

a lot of the time the reader's values will be different from

25:26

that of the journalist. And so that starts to feel very lecturing

25:28

and clawing. The second problem is that

25:31

I think it often makes

25:34

people mistrust what

25:36

journalists do. I think

25:38

a lot of journalists have gotten into the habit of

25:43

framing every piece about Donald Trump

25:45

for example or about an upcoming

25:47

election or about some other issue

25:49

of genuine political concern with

25:51

the thought of how do I get

25:53

the reader to take the right conclusion

25:56

from that. And I think that's

25:58

often self-undermining. 2016-2017

26:01

was very worried about the rise of populism

26:03

and the election of Donald Trump, and I

26:06

continued to be very worried about those things.

26:08

And I certainly wanted newspapers to pay attention

26:11

to that topic, to take serious leaveaways in

26:13

which democracy might be undermined by these kind

26:15

of political movements. I didn't

26:17

think then, I certainly don't think now, that

26:20

news reporters thinking

26:23

to themselves every time they cover a Trump

26:25

press conference, how can I make sure that

26:27

the way I cover this event is going

26:29

to make people not vote for Donald Trump, so

26:31

we save our democracy, is in

26:33

purely instrumental terms, leave alone the normative element

26:35

of it for a moment, a good way

26:37

of ensuring that people don't vote for Donald

26:40

Trump. Because what people actually do

26:42

is to recognize, hey, you're not talking about certain

26:44

things because you worry it's going to lead me

26:46

to the wrong conclusion. You're framing

26:48

things in a very heavy-handed way in such a

26:51

way that I come to the right conclusion. But

26:54

actually all that leads up

26:56

to is to me mistrusting the way you're

26:58

trying to manipulate me. And

27:00

so I worry that many journalists, most famously

27:02

in the case of The Washington Post, adopting

27:05

the slogan, democracy dies in darkness, coming

27:07

to think of their own goal

27:10

as saving democracy has

27:12

actually undermined the cause for

27:14

democracy. And it's not because I disagree with

27:16

them about the urgency of protecting democracy or

27:18

the nobility of trying to do something

27:20

to save democracy. I just think that we

27:22

have a division of labor in society, and the

27:24

job of reporters, the best way they can serve

27:26

democracy is to tell it straight, is

27:29

to actually analyze what's going on, is

27:31

to actually allow readers to help understand

27:33

what's going on, not to frame exactly

27:35

how they should perceive things. How do

27:37

you think we should approach objectivity?

27:40

How can we have a standard

27:43

in journalism that

27:45

takes our, especially in

27:47

the reporting business, not in the opinion

27:49

business, but takes our duty to the

27:52

reader seriously without falling

27:54

in some of the genuine traps that

27:56

I think an older style of journalism

27:58

sometimes had, like the... And that's

28:00

just fine bludges on each side, not really analyze it

28:02

too carefully. Right. The caricature

28:04

of objectivity, I think, does a lot of work

28:06

in battling and arguing

28:08

against the benefits of objectivity. Word

28:11

objectivity is fraught. Many listeners of

28:13

this conversation will say, come on,

28:15

there is no objectivity. So call

28:17

it fairness, call it non-predetermined conclusions,

28:20

call it many, there are many

28:22

synonyms that would convey the idea

28:24

that the journalist's job is not

28:26

to have one conclusion

28:28

that they've decided beforehand and that

28:31

they can't get knocked off their

28:33

conclusion. You have to be curious and be

28:35

able to give up your premises as you do

28:37

your reporting. There is

28:39

a problem, I think, in that there is a disconnect

28:42

between the public and the press. And

28:44

I don't think the public is totally right

28:46

on this. When Pew asked people, journalists should

28:49

always strive to give every side equal coverage

28:51

versus every side does not always

28:53

deserve equal coverage. That's

28:56

55% to 44% said every side

28:58

does not always deserve equal coverage. I

29:00

would answer that. That would be my

29:02

answer because I would think of exactly

29:05

the climate change example that you're talking

29:07

about. US adults say, 76% say journalists

29:09

should always strive to give every side

29:11

equal coverage. Because I think people who

29:14

just looked at journalists as, oh, please

29:16

tell me what is true, please tell

29:18

me the news, they're not

29:20

thinking of every exception to

29:23

the rule of equal coverage.

29:25

They're thinking, in general, do

29:27

I want to know why

29:29

Joe Biden or if Joe

29:31

Biden constitutionally, unconstitutionally, legally, correctly

29:34

reduced student loan debt? And

29:36

so they want a story that says, hey, Joe

29:38

Biden did this, here are the political reasons, here

29:41

are the beneficiaries, but also here's the

29:43

argument that it might not pass muster.

29:45

That's the kind of article they want.

29:48

There are thousands of articles

29:51

and topics where the ideal

29:53

news consumer, who I think is still out there, but

29:55

is a little turned off by how news is turned

29:58

out, want that kind of coverage. Even

30:00

if the war, many partisans

30:02

will want to know why the aid

30:05

convoy was hit in Israel, what

30:08

mistakes Israel made, maybe they'd want

30:10

reporting to say that these mistakes

30:12

were guaranteed to happen by

30:15

the flaws of the Israeli system. Some

30:17

news readers will say, or some news

30:19

readers will not want both sides of

30:21

that. They will not either want to

30:23

hear that Israel made a mistake or

30:25

they will not want to hear that

30:27

Israel was acting legitimately at all. I

30:30

think it's the duty of the

30:32

real news reporter to do in that

30:34

side both sides or all sides. And

30:36

it's not both sides-ism. Both

30:38

sides-ism has been, I think, politically

30:40

anatomized and weaponized to make it

30:42

seem like if you articulate a

30:44

view of someone who, I don't

30:46

know, for instance, thinks that there

30:49

really was no great evidence that

30:51

Donald Trump was marching to the

30:53

Kremlin's orders when it comes to

30:55

election interference, put that case on.

30:57

With that person airing, it's not

30:59

as if there's absolutely nothing to

31:02

that point of view. I think especially

31:04

in that case, a little bit with

31:06

the Wuhan virus, there have been a

31:08

lot of high-profile stories where the idea

31:10

of, well, we don't have to engage

31:12

in both sides-ism because we know the

31:14

truth. And then you're exposed as, oh,

31:16

we got the truth, quote unquote, a

31:18

little wrong. It seems like

31:20

the public is more correct than

31:22

journalists when they want more both

31:24

sides or all sides or a

31:26

better rounded-out story. I mean, even

31:28

though, like I said, I would

31:30

side with the majority of U.S.

31:32

journalists and say every side doesn't

31:34

always deserve equal coverage. That's true.

31:36

But in general, your default setting

31:38

as a journalist should be humble

31:41

to know that the narrative or

31:43

the agreed-upon frame isn't necessarily correct.

31:45

You also have to do a

31:47

lot of work to, you know,

31:49

not air things that seem to

31:51

have absolutely no basis to them.

31:53

I think that the idea of objectivity

31:55

is sort of like the

31:58

idea of kindness, right? You could always say. there's

32:00

no agreed upon definition. And what a

32:02

lot of journalists have done is sort

32:04

of, I think, like a

32:06

radical reconsideration of some basic ideals

32:08

that it definitely hurt journalism. Yeah,

32:11

I mean, a few points here, right?

32:13

One is just, it's a very, very

32:15

weird confusion in the

32:17

debate where the impossibility of fully

32:20

reaching a certain kind of normative

32:22

standard is a reason

32:24

not to aspire to that

32:26

standard at all. I try to be kind

32:29

in my personal interactions. I don't always succeed

32:31

in being kind in my personal actions. That's

32:33

not a reason to say kindness is a

32:35

bad standard to try and hold yourself to.

32:37

And this is true of every societal endeavor,

32:40

right? Justice, fairness.

32:42

These are all baked into what we do as

32:44

societies. And you're right, there's no agreed upon definition.

32:46

It doesn't mean that we should,

32:48

you know, decarcerate or have no concept

32:50

of justice. I'll give you an example

32:53

of, I've been doing some research and

32:55

I'm trying to remember some of

32:57

the more egregious examples in media where I

32:59

think they went off the rails. So there

33:01

was a producer for an NPR show called

33:04

1A and he, as a producer, without

33:07

permission, started tweeting, Donald Trump is a fascist.

33:09

And it caused a little bit of kerfuffle,

33:11

should a producer say this. So

33:14

the program 1A did a whole show where

33:16

they had the PBS on

33:18

Budsman, and they had Nicole

33:20

Hannah Jones, and they had this producer

33:22

essentially all agreeing with each other and

33:25

the host did, that there is no

33:27

objectivity. There is no such, or the

33:29

objectivity that we once decided on was

33:31

like a white person's objectivity. And it

33:33

didn't take into account the perspectives of

33:35

the marginalized. I think everyone in the

33:37

conversation, I think the PBS on Budsman's

33:39

Latino and everyone else was black. So

33:42

what the journalist said or what the

33:44

producer said was, the reason I said

33:47

Donald Trump is a fascist is because

33:49

it is the truth that Donald Trump is

33:51

a fascist. Because I have done the reading

33:53

and I have learned that what fascism means,

33:55

and that's why we say it as journalists.

33:58

We have to say the truth. I

34:00

have unlearned, since he used the word

34:02

unlearned a couple times, I have unlearned

34:05

the thinking that would lead me to a

34:07

different conclusion, and this is why we must

34:09

say it. No one on the show disagreed

34:11

with him. And that, I think, is exactly

34:14

the problem, that if we embolden that

34:16

kind of thinking, which is not if

34:18

Trump was or wasn't a fascist, but

34:21

the thinking that what journalists should be

34:23

doing is coming out and saying, the

34:25

fascist president, Donald Trump, et cetera,

34:27

et cetera, because they've learned it

34:29

and because it's the truth, it is

34:31

going to do nothing but degrade and

34:33

destroy the credibility of news organizations. And

34:36

they haven't done that. You

34:38

can mention Donald Trump without saying the fascist

34:40

Donald Trump, but they've gone 80-something percent of

34:42

the way there. And I think that that

34:44

does degrade trust, and not just with

34:46

Trump, with many, many issues. Yeah, and

34:48

part of this is a kind of illusion

34:50

of omnipotence among journalists. So one concern I

34:52

have is that there's many, many, many things

34:54

for which there was good reason to criticize

34:56

Donald Trump. There's many, many reasons to worry about

34:58

what will happen if Donald Trump becomes president again in

35:00

2024. The fact

35:03

that media outlets can't

35:05

restrain themselves from also criticizing

35:07

him in ways that are very dubious,

35:10

from also pretending that

35:12

he said things that he didn't really

35:15

say, makes people not listen

35:17

to the real criticisms of it. So

35:19

one recent example was when

35:21

Donald Trump was talking

35:24

about the competition economically

35:26

for Mexico, and the

35:28

fact that there's many cars now produced in

35:30

Mexico, rather than the United States, and then

35:32

being sent across the border. And he said,

35:34

in that context, if Biden gets elected, there's

35:37

going to be a bloodbath. And clearly what

35:39

he meant was a lot of

35:41

American autoworkers would lose their jobs, which is, by

35:43

the way, itself, a very, very dubious claim. I

35:46

don't buy what he was saying. Media outlets would

35:48

have been perfectly justified in saying it's ridiculous to

35:51

think that the American economy

35:53

is going to be decimated if Biden gets

35:55

reelected, and somehow if Trump gets elected miraculously,

35:57

everybody is going to want an auto manufacturing.

36:00

decent ways to criticize it in a

36:02

factual way, but instead a lot of

36:04

mainstream outlets, and I believe both NPR

36:06

and the New York Times quoted

36:08

this in headlines in ways that

36:10

strongly implied Trump was saying, if

36:13

I don't get elected, my followers are going

36:15

to ensure that there's a bloodbath in the

36:17

streets of the United States, a kind

36:19

of veiled threat as to what would happen to the

36:22

country if he wasn't elected. Now,

36:24

some of these reports in the 10th

36:26

or 15th paragraph provided a little bit

36:28

of a context, so for the small

36:30

percentage of people who clicked

36:32

on the headline and got down to

36:35

the second half of the article, they

36:37

might to some extent have been rectified

36:39

in their initial impression. But that, I

36:42

think, is deeply irresponsible, in part

36:44

because it makes questions of Trump less

36:46

effective. But the second point here is

36:49

that journalists, I think, generally have this

36:51

idea that if we

36:53

don't talk about uncomfortable topics, if

36:55

we don't talk about ways in

36:57

which perhaps some of the aspects

37:00

of a trans debate are more complicated than

37:02

meets the eye, the way in which perhaps

37:04

Democrats have made some genuine mistakes when it

37:06

comes to inflating other topics. If we don't

37:08

talk about this stuff, we take that off

37:10

the table, then nobody's going to know. And

37:13

if we frame things in the right way for

37:15

our readers, if we say, the fascist Donald Trump,

37:17

then people will understand he's a fascist and nobody's

37:19

going to vote for him anymore, right? And

37:21

that's just hugely overestimating

37:26

the power of journalists and the stupidity

37:28

of the audience, because the audience realizes

37:30

when somebody is hiding the ball. The

37:33

audience realizes when they're being manipulated.

37:36

And their response tends to be either to

37:38

just switch off the medium, go

37:40

to a different medium, which is often worse,

37:42

which is often the less mainstream medium that

37:44

actually has stronger biases in

37:46

its own right. But a lot of the time,

37:49

I'll actually go to things that are much less

37:51

intellectually serious and rigorous and honest

37:53

as a result. Always simply conclude the opposite.

37:55

They say, well, look, if you're trying to

37:57

manipulate me like that, perhaps actually the opposite

37:59

is true. Right. And

38:01

the audience that's left in the case

38:03

of all of our fractured table audiences

38:05

are the audiences that buy into it

38:07

and then you just serve them and

38:09

you get captured by the audience that's

38:12

using your service, not so much to

38:14

hear about the news, but to assuage

38:16

their anxiety about where they put their

38:19

finger on as the state of the

38:21

world. Right. Fox News exists to assuage

38:23

the anxiety of Republicans about immigration and

38:26

MSNBC exists to assuage the

38:29

anxiety of liberals about

38:31

the racism of Republicans, among

38:33

other things. The bloodbath

38:36

issue is really interesting because at that same

38:39

speech that he said bloodbath and it was

38:41

taken out of context. He also led that

38:43

speech with his hand over the heart playing

38:45

of the national anthem as sung by January

38:48

6th insurrectionists from prison who he called hostages.

38:50

The thing is that has been reported before.

38:52

So you can't say, or you can, but

38:54

it wouldn't be a good news story for

38:57

the eighth day in a row or for

38:59

the 12th rally in a row, Donald

39:01

Trump played people who he called

39:03

hostages who had been adjudicated as

39:05

insurrectionists and held

39:07

his hand over his heart as

39:10

they played the national anthem. Right.

39:12

It's a conundrum and Donald Trump

39:14

knows about this conundrum and he

39:16

knows how to take offense at

39:18

any misstatement or mischaracterization of anything

39:21

he said. So you can't say

39:23

that Donald Trump told the proud

39:25

boys to storm the Capitol, but

39:27

you can say by his ambiguity,

39:29

either strategic or just like the

39:32

lucky guy he is always

39:34

falling into shit and finding

39:36

gold by saying, stand down

39:38

and stand by. He communicated

39:41

to each audience something ambiguous

39:43

that wound up being dangerous.

39:45

Bloodbath also specifically, it

39:47

wasn't just a mischaracterization and sometimes Trump

39:49

is mischaracterized. Is he mischaracterized more than

39:51

other politicians? I don't know. I bet

39:54

you've, if you asked Obama, who

39:56

probably, I would say got the best news

39:58

coverage of any politician, major. politician in my

40:00

lifetime, he would say, oh my god, the

40:02

media mischaracterized me so often. But the very

40:05

point of bloodbath and insurrection

40:07

goes exactly to this tension that I

40:09

did want to ask you about, which

40:11

is two books ago, you raised

40:14

the point of our democracy being imperiled. But

40:16

then one book, which is true, and I

40:18

agree to it to some extent, one

40:21

book ago, it was about the

40:23

mindset that has overtaken much of

40:25

academia, but also much of the

40:27

media. And I would say the

40:29

consequence of is polarization. MSNBC, which

40:31

I watch and monitor, is

40:34

both a major source of

40:36

raising the salience question of

40:39

our democracy being imperiled. It's

40:41

not untrue that a Trump

40:43

election will be bad for democracy. I

40:45

don't know the death knell, but bad.

40:48

So MSNBC is very good,

40:50

I guess, or consistent on that front.

40:52

But on the other hand, I think

40:54

they're a deeply polarizing force,

40:56

not that Fox isn't okay, but

40:58

they're a deeply polarizing force. Because

41:01

if there ever is any right

41:03

winger with a gun who either

41:05

shoots at an FBI headquarters through

41:07

thick glass that doesn't hurt anyone

41:10

then gets killed, it's, I'm

41:13

not gonna say wall to wall covered,

41:15

but covered extensively on MSNBC about look

41:17

at these right wingers and periling democracy.

41:19

And I think the idea of right

41:21

wingers with guns in periling democracy who

41:24

want to kill you who want to

41:26

kill your family is so

41:28

prevalent there, it leads to

41:30

polarization. And I think that

41:32

they've done a disservice when it comes to

41:34

that. And you could say they haven't done

41:37

as much of a disservice as Fox has,

41:39

I'll concede the point. But I think they've

41:41

done a disservice. And their ratings are twice

41:43

as big as CNN's. And I think that's

41:46

a big problem with our country.

41:48

And with the mindset of a

41:50

lot of people who

41:52

identify as fair minded, liberal,

41:55

not necessarily entirely progressive Democrats,

41:57

but they really, really do say

42:00

that we're on the verge of a

42:02

civil war. So you could worry about

42:04

democracy, but also think these claims about

42:06

a civil war are totally overblown and

42:09

really destructive to the project

42:11

of depolarization. Yes, I agree

42:13

with all of that. I can see how there's

42:15

a superficial tension between my third

42:17

book, The People versus Democracy, and my

42:20

latest, my fifth book, The Identity Trap.

42:22

I think there is a tension between

42:24

those two, but I don't think they're

42:26

contradictory in any way, right? It's

42:29

both true that there are dangerous

42:31

authoritarian populists around the world, some of whom

42:33

are on the left, but many of whom,

42:35

and most of whom are on the right.

42:38

And that a lot of this political

42:40

moment requires us to beat

42:42

those political forces in order to defend

42:45

democratic institutions. And Donald Trump

42:47

is a, perhaps, the

42:49

prime example of that kind

42:51

of right-wing populist. And I do

42:53

worry about the way in which he attacked

42:55

independent political institutions in his post-German office,

42:57

and I worry very much that he's

43:00

going to do that with

43:02

more effectiveness and more vindictiveness

43:05

in his potential second-term office if he

43:07

gets reelected in November 2024. At

43:10

the same time, I worry that in

43:13

part because of the shock of his

43:15

victory, an ideology has come to

43:17

be so influential in big parts of the

43:19

mainstream, that it's actually harder to beat him.

43:22

I think a lot of the reason, even in

43:24

2016, I think a little bit of the reason

43:26

why he won was that some of these ideas

43:29

were starting to spread. I've taught many times the

43:31

essay by Michael Anton called the Flight 93 election,

43:33

which was a key document

43:36

in moving conservatives, movement

43:38

conservatives, more traditional conservatives, towards Donald Trump

43:40

in the fall of 2016. And

43:43

what struck me about that text when I was

43:45

first teaching it, because I think it's actually an

43:48

interesting exhibit of how Trump was able to broaden

43:50

and rally support, was his

43:52

lines about immigration. So the line which has

43:55

not the ceaseless, quote unquote, the ceaseless importation

43:57

of third world foreigners is going to make

43:59

a difference. America less small-out Republican and less

44:01

capital-out Republican over time. So this is an

44:03

existential threat to our Republican system of government,

44:06

and that's why even though we don't know

44:08

whether or not Donald Trump can fly the

44:10

plane, we should put him in the cockpit

44:12

and see what happens the way that the

44:15

passengers of flight 93 on 9-11 stormed the

44:19

cockpit. That's been quite, of course, wonderful.

44:22

Re-reading the essay recently when I was teaching it again,

44:24

I was struck that even

44:26

at the time, some of

44:28

the concerns were actually about cultural overreach on

44:30

the left. So I think it played some role in 2016.

44:33

I think it plays a much bigger role today. One

44:36

of the reasons why Republicans are

44:39

making huge inroads, especially among

44:41

non-white voters, is that so

44:43

many of them are deeply put off by

44:45

the quote-unquote wokeness

44:48

in NPR and many of the times that

44:50

we're talking about and in parts of the

44:52

Democratic Party. And so I think if we

44:55

actually want to beat populists like that, we

44:57

have to make sure that our mainstream institutions

44:59

and make sure that non-popular political parties don't

45:01

get taken over by this ideology. That's a

45:03

broader point. The more narrow point relates

45:06

to what I was saying earlier

45:08

about journalists not

45:10

taking on the role of democracy defenders,

45:13

right? I think it's fine to have

45:15

a broader conception of one

45:17

of the things I want to do in life and

45:19

as a citizen is to defend democracy. I certainly think

45:21

of myself in both parts. It's even

45:23

fine to say we have a division of

45:25

labor and society and one of the key

45:27

ways in which we'd affect the democracy is

45:30

to have good journalists who do good jobs

45:32

as a journalist and therefore I take

45:34

some professional pride in what I do because I think it's

45:36

part of the maintenance of democratic norms. That's

45:39

also fine. When you're sitting

45:41

down and saying, how do

45:43

I frame the story about Hunter Biden's laptop

45:45

or how do I frame the story about

45:48

the origin of a coronavirus in such a

45:50

way that I'm defending democracy, then

45:52

I think you are actually coming to be actively

45:54

harmful to that asset. I would go one step

45:56

further, which is that I think a lot of

45:59

journalists are going to I think some

46:02

political scientists have too. I was very

46:04

saddened when many of my genuine

46:07

friends and colleagues, some people who deeply respect

46:09

and admire, signed onto a letter,

46:11

I think it was in the days after Joe

46:13

Biden won the 2020 election, perhaps it

46:15

was briefly before, demanding that Democrats abolish

46:18

the filibuster as a matter of democratic

46:20

theory. If you want to have a

46:22

democracy, you have to abolish the filibuster.

46:25

Now I'm not deeply wedded to

46:27

the filibuster for some good reasons. To get

46:30

rid of the filibuster, I also am far from

46:32

certain that this would be in the long run

46:34

in the interest certainly of a democratic party or

46:36

of democratic stability because after all

46:39

the Senate favors Republicans

46:41

in its current shape and that probably makes

46:43

people like Trump more powerful on average when

46:45

we don't have a filibuster. You can have

46:47

debates about one way or the other, but

46:49

to have all of the leading political scientists,

46:51

and many were signed by just about every major

46:53

political scientist in the country, Marinus Meebe said, I

46:55

didn't sign it. I refused to

46:57

sign it. Saying we

47:00

as experts and political scientists are

47:03

saying that to serve the cause

47:05

of democracy, the Democratic Party

47:07

has to do this thing that happens to be in as

47:09

part of an interest in order to pass laws that we

47:11

all happen to agree with. I thought

47:13

there was one worrying indication of a way

47:16

in which the field of political science has

47:18

gone the wrong direction. The academy

47:20

does remain a good place for having

47:22

serious intellectual debates despite all of its shortcomings.

47:25

But I do worry about that development in

47:27

the field and especially among the most audible

47:29

voices within the field. I agree

47:31

with you and I would even take it beyond the realm of journalism.

47:36

I want to ask you a question. Did

47:38

you not want to sign the filibuster

47:41

is the death knell of

47:43

democracy or needs to be abolished article

47:45

because you had some disagreements

47:48

with the analysis or you don't think

47:50

it's the proper place of a political

47:52

scientist to have that sort of decree?

47:55

Yeah, that's a great question. Let's take back

47:57

a couple of steps. One is I certainly

47:59

don't think that academics, including political scientists,

48:01

need to pretend not to have

48:03

values or to be neutral

48:05

in that kind of sense. It's perfectly fine

48:07

for them to be very active as citizens,

48:10

fighting for political causes, whether the mainstream political

48:12

causes or whether the less mainstream political causes,

48:14

all of that right to have

48:17

that form of political engagement does not go

48:19

out of a window just because you also happen

48:21

to have a day job as a political

48:23

scientist. The second point is that I think

48:25

when you are speaking as an

48:29

expert, right, when you're speaking

48:31

with a professional hat on from

48:33

point of view that should aspire

48:36

to a certain kind of academic grounding, and if

48:38

you want to use that word through a certain

48:40

kind of objectivity, you want

48:42

to be very, very careful that you're

48:44

not letting your

48:47

activist point of view color what

48:50

you're telling people from on high.

48:53

So I have no problem with

48:55

an individual political scientist writing an

48:57

op-ed saying, here's why I think

48:59

abolishing the filibuster would

49:02

on the whole be good

49:04

for democracy. I

49:06

might disagree with that, but I think the

49:08

standard for putting that forward

49:10

as an individual opinion is a

49:13

little bit lower. I

49:15

think once you're saying, here is

49:17

an open letter from 50 of

49:20

the most distinguished political scientists today,

49:23

and we're telling you as experts

49:26

that objectively speaking abolishing

49:28

the filibuster is what we need to do

49:31

in order to save American democracy. The language

49:33

probably wasn't quite as dark as that, but

49:35

that is certainly the impression that the letter

49:37

was trying to convey. You better

49:40

be doing sure. I mean, that better have

49:42

a very high epistemic standard, especially if it

49:44

so happens that 49.9

49:46

out of 50 political scientists also think

49:48

that abolishing the filibuster would happen to

49:51

be in the partisan interest of the

49:53

political party that they, like me, prefer

49:55

in this particular historical structure. And

49:57

I just felt that And

50:00

that letter fell short of

50:02

that epistemic standard. That certainly,

50:05

look, the filibuster is not

50:07

written into the Constitution. It used

50:09

to be a very rare thing. It's now

50:11

become something very routine. There is

50:13

a counter-majoritarian element to the Senate,

50:15

which was part of this design, but that

50:18

is slightly troubling in the way it's playing

50:20

out these days. Perhaps actually

50:22

political systems that have too many veto

50:24

points become too stuck, and that

50:26

can actually grow the appetite for a

50:28

strongman leader. These are all

50:30

good reasons to abolish the filibuster

50:33

that I think are legitimate. On the other

50:35

side, though, it's also the case that

50:38

veto point is quite a useful thing to

50:40

have when you have, before a time, populist

50:42

possibly come back to office, and nobody was

50:45

thinking about Trump getting back in office in

50:47

December of 2020. But lo and

50:49

behold, we're now in a situation where it looks like

50:51

the Senate has at least about 50 percent, but he

50:54

might be very soon. So perhaps

50:56

it's a good thing that the filibuster is still around. He

50:58

might abolish it if he wins the Senate, etc. Still,

51:00

good thing that for now we have a

51:02

filibuster that's at least going to be one

51:05

more roadblock, making it harder for Donald

51:07

Trump to do whatever he wants. I

51:09

don't think that people thought seriously about the

51:11

fact that because the Senate skews Republican, it

51:14

actually is as likely to undermine the causes

51:16

of Democrats as it is to serve them.

51:19

I think that some background theory that political

51:22

scientists have that it's very hard to pass

51:24

certain things like the exponents of a welfare

51:26

state, but it's very hard. And once you've

51:28

passed them, they never get repealed. And so

51:31

therefore, if Senate filibuster skews conservatives, because it

51:33

makes it harder to put things in place,

51:35

but nobody's going to repeal them anyway. I'm

51:38

not at all sure that is the case. I

51:40

think there's going to be a lot of destructive

51:42

work that happens if Trump wins a trifactor in

51:45

a way that political scientists didn't anticipate. So

51:47

was it OK for a public health official

51:49

in May or June of 2020 to go

51:51

on the streets and join the George Floyd

51:54

protests? Sure, depending on what other kind

51:56

of pronouncements they did in the days leading up

51:58

to that protest. completely contradicting

52:00

other things they said themselves, for them

52:02

to go and join with protesters in a personal capacity,

52:05

absolutely fine. Was it okay for

52:07

public health officials, academics and researchers

52:09

and so on, to do a

52:11

big open letter saying that after

52:14

they told people they can't attend funerals and

52:16

we have to have very extreme lockdowns, it

52:19

is in fact good from the point of

52:21

view of public health to go join mass

52:23

demonstrations over George Floyd? No, they

52:26

were just straying very far from what

52:28

in the capacity as public health officials

52:30

they should have told us. I worry

52:32

in a milder form that

52:35

my genuine dear friends and colleagues who

52:37

signed this letter about the filibuster made

52:39

a similar mistake. Yeah, and you could

52:41

say was it right for 51 intelligence

52:43

officials to say that the Hunter Biden

52:45

laptop was likely the source of foreign

52:47

intelligence? Maybe the standard there

52:49

is if they're right, if they're sure

52:51

they're right, but you were saying something

52:54

different, you articulated very

52:56

eloquently an epistemic, an

52:58

epistemic principle, and for

53:00

you it didn't clear that bar.

53:02

Do you think your fellow academics,

53:04

most of them, all of them, for

53:07

them it did clear the bar of

53:09

a similar principle or they just don't

53:11

have that same epistemic principle? And the

53:13

reason I ask is I think, and

53:15

I'm not in the academy, but I

53:17

just read about it. I think the

53:20

ship has sailed on ideas like our

53:22

job is to describe the world as

53:24

it is not as we wish it

53:26

would be. I think the ship has

53:28

sailed maybe it's department by

53:31

department or discipline by discipline, but

53:33

when I read stories about the

53:35

fight to include ethnic studies in

53:37

California, and California wanted a descriptive

53:39

approach to here was the experience

53:41

of the Asians or the Chinese,

53:43

the Japanese, here is the

53:45

experience of the Latinos, and the

53:48

head of ethnic studies at the University of

53:50

California, Riverside, defines his field

53:52

as not a descriptive curriculum that

53:54

speaks to various ethnic and racial

53:56

groups' experience that is a bland

53:59

form of multicollinear. Culturalism he

54:01

defines the discipline as a critical

54:03

analysis of the way power works in

54:05

society I read that as

54:07

saying they're out of the

54:10

game of description and they are

54:12

consciously activist I perceive most of

54:14

the Academy the social sciences the

54:16

humanities as being in that

54:19

camp I don't think journalism is yet

54:21

But I want to just backtrack half

54:23

a step and saying am I right

54:25

about the Academy? They're now explicitly activist

54:27

and the descriptivist role is just a

54:30

relic of the past You know,

54:32

I might disagree actually so it's certainly true

54:34

of the corners of the Academy And I'm

54:36

very very worried about that and what you're

54:38

saying about you know That ethnic studies colloquial

54:40

in particularly in California is you know One

54:42

of the really dangerous examples of how that

54:44

form of activism Just leads to

54:46

the imposition of pure ideology in pedagogical

54:49

settings in a way that I'm very

54:51

concerned about The people

54:53

who signed this particular petition do

54:55

not have a mind frame They're

54:57

not work ideologues and many of them I

55:00

know privately have serious misgivings about

55:02

work ideology And I certainly think

55:04

that they can have a

55:07

have a mission that I share in a certain

55:09

sense of trying to save democracy But they're not

55:11

they don't I don't think most of them would

55:13

consider themselves Activists in that kind of way and

55:15

I don't think they are activists They're people whose

55:17

judgment I trust in general and who I think

55:19

are doing some of the most important work and

55:21

helping us understand The state of democracy

55:24

and our political questions around the world. I

55:26

do think that There

55:28

is a danger of groupthink You

55:32

talked about the political

55:34

ramifications of the media

55:36

and Democrats

55:39

disgusting the People

55:42

who are maybe swing voters or

55:44

don't share that particular those particular

55:46

cultural concerns And it creates the

55:48

opening for Donald Trump and you

55:50

talked about the Anton essay and

55:52

your analysis was this gives Fertile

55:55

ground for people who might be voting

55:57

against Democrats. Would you say that in

55:59

an? irony, the

56:01

luxury or the leeway

56:04

to use your vote to

56:06

give the middle finger to

56:08

the culturalism of the left

56:10

is because of the

56:12

successes of Joe Biden's or the

56:14

Democrats' policies materially speaking. In other

56:16

words, Donald Trump was voted out

56:19

of office when the economy seemed

56:21

horrible, when the pandemic was raging,

56:23

when it seemed as if his

56:25

leadership was not directing the country

56:27

in a way that Americans could

56:30

live with. Now that things have

56:32

been stabilized and that Biden or

56:34

let's just say the Democrats, even

56:36

the Democrats who operated within the

56:38

filibuster to pass the Infrastructure Act,

56:41

now that they have calmed things down and

56:44

wages are up and unemployment is down,

56:46

provided all those good things, that's where

56:49

the cultural play can affect people's votes

56:51

and they could give the middle finger

56:53

with their vote instead of using the

56:55

vote just to get the benefits of

56:57

democracy. That's a really interesting theory.

56:59

I mean, certainly there's a question about

57:02

more broadly why is it that economic questions

57:05

were at the forefront of politics in the

57:07

post-war era and cultural questions

57:09

seem to be at the forefront of politics

57:11

in the last decade or two at least,

57:13

and perhaps longer than that. So one point

57:15

that I often make is that if you

57:17

were allowed to ask a voter one policy

57:19

question and had to guess which political

57:21

party they vote for, not just the United States but

57:24

the most Western European democracies, in

57:26

the 1970s or 80s you would have asked an economic question. You

57:28

would have broadly speaking asked something like, would you

57:30

rather have higher taxes and a bigger welfare state

57:32

or lower taxes and a smaller welfare state? And

57:35

that would have told you if a somebody's voting

57:37

for Democrat or Republican, for the Social Democratic Party

57:39

of Germany or the Christian Democratic Party of Germany.

57:42

Nowadays, I think the best way of guessing if somebody

57:45

is going to vote for Democrats or Republicans would be

57:47

a cultural question. It would be about to what

57:49

extent should we crack down on the southern border of

57:51

the United States? What do you think

57:54

about trans people in sports or any number of

57:56

other kinds of cultural questions like that?

58:00

partially because we are a lot more affluent than

58:02

we used to be actually. And despite the serious

58:04

material concerns that many people have, they

58:06

are less at the foreground of what everybody's

58:09

thinking about because actually people are doing, and

58:11

I know often

58:13

on Twitter it doesn't sound like that and people

58:15

are catastrophizing about how bad the younger

58:17

generation is off and so on. And there's some genuine

58:20

challenges with housing price and other things. People

58:23

are a lot more affluent than 50 years ago. And

58:25

that is very, very, very clear from every

58:27

statistic. And by the way, at this point,

58:29

people in their 30s have

58:31

more wealth and have higher

58:33

levels of property ownership than their parents'

58:36

generation did at the same age. So

58:38

that might be kind of one background

58:40

reason for that shift.

58:44

Whether that shift is also true in the

58:46

shorter run, I don't know. I mean, 2020

58:48

was a weird election because we were in

58:50

the middle of a pandemic and there's not

58:52

a lot of historical evidence on how people

58:54

go during the pandemics. And that certainly was

58:56

at the forefront in certain ways. So the

58:58

best theory I have heard for how Joe

59:00

Biden will win the election came from a

59:02

friend I spoke to recently who said, look,

59:04

basically what the White House has decided is

59:06

that if the election is

59:08

about Joe Biden, they probably lose.

59:10

If the election is about Donald Trump, they probably

59:12

win. So the Democrats are going

59:14

to do what they can to make the election about

59:17

Donald Trump, which has the advantage

59:19

of giving them a strategic imperative

59:21

for a tactical necessity, which

59:23

is for Joe Biden to not sit in

59:25

his basement as he did in 2020, but

59:28

sit in the Rose Garden as he might do in 2024

59:30

and not run around the country too much, which clearly

59:33

he has trouble doing. And of course,

59:35

Donald Trump and Republicans are incapable of viewing

59:37

from that strategy because Donald Trump isn't capable

59:39

of talking about anything other than himself. And

59:42

so Donald Trump is going to make the election about Donald

59:44

Trump. And if Joe Biden also makes the election

59:46

about Donald Trump, that is the

59:48

only time I've been optimistic about the outcome

59:51

of his election in the last months. I

59:53

think it's the smartest theory about how Democrats

59:55

might somehow squeak through. But

59:57

that does go against the counter counter.

1:00:00

that people continue to be upset about the economy for

1:00:02

reasons we can debate. I think there are some good

1:00:04

reasons for it. Some extend it's

1:00:06

a misperception of the economy, but people,

1:00:08

I talked about this with Larry Summers, they

1:00:11

don't compare inflation to a year ago. They compare

1:00:13

horizon in the grocery store to five years ago,

1:00:15

and they have gone up over five years. They

1:00:18

are, I think, very upset about some of this

1:00:20

cultural stuff. They don't trust Democrats. It's a bottom

1:00:22

line thing. They don't trust that Democrats are sensible,

1:00:25

and they don't trust that Democrats think

1:00:27

highly of them. They don't trust Donald Trump either.

1:00:29

It's a tough, genuine, tough call for many reasons,

1:00:31

people. I mistrust Donald Trump

1:00:34

more than I mistrust the Democrats. That

1:00:36

is what makes it so difficult. They say,

1:00:39

I don't think things are going great. We're

1:00:41

not getting terribly, but I

1:00:43

just don't trust these people, and I kind of

1:00:45

want to tell them, fuck you. Against

1:00:47

that stands, if the election comes

1:00:50

to be about Donald Trump, Donald

1:00:52

Trump is not popular in America for

1:00:54

very good reason, and that

1:00:57

pushes him back towards the Democrats, and who knows

1:00:59

how those two countervailing factors are going to balance

1:01:01

out. Yeah. A negative polarization is

1:01:04

the single most potent force in American politics, and

1:01:06

I would sign on if you said, will the

1:01:08

next four elections be mostly determined by who do

1:01:11

voters hate more? I think they

1:01:13

probably will be, maybe the next 10. Also, we've

1:01:15

seen evidence that Joe Biden or his people

1:01:17

know this is the strategy. I

1:01:20

mentioned the debt relief program. This is

1:01:22

a big program that could help a lot of

1:01:24

people. You'd think he'd be clamoring about it, but

1:01:26

of course, he announces it during the eclipse

1:01:28

when everyone is paying attention to something else. He

1:01:31

knows even his policies that could appeal

1:01:33

to people, he knows that just not

1:01:36

talking about him or being quiet or

1:01:38

whispering those policies, so the 30 million

1:01:40

Americans who could benefit from them hear

1:01:42

about it, but no one else does.

1:01:44

He knows that plays into his favor.

1:01:47

You're also right. Donald Trump can't help

1:01:49

but get ... He's a chaos agent.

1:01:51

He gets all the attention, and

1:01:54

Americans will probably vote against

1:01:56

him. I do also think, in 2020, my analysis ...

1:02:00

of that election was it was legitimate

1:02:02

for people to be upset about inflation

1:02:05

and to blame Democrats for at least

1:02:07

you know two or three percent of

1:02:09

that inflation. I think Larry Summers helped

1:02:12

for my opinion about which

1:02:14

percent of the inflation Democrats were responsible

1:02:16

for. But now as things actually change

1:02:18

acknowledging that it sticks in people's heads

1:02:20

and people aren't entirely rational actors or

1:02:22

maybe they just don't like the fact

1:02:24

that cornflakes cost two dollars more than

1:02:26

it did in 2021. But anyway my

1:02:28

point is in 2020 people were voting

1:02:33

on crime, inflation, and

1:02:36

you know maybe abortion. Well

1:02:38

crime really I like

1:02:41

empiricism it has come down a lot

1:02:43

it's less of an issue inflation has

1:02:45

come down I don't know how much

1:02:47

it's affecting people's voting or attitudes but

1:02:49

some it's gotta affect at some and

1:02:51

abortion is still I think the big

1:02:53

issue that will motivate Democrats and Donald Trump

1:02:55

hasn't changed or mediated at all he

1:02:57

never can. So add all that up

1:02:59

if Joe Biden doesn't screw it up

1:03:01

too much and the irony is what

1:03:03

you went back to Joe Biden was

1:03:05

too old or maybe not nimble enough to get

1:03:08

with the program and be the progressive of 2020

1:03:10

great so he knew where

1:03:12

the for whatever reason

1:03:14

he aligned with the electorate I

1:03:16

do think that a more virile

1:03:20

capable energetic Joe

1:03:22

Biden could be

1:03:24

louder and help himself the Joe Biden of

1:03:26

2014 could

1:03:28

in fact articulate some policies that maybe

1:03:31

people will give him credit for but

1:03:33

given the hand you're dealt his advisors

1:03:35

are I think there's all the evidence of their

1:03:37

play in that playbook be quiet let people vote

1:03:39

against Donald Trump that's how we'll win. So

1:03:42

you've turned around this conversation for

1:03:45

for matter of conversation to ask me questions is

1:03:47

great but I do want to close the question

1:03:49

for you which is that we've criticized

1:03:51

the media a lot and we're both trying to do

1:03:53

something more constructive which is to build

1:03:55

platforms where we are

1:03:58

able to criticize some

1:04:00

of the new orthodoxy in institutions like

1:04:02

NPR and report on the

1:04:04

world and inform our readers

1:04:06

or listeners about the world in a way that doesn't

1:04:09

fall into those same traps. But without

1:04:11

becoming reactionaries, without running over in the

1:04:13

other direction where all you

1:04:15

do is to criticize those things and you

1:04:17

come to agree with anybody who disagrees with

1:04:19

that ideology and find themselves in their weird

1:04:21

company. How do you do that and

1:04:24

how in particular in the form of a daily podcast

1:04:26

do you cultivate that

1:04:28

conversation? How

1:04:30

do you challenge them in ways that

1:04:32

avoid the temptation of falling into group

1:04:34

things? Tell us a little bit how

1:04:36

you've been so successful at this. First

1:04:39

of all, some of it is easy for

1:04:41

me because my predilection is towards debate and

1:04:43

free inquiry and the exchange of ideas. Most

1:04:46

arguments about platforming, I know they're out there, but

1:04:48

I don't buy them and it doesn't occur to

1:04:50

me that if you talk to a bad person,

1:04:52

badness will spread throughout the world,

1:04:55

especially if you give them good questions, which

1:04:57

isn't to say I would book anyone on

1:04:59

the show, but I'd book almost anyone knowing

1:05:01

that they'd come on knowing

1:05:03

that they might face tough to withering questions.

1:05:06

Some of it is just how I am and it

1:05:08

is just how I order the world. There

1:05:10

are other things that I have to really be

1:05:12

strategic about. A while ago, I

1:05:15

was actually listening to an interview with Hannah

1:05:17

Gatsby, the comedian with Mike Birbiglia, and Hannah

1:05:19

Gatsby was talking about that there's the text

1:05:21

of the work and the theme of the

1:05:23

work and the spirit of the work. That

1:05:26

stuck with me because the text is the

1:05:28

text, but I like to be informed by

1:05:30

the spirit of inquiry and

1:05:32

the spirit of questioning

1:05:34

ideologies. You could imagine a

1:05:36

situation where I had

1:05:38

some bad experience with Slate. I used to work

1:05:41

at NPR. I think there's all this, we're

1:05:43

veering off the course media-wise and so

1:05:45

much of my content is informed

1:05:48

by that as the theme. You can't listen

1:05:50

to the show without knowing, yeah, Mike hits

1:05:52

upon these themes again and again. I

1:05:54

consciously don't want to do that show. I want

1:05:56

the spirit of that to inform the show,

1:05:58

but you could go two or three

1:06:01

shows, it's a daily show, without even

1:06:03

knowing what my stance is

1:06:05

on trans girls in sports. And by the

1:06:07

way, I think I know what

1:06:09

my stance is, but it might surprise you, it

1:06:11

might surprise my listeners. I'll tell you what it

1:06:14

is. I think in high school, generally, you should

1:06:16

let people play and when scholarships are at stake,

1:06:18

it's a different consideration. Fine. So

1:06:20

the spirit of the show

1:06:22

should be the media that

1:06:24

I loved, where all the

1:06:26

best questions, anticipating the audience's

1:06:29

questions are asked. There are

1:06:31

no shibboleths. The ideology that

1:06:34

would mostly appeal to me as a

1:06:36

liberal person does get questioned even harder

1:06:38

than the ideology of people I disagree

1:06:40

with, who we just love to beat

1:06:42

up on. So that's another major factor.

1:06:45

Mike, thank you so much for being on the podcast. Thanks

1:06:47

for having me. A great pleasure. Shall

1:06:50

I say a dream come true? We could put it

1:06:52

in that category. I love listening to the podcast. You

1:06:54

do a great job. Thank

1:06:59

you so much for listening to The Good Fight. Lots

1:07:01

of listeners have been spreading the word about the show.

1:07:04

If you too have been enjoying the podcast, please be

1:07:06

like, rate the show on iTunes, tell

1:07:08

your friends all about it, share it on Facebook,

1:07:10

whatever. And

1:07:12

finally, please mail suggestions for great questions

1:07:15

or comments about the show to goodfightpod

1:07:18

at gmail.com.

1:07:21

That's [email protected].

1:07:26

This recording carries a Creative

1:07:28

Commons 4.0 international license. Thanks

1:07:31

for seeing it. Reversed. Chess

1:07:34

pieces.

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