0:01

Hello, you're very welcome to Long Reads, a

0:03

Jacobin podcast where we look in depth at

0:06

political topics and thinkers. My

0:08

name's Daniel Finn, I'm the Features Editor

0:10

here at Jacobin and I'll be

0:12

presenting the show. Earlier

0:15

this year, the French politician Jacques de Lour

0:17

died at the age of 98. De Lour

0:19

is best

0:21

remembered for his time as President of the

0:23

European Commission, from the mid-1980s During

0:28

that time, the European community became

0:30

the European Union. The

0:33

De Lour Commission also laid the groundwork

0:35

for the single currency through the Maastricht

0:37

Treaty. One of

0:39

the main ideas associated with De Lour was

0:41

the concept of a social Europe. Our

0:45

guest today is Orly Dianaara. She's

0:47

a research fellow at the University of

0:50

Avery in Paris. Her

0:52

book Social Europe, The Road

0:54

Not Taken, The Left in

0:56

European Integration in the Long 1970s was

0:58

published in 2022. As

1:02

Orly explains, the idea

1:04

of social Europe originated in

1:06

the crisis of global capitalism

1:08

during the 1970s. When

1:10

it was taken up by De Lour and his commission, it

1:13

lost its radical connotations and

1:15

eventually became an alibi for the

1:17

neoliberal framework of the Eurozone. Before

1:21

people began talking about the idea of a

1:23

social Europe in the 1970s, what was the

1:27

nature of the European project actually

1:30

existing as it had developed from the

1:32

Treaty of Rome onwards up

1:34

to the entry of states like Britain, Ireland

1:36

and Denmark in the mid-1970s? Post-war

1:41

European integration is generally presented

1:43

in the official discourse of

1:45

the European Union and in

1:48

mainstream political and media

1:50

discourse as very much

1:52

a peace project after the Second World

1:54

War, a project of a

1:56

few visionary fathers of Europe like

1:58

Jean Monnet, Chide de Gaspé,

2:01

Kaunerada de Naur, and so on.

2:03

But in fact, it was

2:06

really mostly an economic project

2:08

that was led by conservative

2:10

Christian democratic and liberal forces.

2:14

And socialist forces were really

2:16

marginal in the first years

2:18

of this integration process.

2:21

And communist forces were plainly

2:23

absent from European institutions until

2:25

the late 60s and early

2:27

70s. So

2:30

the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, and

2:34

it established the European Economic Community,

2:36

which is the forerunner of today's

2:38

European Union. And it

2:40

created in 1957 a common

2:43

market and a customs union

2:45

among the founding members, the

2:47

first members of the European

2:49

community, which were Belgium, France,

2:53

West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the

2:55

Netherlands. And the

2:57

treaty really marked after a

3:00

lot of discussions and preparatory

3:02

works, pre-preparation works, the

3:05

victory of a liberal vision

3:07

of economic integration to the

3:09

disadvantage of other visions and

3:11

of more social vision with

3:13

social harmonization. So to give

3:15

you an idea, in total

3:17

in the Treaty of Rome, only

3:20

12 out of 248 articles were devoted to social policy. Out

3:27

of these 12 articles, a lot

3:30

of them were quite irrelevant.

3:32

The only really relevant ones

3:34

were three articles. One on

3:37

an article that created a

3:39

European social fund, basically

3:41

an instrument which wasn't

3:44

efficient and had very limited

3:46

funding, at least until the late 1960s. Then

3:50

there was a second important article

3:52

on equal pay for men and

3:54

women within the European community. But

3:57

again, this was not applied until I...

4:00

the late 1970s. And

4:03

then there was a third article which

4:05

was quite relevant on

4:07

non-discrimination in working conditions and

4:09

in access to social protection

4:11

for workers that were moving

4:13

between different member states,

4:16

right? So migrant workers within

4:18

the European community. And again, this

4:20

article was not applied until much

4:22

later, at least the end of

4:24

the 60s. So to

4:27

simplify, the general conviction of

4:30

the people who drafted the treaty

4:32

and the people, the European leaders

4:34

and governments who signed the treaty

4:37

was that social progress would

4:39

naturally follow from economic

4:41

prosperity, that the

4:44

European community would create economic prosperity

4:46

and this would naturally create social

4:48

progress. And of course, this did

4:50

not happen, but

4:53

things remain pretty much unchanged. This

4:55

sort of social deficit of European

4:58

integration plans remain pretty

5:00

much the same until the late 1960s. One

5:02

of the main

5:05

architects of European integration in the 1950s was the West

5:19

German leader Konrad Adenauer.

5:22

Adenauer lobbied for the release of German

5:24

war criminals and employed former

5:26

Nazis in his government. This

5:29

newsreel from 1951 reported on

5:31

his trip to London to

5:33

help consolidate the Western alliance

5:35

against the Soviet Union. To

5:38

Pathé News, he speaks through an interpretive. I

5:43

am very grateful to his major government for the

5:45

invitation to come to London. It

5:48

is my cordial hope that the talks which I

5:50

can have here will contribute to peace and understanding

5:52

all over the world. In 1958,

5:55

Adenauer traveled to France

5:57

to meet the country's new leader, Charles

5:59

de Gaulle. carrying West German Chancellor

6:01

Konrad Adenauer for the first meeting between

6:03

the continent two top statesmen. Each a

6:06

powerful personality in his own right as

6:08

well as a great national leader. Their

6:12

meeting has an important outcome in de

6:14

Gaulle's assurance that France will continue to

6:16

work for post-link continental defense and economic

6:18

programs. Together they call for an end

6:20

to the ancient enmity between the two

6:23

nations as essential to the future of

6:25

free Europe. De Gaulle

6:27

was an independent minded leader who would

6:29

later pull France out of NATO's

6:31

command structure. But Adenauer

6:33

and his West German allies were always

6:36

firmly committed to the alliance with Washington.

6:39

In 1961 he went on a

6:41

trip across the Atlantic to make

6:43

some new friends in Texas. The Texas

6:45

spirit enters the usually austere chancellor as

6:48

he deemingly accepts the state's unofficial symbol,

6:50

the noble 10 gallon hat. If

6:52

he goes back to bond with the sheriff's badge

6:55

too, why it wouldn't surprise Texas at all.

6:59

During this period how did the

7:01

left-wing parties of Western Europe, both

7:03

social democratic and communist, perceive

7:06

and respond to the idea

7:08

of European integration? European

7:12

unity as you may know has

7:14

been one of the most contentious

7:16

questions for the European left in

7:19

the 20th century. And this was

7:21

particularly the case in different moments,

7:24

but one of them was just

7:27

after the Second World War for

7:29

post-Second World War plans for Western

7:31

European integration, which started in 1947

7:33

with the Marshall Plan, right?

7:36

This European

7:39

recovery program financed by US

7:41

loans, and which of course

7:43

was intertwined as other plans of European

7:46

integration in those years with the beginning

7:48

of the Cold War and the dynamics

7:50

of the Cold War, right? So

7:53

communist parties and communist trade

7:55

unions were inanimously

7:58

hostile. to the

8:00

Marshall Plan to start with

8:02

and to later projects of European

8:04

integration. For example, the European Coal

8:07

and Steel Community that was created

8:09

in 1951, the

8:11

European Economic Community in 57 and

8:14

so on. So in

8:16

the view of communist

8:18

parties and communist trade unions,

8:20

these projects of European unity

8:23

were really instrumental to isolating

8:25

the Soviet Union, to

8:28

dividing the European continent

8:30

and the world more generally in two

8:33

blocks, rallying Western Europe to

8:35

a Western block and placing

8:38

it under US hegemony. And

8:40

they really denounced those projects,

8:43

those early projects of Western

8:45

European integration as capitalist bourgeois,

8:48

Catholic, militaristic and also

8:51

imperialist and colonial. And

8:53

this started to change a little

8:56

bit in the 60s, especially at the end

8:58

of the 60s and in the early 70s. So

9:02

communist trade unions were the

9:04

first to change their attitude towards

9:07

the European economic community and

9:09

its common market, which

9:11

in those years they started to view

9:14

not so much anymore as something

9:16

that needed to be combated from

9:18

outside and abolished from

9:21

outside, but as something that could

9:23

be changed from within, that could

9:25

be improved from working within. And

9:29

so did the communist parties, starting

9:32

with the Italian Communist Party,

9:34

where there was a group

9:36

of pro-European reformers led

9:38

by Giorgio Amandra. The

9:40

French Communist Party, which was

9:42

the other very important Communist

9:44

Party in Western Europe historically

9:46

in those years, was more

9:49

hostile and more reluctant than

9:51

the Italian Communist Party. But.

9:54

It also gradually shifted its

9:56

position towards European reformism, which

9:58

we could call a. How

10:01

many European Reformism during those years?

10:03

So. By. The late Nineteen

10:06

sixties and the early Nineteen seventies.

10:08

Covenants, Trade Unions and Communist

10:11

Party's started to send representatives

10:13

within European institutions have

10:15

to take part in that

10:18

European decision making process.

10:20

Basically, And and the

10:22

Socialist side of things were

10:24

a bit different. Situation was

10:26

more complicated and also involve

10:28

during this third or the

10:30

first decade or first years

10:32

after the Second World War.

10:34

So to. Simplify. There was a

10:37

who could say that was a

10:39

line that divided the. European Socialists

10:41

and Social Democrats into

10:43

to road camps regarding

10:45

European Integration European Unity

10:47

There was one can

10:49

A comprising the friends,

10:52

the bells and that's

10:54

and Luxembourg is Socialists.

10:56

And Social Democrats who were

10:58

in favor of economic and

11:01

political integration and. Private

11:03

supported those early plans of

11:05

European integration as to the

11:07

war. And then there was

11:10

another camp including the British

11:12

Labour Party and the Scandinavian

11:14

Social Democrats which were opposed

11:16

to supranational European Union To

11:19

than the gym social democrats.

11:22

Either a difference, I'm sort

11:24

of evolution the were initially

11:26

or style ah in the

11:29

early nineteen fifties. for example

11:31

their leader cook too much

11:33

her used to whine and

11:36

to denounce what he called

11:38

the for European season which

11:40

were capitalism, conservatism, clericalism and

11:43

cartels so. German

11:45

Social democrats were very hostile to

11:47

early plans of European integration, but

11:49

by Nineteen fifty. Seven When the

11:52

Treaty of Rome I was

11:54

assigned, they had sister their

11:56

position. And they voted in favor of

11:58

the room treated. Like

12:00

all socialist parties of the six

12:02

founding countries, have, they have been

12:05

communities the British Labour Party. On

12:07

the other hand, Remains.

12:10

Costello. Are divided on

12:12

the question a up until

12:14

the eighties and a even

12:17

after the Uk, Denmark and

12:19

Ireland join the European Community.

12:21

In Nineteen Seventy Three

12:23

And. I think that

12:26

this initial of still it's he

12:28

and his divisions were one of

12:31

do many. Different reasons Why

12:33

do you have been less

12:35

sales to influence the European

12:37

integration? First this and to

12:39

realize that quote unquote Social

12:41

Europe in this year's. Francois

12:46

Mitterrand with one of the most

12:49

important figures on the European last

12:51

nineteen sixties time Ninety Nineties, Is

12:54

how can you sell a and Nineteen Sixty

12:56

ice? Shortly. After the famous

12:58

student protests and the general strike

13:00

and from. And this

13:02

part of his talk measure on spoke

13:04

about as an upper the or them

13:06

for the European project. He criticized out

13:09

to go on the French communists for

13:11

their stance on the question of Europe.

13:13

Latin. Like are unavoidable to

13:15

surpass. Lobby know the great the

13:18

paid which separates socialism. A new

13:20

motherboard journal. The goal is the

13:22

question of Europe for deal done.

13:24

I don't have books you don't.does

13:26

Western Europe have to have a

13:29

political. And. An organic

13:31

unity sit down mean an assault darkness.

13:33

It was a nineteen forty nine. The

13:35

German are and how they have some.

13:38

I'm not launched the idea of a

13:40

united Europe. Many was mom. Said.

13:42

To be when a point. Unluckily, this

13:44

wasn't the same time with the world

13:46

splitting into two factions under the Warsaw

13:49

Pact and under the No. two packs

13:51

of you need to. Go

13:53

see know How block also shown below

13:55

Been. It. Then up and therefore

13:57

not the idea of Europe seem to.

14:00

In Poland, Asian American military might

14:02

have it again. They. Are

14:04

more you do today and a way of

14:06

fighting communism. Virginia under bullet.

14:09

Ah, In a position the Soviets

14:11

had a deal as an overgrown

14:13

has a hostile attitude towards America

14:15

towards worth more for the communist

14:17

party has as you miss uniform

14:19

fucking fired have led to position.

14:22

The one must not next these two

14:24

positions. Virginia. And a

14:26

good citizen observers uses his nationalistic

14:29

system to prove this as a

14:31

both the particle minister nouri of

14:33

Us the communist party sites is

14:35

to finds a note of and

14:38

com and Europe because they are

14:40

enemies of American power is satanic

14:42

resource many deaths of yet because

14:45

road support the national might have

14:47

Russia the military might have Russia.

14:51

What impacted the economic crisis of

14:53

the nineteen seventies and the end

14:55

of Ten Posts one boom have

14:57

on the development is t European

15:00

Project. Out say

15:02

that. The crisis of

15:04

the Nineteen Seventies, the end of

15:07

the first one was one of

15:09

the factors that lead European leaders

15:11

to consider changes in European Integration

15:14

and their European Unity projects during

15:16

those years to it start imagining

15:19

you team community with a human

15:21

face that was and express in

15:23

the use of the times that

15:26

is really wasn't the only have

15:28

one right? So for example that

15:30

was May Sixty Eight and the

15:33

important. Workers and Students

15:35

movement dulcet Semitism environmental

15:38

movement that emerged. In

15:40

the late sixties and continue

15:42

well into the seventies and

15:44

more generally, the intensification of

15:46

the level of social conflict

15:48

in Western. europe in those

15:50

years and this had an

15:53

impact on european leaders decided

15:55

there's and on their higher

15:57

consideration for social dimension of

15:59

European integration in those years.

16:02

And there was also another

16:05

factor which is not

16:07

really well known but I think was important

16:09

which was the affirmation during

16:11

those years from the late 50s onwards

16:14

of a union of third world

16:17

countries for a redistribution of power

16:19

and wealth for what

16:21

they called a new international economic

16:23

order in this period.

16:25

And this had an influence on

16:28

European deciders and especially on left-wing

16:30

European leaders in those times. And then

16:33

there was the fall of the Bretton

16:35

Woods monetary system in the early

16:37

70s, the exhaustion of the

16:39

post-war economic boom, of course the

16:41

economic crisis of the 70s. And

16:44

the disintegration more

16:46

generally of the so-called post-war compromise

16:48

which had characterized the

16:50

sort of social balance,

16:54

social peace of the so-called

16:56

golden years of welfare capitalism

16:58

in the 30 years after

17:00

the Second World War in

17:02

Western Europe. And all

17:04

these changes during the long

17:07

1970s, so from the late 60s

17:10

until the early 80s, all

17:12

this contributed to opening

17:15

a window of opportunity

17:17

for new alternatives, for

17:20

new possibilities. So

17:23

in those years, and that's what

17:25

I argue in my book and

17:27

in my work generally, the European

17:29

integration project just like the

17:31

world order more generally seemed

17:34

to be at a crossroads.

17:36

And different roads could be

17:39

taken, different radical divergent solutions

17:41

where envisaged were being formulated

17:43

and discussed during those

17:45

years. And neoliberalism was only

17:47

one of these several options, it

17:49

was only one of the roads

17:52

that were imagined and possible and

17:54

there were actually alternatives

17:56

during those years. And

17:58

then I like to... which

18:01

I think is quite interesting

18:04

and sort of ironic

18:06

illustration of this tension in those

18:09

years, that in 1974

18:11

the Nobel Economics Prize

18:14

was jointly awarded to

18:16

two rather completely contrasting

18:18

thinkers. On one hand

18:21

the influential social democratic

18:23

Swedish economist Gunnar Myrbal

18:26

and on the other hand Austrian

18:28

British neoliberal champion Friedrich von

18:30

Hayek. And

18:33

so this tension during

18:35

those years and this

18:37

window of opportunity led the

18:39

European Left to start discussing and

18:41

to start struggling for their social

18:44

Europe project. And it was a

18:46

time, and this is important to

18:48

understand this story, it was a

18:50

time when the European Left was

18:53

in a moment of important success. From

18:56

the late 60s onwards social

18:59

democrats led governments

19:02

across Western Europe and

19:04

Scandinavia of course which was

19:06

their historic stronghold but also

19:08

in West Germany from 1969

19:11

in the Netherlands and in the

19:13

UK in the 70s and

19:16

France in the beginning of the 80s. And also

19:18

there were different countries in Europe

19:21

like Luxembourg and Italy where social

19:24

democrats or socialists were part

19:26

of coalition governments. And

19:28

at the same time Western European

19:31

communists had very significant electoral

19:33

successes especially in France and

19:35

in Italy. And

19:37

European trade unions also were

19:39

reaching a peak in terms

19:42

of membership and in terms

19:44

of combativity. So they could, the

19:47

European Left generally could hope

19:49

to influence much more the

19:52

European integration process, European policies

19:54

and to change Europe from

19:57

within. And during

19:59

the long-term, 1970s

20:02

socialist parties and trade unions

20:05

but also to a lesser extent

20:07

communist parties started to improve

20:09

their transnational cooperation in

20:12

order to be able to better

20:14

influence European policy. So for instance

20:17

in 1974 the confederation

20:19

of socialist parties

20:21

of the European community was

20:23

created which was the forerunner

20:26

of today's party of European

20:28

socialists and in 1973 the European

20:31

trade union confederation was created

20:33

which was a regional

20:35

trade union organization that united

20:37

for the first time since

20:40

the beginning of the Cold War

20:42

trade unions from social democratic Christian

20:45

socialist and communist traditions right which

20:47

had been divided since the Cold

20:50

War and now this

20:52

new organization represented around 40

20:55

million workers and could really hope

20:57

to weigh on European

20:59

decisions much more than in the past.

21:06

In 1972 the council of Europe

21:09

voted to adopt Beethoven's Ode to

21:11

Joy as the anthem of the

21:13

European community. The

21:15

previous year this electronic version

21:17

by Wendy Carlos was released

21:19

as part of the soundtrack

21:21

for Stanley Kubrick's film A

21:24

Clockwork Orange. European

21:31

officials would probably have liked the

21:33

combination of European high culture with

21:35

modern technology. They might

21:37

not have felt the same about the

21:40

association with psychopathic violence and

21:42

totalitarian state control in the rest of

21:44

the movie. So

21:55

as you said this was a moment

21:57

in European and world politics when Everything

22:00

seemed to be up for grabs in a

22:02

sense and there were various ideas being canvassed

22:04

and political forces of the left of

22:07

various kinds had significant

22:10

political positions and assets at their

22:12

disposal. So in this context what

22:15

were some of the main plans

22:17

and proposals that were put forward

22:19

on the European left during the

22:21

1970s for new forms of European

22:24

cooperation that might better facilitate their

22:26

own objectives and did any of

22:28

those plans, the ideas that

22:31

you refer to as the road not taken

22:33

or perhaps several roads not taken actually

22:35

come close to being realised? This

22:39

social Europe project was

22:42

imagined during those years primarily

22:44

by European socialists and social

22:47

democrats and by the

22:49

main European trade unions especially

22:51

organised in this European trade union

22:53

confederation I was talking about and

22:56

they were shared to some extent

22:58

by European communists and this

23:01

social Europe project aspired

23:03

for example to use

23:06

European institutions to regulate the

23:08

economy, plan and democratise the

23:10

economy, to

23:13

harmonise social and

23:15

fiscal regimes at the European

23:17

level, to raise living standards

23:19

and working conditions, to shorten

23:21

working hours and so on and

23:24

to generally use a series

23:26

of proposals that would generally shift the

23:28

balance of forces in

23:30

society and the European community in

23:32

favour of workers instead of in

23:34

favour of capital. And

23:37

also this social Europe

23:39

project included environmental concerns,

23:42

they were also including proposals

23:44

for democratisation of European institutions

23:46

which were considered by the

23:48

left anti-democratic or

23:51

a-democratic and it included

23:54

also aspirations to

23:56

rebalance the international economic order in

23:58

favour of the so-called the

24:00

third world, right? Now did

24:02

any of these plans come

24:05

close to being realized? Yes and

24:07

no. So in the

24:10

1970s several of these

24:12

social Europe proposals made their

24:15

way onto the European agenda and

24:18

the efforts of the European

24:20

left were crucial, for

24:22

example, in the adoption of the first

24:24

social action program in 1974 by

24:28

the European community and

24:30

this resulted in the adoption of

24:32

a number of measures and

24:34

of directives. Directives are European

24:36

laws, right? And this

24:38

included, for example, the

24:41

enhancements of the European Social Fund

24:43

that I was talking about before,

24:45

the creation of different European agencies

24:48

for vocational training and for working

24:50

conditions. But the progress was most

24:53

important with regard to gender equality and

24:55

health and safety at work and there

24:58

was a series of

25:00

directives adopted by the

25:02

Council in the second half of the 70s and

25:04

in the 80s with regard

25:06

to these two

25:08

fields. But it's

25:11

important really to underline that

25:13

the main proposals of

25:15

the Social Europe project imagined by the

25:17

left during these long 1970s were never

25:20

implemented, were never realized.

25:23

And I can give you two

25:26

examples of prominent campaigns and struggles

25:28

of the European left during those

25:30

years which were defeated. One

25:33

example is the battle for

25:35

an alternative economic strategy in

25:37

support of full employment in

25:40

which the European left really

25:42

decided to highlight one demand

25:44

in particular which was the reduction

25:46

of working time without wage losses.

25:49

This was the big

25:51

campaign of the European left

25:53

in the late 70s and early 80s. And this battle

25:55

went on

25:58

for several years and I can get into

26:01

the data right now but the

26:04

European Trade Union Confederation

26:06

even organized its first

26:08

European demonstrations all

26:10

across the European communities and even

26:12

beyond the European communities in

26:14

support of this campaign in the

26:17

late 1970s and early 80s but

26:20

this led to basically nothing

26:22

next to nothing. The European

26:24

Council only adopted a non-binding

26:27

and very an ambitious

26:30

recommendation on this topic

26:32

in 1984 and

26:34

then another important battle of

26:37

the European left during those years

26:40

was the battle for a democratization of

26:42

the workplace and the economy. This was

26:44

a very important topic at the time

26:46

and this led in 1980 to the proposal of

26:50

a European directive for workers

26:53

rights to information and consultation

26:55

in multinational companies. This

26:57

is the so-called Vredolin directive

26:59

after the name of

27:02

the social affairs commissioner, European

27:04

commissioner, Hank Vredolin who

27:06

was a Dutch social democrat

27:09

and who had pushed

27:11

for this directive proposal

27:14

and of course this directive

27:16

proposal provoked very strong hostility

27:19

from employers and from business

27:21

circles and also some important

27:23

opposition within your institutions

27:26

so within the European Commission

27:28

and within the council and

27:30

in the end basically the

27:33

directive was buried after years of

27:35

discussion in the European institutions it

27:37

was buried by the European Council

27:39

in 1986 and

27:41

there would be later directives

27:44

on these questions on these two questions

27:46

in the 90s and 2000s

27:48

but which were much less ambitious

27:51

than what the European Trade Union

27:53

and the European left had

27:55

striven for in the long 1970s. In

28:03

Nineteen Seventy Seven, with the

28:06

future of Europe still up

28:08

for grabs, the German group

28:11

Kraftwerk released their album Trans

28:13

Europe Express. The opening shot

28:16

Europe endless expressed a sense

28:18

of boundless possibilities with her

28:21

songs about motorways and railway

28:23

journeys, robots and pockets calculators.

28:25

Crawford perfectly captured the certainty

28:28

of European maternity. They

28:31

became Germany's most important cultural

28:33

export. Since the last days of

28:35

the Weimar Republic. Every

28:52

turn now to the way that

28:54

the European project or see to

28:56

develop coming out of this moment

28:58

of crisis and possibilities. And he

29:00

tells something about the political background

29:02

of Jacques Delors before he became

29:04

the President of the European Commission.

29:06

Surely the most influential president commission

29:09

had had a plot points and

29:11

indeed since then and what road

29:13

and he plays in the government

29:15

of Francois Mitterrand as a minister

29:17

during the early Nineteen eighties. So

29:20

I don't know how much is

29:22

the love is known out so

29:24

absurd Europe in the Us suppose

29:26

not so much that he's quite

29:28

in the Tories, political figure and

29:31

friends, and in Europe rights when

29:33

he. Died a couple of months ago.

29:35

I think it was in at the

29:37

end of December. The whole political and

29:40

media elites were in any moose. And

29:42

praising his role as wait you a

29:44

pin. And what is

29:46

interesting is that. Before. Becoming

29:48

President of the European Commission.

29:51

The Law had been really a key

29:53

player. In the Friends lists,

29:55

the Liberal turned in the

29:58

nineteen eighties his political trust

30:00

the three. Basically it was

30:02

that other social democratic reformists

30:04

who served on the radical

30:06

wave of the nineteen seventies

30:08

before rallying to economic liberalism

30:10

in the nineteen eighties. The

30:13

Law was ah convinced social

30:15

christian. He was a member

30:17

of the Christians Social Trade

30:19

Union for all his life

30:21

or he had been working

30:23

at the bulk of house

30:25

that national Bank is been

30:28

a member of the General.

30:30

Planning Commission to the National Friends

30:32

Planning Commission and then he has

30:34

been special advisor to Just Have

30:37

to do school a star Prime

30:39

Minister insects have on the math

30:41

during the early Nineteen seventies and

30:44

in Nineteen Seventy Four, he joined

30:46

the Socialist Party and the Socialists

30:48

or it's He. Had

30:50

to me since the

30:52

reorganized the fragmented forces.

30:55

Of Friends Socialism under delete the

30:57

files from it. They'll in those

30:59

years that the decision is for

31:01

it. He had adopted a common

31:03

program of government wisdom French Communist

31:05

Party and in the To Earth

31:07

the Socialist Party was advocating nothing

31:09

less than a redshirt with capital

31:11

is rights. Those are the words

31:13

that were used by it's either

31:15

me to on those shows and

31:17

I think is really striking that

31:19

during the seventies like the rest

31:21

as the French New Left that

31:23

we call. Second left off in

31:25

France. A secular was

31:27

advocating a decentralizing self

31:30

management socialism. He was

31:32

advocating socialist planning, and

31:34

in. France and in Europe. And

31:36

this changed very much in the

31:38

Nineteen eighties, right? So, Then

31:40

in May, Nineteen eighty. One

31:42

after. Twenty three

31:45

years of right wing. Government and

31:47

friends The Left one d

31:49

presidential election me see our

31:51

was elected president and the

31:54

Socialist. government took over which

31:56

was giant even by for

31:58

a communist ministers

32:01

a few months later. And Jack de

32:03

L'Oré was appointed finance

32:06

minister at this time. And at

32:08

the beginning, the new

32:10

government passed many major

32:12

radical social and economic

32:14

reforms, including, for

32:17

example, extensive nationalization of

32:19

industry and banks, mass

32:22

hiring in the public sector, a

32:25

rise in minimum wage, a rise

32:27

in pensions, growth, Canadian

32:29

stimulus plan, and so on. But

32:32

at the same time, unfortunately,

32:35

France's main commercial partners, trade

32:37

partners, starting with Helmut Schmitt

32:40

and Helmut Kohl's West Germany,

32:42

and of course, also Margaret

32:45

Thatcher's United Kingdom, they

32:47

were adopting deflationary austerity

32:50

policies as a response to the economic

32:52

crisis of the time, in

32:55

complete contrast with what the left was

32:57

doing in France, right? And

32:59

so, as a result, France

33:02

got confronted with increasing trade

33:05

deficit and increasing budget deficit,

33:08

but also with speculation and

33:10

continued downward pressure on its

33:12

currency, and increasing difficulty

33:14

to find loans and to finance

33:16

its budget and its expenses. And

33:19

it's also important to say that France

33:22

was a member of the European

33:24

monetary system, which was the

33:27

forerunner of the current monetary union,

33:29

European Monetary Union. And

33:31

this European monetary system already

33:34

limited the country's monetary

33:36

leeway, right? And

33:38

so, as a result of all this situation, in

33:41

March 1983, after

33:44

three devaluations of its currency,

33:46

the French government had to

33:48

choose, basically, between sticking

33:50

to the program, the socialist

33:53

program on which it had

33:55

been elected, which implied leaving

33:57

the European monetary system. the

34:00

other way around basically abandoning the

34:02

socialist program on which it has

34:05

been elected in order

34:07

to remain in the European

34:09

monetary system. And it

34:11

opted to abandon its program and after

34:13

1983 it carried

34:15

out a very radical change

34:18

of economic policy. So basically

34:20

the French government turned to

34:23

deflationary policies, budget

34:26

restrictions, a reversal of

34:29

nationalizations, progressive

34:31

financial deregulation and so

34:34

on. And this austerity

34:36

term which is called in French the

34:38

Tourndant de la Rigaire and which really

34:40

remains up until today a collective

34:44

trauma for the left in

34:46

France. This term was undertaken

34:48

in the name of Europe but also

34:51

under the influence and

34:53

the lead of Jacques

34:55

de Lour as finance

34:57

minister. This

35:04

was the song for Mitterrand's presidential

35:07

campaign in 1981. The

35:09

lyrics convey a sense of hope and

35:11

urgency telling the people of France

35:13

that it's possible for life to be different

35:15

with a new leader in charge. By the

35:22

time Mitterrand

35:24

died in

35:30

1996 the BBC could

35:32

present him as one of the

35:34

gravediggers of European socialism. This

35:37

is how the report summed up his career

35:39

from the late 1960s. Mitterrand turned the left

35:41

into a force in France for the first

35:43

time since the war. But

35:45

the promise of 81 didn't last

35:48

long. Two years later faced with

35:50

either abandoning the European monetary system

35:52

or abandoning his socialist policies,

35:55

Mitterrand did a U-turn ditching

35:57

the communists and abandoning socialism.

36:00

It was a defining moment for the left in Europe.

36:03

And it was the beginning of a long decline

36:05

for the socialists. By 1986,

36:07

Mitterrand was presiding over a Conservative government

36:09

that the fascist National Front was on

36:12

the rise. By 1993, the

36:15

socialists were crushed as a serious

36:17

political force. But long

36:19

before then, François, the socialist, who'd clung

36:21

to power through all of this, had

36:24

become François, the world's statesman. And

36:27

de Lour took up his position as the

36:29

European Commission President in the mid-1980s. How

36:33

did he adopt and in his

36:35

own way transform the idea of

36:37

social Europe? And what steps

36:39

did he take as Commission President to

36:41

implement that vision? Yeah.

36:44

So de Lour, as you may

36:46

know, is usually depicted not just as

36:48

a great European, as I

36:51

said before, but as really the

36:53

father of social Europe. And that's

36:55

for his role in, when he was

36:58

at the head of the European Commission, in

37:01

institutionalizing so-called European

37:03

social dialogue and strengthening

37:06

European social and cohesion

37:08

funds, and also in

37:10

increasing European competences and

37:12

regulation in the social field. But

37:15

in reality, if you look

37:17

at what he's been doing

37:20

right after he took office

37:22

as the new Commission President

37:24

in 1985, de Lour

37:26

really actually placed economic

37:29

liberalization at the top of

37:31

his agenda with the single

37:34

market project, right? So the single

37:36

market project basically had

37:38

the objective of completing

37:40

the European communities already

37:44

existing internal market with the removal

37:46

of all the remaining obstacles to

37:48

the free movement of goods,

37:51

capital services and interior

37:53

people. And this was

37:55

supported basically by all European

37:58

governments and especially of course

38:00

by Margaret Thatcher in the UK

38:03

and I would call in West

38:05

Germany. So basically by

38:07

the most liberal neoliberal governments.

38:09

And it should be said

38:11

also that pressures from the

38:13

various business lobbies were really

38:15

crucial in shaping the single

38:17

market program, especially pressures

38:20

from the European Roundtable

38:22

of Industrial, the ERT,

38:24

which was created in 1983 and which included basically

38:28

the CEOs of 17 top

38:32

European transnational corporations at

38:34

the beginning. So for

38:36

example, Volvo, Nestle, Fiat,

38:39

Phillips and so on. And

38:41

so clearly the rationale of

38:43

the single market program, which

38:45

was then institutionalized by the

38:47

1986 Single European

38:50

Act, another European treaty, was

38:53

very much free market oriented. And

38:56

in the following years, for instance,

38:58

in application of this program,

39:00

some critical directives were

39:02

adopted regarding the liberalization

39:05

of capital movement and

39:07

deregulation of banking and

39:09

insurance sectors. At

39:11

the same time, it's true that

39:14

the law and his administration in

39:16

the European Commission hope to cash

39:18

in on the success of the

39:21

single market program with new initiatives,

39:23

including initiatives in the social field.

39:26

But unfortunately, well,

39:28

the law, he had

39:31

been in the Socialist Party in the

39:33

70s and he knew the

39:35

social Europe project, he'd been part

39:37

actually of the work, of the

39:39

preparation of these and the formulation

39:41

of this project. But

39:44

unfortunately, the social aspects

39:46

of his agenda did not have

39:48

the same success as the economic

39:50

aspect. So for example, the

39:53

so-called dollar packages that he

39:55

was putting forward during his

39:57

time at the commission. were

40:00

adopted after a lot of

40:02

negotiations within European institutions and

40:04

between member states, which

40:07

increased the funds for economic and

40:09

social cohesion. But their

40:12

funding remains limited, right? And

40:14

the overall budget of the

40:17

European communities and the

40:19

European Union remain limited. And therefore,

40:21

the potential of the European community

40:23

and union for social

40:26

and regional redistribution has

40:28

always been very limited. And it

40:30

remains the same today. Even now,

40:32

the budget of the European Union

40:34

barely exceeds 1% of the European

40:36

GDP. And another

40:39

example of how the social dimension

40:41

of the activism of Jacques de

40:44

Lour was weaker

40:46

than his economic successes

40:49

was in 1989, basically

40:52

a charter of the fundamental social

40:54

rights of workers was

40:56

adopted, which had been a demand of

40:58

the European left, of European trade unions

41:00

for several years. And

41:02

it was adopted, and it's this

41:05

proclaim several social and economic

41:07

rights, but it was

41:09

non-binding. And the

41:11

social action program, which was adopted

41:13

the same year to implement this

41:16

charter, consisted only

41:18

of 47 instruments, compared

41:20

to the nearly 300 instruments for

41:23

the single market program. And most

41:26

of these 47 instruments were

41:28

actually non-binding with recommendations

41:30

and opinions. In

41:33

1993, the Dutch-Belgian group

41:36

2 Unlimited released this track.

41:44

Top the charts in 12 of the 15

41:47

countries that would belong to the

41:49

expanded European Union by the mid-1990s. In

41:53

The same year, another product of the

41:55

Low Countries, the Maastricht Treaty, came into

41:57

effect. The

42:00

unlimited and read the Maastricht Treaty or

42:02

Jacques Delors had ever listen to their

42:04

music for the lyrics to express a

42:06

form of Euro optimism that was rampant

42:09

in the early nineties after the fall

42:11

of the Berlin Wall. By

42:38

the time to lower step president,

42:40

the European Community had become the

42:42

European Union and is also had

42:45

several new member states' power to

42:47

change during the same period in

42:49

terms of quality rather than quantity

42:52

or nomenclature. So

42:54

the lower lanes for ten years of

42:56

the heads of the Commission between eighty

42:59

seven. Nineteen Ninety Five.

43:01

And. Qualitatively.

43:04

The main changes are the

43:06

main scenes of to European

43:08

Community which became the European

43:11

Union in Nineteen Ninety Three

43:13

of to the most restricted

43:15

rights. So the Menzies aside

43:17

from the single market and

43:20

economic liberalization was of course

43:22

monetary union European Monetary Union

43:24

which was a very important

43:26

quality the chains and this

43:28

turned out to be dollars

43:31

greatest political success actually. To

43:33

to explain. Just a few words in

43:35

Nineteen Eighty Eight. The European

43:37

Council appointed the Love to

43:39

share a common He composed

43:42

largely of European central bankers

43:44

to make new proposals for

43:46

the realization of economic and

43:48

monetary union. And

43:50

then the Do Love Report A was

43:52

released. A year later and it was

43:55

adopted by a European governments. And and

43:57

then to and Eighty Nine And it's said

43:59

the chorus. For monetary union,

44:01

it was than enshrined in

44:03

the master's. Treaty, which was signed

44:05

in Nineteen Ninety Two and the core

44:08

of this new Treaty. It was

44:10

the commitment of the member

44:12

states accepts the Uk and

44:14

and want to adopt a

44:17

single currency under the authority

44:19

of a single independent central

44:21

bank. By two thousand and

44:23

this was a very important

44:25

decision because it meant that

44:28

you have been government's with

44:30

abandoned key aspects of national

44:32

economic and monetary sovereignty starting

44:34

with their right to issue

44:36

money and to alter exchange

44:39

rates and the treaty also

44:41

formally introduced for the first

44:43

time to seclude conversions criteria

44:45

also called the masters criteria

44:47

that. Said basically a mandatory.

44:50

Rules regarding the member states

44:52

economic policies for example it

44:54

limited government said budgets If

44:56

it is to three percent

44:58

of their gdp their public

45:00

that sues sixty percent of

45:02

their to d p A

45:04

push them to keep inflation

45:06

rate slow and fallen and

45:08

actually much to do love.

45:10

So regrets at that time.

45:12

The negotiators a of the

45:14

mess with three teams with

45:16

fuse to influence conversions, criteria,

45:18

unemployment rates so on. Basically

45:21

social aspects. There

45:24

were also other qualities changes

45:26

during those years, with for

45:28

example, More. Integration in

45:30

the fields of security and

45:32

foreign policies or more progress

45:35

in. The Hills of Justice and

45:37

Police Coordination of but the the

45:39

main. Changes rated during those years

45:42

where I would say the

45:44

Single Market and European Monetary

45:46

Union which really constitution allows

45:48

the newly will turn of

45:50

the European Union during those

45:52

years. And

45:55

Nineteen Eighty Nice. Dr. Laura made an

45:57

appearance on a national trade Union conference

45:59

and. Britain free Spoke about his

46:01

vision of a social Europe. The

46:04

delegates gave him a standing ovation.

46:07

A few weeks later, Margaret Thatcher

46:09

hit back with a speech of

46:11

our own and Bruce. I'm

46:13

the first to say that are many

46:15

raises seuss the countries of Europe should

46:17

try to speak with a single voice.

46:20

Such a railed against the idea of

46:22

using the European Union as a vehicle

46:24

for social democracy. But

46:26

working more closely together

46:28

does notes to be

46:30

centralized in Brussels or

46:32

decisions with the been

46:34

appointed bureaucracy. We

46:37

have not successfully road saxophone

46:39

to of the states and

46:41

Britain only to see them

46:44

reimposed european nervous to the

46:46

European superstate exercising a new

46:48

dominance some Brussels. The

46:51

view that is to flourish and cleared

46:53

the jobs of the future enterprise is

46:55

the key. The. Lesson of

46:57

economic history of Europe in

46:59

the seventies and eighties. This

47:01

is central planning and detail.

47:03

Console don't work. For

47:05

getting rid of that is making

47:07

it possible for Clinton is to

47:10

automate only Europeans. Day Weekend best

47:12

compete with United States, Japan,

47:14

and the other new economic

47:17

powers emerging and Asia and

47:19

elsewhere. And

47:21

that lose access to free

47:23

markets accent to widen. Choice.

47:27

Action To reduce government

47:29

intervention. Our own

47:31

should not be more and more

47:33

detailed regulations on the center which

47:35

would be to deregulate until the

47:37

moves or constraints on trade. The.

47:40

Lore became a hate figure for the British

47:42

right wing press. The Sun

47:45

newspaper famously run a front page

47:47

story with a headline of yours

47:49

The Law. The

47:51

man himself felt obliged to deny

47:54

that he had any Napoleonic aspirations.

47:56

I don't want to. To.

47:58

Be as the emperor. Of the

48:00

Europe No, No No. One

48:03

implications did the single market some

48:05

the framework put in place by

48:07

the Maastricht Treaty House for the

48:10

idea of Social Europe. So.

48:13

I think it's quite obvious

48:16

to most people that if

48:18

you unleashed frayed a new

48:20

liberalized services and you let's

48:22

capital move freely within the

48:25

European Union oh within any

48:27

kind of regional or trade

48:29

area without prior to school

48:31

in social harmonization then you

48:34

inevitably pits workers again, seats

48:36

over and pit national were

48:38

for states with for regimes

48:40

against each other again so.

48:43

The single market close to

48:45

basically it's a race to

48:47

the but over social rights,

48:49

over salaries, overtaxation and over

48:51

a redistribution from the nineteen

48:53

eighties up until today and

48:55

this was actually of use.

48:57

To do you. Have been left in

48:59

the nineteen seventies when they works. You

49:02

know, discussing formulating imagining their

49:04

projects have a social Europe's.

49:07

And that's why they had been

49:09

talking on and on about Afford

49:12

Social, insist that I'm on a

49:14

Thiessen, and about greater control over

49:16

capital movements and multinational companies, and

49:19

about economic planning and so on.

49:21

And not about the. Regulations:

49:23

Orcs Economic liberalization

49:26

Now. While. The

49:28

single european that it's in a to seats

49:31

in the new as Retreat in Ninety Nine.

49:33

And then teachers are it's. Liberalized

49:35

the economy and imposed. Budget

49:37

to rigor the Social they mention

49:39

of European integration that had been

49:41

promised to trade unions and that

49:43

has been promised to your input

49:46

relations and ten you to lag

49:48

behind. Up until today there wasn't

49:50

agreements on social policy that with

49:52

the next to the master she's

49:54

it but it only really costly

49:56

increased the have been competences in

49:58

the social field. And it

50:01

could nudge counterbalance at this is

50:03

really important part. The social they

50:05

mentioned it was developed really couldn't

50:08

that counterbalance the constitutional I think

50:10

of neoliberalism at the core of

50:13

the new European Union. There was

50:15

also a social protocol and much

50:17

was treaty which institutionalized new European

50:20

social dialogue between employers, trade unions,

50:22

And European institutions that this

50:24

we the lead to Very.

50:27

Few results because given employers

50:30

reluctance and in the absence

50:32

of. Pressure. From European

50:34

institutions and from member states from

50:36

governments but also from below from

50:39

the rank and file from social

50:41

movements. this protocol couldn't bring much

50:43

and between nineteen nineties and to

50:45

doesn't first chance I think for

50:47

the first twenty years of the

50:49

application of this protocol only three

50:51

their relatives were passed and this

50:54

procedure on parental leave and part

50:56

time work and I'm fix turmoil

50:58

So the results were really. Very.

51:01

Very little. And by the

51:03

nineteen nineties and today I mean

51:06

it's quite obvious a you have

51:08

has been a going for for

51:10

and for for away from that

51:12

social Europe and Prozac. That to

51:14

your pin left had been fighting for

51:17

in the nineteen seventies and it was

51:19

really. Going far from and market

51:21

controlling the distributive, economic planning oriented

51:24

and democratised Europe at the service

51:26

of workers that had been imagined

51:28

by the happy. let them and

51:31

what was coming about was increasingly

51:33

it's a new of the bullet

51:35

Europe. Lose. Social dimension

51:37

was only compatible with free

51:40

markets and lives. extension of

51:42

private property. And

51:46

the new century European Union markham

51:48

some of the former communist state

51:50

and the east of the continent.

51:52

the Slovenian industry improve my back

51:54

and once I see their own

51:56

passports to refugees from Bosnia out

51:58

of her place and. You have

52:00

been released, a charcoal Eurovision and

52:02

Twenty fourteen at the High Point

52:05

of the Euro Zone crisis. The

52:17

lyrics aren't exactly subtle, but then neither

52:19

was the political climate of the time.

52:25

Following on from.points and I know this

52:27

takes us past the period that you

52:29

covert in your book bus. After

52:32

the. Financial Crisis Of Two

52:34

A Nice We saw the European Union

52:36

facing the greatest challenge, the greatest crisis

52:38

in it's history up to that point,

52:40

in the form of the Euro Zone

52:43

Crisis, which. Many people feared

52:45

or even hopes that might lead

52:47

to the breakup of the European

52:49

Union itself. How would you say?

52:51

We saw some of the legacies

52:53

of Shock Galore and the period

52:55

in which he was the driving

52:57

force at the Commission's play ios

52:59

during that crisis and away the

53:02

European Union responded. To us. Well.

53:06

The architecture of this some

53:08

European Economic and Monetary Union

53:10

created by domestic treated soloing

53:12

did the no reports of

53:14

following the law as the

53:16

advice transferred monetary policy of

53:18

twenty countries have to you

53:20

as elites to the super

53:22

national level and in deprived

53:24

you have been on fees

53:26

from money tree tools that

53:29

they were previously using to

53:31

face economic difficulties to regulate

53:33

inflation and unemployment and they

53:35

were. also limited in their

53:37

investment capacities by the masters

53:39

criteria it was the independence

53:42

european central bank that was

53:44

a lines very much and

53:46

german or to liberal minutes

53:49

with the elysee which place

53:51

priority on the fight against

53:53

inflation above as anything else

53:55

especially above the fight against

53:58

unemployment and also with no

54:00

real solidarity mechanism in

54:03

the monetary union, this architecture could

54:05

only turn into a straightjacket. And

54:07

it was especially a straightjacket for

54:10

economically weaker countries, countries that had

54:12

traditionally been, had the weaker currency

54:14

and had the weaker economies like

54:17

Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and so

54:19

on. And it forced these countries

54:22

to follow the rules of

54:24

the stronger currency in the Eurozone, which

54:26

has been and is, as

54:28

of today, the German-Dutch market. The

54:31

Eurozone faced, of course,

54:33

a very acute debt

54:35

crisis after the 2008 financial

54:39

shock, which lasted for many

54:41

years, which really showed the

54:43

negative impact of both liberalization,

54:45

of course, but of this

54:48

economic and monetary union,

54:50

especially on weaker European

54:53

economies. And Greece

54:55

was the most clearest,

54:58

the most blatant example of

55:00

this, right? Greece was hit very hard

55:02

by the economic crisis after

55:05

2008 for different reasons that are

55:08

structural to its economy. And

55:10

its debt increased very sharply after

55:12

2008. And

55:14

as a result, Greece was

55:17

punished by the markets, which

55:19

increased their borrowing rates and

55:21

made it impossible for the country

55:24

to finance its debt, right,

55:26

to find loans to finance its

55:28

expenses. And this pushed the

55:31

Greek government to ask for loans from

55:33

the International Monetary Fund, the

55:35

IMF, and from the European Union.

55:38

And it's actually important also to say that

55:41

the risk of a default payment or

55:43

default of payment by

55:45

the Greek government threatened directly

55:48

the banks of other European countries,

55:50

mainly French and German banks, which

55:53

had massively invested in Greek state

55:55

bonds in the Greek economy in

55:57

previous years. And so, This

56:00

is also the reason why the

56:03

so-called TROICA, the European Commission, the

56:05

European Central Bank and the IMF

56:07

in those years, forced the

56:09

Greeks to accept loans

56:12

of, I think, over 110 billion euros,

56:14

if I'm not mistaken, which

56:18

were conditional on

56:21

the adoption, the implementation of

56:23

very severe austerity measures, like

56:26

cuts on public services like health

56:28

and education, destruction of the minimum

56:30

wage, destruction of wage in general,

56:32

destruction of the wealth of state

56:35

and Greece and so on. And

56:37

so to cut a long story short, the

56:40

money went in

56:42

good part to French and German banks,

56:44

and the Greek economy was destroyed by

56:46

these austerity measures. And

56:49

this was in great part because

56:51

Greece had lost sovereignty over its

56:54

monetary policy, and

56:56

because of the absence of a

56:58

real solidarity mechanism in the European

57:01

Monetary Union, and

57:03

also, of course, because of the neoliberal Maastricht

57:06

criteria. When

57:09

Euronews asked Delors about the crisis in

57:11

2011, his proposed remedy

57:13

was to speed up the pace of

57:15

integration. Firstly,

57:22

could you tell us how you feel when

57:24

you see the European Union project in such

57:26

difficulties? I'm worried, and

57:29

I have regrets. I

57:32

especially regret that when

57:34

the euro became operational

57:38

during the decision-making in 1997, they

57:42

rejected my idea for an economic

57:44

policy coordination pact alongside the stability

57:46

and growth pact. Who rejected

57:48

it? I think

57:50

the heads of government rejected it. If

57:52

we had had that, the euro wouldn't have

57:55

covered it. mistakes

58:00

made by certain people. But

58:03

it would have stimulated the Europe. And

58:06

also in discussions with each other, they

58:09

would have noticed that private debt

58:11

in Spain was mounting to dangerously

58:13

high levels, that the Irish

58:15

government was turning a blind eye to the mad

58:17

deals made by the banks, etc., etc. But

58:21

they didn't do it. But why? Why?

58:27

Because leaving aside this business

58:29

of the Economic Policy Coordination

58:31

Pact, which they're now coming

58:34

back to in one form or another, but

58:37

it's a bit late now. The

58:39

problem which has arisen from the Greek

58:41

difficulties is simple. Do

58:44

we apply the no bailout as

58:46

written in the treaty, which states

58:48

that there will be no systematic

58:50

help for a state which

58:52

runs into difficulties? Or

58:57

does the Eurogroup feel that it is

58:59

morally responsible for not letting the situation

59:02

worsen in these countries, and

59:04

that being morally responsible, it takes

59:06

political decisions to address the problem?

59:12

That's the idea I've been putting forward,

59:15

especially to the Germans, telling

59:17

them, but we are collectively responsible,

59:19

we cannot simply point the finger

59:21

at the naughty Greeks. Particularly

59:23

in the light of the Eurozone

59:26

crisis, the question of the European

59:28

Union and the question of whether

59:30

it can be reformed has been one of

59:32

the major controversies for the European left over

59:34

the last 15 years or

59:36

so. What do you think

59:38

the long-term historical perspective that you set

59:41

out in your work can bring to

59:43

that debate? Yeah, so

59:45

this is a good question, a question

59:47

that I've been asking myself very much in

59:49

my work and writing my book. Well,

59:52

I think that

59:55

there have been less failure to build

59:57

a socialist Europe during the long 1970s.

1:00:00

70s holds important lessons for

1:00:02

the left today. I think

1:00:05

on one hand and most

1:00:08

importantly, it really suggests

1:00:10

a need for a certain degree

1:00:12

of pessimism, actually a very significant

1:00:14

degree of pessimism, I

1:00:16

think, about the possibility of

1:00:18

ever turning the EU into

1:00:20

an instrument for social, democratic

1:00:23

and ecological progress. And

1:00:25

I think it is really worth emphasizing in

1:00:27

this regard that in the

1:00:29

long 1970s, the balance

1:00:32

of power was much more

1:00:34

favorable to the labor movement and much

1:00:36

more favorable to the left than

1:00:38

it is today. And the

1:00:40

framework of European governance, European

1:00:43

socio-economic governance was much more

1:00:45

malleable than it is today

1:00:47

when there were only six

1:00:49

or nine or 10 countries

1:00:51

around the European table. And

1:00:53

now, today, with 27 member

1:00:56

states sitting at the council

1:00:58

table, and with neoliberalism really

1:01:00

more deeply anchored

1:01:02

in European treaties and policies,

1:01:05

I think that attempts to reimagine a

1:01:08

social Europe for the

1:01:10

21st century appears more

1:01:12

and more like a fantasy,

1:01:15

less and less likely. In

1:01:17

recent years, the COVID crisis

1:01:19

had forced European leaders

1:01:21

to open tiny breaches in the,

1:01:25

you know, the so-called Maastricht consensus, right?

1:01:27

You remember that the stability

1:01:29

pact, for example, has been

1:01:32

suspended for several years, but

1:01:34

conservative forces are already busy

1:01:36

re-imposing these rules and

1:01:39

reasserting austerity. So just a few

1:01:41

weeks ago, for instance, the European

1:01:43

Council announced massive

1:01:45

cuts in the European

1:01:48

Union public spending.

1:01:52

So I think there would be, you

1:01:54

know, reasons for high pessimism in

1:01:56

this regard, but at the same time, I think

1:01:59

that for those on the left who still

1:02:01

believe the EU can be changed, or

1:02:04

perhaps that the EU

1:02:07

could be supplanted by another type

1:02:09

of European cooperation and other type

1:02:11

of European unity. I

1:02:13

think that this historical perspective and

1:02:16

this forgotten defeat of social Europe

1:02:21

is really an invitation to work relentlessly

1:02:24

to overcome internal divisions and

1:02:26

strategic weaknesses on the left.

1:02:29

Basically, this story of a

1:02:31

defeat, the lesson of this story of

1:02:33

a defeat is that the

1:02:36

left has to invest much more on

1:02:38

internationalism, right? And some

1:02:40

people on the left today think

1:02:42

there are reasons to be optimistic,

1:02:45

as in a way social

1:02:47

democratic, green, and radical left

1:02:49

parties, with also trade unions and

1:02:51

civil society are better organized at

1:02:53

the European level than they used

1:02:55

to be a few decades ago. And

1:02:58

today, citizens are

1:03:00

more attentive to European politics

1:03:02

than they used to be. And also

1:03:04

the climate crisis pushes people

1:03:07

to think about issues transnationally in

1:03:09

a way that didn't exist a

1:03:11

few decades ago, until recently actually.

1:03:15

So this is true to

1:03:17

some extent, but I

1:03:19

think really that a lesson of

1:03:21

this road not taken, of

1:03:24

this story of a defeat, is

1:03:27

that in order to move the European

1:03:29

project in a radically different direction, which

1:03:31

is what we need, right? The

1:03:34

left would have to build a

1:03:36

genuinely transnational alliance,

1:03:38

a sort of a Germanic

1:03:41

bloc that is clearly opposed to

1:03:43

the neoliberal and the reactionary versions

1:03:45

of Europe. And the left would

1:03:47

have to agree on a

1:03:49

common program that would

1:03:51

be clearly oriented towards workers'

1:03:54

interests. And the left would have

1:03:56

to launch an offensive

1:03:58

based also... mass

1:04:02

mobilization, mass popular mobilization,

1:04:04

working-class mobilization. And we're

1:04:06

very, very far today

1:04:09

from being able to do this. And

1:04:12

without this, the left

1:04:14

will have little chance of

1:04:17

succeeding in turning the European Union

1:04:19

into a social Europe or even

1:04:21

just in turning the European Union

1:04:23

into something that is less of

1:04:25

an obstacle for any progressive social,

1:04:28

economic and environmental transition Europe. Many

1:04:33

thanks to Oreli Dianaara for that discussion

1:04:35

about the origins of the modern EU.

1:04:38

Her book Social Europe, The Road

1:04:40

Not Taken, is available from

1:04:42

Oxford University Press in open

1:04:44

access form.