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How Gigantic Ships Are Creating Global Supply Chain Havoc

How Gigantic Ships Are Creating Global Supply Chain Havoc

Released Wednesday, 31st March 2021
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How Gigantic Ships Are Creating Global Supply Chain Havoc

How Gigantic Ships Are Creating Global Supply Chain Havoc

How Gigantic Ships Are Creating Global Supply Chain Havoc

How Gigantic Ships Are Creating Global Supply Chain Havoc

Wednesday, 31st March 2021
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Episode Transcript

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0:10

Hello, and welcome to another

0:12

episode of the Odd Lots Podcast.

0:15

I'm Joe Wisenthal and I'm

0:17

Tracy Alloway. Tracy,

0:20

I know it's early morning time

0:22

in Hong Kong where you are right now. But did

0:24

you hear the big news while you were sleeping? Um?

0:29

Well, I'm trying to think. I guess I didn't.

0:31

What was the big news while I was sleeping? Maybe

0:34

maybe you saw it before you went to bed, just that they freed

0:36

the ship. Oh yeah, so maybe

0:38

that happened before you fell asleep. It did that

0:40

happen during the working day in Asia? They

0:42

got it floating? Um, and then

0:44

they got it I guess more floating

0:47

or more free. Yeah, it's

0:49

good news for global supply chains,

0:53

global factories, retail

0:55

outlets. Everyone breathing a big

0:57

sigh of relief as the were

1:00

given ship that was stuck in the

1:02

Suez for six days. As

1:04

of right now we're recording this March New

1:08

York time, seven pm New York time has

1:10

been Uh, it's been freed. It's floating again.

1:13

The thing that I really loved about, you

1:15

know, this very special week where

1:18

we were all focused on this one container

1:20

ship that was stuck in a Canal was

1:22

that, first of all,

1:24

everyone suddenly took an interest in global

1:27

shipping and transport and global

1:29

trade, which is something that usually

1:31

people don't necessarily think

1:34

of that much, or at least they don't think about how

1:36

stuff actually gets to them. People think

1:38

about global trade, but not necessarily

1:40

the infrastructure and the industry that kind

1:43

of underpins it. So last week

1:45

was a really good one for everyone to sort of sit

1:47

back and consider how

1:49

globalization actually works and how the

1:52

flow of all these goods is actually

1:54

affected. Absolutely.

1:56

Also, like everyone becomes like a container

1:59

ship expert like overnight. But

2:01

the good news is, like you and I are like kind

2:04

of experts because we've actually talked

2:06

to one before. Hey, I have read

2:08

two books on shipping, so you

2:10

know, I feel like I'm I'm firmly up

2:12

there as an expert. I'm joking

2:14

obviously, but fair enough, but I

2:17

am, you know, the next best thing, because

2:19

we did an episode back in January

2:21

where we talked about container ships,

2:24

and so that turned out to be very,

2:26

um, very auspicious

2:28

because then I knew like two or three facts

2:30

that I was able to like put in tweets

2:32

and stuff like that, which is, you know, more

2:34

than I would have otherwise been able to. Well, look, it

2:36

was a great episode, and there are multiple issues

2:39

affecting shipping at the moment. So we have

2:41

the gridlock in traffic because

2:44

of the coronavirus crisis,

2:46

and also the sort of changes

2:48

in the direction of global

2:50

trade, so you know, stuff getting really

2:52

snarled between China and the US because

2:54

lots of people in America are just buying more

2:57

and more things during the pandemic.

3:00

But then we also have a separate issue,

3:02

which is that ships are

3:04

so freaking big a they

3:07

get stuck in canals and be they

3:10

also contribute to um

3:12

that global snarling of of shipping

3:14

traffic instead of actually alleviating it.

3:16

Exactly right. So Beck in January

3:19

we talked about the high cost of

3:21

shipping these days. We spoke with Mark

3:23

Levinson, who is the author of The

3:25

Box, famous book The Box How the shipping

3:28

container made the world smaller and the

3:30

world economy bigger, And he said something

3:32

on that episode which was very

3:35

uspicious or very very timely,

3:38

which was that a big part of the problem was

3:41

that ships are just massive these days

3:43

and that creates its own problems

3:46

for the logistical system of the globe. And

3:48

then of course, one of the biggest ships in the world

3:51

ended up jamming the Suez and that was

3:53

sort of a freak accident. There was

3:55

a sandstorm, some really great reporting

3:57

on exactly how it went down. Nonetheless,

4:00

it was sort of an example of what he

4:02

was talking about, which is that these gigantic

4:04

ships are bigger

4:06

and not you know, the infrastructure for shipping

4:09

is not necessarily optimized for ships

4:11

these large Yeah, I think

4:13

that's exactly right. So I'm very excited

4:15

we have Mark back on the

4:18

podcast. Everyone loved the last one, and this

4:20

time we're going to focus just on this

4:23

question, the problem

4:25

with really big ships. So Mark,

4:27

thank you for coming back on Odd Lots. Hey,

4:30

Joe, glad to be with you. Tracy, good to be with you

4:32

tonight. So the sue is

4:34

is uh is free again? Um,

4:37

the ever given has been floated. It went down

4:39

the canal. Nonetheless, as you

4:41

pointed out back in January, large

4:44

ships are problems. So let's just start with the

4:46

question of when we talk about

4:48

a large ship. I mean, all shipping containers

4:50

ships are large, But when we talk about a large

4:52

ship, what are we really talking about here?

4:55

Well, shipping guys use

4:59

the term t e u t EU

5:02

means twenty foot equivalent units.

5:05

UH. The size container you see

5:07

on the back of the truck when you're driving down a highway

5:10

is typically about forty ft. So

5:13

if you take the number of t e u s

5:15

and divide by two, that tells

5:17

you how many truckloads are on the

5:19

ship. So we're talking

5:22

here about a vessel that

5:25

was roughly twenty thousand t e

5:27

u s. In other words, it was capable of holding

5:30

as much cargo as roughly ten

5:32

thousand over the road trucks. This

5:35

is not the biggest vessel out there on the

5:37

seat. The biggest that

5:39

are afloat now in the container

5:42

ship line can hold two

5:44

thousand eu s, or as much cargo

5:46

as twelve thousand trucks. So

5:49

that's a lot of freight on a single vessel.

5:52

So talk to us exactly about the economics

5:55

driving the shift towards bigger

5:57

ships. So you know, it's not like people

5:59

woke up one day and said they're going to build

6:01

big ships for the sake of it um or at

6:03

least maybe some people did, but not

6:05

everyone. There were supposed to be efficiencies

6:08

that were targeted. Right the

6:11

first modern container ship voyage

6:13

was back in nineteen fifty six, and

6:17

the ship that made that trip was

6:19

called the Ideal X and it carried

6:21

fifty eight containers. Go

6:24

from fifty eight to twelve thousand,

6:27

and you can see the sort of growth that's gone

6:29

on in this industry. Most

6:31

of that time, ships got

6:34

bigger, small step by

6:36

small step, okay they

6:38

they the next generation added

6:41

a few hundred more containers at

6:43

best, and so ships were getting

6:45

steadily larger, but moderately

6:48

so. And then

6:51

in two thousand three,

6:54

the Shipline Merisk, which is based in Denmark,

6:57

as I think everyone knows by now, a

6:59

decide did a that it

7:01

was in danger of running out of capacity,

7:03

so it needed some big ships and

7:06

be that it really wanted

7:09

to get a jump on everybody

7:11

else by having much bigger ships, and

7:14

so it commissioned a series of seven

7:16

vessels. These

7:19

ships, it turned out,

7:22

we're six larger than any

7:24

other ships that were on the ocean at that point.

7:27

That's not what had been advertised, but that's

7:30

what turned out to be the case. So they

7:32

were just hugely a

7:34

large compared to anything else that was

7:36

at sea or in the order books

7:38

at this point in time. Those mask

7:41

ships, the first was called the MA Marisk came

7:43

online starting in two thousand six.

7:46

These very large ships. M

7:49

Marsk was capable of carrying about fifteen

7:52

thousand Eu s in other words, truck

7:55

size containers, and assuming

7:58

that she was full, could

8:00

do that much much more cheaply

8:03

than any of the other ships being used

8:06

in the industry. And so the

8:08

competitors looked at this and said,

8:12

we got to do something too. We've

8:14

got to build ships at

8:16

least as big as the MM Marisk, or we're going

8:18

to have higher costs. And

8:22

yet they were faced with a dilemma, which

8:24

was if they built

8:27

higher, bigger ships, and everybody else

8:29

built bigger ships, then there was going to

8:31

be a whole lot of capacity coming onto

8:33

the market, and that was going to cause a problem

8:35

too. Most of the ship lines

8:37

ended up building bigger ships, and

8:40

you started to see around.

8:43

You started to see ships of seventeen

8:46

eighteen thousand Eu s going

8:48

on. And now they've

8:50

been up into the high teams and then

8:52

into the twenties, such as the one that

8:54

was just stranded in the Suez Canal.

8:57

And now we're talking do

9:01

they save money, Well,

9:05

they save money on the

9:07

ocean leg of the

9:10

transport. If the ship

9:13

is full or close to full. For

9:16

most of the past decade, the ship lines had

9:18

this problem that there wasn't all that much cargo.

9:20

They had really overestimated the growth in international

9:23

trade, and so they were

9:25

running these enormous ships

9:27

around the oceans half empty, and

9:30

that was a recipe for losing a lot of money.

9:32

Many ship lines went bust, others

9:34

were forced to merge, and

9:37

the pandemic kind of bailed

9:39

out the shipping industry. When Americans

9:42

couldn't take vacations and Europeans couldn't

9:44

take vacations, they couldn't go out to the restaurant,

9:46

they couldn't go to a concert, couldn't go to the theater,

9:49

they started spending their money on stuff,

9:52

and all of a sudden, the ships got

9:54

full of factories in Asia revved up

9:56

and all this cargo was was

9:58

filling these vessels really for the first time. So

10:18

going back to um the

10:21

dawn of the really big ships here,

10:23

I mean, it's interesting this sort of I don't

10:25

know, maybe it's it's a game theory because

10:27

everyone wants to have the cheapest shipping

10:30

and so okay, everyone feels they need to compete in larger

10:32

and larger more efficient ships. On the other

10:34

hand, that creates all this inventory and a problem.

10:37

But I guess, like was it a problem?

10:40

Is that was the thinking back and like saying, like

10:42

two thousand, two thousand six that like,

10:45

well, globalization just keeps getting

10:47

bigger, world trade keeps growing, There's

10:50

this big commodities boom going on. China

10:52

is buying stuff voraciously. So essentially,

10:55

yeah, it creates some risks, but ultimately,

10:58

at least back then, it looked like volume

11:00

would just sort of keep growing forever and that would take

11:03

care of any of the capacity the

11:05

capacity build up. Yes, absolutely,

11:07

Joe. The expectation was that international

11:10

trade would continue to boom.

11:12

From the late nighties

11:15

until the

11:17

two thousand seven eight international

11:20

trade grew more

11:22

than twice as fast as the world economy, and

11:25

the expectation was that that was going to continue,

11:27

and that there was going to be a need

11:30

for shipping capacity to handle all

11:32

of these exports from

11:34

Asia that were expected to come. And

11:37

of course after

11:39

the financial crisis, trade

11:42

did not pick up as it always had

11:44

after recession, so there were a lot of

11:47

half empty ships sailing around. So

11:50

one thing I've wondered is if we assumed

11:53

the counter factual, Like, let's say that global trade

11:56

had boomed, would the

11:58

mega ships be more efficient

12:00

or would there still be issues

12:03

with, for instance, their flexibility and

12:06

their ability to adapt to

12:08

changing trade routes, changing demand,

12:10

and things like that. If

12:13

world trade had continued to boom,

12:16

there would be a couple of things that would be different

12:18

now. One would be that

12:21

there would not have been a ton of container shipping

12:23

companies going out of business, so

12:26

there would be a lot more competition in the industry.

12:29

Given the number of firms that have gone out of business

12:32

and alliances between the surviving

12:34

shiplines, there are really only

12:36

three groups that dominate this

12:39

industry now, so it's somewhat of an olegopoly,

12:42

and that would have been less likely to happen

12:45

had a world trade remained

12:47

a robust The other

12:49

thing would be that shiplines would

12:52

have made some money, and they

12:54

might have behaved quite differently from from

12:56

the way that they ended up behaving,

12:59

but the landside problems

13:01

would not have gone away. What you're

13:04

pointing to is the

13:06

fact that the ship lines really

13:09

ordered these huge vessels because

13:11

they thought they were good for themselves. They

13:14

didn't really pay much attention at all

13:17

to the whole goods transport system.

13:19

They were not asking the question, well, what

13:21

happens when these show up at

13:24

the container terminal? Is the terminal

13:26

able to handle them? Will the

13:29

railroads be able to get enough trains in and

13:31

out? Will truckers be able to handle all

13:33

these boxes? Will the harbors be

13:35

deep enough that we can sail these ships in?

13:37

In the first place, those sorts of questions

13:40

really didn't get enough consideration.

13:42

And I think that even had trade

13:45

remained more robust than it proved

13:47

to be, these problems

13:50

with the freight transport system would

13:52

have developed because the

13:55

container ship lines said, here, we've got

13:57

this thing, which is good for us. You guys,

13:59

you worts, you railroads, you

14:02

truckers, you guys deal with this. So

14:04

this was what you brought up in our last conversation,

14:07

the sort of bottlenecks that have emerged

14:10

because of the size of the ships.

14:12

So let's go into that a little bit further,

14:15

um a walk through

14:17

specifically how the size

14:20

of the ships are I don't know if incompatible

14:22

is the right word, but problematic for the ports

14:24

and the sort of land based shipping

14:27

movement. And why didn't the

14:30

shipping companies foresee

14:32

this sort of like seemingly obvious thing like

14:34

if you have a plug, you want to make sure it fits on the outlet.

14:37

Why was this sort of not on their radar?

14:39

Well, I went into the second half of that first

14:42

Okay, sure, the shipping lines pretty

14:44

much took the attitude that ports,

14:46

it's your problem to deal with this. Railroads,

14:49

we're bringing you the cargo. You figure out how to get

14:51

it out of the port. Okay. It was

14:53

their attitude that there in the shipping business

14:56

and everybody else who is part of the logistics

14:58

system ought to just

15:00

deal with what's best for them.

15:02

So that's where where that went. I

15:06

think in terms of

15:09

the challenges posed by these very

15:11

large ships. Let me just give you a couple of examples.

15:14

These mega ships, these ones that hold

15:17

twenty thousand those

15:21

they are not longer than the ships that preceded

15:24

them to handle

15:26

all this cargo, they're

15:29

wider. Ships have grown

15:31

wider. Well, think

15:33

about how the cargo is typically moved on and

15:36

off a container ship. The container

15:38

ship pulls up to a wharf. There

15:41

are cranes alongside

15:43

the vessel, and each of these cranes

15:46

lifts containers off the vessel, puts

15:49

them onto a little carrier that's on

15:52

the ground. The carrier takes the container

15:55

away, and another carrier brings an outbound

15:57

container that goes onto the ship. Well,

16:01

since the ships are not longer than their

16:03

predecessors, there's no room for additional

16:06

cranes alongside the ship. But

16:08

since the ships are wider, it

16:10

takes longer each time a crane

16:13

reaches out with a container and

16:15

takes the container over to the far side of the

16:17

ship. So it takes an additional

16:20

few seconds to lift the average

16:22

container off the ship, and it

16:24

takes an additional few seconds to put

16:26

the average container onto the ship.

16:29

That may not sound like much, but

16:32

you're multiplying these few seconds

16:34

times thousands upon thousands of containers,

16:37

and all of a sudden, you're delaying the vessel. Okay,

16:39

it's it's stuck in port for longer

16:41

than it wants to be stuck in port

16:44

because they can't get the ship

16:47

discharged and reloaded in time, so

16:50

the cargo is delayed. There

16:53

have been a numerous

16:56

examples where ships left

16:58

China late, late late.

17:01

At some points a thirty

17:03

or thirty of the vessels leaving

17:05

China have been behind schedule. There

17:08

have been sailings canceled

17:10

because a ship couldn't complete its

17:12

sailing in time to do the next sailing. And

17:17

these are a result of the difficulty

17:20

aloading the ships and also

17:22

of the fact that these vessels were built

17:25

to steam slowly. In

17:27

previous iterations, container ships

17:30

were able to travel somewhat faster. It

17:33

was decided by the folks who designed these

17:35

megaships that they should

17:37

steam slowly, in part because

17:40

that saves money. They burn

17:42

less fuel, certainly less fuel

17:44

per container, and second, they

17:47

produce less greenhouse gassing missions

17:49

because the greenhouse gassing missions come from burning

17:51

fuel. So these slow vessels

17:53

are environmentally better and

17:56

and they don't waste energy. That's

17:58

all well and good, but what it means is that once they

18:00

fall behind schedule, they can't catch up

18:02

again. They can't go faster to make up the

18:05

time that perhaps was lost in port. So

18:07

there are a couple of examples of how these

18:11

very large ships really have exacerbated

18:14

the problems in supply chains. They

18:16

have a lot of trouble just delivering the goods on time.

18:19

So you mentioned this idea of

18:21

the ships getting wider, and I suppose that's

18:23

our our queue to talk about the canal.

18:26

But I mean talk to us

18:28

about how going down the Suez Canal

18:31

usually works, and whether

18:34

or not that process has become more difficult

18:37

as ships got larger. I

18:39

don't want to pretend that I'm an expert on the hydrology

18:43

of the Suez Canal, because I'm most definitely

18:45

not here. Um the Suez

18:48

Canal was dredged

18:51

to make it deeper for these very large ships

18:53

and for other very large ships, just

18:55

as many harbors have been

18:58

dredged to enable these large

19:00

ships to go through. The

19:02

vessel that was grounded in the Suez

19:05

Canal, they ever given, required

19:08

seventeen and a half meters of water just

19:11

about fifty two ft between

19:13

the water line and the bottom of the vessel.

19:16

Okay, so that's a lot of water. They need

19:18

a very deep the ship needs a very deep channel

19:21

to steam in, and

19:23

if the ship gets forced out

19:25

of that channel for whatever reason, there's

19:28

a lot of potential for bad things to happen. That's

19:31

true in a harbor. That's also true in

19:33

a canal. The channel

19:36

is not that wide, and sometimes events

19:38

occur. You do have winds

19:40

that can blow up

19:42

against the vessel. Remember,

19:46

a ship like this is a quarter

19:48

mile long. It has nine

19:50

or ten layers of containers

19:53

stacked on its deck in addition

19:55

to the containers below deck, so

19:58

ten layers of contained. Each

20:00

container says eight ft high,

20:03

that's eighty feet above the deck and

20:06

a quarter mile long, and it's like a wall.

20:10

So if there's a really strong gust of wind,

20:13

it's one more source of pressure on the ship.

20:15

It can can push the ship, and

20:17

container ships have had problems with this in

20:20

the past. I think the size makes the

20:22

situation a little bit worse. This particular

20:25

container ship was actually involved

20:28

in an accident in Hamburg, Germany,

20:30

a few years ago. The ship's only

20:32

three years old, so a few years ago means too, I

20:35

believe, when

20:37

again the ship was blown a little

20:39

bit and it ran up against

20:42

a ferry boat. And accidents

20:45

happen sometimes. But the

20:47

large size of the vessel

20:50

of this sum this magnitude, and

20:53

the large amount of containers stacked

20:55

on the deck, I think makes

20:58

perhaps for a smaller margin of error. Zooming

21:15

back out to this sort of global

21:18

situation that we have right now, and it's ongoing

21:20

and there's all these delays in every retailer.

21:23

Last quarter, H talked about

21:25

that, how does uh, you

21:27

know this this phenomenon of super large

21:29

ships creating tension at the ports. Obviously

21:31

it's been going on for a while. But how

21:34

in this current environment

21:37

are they uh you know, the sort

21:39

of mismatch between the capabilities of the ports,

21:41

the transportation system, and the size of the ships.

21:44

How is that exacerbating the

21:46

current issues that we're seeing with trade

21:48

all over the place. Well, the problems

21:51

in the ports, I think tend to slow

21:53

down. Once the ship

21:56

gets there, it has to unload, right, has

21:59

to discharge its cargo. We've certainly

22:01

had some complaints in the United

22:03

States that the

22:05

ships were not waiting to be fully

22:08

loaded. They wanted to get

22:10

back to China, and they wanted to take empty

22:12

containers with them back to China just

22:15

so there could be more Chinese exports. Um.

22:17

There have been complaints from the US farm sector

22:21

that farm goods that normally

22:23

moving containers haven't

22:26

been accommodated. Typically, the

22:29

westbound freight on the Pacific moves

22:31

at a much lower rate because

22:33

most of the cargo is coming east from Asia

22:35

to the United States, and so these

22:37

guys are looking to send containers of soybeans

22:40

or of meat

22:43

products or other things to

22:45

Asia, and they're complaining they can't

22:47

get enough containers because

22:51

as a result of the mess in the

22:53

ports, the ships just want to get out of there and

22:55

won't wait for the outbound containers. So

22:58

that is one example of the sorts

23:01

of problems that people are

23:03

seeing when you have an event

23:06

like happened in the Suez

23:08

Canal. Well,

23:10

some vessels decided to go around

23:13

Africa to to get

23:16

between Asia and Europe.

23:19

Well that's a longer trip, Okay, that adds

23:21

two to three weeks to the chip trip

23:23

between Asian and northern Europe. If

23:26

each trip is going to take a longer period

23:28

of time, that means the vessel can't make as many

23:31

trips over the course of a year, which means it can't

23:33

carry as much cargo over the course of a year.

23:35

And so you can see that there's going to be even more

23:37

pressure for a while, at least on

23:41

the supply chain. So

23:44

we talked a little bit about this in the intro. But

23:47

one of the great things about

23:49

this whole um chipping drama

23:52

has been that people are talking about

23:55

these transport issues in a way that they

23:57

don't usually talk about. And you

23:59

may the point in your book that

24:02

the whole field of economics

24:04

kind of persistently

24:06

underestimates or ignores

24:09

the costs embedded in transport,

24:11

like the idea that there might actually be frictions.

24:14

When people talk about competitive advantage, they

24:16

usually talk about friction lists transactions.

24:19

Um. And I think you even cite the the

24:21

old example of you know, England versus

24:24

Portugal. The economists

24:26

who came up with that never actually took into account

24:28

transport costs when they said that, you know, it

24:31

might be cheaper for England to do this and for Portugal

24:33

to do this than they can just trade with each other. Do

24:36

you think the situation in global

24:38

shipping, the fact that we were all absolutely

24:41

fascinated by the ever given for

24:43

the past week, do you think that's going to change

24:45

that at all? Our people going to be more

24:48

focused on the frictions

24:50

caused by global transport or involved

24:53

in global transport because of these

24:55

issues. Absolutely.

24:58

And that's a wonderful opportunity to give

25:00

a shout out to my latest book which is called

25:03

Outside the Box. It talks

25:05

about these problems with supply chains

25:08

and it explains why businesses

25:12

that built these long supply chains systematically

25:14

underestimated the risk. Okay,

25:17

they made decisions about where to produce

25:19

things, typically in Asia, by

25:21

looking at production costs and transport

25:24

costs, and they didn't pencil in

25:26

the cost if, say the goods don't arrive

25:28

on time, well, that

25:30

can be a very significant cost. And

25:33

when that happens, then all

25:36

of the money that you saved on production may

25:39

not turn out to be such a great deal. So

25:42

I think we've seen a lot of companies now begin

25:44

to reassess whether these

25:47

supply chains makes sense

25:50

constructed as the way they have been. We've

25:52

seen in the United States,

25:54

which is the place where we've got the best data

25:56

on this, you've seen a lot of companies

25:59

keep more infantor than they used to. Right,

26:01

it used to be that companies didn't want

26:04

inventory. Everything was going to be just in time.

26:06

Inventory is wasteful. Well,

26:08

inventory is insurance, right. Inventory

26:11

gives you something to sell in case your next

26:13

delivery doesn't make it on time. So,

26:15

even though there's a cost, firms have been keeping

26:19

more inventory. Firms have been

26:21

looking at multiple production locations

26:23

rather than having everything made in some big

26:26

factory. Yes,

26:28

the big factory might give you great economies

26:30

of scale, but if there happens to be

26:33

a fire at the factory, or an earthquake

26:36

or if there's a transport disruption and route,

26:39

all those economies of scale aren't going to have help

26:41

and and so you really need an

26:43

alternative source of production.

26:46

And firms have been looking at these things. They've been

26:48

going for redundancy. There's

26:51

a lot of interest now and resilience. It's

26:53

actually a hard thing for a manufacturer

26:55

to do, but we've been

26:57

seeing a lot of attention to it. And that was even

27:00

for the forgiven was rounded

27:02

in the suite. Uh.

27:05

Mark, that was great. That's exactly you've

27:07

filled in a bunch of gaps for us and sort

27:09

of our understanding of this. And really appreciate

27:12

you coming back on oddline. Well,

27:14

it's been delightful to be with you. Thank

27:17

you very much for having me. Thanks so much,

27:19

Mark. Thanks Mark, that was great. I

27:38

found that very helpful, Tracy. I

27:40

mean I sort of had some sense

27:42

that the the size of

27:44

the ships was creating specific problems

27:47

at the ports. But his example

27:49

about like the crane, you can't put more

27:52

cranes because um not

27:54

any longer, but that they have to reach further into the

27:56

ship, but that takes a few more seconds

27:58

and that ends up like that really started to help

28:00

like crystallize the issue for me. Yeah,

28:03

the great thing about talking to Marcus he brings

28:05

this fantastic economics perspective

28:08

to global shipping, which I think,

28:10

um, you know, not everyone does. But

28:13

also the point about how building

28:15

these massive ships maybe

28:18

could have resulted in more efficiencies

28:20

at sea had global trade actually picked

28:22

up, but the bottleneck was always

28:24

going to be on the port side when you're

28:26

loaning and unlaning stuff. And the

28:29

irony there, of course, is that the whole

28:31

reason container shipping was invented was

28:33

to try to minimize costs

28:36

on the port side. So you used to have, you

28:38

know, hundreds of laborers

28:41

who would be unloading and loading

28:43

these boxes by hand, and they'd all be sort of

28:45

individually wrapped or everything

28:48

would be kind of packaged differently, and it

28:50

was really labor intensive, very

28:52

very expensive. So they moved to the standardized

28:55

container shipping and that was

28:57

supposed to lead to more efficiencies, which it

28:59

did did, but then of course the shipping

29:01

companies kind of got ahead of themselves stacked

29:04

as many containers as possible, and

29:06

eventually the economy of scale just kind

29:08

of goes away because the ports

29:11

aren't set up to handle it. Absolutely

29:14

super interesting to think about like this sort

29:16

of the different legs of the system and

29:19

how economies of scale and one part create

29:21

dis economies of skill elsewhere

29:24

in the systems. And it also again

29:26

this really helped we understand the situations.

29:29

So like there's so much inbound

29:32

demand for US uh

29:35

for Chinese goods coming to the US, Like we know

29:37

this, it's voracious. There is some export

29:40

activity obviously, as he mentioned, there's

29:42

soybeans and a few other agricultural goods,

29:44

so it's not entirely one directional. But

29:47

in this situation in

29:49

which there is a pretty big opportunity

29:52

cost of not racing back to China and getting

29:54

more goods, and you have

29:56

the delays already at the ports because

29:59

there's a bunch of ships because of the logistical issues,

30:01

this idea like nobody wants to sit around and

30:03

wait for all the soybeans to like fill

30:06

up maybe a quarter or a third full

30:08

vessel, so everyone just races back. Very

30:12

clear example of how messed up the whole situation

30:14

is right now. Yeah, absolutely, And I guess

30:16

it gets back to this idea that no one expected

30:19

a global pandemic in this way

30:22

and people hadn't really been building

30:24

supply chains that would be robust

30:26

enough to take it into account, which is kind of understandable,

30:29

but again, you wonder how much

30:31

that's going to change. Absolutely, we'll

30:34

see. We'll get him back on in a couple of years. Yes,

30:37

Okay, let's leave it there, let's save

30:39

it there. This has been another episode

30:42

of the All Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway.

30:44

You can follow me on Twitter at Tracy

30:46

Alloway, and I'm Joe Wisntal.

30:49

You can follow me on Twitter at

30:51

the Stalwart and check out our guest Mark Levinson's

30:54

book The Box and the sequel

30:56

Outside the Box, and be

30:58

sure to follow a producer, Laura Carlson. She's

31:01

at Laura M. Carlson. Follow

31:03

the Bloomberg head of podcast, Francesco

31:05

Levi at Francesca Today, and

31:07

check out all of our podcasts at Bloomberg Onto

31:10

the handle ad Podcasts. Thanks

31:12

for listening.

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