Podchaser Logo
Home
Development Futures: Reforming the Multilateral Development Banks

Development Futures: Reforming the Multilateral Development Banks

Released Thursday, 26th October 2023
Good episode? Give it some love!
Development Futures: Reforming the Multilateral Development Banks

Development Futures: Reforming the Multilateral Development Banks

Development Futures: Reforming the Multilateral Development Banks

Development Futures: Reforming the Multilateral Development Banks

Thursday, 26th October 2023
Good episode? Give it some love!
Rate Episode

Episode Transcript

Transcripts are displayed as originally observed. Some content, including advertisements may have changed.

Use Ctrl + F to search

0:05

Hello and welcome to Development Futures, a podcast

0:07

brought to you by the Indo-Pacific Development Center

0:10

here at the Lowy Institute. My

0:12

name is Alexander Dayan, the deputy director

0:14

of the center, and I am your host for this episode.

0:17

In this podcast, our researchers

0:20

and some of the world's leading experts discuss fresh

0:22

policy insights and ideas on the

0:24

most pressing development issues in the world today.

0:28

In this episode, we will be talking about

0:30

the future of the multilateral development banks,

0:32

often referred to as the MDGs.

0:38

More than a year ago, the MDGs embarked on

0:40

an ambitious reform agenda for them to tackle

0:43

the pressing dual challenge of climate change

0:45

and development. Items on

0:47

the agenda involve improving MDB governance

0:49

structures, objectives and targets,

0:51

and creating new financial instruments

0:54

to mobilise public and private capital

0:56

for climate and development investments. And

0:59

this week, finance ministers and other officials

1:01

from around the world are in Marrakesh for

1:03

the world Bank and IMF annual meetings,

1:06

where a lot of attention is put on the

1:08

reform efforts in the work. So

1:10

to discuss those, I am joined by Clemens Landers,

1:13

a senior policy fellow at the center for Global

1:15

Development who focuses on multilateral development

1:17

banks and sustainable development finance.

1:21

Clemens previously worked at the US

1:23

Treasury on US engagement with the NBS

1:25

and also at the world Bank. So she's

1:27

basically one of the best persons to discuss those issues.

1:31

I had the pleasure of meeting Clemens a few

1:33

months ago, when my colleague, Roland Rajan and I

1:35

presented our work on development finance

1:37

at CGD in Washington. And

1:39

since that time, we've had the idea of having her

1:41

as a guest on our new podcast. And

1:44

I'm thrilled that this has finally become a reality.

1:46

So, Clemens, thank you very much

1:48

for taking the time to have a chat today.

1:50

Well, thank you, Alexander, and I'm so pleased to

1:52

be here.

1:52

First, I would like to look at the big picture

1:55

and ask you the following questions. What

1:57

do we mean when we talk about

1:59

MDB reforms generally? I

2:01

mean, what are the primary topics of discussion

2:03

concerning those reforms and

2:05

in the context of the world Bank, IMF

2:08

annual meeting is happening as we speak.

2:10

What do you think is being discussed precisely

2:12

on that specific topic?

2:14

Yeah. Well, you're right to point out

2:16

that there's been a really strong

2:18

spotlight on the MDGs

2:21

since for the past year and the world

2:23

Bank in particular about

2:25

a year ago, actually, Secretary

2:27

Janet Yellen, the US Treasury secretary, made

2:29

a speech around what is

2:31

now called MDB evolution,

2:34

really focused on the fact that it was time

2:36

for for some major changes

2:39

within the system, with a particular focus

2:41

on the world Bank. And she made she

2:43

made the speech about a year ago at the center for Global Development.

2:46

And this is really created an

2:49

enormous amount of momentum, an enormous

2:51

amount of political momentum around

2:53

around reform. And there's been

2:55

especially a lot of a lot of focus on the

2:57

world Bank, which is which has been

3:00

in a lot of ways accelerated by the fact

3:02

that the world Bank also has a new, new president,

3:04

AJ Banga. Um,

3:07

so so what is meant and what what

3:09

really drove drove

3:13

the US Treasury secretary to,

3:15

to start this whole process,

3:17

I think was, was, was was

3:19

really several things. Um, one,

3:22

of course, was the

3:24

Covid crisis really radically changed

3:27

the global economic landscape. Um,

3:30

we really saw a lot of countries

3:33

really struggling to

3:35

access capital markets

3:38

and external financing. And the MDGs

3:41

were really seen to be the

3:44

global safety net. But

3:46

their their response to Covid

3:48

was was uneven. There's there's

3:50

there's quite a bit of literature out there

3:52

and including from from the center for Global

3:55

Development just around you know,

3:57

some for some countries,

3:59

you know, disbursements, you know, weren't moving

4:01

particularly fast. The

4:03

institution for some countries was

4:05

very good on the crisis response and for others

4:07

was less good. And

4:10

there's also a sense that that that the

4:12

world Bank in particular slightly

4:14

missed the boat on things like Covax,

4:16

which was a multilateral funding

4:18

for for vaccinations and simply

4:21

because its own internal rules and procedures

4:24

were too complicated for, for, for

4:26

to participate. And it eventually actually did end

4:28

up participating. But but

4:30

just this feeling that that

4:33

the world Bank really wasn't equipped for the challenges

4:35

of the day, and if it was kind of missing the boat

4:37

on the Covid crisis, what did that

4:39

really say about the World Bank's response

4:41

to the climate crisis, which in a lot of ways

4:43

is like a slower, slower brewing

4:46

Covid crisis, but equally as as existential

4:48

in its nature? Um, and

4:51

against that backdrop, there

4:53

was also a lot of political changes afoot.

4:55

Notably, you know, I've mentioned the United

4:57

States quite a bit. You can see maybe a little bit of my

4:59

Washington bias as I, as I sit here.

5:02

But, you know, there were big changes in the US

5:05

political landscape with

5:07

with the election of Joe Biden and

5:09

really, really sharp turn

5:12

on in terms of foreign policy and economic

5:14

policy priorities. And notably,

5:16

you had you had an administration

5:19

that was that was after the Trump administration

5:21

that was coming in that really wanted to signal

5:24

that it was multilateral,

5:26

um, that that it was

5:29

focused on international issues

5:31

like foreign assistance and that

5:33

it was also going to embrace the climate

5:35

agenda. And so in a lot

5:37

of ways, this really

5:39

created a in a lot of ways, the stars

5:42

were aligned for really big focus and

5:44

a really big rethink of

5:46

of the world Bank and

5:49

the other MDGs by association.

5:52

So what is what is what is kind

5:54

of the meat? Meat on the bones here.

5:57

You know, think it's a couple of different things,

5:59

but in a lot of ways think, you know, you can

6:01

this, this, this evolution. And we can talk

6:03

about it a little bit further means

6:05

a lot of different things to a lot of different shareholders.

6:07

And there's not necessarily complete

6:10

agreement amongst shareholders

6:13

on on where the evolution and

6:15

reform agenda should be, should be headed.

6:17

But think a couple of areas where there

6:19

is broad consensus and think

6:21

this is the easiest and the hardest is

6:24

the system is too small. The to

6:26

the extent that the system is,

6:28

is the global safety net and needs

6:30

to be the source and should be the

6:32

source of a lot of public global investment.

6:36

These together, institutions that are

6:38

together providing 100, $200

6:40

billion a year in financing.

6:42

And that really is a drop bucket in the bucket compared

6:45

to the climate and development challenges

6:48

that a lot of low and middle

6:50

income countries face. So

6:53

that's that's one piece. The second piece

6:55

is really thinking about how the

6:57

these institutions can be more flexible

7:01

and in particular,

7:03

more readily

7:05

to readily engaged on

7:07

climate finance issues. And

7:10

that kind of points to one of the complexities

7:12

in these institutions models is that they're really demand

7:15

driven institutions. It's not

7:17

that the world Bank goes to a country and says,

7:19

we want to invest in this project

7:21

to the contrary, and this is really the

7:24

kind of heart and soul of what

7:26

distinguishes an MDB from a bilateral

7:28

aid agency, for instance, is is it really

7:30

is the country that originates the project and

7:33

says, this is what we want to borrow for.

7:35

So if there's this, this increasing realization

7:37

that we live in a world where there

7:39

are all these existential threats,

7:41

you really want to think about how you're incentivizing

7:44

countries to borrow to

7:47

mitigate these existential threats,

7:49

whether that's climate pandemic,

7:53

you know, fragility, you

7:56

know, kind of what's been put under this rubric

7:58

of, of global public goods. And then

8:00

the third piece, you know, and think this

8:02

is getting a little bit less of a focus,

8:04

but think remains incredibly important,

8:06

is there is this unfinished business of

8:08

development there?

8:11

You know, we are nowhere out of the woods

8:13

in terms of, you know, eradicating

8:15

poverty, you know, think, you

8:17

know, a couple of weeks ago, we had the Unga

8:21

in New York. It was very clear how

8:23

off track the international community

8:25

is on pretty much every single

8:27

SDG. So just

8:29

as you're reinventing new missions for

8:31

these institutions, you also have

8:34

to ensure that they're staying in the course

8:36

on their on their original ones. So,

8:39

you know, that's a lot. So

8:42

what is getting discussed in Marrakesh.

8:45

And I really do want to emphasize

8:47

think Marrakesh is really kind of the

8:50

beginning and not the end point. One

8:52

is, you know, these, again, are

8:55

meetings that are particularly focused on the world Bank and

8:57

not the broader system. One

8:59

is that shareholders

9:01

in the institution have endorsed

9:03

a larger perspective

9:06

on what the World Bank's mission is. So

9:08

after many, many months

9:10

of wordsmithing, they've

9:13

decided to add the bank's

9:15

original mandate. And the mandate is

9:17

the twin goals of of eradicating

9:19

poverty and boosting shared prosperity. They've

9:21

they've they've agreed to add to a livable

9:24

planet. So finance ministers

9:26

who are shareholders in the institution are going to be

9:28

formally endorsing

9:30

this new mandate. So that's

9:32

the big ticket item. But

9:35

for many think that that simply isn't

9:37

isn't going to be enough. It's it's the opening

9:39

salvo in a reform process. But

9:41

but a new mandate is in

9:44

and of itself, not a reform

9:46

agenda.

9:48

Okay, well, putting aside this new mandate,

9:50

then what do you view as the low

9:52

hanging fruit of the reform

9:54

agenda? I mean, what

9:56

changes to the development banks do you think

9:59

will be the simplest to implement with the

10:01

highest impact?

10:02

Well, think maybe maybe kind

10:04

of going back to the financing side. I mean, think

10:06

one of one of the lower

10:09

hanging fruit is

10:11

the fact that there was recently

10:14

a report on this

10:16

is going to sound very dry. So listeners,

10:18

bear with me because I'll make this fun. But

10:21

there was recently a report called the The

10:24

Calf Report, which, which

10:26

reviewed the capital adequacy frameworks

10:28

of these institutions. And it basically

10:30

found that most

10:32

multilateral development banks manage their finances

10:34

very conservatively. And

10:37

because they manage their finances so conservatively,

10:39

they're potentially holding back a lot

10:41

of development finance. So

10:44

one of the the interesting

10:46

perspective that the authors of this report

10:48

took was there were a few small changes that

10:51

these banks can make, changing

10:53

how they provision for loans,

10:55

changing what's known as their equity to loan

10:58

ratios, changing how

11:00

they view something called callable capital, which I promise

11:02

I won't get into. But

11:05

a couple of things like this, actually

11:07

not a couple of pretty sturdy list

11:09

of things could be enough to really unlock

11:12

quite a bit of financing. And so

11:14

in a lot of ways, you

11:16

know, this calf review and a lot of these

11:18

findings are very

11:21

easy ways of really increasing

11:23

the amount of headroom that

11:25

the multilateral development banks can be,

11:28

then providing as loans to their client countries

11:30

without necessarily having to go

11:33

to shareholders to ask for more

11:35

cash. The bigger difficulties

11:37

in this reform agenda is everyone wants

11:39

the institutions to do more and to change.

11:42

But as you know, you know very well

11:44

and everyone in the development finance space

11:46

knows very well this is not a particularly

11:50

this is not a particularly glorious time

11:52

for general the generosity

11:55

of bilateral donors to especially

11:57

to multilateral institutions. So,

11:59

so this, this, this capital adequacy review is

12:01

kind of the way it's often described as the bank is,

12:04

is a way of squeezing a little bit more out of the

12:06

lemon and, and think in a lot

12:08

of ways the institutions really have

12:10

embraced these mean for some it's been a

12:12

little bit too slow to embrace these reforms,

12:14

but they have embraced these reforms and have

12:16

put forward some pretty, you know, not

12:18

enormous but good consequential

12:21

new headroom numbers.

12:24

I think the world Bank put

12:26

out said that, that by implementing some

12:28

of these reforms that could generate an extra 100 billion over

12:30

the next ten years. So

12:32

some, some pretty good ambitious numbers

12:36

linked to the agenda. So,

12:39

you know, and so hopefully that's something that,

12:41

you know, the the momentum on on that

12:43

side will continue.

12:44

Well very good. Now I would like to

12:46

talk to you about the global public goods

12:48

or the JRPGs that you mentioned earlier.

12:51

So for our listeners, global

12:53

public goods are goods and resources that benefit

12:56

everyone. They are non excludable

12:58

so no one can be excluded from using them.

13:00

And they are non rivalrous, meaning

13:02

that using them doesn't actually reduce their availability

13:05

to others. Example of

13:07

JRPGs include climate change mitigation,

13:09

communicable disease prevention and global

13:11

peace and security. Um,

13:14

and the global public goods are, in my mind,

13:16

at the centre of the MDB reform agenda,

13:19

as the MDGs are under pressure to

13:21

expand and adapt to address global needs,

13:23

including through the provision of those global

13:25

public goods. Now,

13:28

the problem is that for some developing countries,

13:31

borrowing for GPG programs

13:33

at the domestic level can be challenging

13:35

due to fiscal constraints, for instance,

13:37

or different national priorities.

13:40

And so to make these loans more appealing

13:42

to these countries. Institutions

13:44

like the world Bank may need to actually sweeten

13:47

the deal, often involving subsidies,

13:49

which translates into increased

13:52

grant funding. But given the

13:54

limited budget of organisations like

13:56

the world Bank and other MDGs, allocating

13:58

more grants for climate

14:00

and similar global public goods could actually

14:03

result in reduced grant

14:05

funding available for other developmental

14:07

issues. So my question

14:10

to you is this is there a trade

14:12

off between financing for climate

14:14

and financing for development?

14:17

Yeah. No. Thank you for this question. It's I

14:19

think this question really just cuts right

14:21

to the heart of the matter and right into the really

14:24

where a lot of the the traffic

14:26

jam is right now in a lot of ways, in terms of

14:29

the reform agenda and in particular,

14:31

I was making, you know, earlier this point around

14:33

the fact that these organisations

14:35

are demand driven organisations.

14:38

So the question then becomes, well, how

14:40

do you incentivise countries to want

14:42

to do things differently

14:44

and to borrow for different kinds of programs? But

14:46

as you said, the

14:49

it's hard to get countries to want to borrow

14:51

for JPGs because you are basically

14:55

taking out resources. Borrowing

14:58

money for a project that

15:00

does not necessarily generate or

15:02

generally does not generate a cash flow.

15:05

And for which you as a as

15:07

a nation, may not be capturing the benefits

15:10

of the project. And so there's a

15:12

really core, really systemic

15:15

change here in

15:17

thinking and in models that the

15:19

MDGs need to embrace if they're

15:21

going to move towards this agenda. But

15:23

as you also pointed out and

15:26

think this is another element of real

15:28

tension and negotiation and debate right

15:30

now, is that the

15:32

logical path towards financing

15:35

more JRPGs is therefore not

15:37

necessarily to finance them through loans,

15:40

but to really use grants

15:42

much more systematically,

15:45

either to concessional loans

15:47

to cheapen the terms of the loans or actually

15:49

just pure grants to finance some

15:52

of these projects. And then that

15:54

creates a real

15:56

trade off, because if

15:58

you need to fundraise for grants

16:01

and you're also needing to fundraise for your

16:03

concessional lending windows for your for course

16:06

countries, you create a trade

16:08

off when a donor says, okay, well, do I give

16:10

my dollar to help fight poverty

16:12

in the lowest income countries? Or do I give

16:14

my dollar to

16:16

finance global

16:19

public good that

16:21

benefits everyone equally? And

16:24

there's also an added element in the politics

16:26

of climate change. Come in. Here is a lot

16:28

of countries are saying to the rich countries

16:31

at these institutions, as you're imposing

16:33

this global public good agenda

16:36

on us, but you,

16:38

because of how you grew and how you prospered,

16:40

created the global public bad

16:43

that now you are using development resources

16:46

to try to mitigate. And so

16:48

there's there we're currently

16:50

in a moment where there's a tremendous

16:52

amount of debate,

16:54

but also, I would say distrust

16:58

within the system around, you know,

17:00

the intentions of a lot of the

17:03

advanced economies that are that are really pushing

17:05

for these reforms of saying, you know, you're

17:07

you're really using a dollars towards

17:09

purposes that really aren't necessarily

17:11

particularly aid related. They're very self-interested.

17:15

So as a result, you know, there really

17:17

isn't right now a

17:19

very clear offer for

17:22

how it is that these institutions

17:24

will finance JRPGs. The

17:28

has a small fund on its balance

17:30

sheet called the fund, which was set

17:32

up a couple of, I think, in 2018.

17:35

And it's financed mainly through

17:37

through net income. So that's the profit

17:40

that the organization makes. Some of its

17:42

profit goes into financing this fund. But

17:44

it's it's very small. Think it's not

17:46

more than 100 $100 million has

17:48

gone into this. There

17:50

are some proposals out there to create

17:52

an entirely new window

17:56

that would be completely

17:58

financed, separate from the again,

18:01

but by donors, and

18:04

that those proposals create that new window,

18:06

invite the kind of criticism that I that

18:08

I presented earlier. Um,

18:10

and then there are there is some interest

18:12

in, in, in figuring

18:15

out some other slightly more innovative

18:17

quote unquote mechanisms to fund

18:19

JRPGs. Um,

18:22

you know, through, you know, guarantees,

18:25

maybe things like debt for nature swaps. I'm again,

18:27

a little bit more skeptical of the financial

18:29

innovation around some of

18:31

these things because I kind of, you know,

18:33

you kind of have to go back to, you know, at its

18:35

core, what is it? You know, it really

18:38

is something where there's not a cash flow associated

18:40

with it. I don't necessarily

18:42

think, for instance, a solar farm in its

18:45

pure sense of the terms is a global public good.

18:47

I mean, that's a project that's economically

18:49

viable generally with a cash flow

18:51

that creates a return. I

18:54

think much more of a is like telling

18:56

a country, don't, you know, preserve

18:58

your preserve your rainforest.

19:00

Um, you know, there's not a cash

19:02

flow really that's associated with that. But the

19:04

benefits of us, the world having

19:06

the Amazon rainforest are tremendous.

19:09

Um, so,

19:12

you know, think right now this is,

19:14

you know, and this is why said this question is the heart of the matter

19:16

is this is one of the impasses that we currently

19:18

find ourselves in, on,

19:21

on, on this kind of broader reform agenda

19:23

around JRPGs. And, you know, it will

19:25

be interesting to see where

19:27

this comes out. But part of where

19:30

this I don't see a

19:32

successful road towards

19:35

a focused MDB

19:37

without much more grant

19:39

resources. And I struggle with

19:42

whether or not that is a politically realistic

19:44

proposition in the day and age in which we are.

19:46

All right. Well, just to rebound on this example

19:49

of the solar farm, you

19:51

mentioned that you don't necessarily see it as a global

19:53

public good, but actually, don't you think it

19:55

really depends on where this project

19:57

is being implemented? For

20:00

instance, you know, a small solar farm

20:02

in the Pacific might not necessarily have

20:04

a similar impact to. A large scale one in

20:06

Indonesia. Indonesia is

20:08

a much larger theater emitter than Fiji.

20:10

So what underlies the

20:12

argument that a solar farm in Indonesia isn't

20:14

necessarily considered a global

20:16

public good, despite its potential to

20:18

significantly reduce global emissions?

20:21

Yeah. Mean think think. It has components,

20:24

especially if you can say the solar farm,

20:27

you know, displaced a

20:29

dirtier form of energy

20:32

and think you can say there there

20:34

are aspects that investment,

20:36

but think in the purest term

20:38

of the sense of what A is,

20:41

I, I don't

20:44

think it fully enters that box. And,

20:46

and in particular, when you're thinking about

20:48

this framework of, you know,

20:50

grant financing, there are a lot of countries

20:53

that borrow from the world Bank

20:55

for solar. Let's stay with

20:57

this example where

20:59

these are very economically viable

21:02

investments for the country. Now

21:04

they have the added benefit. And this is the

21:06

added benefit of renewables, of

21:08

being good for the world. Right.

21:11

But they are also

21:13

economically. The

21:16

country also reaps the economic

21:18

advantage of that project

21:20

and think this in a lot of ways. And this is

21:22

this is, you know, you know, an interesting

21:25

point you make is, is one of the approaches

21:27

the bank is, is trying to take of kind

21:29

of saying, you know, there aren't that many

21:32

projects that in their

21:34

purest, pure sense,

21:36

RPGs. So let's

21:38

think of ways that we can do a national

21:41

project. And

21:43

include a type

21:45

component. So I'm going to wade into territory

21:48

in which I'm not an expert. But, you

21:50

know, my health colleagues would say,

21:52

you know, you could think about this in the health

21:54

sector of, you know, if the world Bank is doing

21:57

a big health sector investment

21:59

in a country to

22:01

also have a component on that that's,

22:04

you know, prevention focused, or

22:06

maybe it's a prevention focused component that's

22:09

linking into some sort of a regional

22:11

prevent supervision network.

22:13

And so you then have had this,

22:15

this project that has strong national

22:17

benefits and

22:19

for which that makes absolute sense for the country

22:22

to kind of finance and use its Ida allocation

22:24

or its world Bank allocation to borrow from.

22:27

But there's also a little layer of

22:29

this project on top that

22:31

has a regional or

22:33

a slightly more global component,

22:35

and that sits

22:38

much more naturally

22:41

within the world Bank

22:43

MDB type model.

22:46

Well. Well that's interesting. You

22:48

know, at the institute, we do have some projects tracing

22:50

what we call climate development finance in Southeast

22:52

Asia and in the Pacific. And what

22:55

we found is that sometimes what constitutes

22:57

a climate adaptation and mitigation projects can

22:59

actually vary from one development partners

23:01

to the next. There's quite a bit of

23:03

inconsistency which makes the quantification

23:06

of climate development finance challenging. And

23:09

so listening to you make me think that, you know, we might

23:11

face the same problems with global

23:13

public goods in the future. And so I

23:15

really hope that standards of transparency will be improved

23:18

across the board in the future. But that's

23:20

that's another issue. Look,

23:23

earlier you talked about the fact that the

23:25

world Bank and other MDGs are

23:27

demand driven. But

23:29

what we've seen is that for many countries, borrowing

23:32

for from MDGs can be a complex

23:34

and actually resource intensive exercise which

23:36

sometimes discourage borrowers. For

23:39

instance, infrastructure lending can be complex

23:41

to navigate. You know, MDB is applying stringent

23:43

environmental and social safeguards, which,

23:46

you know, play a critical role

23:48

in protecting vulnerable groups and

23:50

environments. But they often fail to provide

23:53

the time and financial resources

23:55

needed. So how can

23:57

we improve the demand for MDB

23:59

financing, making them more cost effective

24:01

with maybe less red tape, but at the same

24:03

time ensuring the high quality

24:06

of those funding?

24:08

Yeah. This is this is a fascinating question

24:10

and I. I think you're

24:12

seeing this, this play out in

24:15

a lot of different contexts. A

24:18

lot of countries prefer to go to

24:20

China to borrow for infrastructure

24:23

projects, though, that

24:25

type of borrowing seems to be going down.

24:27

But they're

24:29

faster, less strings attached.

24:32

For a country know you're operating in real

24:34

time and and you you

24:36

want to have a project built not

24:39

in geological time, but in real, actual

24:42

human time. And,

24:44

you know, another another example

24:46

of this is, you know, we especially,

24:49

you know, during Covid saw a lot of countries

24:52

going to the bond markets for

24:54

emergency financing, even if, you

24:56

know, spreads were, you know, 300

24:59

basis points over what they could have been getting

25:01

from the world Bank. And again,

25:03

it's, you know, that's just faster money. And

25:05

countries seem very much it's,

25:07

you know, with certain countries at certain moments in

25:09

time, seem very willing to pay extra

25:12

for faster money with fewer strings

25:14

attached. I think this is actually

25:17

a problem that is not gone unnoticed.

25:20

And it was interesting. AJ Banga,

25:22

who was the new president of the world Bank, was

25:25

recently at the Council for Foreign

25:27

Relations, which is another US based

25:29

think tank. And at the end

25:31

someone asked him what? What are what is

25:33

your big priority for the institution? And one of

25:35

the things he said is I want to fix the plumbing, which

25:38

doesn't sound particularly glorious

25:40

until you really actually think, you

25:42

know, moving, moving things forward

25:45

and faster is is in itself

25:48

a really important part of

25:50

development. And

25:53

the organization in a lot of ways,

25:55

especially, you know, especially the world Bank

25:57

is under a lot of pressure to adhere to very

26:00

strong safeguard standards

26:02

and standards, which

26:04

are, you know, obviously important and obviously

26:07

kind of how part, you know, part and parcel

26:09

of the model that the world Bank

26:11

offers that differs from

26:13

China and may make world Bank financing

26:16

more sustainable than China financing over the longer

26:18

term, that's a whole different podcast,

26:20

but you really need to

26:22

think of a way of how do you reconcile these high

26:25

standards with moving, moving

26:27

forward faster, because this is clearly

26:29

part of what client countries

26:31

are demanding from the institution.

26:33

And it's and it's quite frankly, I think it's very

26:36

encouraging to have a world Bank president who's,

26:38

who's talking about this early

26:40

on in the presidency. We'll

26:43

see. You know, a lot of this, you know,

26:45

is going to be very political to unlock.

26:48

But, you know, there's I think

26:50

this is you know, you were asking a little bit earlier about

26:53

low hanging fruit. I do think there are there are elements

26:55

here of that that that just can

26:57

be advanced a lot faster. And I'll

26:59

just say one one more thing. Um,

27:03

during during the Covid crisis,

27:06

a colleague and I did did a little

27:08

bit of a piece of research on world

27:10

Bank budget support operations and budgets. World.

27:12

The MDGs basically provide two

27:15

main kinds of programs.

27:17

One is projects based

27:19

financing and the other one is just unrestricted

27:21

financing for a country's country's

27:24

budget. And budget support tends

27:26

to have policy conditionality. And

27:28

we went through all the different budget support operations

27:31

during Covid and found

27:33

that operations were full of policy conditionality

27:35

that had nothing to do with the Covid crisis.

27:38

And that just seems like

27:40

an enormous, again, missed opportunity,

27:42

right? I mean, you don't you don't

27:44

want to be forcing

27:48

countries to do all of these complicated

27:50

things in an emergency.

27:53

The complicated things are for another moment in

27:55

time. So again,

27:58

think this, this kind of thing needs to be part of

28:00

the rethink of the plumbing.

28:03

Okay. Well just to rebound on this comments

28:05

on on budget support. During

28:07

the pandemic, we've seen a resurgence of the use

28:09

of direct budget support in the Pacific

28:12

as a swift way for development partners

28:14

to provide emergency financing to those

28:16

countries in the in the region

28:18

at a time where international borders were closed

28:20

and travel was restricted. And

28:22

now today, most Pacific Island countries

28:25

are actually facing high risk of distress, according

28:27

to the IMF. Yet

28:29

our analysis of early numbers show that the

28:31

use of budget support is here to stay. So how

28:33

do we make sure that we continue to use budget

28:35

support, which actually provides

28:37

quick and in the case of the Pacific,

28:39

concessional financing, while

28:41

also considering the debt sustainability issue

28:43

in the Pacific, but also in the broader developing

28:46

world.

28:47

Yeah. No. And that's a very. It's

28:51

very timely question to. Mean one

28:53

of the things about how

28:55

the world Bank and MDPs provide financing

28:57

to lower income countries. And

29:00

this is, I think, one of their real

29:02

strengths and why they're very,

29:06

very reliable partner for a

29:08

lot of these countries is when these countries enter

29:10

into what's called high distress. All

29:14

of their loans automatically switch

29:16

to grants. So the

29:18

idea behind this is that

29:20

the MDB should not be

29:22

contributing to the country's

29:25

debt distressed position. One

29:28

of the weaknesses here, though,

29:30

is that doesn't mean

29:32

even though Ida

29:34

can start providing as grants

29:37

which come with a cost because

29:39

grants at the end of the day do decrease

29:41

the amount of volume over time that you can obtain.

29:44

It doesn't necessarily mean that the country

29:46

has to pursue grant financing

29:48

from all of their creditors.

29:51

So it creates this, this, this

29:54

strange situation sometimes

29:56

where a country is simultaneously

29:58

getting its money from Ida in the form of

30:00

grants, but also, you know, issuing

30:03

Eurobond Eurobonds

30:05

that, you know, 10%. And

30:07

and and I do think this is this

30:10

is something where there is an opportunity

30:12

for, for a little bit of a rethink

30:14

is, is, you know, what is what

30:16

is Ida's role and not just itself

30:19

being responsible lender. But

30:22

have helped a bit of encouraging

30:24

countries to kind of, once they've

30:26

flipped into that high debt distress

30:28

territory where, you know, their

30:31

debt is no longer on a sustainable

30:33

path. How does that also

30:36

change their relationship with with the rest

30:38

of the creditors? And and this isn't really

30:40

fully something that has been

30:43

been worked out. The institutions

30:45

have, you know, both the IMF and world Bank

30:47

have rules that are supposed to limit

30:49

how much non-concessional debt a country can

30:51

take out. They also

30:54

have little carrots and sticks that

30:56

can either penalize a country if it goes beyond

30:59

its non-concessional lending headroom. But

31:01

think these carrots and sticks in particular

31:04

are actually pretty. Not

31:07

not necessarily as as effective

31:09

as as they could be. But,

31:12

you know, in a lot of ways, I do think,

31:14

you know, we

31:17

are, you know, in terms of debt, really seeing a breakdown

31:20

in terms of how creditors cooperate

31:22

and in terms of multilateralism. And one of the things

31:24

that I, you know, would really

31:27

love to see amongst major

31:29

creditors, especially like let's

31:31

put the commercial creditors aside because this isn't going to happen,

31:33

but, you know, official creditors, so multilateral

31:36

and bilateral is just an agreement

31:38

to follow the Ida rules.

31:40

Once a country has gone into high levels of debt distress,

31:43

the automatic rule is that should be triggering

31:45

grants.

31:46

Well, that's a great idea actually, and

31:48

would definitely help making the current high debt

31:50

situation in developing countries more manageable.

31:53

Thanks. Thanks for sharing. Now,

31:56

you mentioned China in your previous answer.

31:58

And so I'd like to ask you about the

32:00

impact of the US-China competition in

32:02

the context of reforms. Both

32:05

countries compete not only economically but also

32:07

in the area of development finance.

32:10

In the world Bank, for instance, the United

32:12

States is the largest shareholders

32:14

in China is the rising number two, but

32:16

also the major borrowers and in turn

32:18

the largest voice for the bank's borrowers.

32:22

And so the deteriorating bilateral

32:24

relationship between the United States and China

32:26

poses a threat to the governance of the

32:28

bank. In this context,

32:30

do you think the US-China competition

32:33

make makes the

32:35

broader MDB reforms impossible?

32:38

And if this is the case, what action

32:40

should be taken by both parties to address

32:42

the situation effectively?

32:44

Yeah, that's that's a. That's

32:47

an intense question, and I'm going to answer

32:49

you very bluntly, is I think the biggest risk

32:52

for a successful reform

32:55

agenda is actually the state of

32:57

the relationship. As you

32:59

said, the bilateral relationship is not good.

33:02

And in previous

33:04

iterations of the relationship

33:08

when it had been better. US-China

33:11

cooperation were really an important

33:13

motor, especially for the world

33:15

Bank. And and you really

33:17

saw China.

33:21

Especially in the context of of

33:23

Ida replenishment. China really stepping

33:26

up increasingly as

33:28

a more and more important source

33:30

of grant financing for

33:33

for a lot of the concessional windows. So

33:35

so there really did seem to

33:37

be on the part of a willingness.

33:39

And this was this was much more

33:41

prevalent under the Obama administration, a willingness

33:44

to bring China into these international

33:47

institutions. And then China

33:49

wanted to act as a good participant

33:52

in these institutions. And

33:54

and that, you know, was was,

33:56

I think, a really important motor for the world,

33:58

frankly, that has

34:00

stopped. The two countries

34:02

are not seeking cooperation

34:05

and coordination on on reform

34:07

the way they were there. That

34:10

level of partnership just

34:12

does not seem to be there anymore and

34:14

think that is that is a

34:17

big risk for the institutions, frankly, think it's a big

34:19

risk for the world. You know, I mean, we

34:21

are talking about global public goods and climate change

34:23

and all of these things that require collective action.

34:25

And if the two largest global economies

34:28

don't see eye to eye on

34:30

these issues or aren't willing to cooperate

34:32

on them, I just don't see how we can

34:34

hope to really solve them in the

34:36

swift and effective way we need to.

34:39

Now, more specifically

34:41

on on the world Bank side, one

34:44

of the issues that I was mentioning earlier was,

34:46

was funding and how important

34:48

thought funding was. So

34:51

the historically world Bank and

34:53

this is the so that part of the world Bank

34:55

that lends to middle income countries

34:57

is funded through capital increases. And

35:00

generally what happens is during a capital increase,

35:02

there's there's a shareholder realignment. So

35:04

you look at a country's shareholding and then

35:06

you decide, okay, based on the

35:08

World Bank's shareholding formula, or are they overweight,

35:10

underweight and the

35:13

latest shareholding exercise that has shown

35:15

that China's China is really underweight

35:17

at the world Bank, it's currently the

35:19

third largest shareholder. It should be the second largest

35:22

shareholder, which would allow it, which would actually

35:24

allow it to overtake Japan. So

35:26

there's huge there's huge geopolitical

35:28

implications here. I

35:30

think one of the reasons for which

35:33

the US has been reluctant to pursue a

35:35

capital increase negotiation in

35:38

the context of this reform agenda. So

35:40

it has really been reluctant to talk

35:42

about financing or

35:44

growing the institution through a capital increase.

35:47

Is is because they're afraid of

35:49

this can of worms that a shareholder

35:52

realignment opens up. And

35:54

I think that's I think that's frankly,

35:57

you know, very unfortunate. I think it's very

35:59

unfortunate for, for the institution

36:01

because I do think, you know, there are a lot of

36:04

different you know, we talked about the CAF reforms and

36:06

we you know, there are a lot of different ways that you

36:08

can grow a balance sheet. But the most tried

36:10

and trusted in effective way is

36:13

through capital. So,

36:15

you know, and so think in a lot of ways that

36:17

leaves the organization at a little bit

36:19

of an impasse, because there's not

36:21

unity of vision amongst China and

36:23

the United States towards where these

36:26

negotiations and where the reform agenda

36:28

should be heading in terms of policy.

36:30

But there's also a huge disunity

36:33

in terms of how do you financially

36:36

grow the organization. And

36:38

that just unity, as I was saying, is, you

36:40

know, there's a lot of geo complex

36:43

geopolitical linkages there. So

36:45

I, I am not

36:47

optimistic on on this front.

36:50

All right. Well, now I would like to

36:52

talk about the billions to trillions concept.

36:54

The billions to trillions concept was first

36:57

introduced at the third International Conference

36:59

on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa

37:01

in 2015. The idea is

37:03

basically that billions of multilateral finance

37:05

and official development assistance should be used

37:07

to mobilize trillions of private investments

37:10

for climate and development. But

37:12

even though AJ Banga, the new

37:14

world Bank president, seems to be very

37:16

enthusiastic about encouraging private capital

37:18

to contribute to development, progress

37:21

in that regard has been limited so far.

37:24

So what are your thoughts on the potential

37:26

for this to happen, and what strategies

37:28

can be employed to achieve this?

37:31

Yeah, the built in the billions to trillions

37:33

agenda. You know, one of one of

37:35

the ideas animating that was really, you know,

37:37

$1. In

37:40

development finance and public finance

37:42

can mobilise about $10 in private

37:44

finance, which is just

37:47

an enormous ratio. The

37:50

latest numbers that I've seen is at best

37:52

we're on. We're at 1 to 1. More

37:55

generally think it's about 1 to 0.7.

37:58

So so the billions to trillions agenda

38:00

has not has not materialised.

38:03

And there isn't a lot of focus on it.

38:05

It's been it's been re renamed

38:07

as private capital mobilisation now.

38:10

And it's very clearly a priority

38:12

of of of the new world Bank president.

38:15

He's created a lab focus

38:18

specifically on this this issue with a lot of

38:21

eminent private sector representatives.

38:24

You know. I'm

38:27

of two minds, frankly, on this gender.

38:30

I think, you know, from a political perspective.

38:32

Think the billions, trillions agenda was a

38:34

little bit of a of a donor

38:36

agenda saying, you know, we need all

38:38

this money for the world.

38:40

There are huge challenges, but we

38:43

aren't really fully going to pay for

38:45

it. And ergo, let's

38:47

kind of create this,

38:49

you know, self-fulfilling prophecy

38:51

that our dollars can really stretch

38:54

and bring in, bring in all of this private

38:56

capital.

38:58

And.

39:00

And I think that in a lot of ways has done

39:02

a lot of damage, because a lot of

39:04

countries, you know, especially a lot of developing

39:06

countries, kind of look back and say. Where

39:09

is it? Where did it come? Where what? What

39:11

happened? And and

39:13

so, you know, think part of the

39:16

let's call billions of trillions

39:18

2.0 private capital mobilization.

39:20

Sorry for the acronym. Is

39:22

to really think about this in the context of much

39:24

more anchored targets.

39:27

I think that 1 to 10 ratio

39:30

is a little bit. You

39:33

know, unrealistic. So

39:35

let's ground this conversation in

39:37

more realistic terms. So

39:39

think that's that's a first start. And

39:42

you know of course you know

39:44

you know think there's a big actually. And

39:46

this allows me to say this is think, you know, one

39:48

of one of the pieces that's a little bit overlooked

39:50

when you look at some of the literature that's

39:52

come out around the evolution roadmap, is there's

39:54

not so much discussion of the IFC and

39:57

of Miga, and these are the private sector

39:59

financing arms of the world Bank.

40:02

But there's also an interesting question

40:04

about financing instruments. We've

40:07

been talking throughout this entire conversation about

40:09

loans and grants, but there

40:11

are other kinds of instruments that these MDGs

40:13

provide, for instance, guarantees.

40:15

And when you go back to the articles of

40:18

agreement of,

40:20

of the, for

40:22

instance, the international Bank for Reconstruction and Development,

40:25

they were really intended to be

40:27

an institution that was mainly providing guarantees,

40:30

and guarantees are much

40:32

more effective at leveraging

40:35

private finance than loans are.

40:37

So one of the points

40:39

that I'm really making is that, you know, if you

40:41

really want to kind of focus on,

40:44

you know, getting more

40:46

private capital in, it really does

40:48

require changing a lot of the instrument mix

40:50

that these institutions are using. And

40:53

I really do think move

40:55

a little bit more towards guarantee financing

40:57

through guarantees could

40:59

be a very appealing one for a lot of the different

41:02

client countries of the bank. The

41:04

second thing, though, that I will say

41:06

is, you know, one

41:08

of the other really big shifts that we've had

41:10

over over the past several

41:13

years is, you know, we're

41:16

now in a very high interest rate global environment.

41:19

And I do wonder,

41:21

it was, you know, during a time

41:24

of benign interest rates when investors were

41:26

starving for yield and really looking

41:28

for investments in emerging markets

41:30

and low income countries, you know,

41:32

and this was a time when interest rates were low. Now

41:34

there's a whole change

41:36

in kind of global risk appetite with interest

41:38

rates going up. And it really that search for yield

41:40

changes. Investors can stay

41:43

you know in advanced economies and get that

41:45

yield. You know that really can

41:47

change a lot of the equation to around

41:49

around the billions of trillions agenda

41:51

and around private capital mobilization. And if we

41:53

couldn't do it in a benign interest rate environment,

41:56

the higher interest rate environment, I think,

41:58

also makes it that much

42:00

more complicated. And just one more point

42:02

on this. This is also

42:04

an interesting conversation because it does link

42:07

back to some of the conversation

42:09

that we were talking had, were having earlier around

42:11

global public goods. And in particular,

42:14

you know, if you want to use

42:16

your concessional financing or your grant financing

42:19

to bring in private capital, is that

42:21

the best use of your money?

42:24

Is it is it really on private sector investments,

42:27

or is it on the public sector side? And,

42:29

you know, a lot of a lot of criticism

42:31

of the billions of trillions, it's you're using

42:33

a lot of development finance to de-risk and ultimately

42:36

subsidize private sector,

42:38

taking a lot of the putting a lot of the

42:40

risk on the public sector, but

42:43

not the upside and putting, you know,

42:45

really de-risking the private sector. So

42:47

so this is this is really turned into

42:49

quite a complicated, ferocious

42:52

debate in a lot of ways and can say it's

42:55

in particular, we do not have a unified

42:57

view on this. And this is one of the topics in development

42:59

finance where we are

43:01

often internally most most in disagreement.

43:04

All right. Well, look, I hope this, this

43:06

Lowy Institute podcast will not contribute

43:08

to additional disagreement at committee. I

43:11

have two last questions for you. For

43:13

the first one, I would like to take a step back

43:15

and look at the MDB reforms overall.

43:18

Do you think the current reforms go far

43:20

enough, and if not, what else needs to

43:22

be done?

43:23

Look, I mean, as it as it stands right now,

43:26

I don't think that the

43:28

institutions have done enough.

43:30

I don't think shareholders have done enough. I think

43:32

there's this is this is a little

43:34

bit more of a marathon than a sprint.

43:37

And and again, you know,

43:39

I really do repeat myself here, but

43:41

I really think part of this is I

43:43

think these institutions need to be a lot bigger.

43:46

I think these are this is the global safety

43:48

net. We need a bigger global safety net.

43:51

And there was a lot of. Speed

43:55

bumps to growing these. These organizations

43:57

and think until there's there's an agreement

43:59

on on what big or how to get

44:01

these organizations bigger. We're going to be at

44:03

an impasse around

44:05

the reform agenda. And that makes me very,

44:07

very concerned.

44:09

Okay. Well, that's actually a very good segment to my last

44:11

question. So in this podcast,

44:13

we'd like to conclude by asking our

44:15

guests for their big ideas on the topic

44:17

that we've covered in the show. I would like

44:19

to ask you this. What is your big ideas

44:22

for reshaping the multilateral development banks

44:24

and making them more efficient and better tailored for

44:26

tackling global challenges in supporting sustainable

44:28

development?

44:29

Well, you know, think we've touched on all

44:31

aspects of this in a lot of ways. So I'm going

44:33

to give you a slightly provocative answer.

44:37

I mean, think, you know, faster

44:40

institutions, bigger institutions,

44:42

more agile institutions, institutions

44:44

that can finance different kinds

44:47

of projects, but that are also still

44:49

focused on the poorest of the poor

44:51

and really on development.

44:54

I think we need all of that. And I think there's there's

44:56

right now, because

44:58

of the year of focus, we

45:00

are not at a time where there's a dearth of

45:02

good ideas. I don't think that

45:04

there's ever been so much written about the multilateral

45:07

development banks than there has in the past years, whether it's

45:09

by the institutions, by by

45:11

the governments that are shareholders,

45:13

by, you

45:15

know, think tanks, some think tanks.

45:19

So my wish for the world

45:21

is I think and

45:23

and and this is you know,

45:26

this is inspired by, by a suggestion

45:28

of a former colleague, you know, was kind of

45:30

making slyly on Twitter

45:32

is I think we need an international moratorium

45:35

for a year on all of these high

45:37

level global convenings

45:39

and think we need to start getting

45:41

some work done. This

45:44

year has been frenetic,

45:46

uh, traveling from

45:49

capital to capital. When

45:51

you look at the declarations and

45:53

the statements that are coming out of these summits,

45:55

they are very mushy. They

45:58

are both promising the world and promising

46:00

the moon and promising the universe

46:02

without really anything

46:05

concrete behind them.

46:07

And I think it's time to start

46:10

talking a little bit less and

46:12

doing a little bit more, because

46:14

we are really inhabiting this time

46:16

where we have some very lofty rhetoric

46:18

out there and not a huge

46:21

amount to show for it. So

46:23

I would like us all to

46:26

get to work.

46:28

Yeah, well, that's actually a great idea. And you

46:30

could also argue that such a moratorium would

46:32

also drastically reduce the carbon footprint of

46:34

NDB. So overall, it'd be very good for the planet.

46:37

There are there are many good externalities

46:39

that could come from this. We can start by

46:41

doing it for six months and then see how that

46:43

goes.

46:44

Well, this is all what we have time for today,

46:46

Clémence. Merci book. We thank you very much

46:48

for sharing your thoughts on those topics.

46:50

This this was really fascinating.

46:52

My pleasure. This was a wonderful conversation.

46:54

You've been listening to Development Features, a

46:56

podcast from the Indo-Pacific Development Center

46:58

at the Lowy Institute, hosted by institute

47:01

experts and produced by my colleague Josh Goodwin.

47:03

Development futures is part of the Lowy Institute

47:05

Podcast Network. Find all

47:07

our podcast series on our website.

47:10

Lowe institute.org/publications.

47:14

Thanks for listening.

Unlock more with Podchaser Pro

  • Audience Insights
  • Contact Information
  • Demographics
  • Charts
  • Sponsor History
  • and More!
Pro Features