0:00

There's a race for who's

0:02

going to become superior in the

0:04

next phase of military development that

0:06

comes out of these new technologies,

0:09

including artificial intelligence, including quantum systems.

0:12

And we certainly want to

0:14

maintain American military superiority, particularly

0:16

in the Indo-Pacific. Hello

0:21

and welcome to the GZERO World Podcast. This

0:23

is where you'll find extended versions of

0:25

my interviews on public television. I'm Ian

0:28

Bremmer, and today we are talking about

0:30

the complex and contentious and competitive US-China

0:33

relationship. After Presidents

0:35

Joe Biden and Xi Jinping met at

0:37

a summit in San Francisco last November,

0:39

the frosty relations were thawing just a

0:41

bit. Xi told a group of

0:43

executives China was ready to be a partner

0:45

and a friend to the United States. Secretary

0:48

of State Anthony Blinken called the US

0:51

and China relationship one of the

0:53

most consequential between any two countries

0:55

in the world. But

0:57

while both China and the United States

0:59

have committed to re-engage diplomatically after a

1:01

low point that culminated in last year's

1:03

spy balloon incident, there is still a

1:05

lot of daylight and not a lot

1:07

of trust between the two countries. Both

1:10

have engaged in tit-for-tat tariffs and

1:12

trade restrictions, Washington pushing to ban

1:14

China-owned TikTok, of course, and spin

1:16

it off, citing Chinese misinformation in

1:18

an election year, while iPhone

1:20

sales in China are plummeting

1:23

as consumers shun Western products.

1:25

Militarily, China continues to increase its

1:28

presence in the South China Sea,

1:30

and Taiwan's defense minister recently confirmed

1:32

US special forces were training on

1:35

its outer islands. So how stable

1:37

is the US-China relationship? Are

1:39

we adversaries? Are we frenemies? Are we toxic

1:42

codependents? Do we hate each other? What

1:44

do the world's two biggest economies and

1:46

largest militaries agree on, and where are

1:49

they still nautical miles apart? I'll

1:52

cover all that and more with

1:54

my guest today, US Ambassador to

1:56

China, Nicholas Burns. The

2:04

GZERO World Podcast is brought to

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you by our lead sponsor, Prologis.

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at prologis.com. Ambassador

2:30

Nick Barnes, so good to see you,

2:32

sir. Good to see you, Ian. US-China

2:36

relations always the

2:38

big, you know, sort of animal in

2:41

the room. Wondering right

2:43

now how much better do you feel about

2:45

how well managed that relationship is compared to

2:47

when you showed up a couple years ago?

2:50

Well, Ian, as usual, when you talk

2:52

about the US-China relationship, it's complicated. On

2:55

the one hand, I think we do have a

2:58

somewhat more stable relationship. Since

3:00

President Biden met with President Xi back

3:02

in mid-November in San Francisco, because before

3:04

that we had a very rocky 2022.

3:07

You'll remember Speaker Pelosi's visit to

3:09

Taiwan, which we supported, by the

3:12

way. But the Chinese shut down

3:14

a lot of our communications channels and then

3:16

that strange balloon floated across the

3:18

United States in early 2023. And

3:21

again, there was a four-month period

3:23

where we really didn't have consistent high-level,

3:27

cabinet-level channels. And that

3:29

all changed at San Francisco when the

3:31

two leaders decided, you know, we had

3:33

to have our foreign ministers, Secretary

3:35

Blinken and Director Wang Yi, and Secretary of

3:38

the Treasury Janet Yellen

3:40

and her counterpart in constant

3:42

contact. And that's important

3:44

because we have a very

3:47

competitive relationship and you want to be able to

3:49

talk about crises before they

3:51

– before – or as they develop.

3:54

And so that was important to

3:56

establish those channels in San Francisco.

3:59

And We had some very – The Civic Agreements China

4:01

would help us on sentinel the leading

4:03

cause of death in our society because

4:05

the lot of the precursor chemicals that

4:07

went to the drug cartels and Mexico

4:09

it come from China and the China

4:12

and the government in Beijing has been

4:14

helpful to us since then. Ah, the

4:16

Chinese agree that we would have military

4:18

to military senior level contacts and it

4:20

is. You know we've talked about this

4:22

are Chew militaries are operating in very

4:24

close proximity in the South and East

4:27

China Sea in Taiwan Straits and you

4:29

want to have. Those contacts to

4:31

drive down the probability of any

4:33

kind of accident or conflict we

4:36

agreed to talk about Ai. And.

4:38

The risks associated with artificial intelligence.

4:40

And finally, we agreed. Or at

4:43

San Francisco the two leaders did.

4:45

After Cove Id which ripped our

4:48

societies apart to try to return

4:50

students, business travelers, tourists between the

4:53

two countries and get slights restored.

4:55

So I think you. Know.

4:57

Some it proved to stabilize the relationship

4:59

in that sense. But here's the big

5:01

but. and here's what makes a complicated

5:03

we have a systemic rivalry. Between.

5:06

Us. And a very competitive

5:08

relationship on technology on a military

5:10

security and the Indo Pacific on

5:13

trade and investment. In of course,

5:15

we have a profound difference between

5:17

us. On. Human Rights and

5:20

On Human Freedom. So like anything

5:22

else in this relationship, it's a

5:24

question of balanced. I think it's

5:26

more of a competitive relationship, much

5:28

more than an is a partnership

5:30

relationship, but we try to work

5:32

with the Chinese where our interests

5:34

are aligned. Climate Change Sentinel are

5:36

too good examples of that. There's.

5:39

A lot more engagement even if

5:41

there isn't a lot more trust

5:43

up before we get to the

5:45

competitive parts of the relationship. What?

5:48

Why do you think the Chinese

5:50

changed their tune on on high

5:52

level engagement? Because it it's not

5:54

like the United States suddenly said

5:56

hey, let's start meeting them, we're

5:58

airports from the Us government's four

6:01

years or to get more regular

6:03

high level engagement between these two

6:05

countries on the books. And that's

6:07

not just true. on the economic

6:09

side, on the diplomatic sides, but

6:11

also on the military side in

6:14

the Chinese Government was resistance. That

6:16

resistance is clearly gone and back.

6:18

We saw that Yellen just announced

6:20

yet another trips or to go

6:22

over to Beijing are very recently.

6:24

So I mean what, What in

6:26

your mind led to the change.

6:29

I. Think two factors in number

6:31

one of the Chinese I think

6:34

we're it. Had to be impressed

6:36

and had to notice that under

6:38

President Biden, we've significantly strengthened our

6:40

strategic alliances here in the Indo

6:43

Pacific. You seen I think now

6:45

the strongest relationship that we've ever

6:47

had with Japan. You seen Japan

6:50

and the Republic of Korea. South

6:52

Korea come together with the United

6:54

States and a trilateral partnerships. you

6:57

seen the Philippines or reassert their.

6:59

Faith in our military alliance with

7:02

them, the emergence of our kiss

7:04

this a Australia, Uk, Us strategic

7:06

or organization looking as per teacher

7:09

military cooperation technology cooperation in the

7:11

future and India has become a

7:13

strategic partner of the United States

7:16

and meets with Japan, Australian, United

7:18

States, and the so called Quad

7:21

and China understood that the United

7:23

States had changed the game. Or

7:26

in the Indo Pacific, we have

7:28

become significantly more I think a

7:30

consequential because of those relationships as

7:33

reasonable. Reason. Number Two, Is.

7:35

Because the Chinese economy, of course, growth

7:38

has slowed. Foreign. Direct Investment

7:40

has dried up. Investor confidence had

7:42

been diminished because the troubles of

7:44

a Chinese economy coming out of

7:46

cove it and I think they

7:48

needed a period of com. They

7:50

wanted to calm the waters and

7:53

is a wanted to make sure

7:55

that Western companies particularly American companies.

7:57

Didn't. Leave China. Those words.

8:00

I think a to convincing factors

8:02

that led the Chinese to reconsider.

8:04

As you say our offer. To.

8:06

Have a much better communications channels between

8:08

the two governments. Better. The

8:10

issues it's gotten the most headlines are

8:13

between Us and China over the last

8:15

few weeks has been tic toc The

8:17

idea that the Americans are gonna require.

8:20

Ah, The Chinese by Dance, the From

8:22

By Dance to spin off Tic Toc

8:24

sell it. Ah, if they want to

8:26

continue to operate in the United States

8:28

been a bipartisan push or and the

8:30

other Chinese obviously unhappy about this, this

8:33

is one of their crown jewels. Technologically,

8:35

I take us through what it means.

8:37

Well. It's interesting. I think we'll have to see

8:39

what the Senate does and were Congress does. Before

8:43

will know in went to prescription.

8:45

Here is but the dialogue visit

8:47

the discussion here is been fascinating

8:49

are lots of people. Actually,

8:51

millions of people in this in

8:53

The And Nationalists netizens online essentially

8:55

decrying the fact that there might

8:58

be limits or a change to

9:00

Tick tock in the United States.

9:02

I find that to be interesting

9:04

because of course, Tic. Toc

9:06

itself. Is. Not allowed in China is

9:09

a Chinese version of it. But. The version

9:11

in the United States is not allowed. Facebook

9:13

is not allowed in China. A

9:15

Google is not allowed in China, Instagram

9:17

is not allowed in China. X

9:20

is not allowed in China. So

9:22

for Chinese to complain that somehow

9:24

the United States wants to have

9:26

an American company, may may want

9:28

to have an American company running

9:30

tic toc. I

9:32

find that a little bit surreal

9:34

because of the all the blockade

9:36

on a million American technology. Here,

9:38

it's difficult to get American media

9:40

here. It's difficult to get the

9:42

New York Times and Washington Post

9:44

online without. Here in China we had

9:46

a virtual private network and so it's a

9:49

little bit like the Pot calling the kettle

9:51

black. it's interesting when the

9:53

chinese response that would be it's not

9:55

that facebook is hop american firms are

9:57

banned on it is rather that American

10:00

firms do not want to adhere to

10:03

the censorship rules that

10:05

the Chinese impose on any firm

10:07

that wants to distribute

10:09

information and collect data

10:12

and the rest on Chinese

10:14

citizens. How do the Americans respond to that? I

10:17

don't think it's a convincing argument.

10:19

The fact is there's been a

10:22

technology blockade here in China for

10:24

many, many years against all the

10:26

leading American technology platforms. I think

10:28

it's really about competition from those

10:30

firms. And it's about the firewall

10:32

that has been set up here

10:34

to insulate the

10:36

Chinese people from the rest of the world, from

10:38

the internet in the rest of the world. So

10:40

I think that's what it's really what it's all

10:42

about. And yet Chinese citizens,

10:44

I mean, if they want to

10:47

find a way, I mean, I

10:49

certainly know a lot of Chinese

10:51

who through their VPNs are engaging

10:53

with Western media. Does the

10:55

Chinese government really think that a firewall

10:57

is effective? Well, you know, there are

10:59

1.4 billion people here. Not

11:01

everyone has the means to

11:04

purchase a virtual private network. They may

11:06

not know that it's possible to

11:08

do that. And of course,

11:10

censorship of any kind of

11:13

a kindness practice here, of course,

11:15

is something that's fundamentally anti-democratic. So

11:17

I don't accept at all this rationale

11:19

that's given by the Chinese authorities here

11:21

for the reason why our tech companies

11:24

not here. They're not here because

11:27

they don't want to have the free flow

11:29

of information. And certainly,

11:31

we prize that in our open

11:33

democratic society. Now, we're

11:35

just coming out of the China Development Forum. And

11:38

you had some 17 American CEOs,

11:40

among many others that made a

11:42

trip out to China to

11:44

meet with Xi Jinping, among other things.

11:47

The report that I'm getting is

11:49

a little bit more confidence on

11:52

the part of Chinese officials that

11:54

the economy is not collapsing, that

11:56

China's power has not peaked. feeling

12:00

that on the ground in your conversations

12:02

with Chinese officials? Well, obviously the economy

12:04

is a big, big part of what

12:07

I do here as the American ambassador,

12:09

what my team does. We

12:11

have a $575 billion two way trade relationship. China's

12:15

our third largest trade partner. We have

12:17

thousands of American companies working here, so

12:19

it really matters. And I think

12:22

there's no question that the economy here is not

12:24

going to fail. But they

12:27

are heading towards a future of lower,

12:29

lower single digit growth. And

12:31

they're very worried, as I said, about foreign direct

12:33

investment. I spoke to 17 American

12:36

CEOs over the last 10 days or so.

12:39

And I think the basic message that I, that

12:42

I would develop from that, those conversations

12:44

is most of the

12:46

American companies, if not nearly all of them

12:48

are staying, China's a huge market. And a

12:50

lot of these companies have been here for

12:53

decades. So we're not seeing countries, companies just

12:55

leave. On the other hand, you're

12:57

not seeing many big new investments by

13:00

American companies. And I think it is

13:02

because there are two messages that they're

13:04

hearing from the government here in Beijing.

13:07

One, which was heard very clearly

13:09

during the China Development Forum last

13:11

week and from President Xi and

13:14

the Premier Li Cheng. China's open

13:16

for business. China wants

13:18

foreign businesses. Investments will be protected, that

13:20

kind of thing. On the

13:22

other hand, the government has

13:24

made no qualms about the fact that

13:27

national security is their highest goal. And

13:30

that could mean things like rating

13:32

American firms, which happened a year

13:34

ago, several American firms rated some

13:36

of their employees, Chinese employees still

13:39

unfortunately and unjustly in jail.

13:42

It's also the Amendment to the Counter-Espionage

13:44

Act, which went into effect here in

13:47

China on July 1st, 2023, which

13:50

defines espionage in such

13:52

an opaque, non-transparent way

13:54

that it unnerves people about

13:56

coming here, some executives. And

13:59

so I think there's a- Today, tension, if

14:01

you will, between these two messages were open

14:03

for business, but the national security state, control

14:05

of data is another example of that, is

14:08

really the imperative. And that

14:10

confusion about the message has stalled, I think,

14:13

a lot of investment here. There's

14:15

a term of art that we hear

14:18

a lot from the administration, the Biden

14:20

administration, de-risking, that

14:23

American corporations should de-risk their exposure

14:25

to the Chinese economy. Now, that

14:27

doesn't mean ending the trade relationship,

14:29

of course, and as you just

14:31

suggested, it's very large. But is

14:34

it fair to say that the

14:36

Biden administration would like to see

14:38

overall reduced U.S. exposure

14:41

to the Chinese economy? Our

14:43

message is a little bit more specific

14:46

than that. Message number

14:48

one is, we don't favor

14:50

a decoupling of the two economies. As

14:52

I described to you, it's a huge

14:54

economic trade and investment relationship that

14:57

in many ways and in many areas

14:59

benefits American companies and American workers in

15:01

our economy. On the other hand,

15:03

and that's decoupling. We're not in favor of it

15:06

and we're not practicing it. But we

15:08

do use this term de-risking, originally

15:10

coined, by the way, by the

15:12

president of the EU Commission, Ursula

15:14

von der Land. And

15:17

it means that we're trying to alter our

15:19

supply chains and critical

15:21

materials and critical minerals so

15:23

that they're closer to home. That was a fundamental

15:26

lesson, I think, that everybody learned during the pandemic.

15:28

In our case, what we've specifically done

15:31

in October 2022, for instance, by the Commerce Department

15:36

is prohibit the sale of

15:38

advanced semiconductors, American semiconductors

15:40

to China for use

15:43

in AI research because that

15:45

kind of technology can be

15:47

used to assist the People's

15:50

Liberation Army to achieve

15:52

a qualitative improvement in their

15:54

military capability to compete

15:57

with us. And we're not going to do that. has

16:00

also signed an executive order that limits

16:03

in certain respects an ability of

16:05

an American venture capital or private

16:07

equity firm to invest in Chinese

16:10

AI. So in critical areas

16:12

essential for our national security, we're

16:14

not going to permit trade. And

16:17

here's what's interesting about it. China's doing

16:19

the same thing. In fact, China

16:21

started to de-risk well before

16:23

the United States did years before. China

16:26

does not permit the sale of

16:28

its most advanced technologies that could be

16:30

dual use, used for military purposes

16:33

to the United States and hasn't done that,

16:35

done so for years. And the

16:37

Chinese are very rapidly

16:39

de-risking themselves trying to make

16:42

sure that they're self-sufficient or near

16:44

so in areas that are critical

16:47

to them. This is a very rational choice

16:49

that the two governments are making. What makes

16:51

it a little bit strange is

16:53

that there's a lot of complaints that I

16:55

receive from my Chinese counterparts about

16:58

our de-risking strategy. And I remind them,

17:00

you're doing the same thing. When

17:03

you look back on Chinese history, what's the

17:05

first because of course, for a long time,

17:07

China didn't have any of those technologies. For

17:10

a long time, China was just trying

17:12

to get themselves into the market, attract

17:14

investment, and then use the

17:17

size of that market and an

17:19

opaque authoritarian political system to

17:21

try to help ensure that they

17:23

could transfer those technologies either legally

17:26

or less legally to their

17:28

own corporations. What was the

17:30

first thing you'd notice that was significant

17:32

that showed that the Chinese themselves wanted

17:35

to de-risk? Well, I

17:37

mean, it was 2015, well before

17:39

I arrived as ambassador seven

17:42

years later. And that was

17:44

China's declaration that they wanted to

17:46

have a Made in China 2025 project. They

17:49

didn't want to just be self-sufficient

17:52

in biotechnology, machine learning,

17:54

artificial intelligence, quantum

17:57

systems. They wanted to be

17:59

dominant. in the world. They certainly

18:01

have achieved a level

18:03

of dominance, say in electric vehicles and

18:05

the supply chain for electric vehicles, at

18:08

least so far as of this

18:10

year. They're certainly the world's

18:12

leader in both solar and wind

18:15

technology. And so they're prodigious in

18:17

that respect. But this 2015 declaration,

18:20

we want to be dominant, I

18:22

think, in an unnerved a lot of people in

18:25

the United States, in Western Europe, in Japan, in

18:27

Korea, in India. And you

18:29

see us now in all those places pushing

18:32

back, demanding that

18:34

China cease its use

18:36

of cyber to favor its

18:39

own companies in competition with our

18:41

companies to enforce technology transfer,

18:43

which is another practice, Ian, that you and

18:45

I both have observed here in China when

18:47

they try to rip off the technology of

18:50

one of our companies here to

18:52

end IP theft. So we're

18:54

looking for a fair and

18:56

open trade relationship, but one

18:58

that has a level playing field

19:00

for the United States. And some

19:02

of our companies do very well

19:05

here. Others are disadvantaged by these

19:07

non-market practices of the

19:10

government here. So our job is

19:12

to fight for American companies and workers and

19:14

fight for them to have a fair chance

19:16

to succeed. And that's been ongoing

19:18

through several administrations. But I do think it

19:20

was that moment in 2015, nine

19:25

years ago, when China's

19:28

boasts, China's ambitions got the attention of all

19:30

of us, and we've all reacted to it.

19:33

When I think about Gina

19:35

Raimondo, the Secretary of Commerce,

19:37

her recent comment that Chinese

19:40

electric vehicles are iPhones on wheels.

19:42

And I mean, you know, that's

19:44

one that I've heard from Chinese

19:46

officials, senior Chinese officials, they really

19:48

took exception to that.

19:50

And the Chinese, you know, sort of

19:52

official line is, well, anytime we get

19:54

world class at something, that's when the

19:56

Americans want to shut us down, like

19:58

electric automobiles. And it's not like

20:01

there's a dual military use on

20:03

the EV side, unless you're arguing

20:05

that any time the Chinese have

20:07

access to data, that that's essentially

20:09

something that the Americans shouldn't tolerate.

20:12

Well, I think in this, you've seen

20:14

the president's statement on connected vehicles

20:17

asking Secretary Raimondo and the Department

20:19

of Commerce to engage in

20:22

an investigation of the implications of

20:24

that for the American economy,

20:26

for American workers, American people. And

20:29

in fact, data has become a

20:31

very big priority for the government

20:33

here in China. They're controlling data.

20:36

They prohibit cross-border data flows in

20:38

a number of areas. So

20:41

when they complain about our

20:43

attempts to make sure that

20:45

the data of Americans, private

20:47

information of Americans, isn't available

20:49

to certain countries like China,

20:51

well, they've been doing, again,

20:54

the same thing on their side. And

20:56

so we want to have an element of

20:58

fairness here. And it's our obligation to protect

21:01

the interests of individual Americans. And that's why

21:03

our government is acting the way we are.

21:07

So I'm not pushing back here

21:09

because I think you're wrong. I'm

21:11

pushing back because I want to

21:14

tease out something, which is that

21:16

as the global economy becomes more

21:19

reliant on data, as the digital

21:21

economy becomes increasingly the dominant way

21:24

that countries do

21:27

business with one another, does

21:29

it become inevitable that

21:32

de-risking becomes

21:34

decoupling? We have always

21:36

said that the

21:38

formulation small yard and high fence, that

21:41

we think de-risking right now is

21:44

going to be across a narrow band of

21:46

technologies, that we prohibit the

21:48

sale to China, not for commercial reasons,

21:51

not to protect an American

21:53

company, but for national security reasons. I

21:56

think you know, Ian, in fact, we've talked about it.

21:58

There's a race. For who's

22:01

gonna be com superior in the

22:03

next phase of military development that

22:05

comes out of these new technologies

22:07

including artificial intelligence including quantum systems

22:09

And we certainly want to maintain

22:12

American military superiority, particularly in the

22:14

Indo Pacific, particularly as we are

22:16

compared against the qualities of the

22:18

People's Liberation Army. So there's just

22:21

no way that we're going or

22:23

allow the sale of these Julius

22:25

technologies and our actions have been

22:27

limited to a small yard. there.

22:30

Are A So secretary Amanda was

22:32

here. In late August early

22:34

September and she said very clearly to

22:36

the Government of China these these i'm

22:38

technology restrictions on the national security around

22:40

their non negotiable and she's not going

22:43

to compromise on them. That's what I

22:45

said and that's A that's what does

22:47

the rest of our officers of the

22:49

government of said So we're going to

22:52

stick to that's it's the only way

22:54

forward to achieve. What? We need

22:56

to cheat or to achieve in that

22:58

is sadness and trade but also keep

23:00

out of the hands of a Chinese

23:02

leadership or most sensitive dodgers technology outs.

23:04

Let's move on to are a couple

23:07

of the most challenging as she is

23:09

out there and Taiwan and South China

23:11

seats us. We had ah at a

23:13

time when he selects since there were

23:15

so many journalists that were that said

23:17

that if Mr lie them for vice

23:19

president Al going vice president were to

23:21

win on that it was gonna lead

23:23

to more confrontation between us and China.

23:25

So. Far it doesn't

23:28

appear. That. That is

23:30

the case. I mean, he won

23:32

pretty convincingly. it's but the relationship

23:34

seems reasonably stable is that is

23:36

that a fair assessment or the

23:38

things we're not seeing? Well.

23:40

I think it's been reasonably quiet

23:42

and that's a good thing. Me

23:44

we bought, we've we've I'd hear

23:46

that he and his you know

23:48

to have a specific one china

23:50

policy ever since President Nixon went

23:52

to China in Nineteen, Seventy Two

23:54

has evolved over time, but we've

23:56

been very consistent as you look

23:58

through the Taiwan relations. And

24:00

the three join communiques that we

24:03

think that the only solution. To

24:06

the cross strait tensions between the

24:08

People's Republic of China and Taiwan.

24:10

or as a peaceful solution. So

24:13

that's our mantra and we do

24:15

everything we can to encourage dialogue

24:17

and to encourage especially the garment

24:19

Beijing to focus on on what

24:22

they can do to enhance communication

24:24

with the other side. And we'd

24:26

like them to commit to a

24:28

unequivocally to a peaceful solution which

24:31

they haven't done by. Think that

24:33

has to be the standards in

24:35

terms. Of. The basic stability

24:37

of that critical waterway. I think

24:39

you know that more than half

24:42

the container traffic in the world.

24:44

Flows. Through the Taiwan Strait

24:47

on a daily weekly basis

24:49

and so consider. If

24:51

the Taiwan Strait were ever to

24:53

be close because of conflict, the

24:55

catastrophic implications for the global economy

24:57

that's just on the economic side

24:59

but also the war and peace

25:01

consequences for basic to two cities

25:03

or stability in as part of

25:05

the world is obviously a front

25:07

order priority as well, so we've

25:09

been very consistent. Since Speaker Pelosi

25:11

is visit, you've seen. An

25:14

increase in Chinese air and naval

25:16

sorties in the Taiwan Strait across

25:18

the center line, which was established

25:21

seventy years ago in the nineteen

25:23

fifties. We think that ought not

25:25

to happen, and we caution. Out

25:28

the government here to be responsible, and

25:30

the way it quits itself visa be

25:32

Taiwan obviously? We hear from the

25:34

Chinese or that they want to erase. That.

25:37

Center Line does it look like that

25:39

is the strategy that they're putting in

25:41

place. Ah, The present.

25:44

We. Think they're be very unwise because

25:46

it's part of what in our we

25:48

call and diplomatic terms the status quo

25:50

and understanding. Since. the nineteen fifties

25:53

that there have to be limits

25:55

on the military activities of both

25:57

sides and so that status quo

26:00

It may be criticized a lot by the

26:02

government here and nationalist netizens

26:04

here online in China, but it's

26:06

kept the peace and

26:08

peace is the paramount priority. It has to

26:10

be, we think, for both

26:13

sides of the strait and for all of us who have

26:15

obviously have an interest in maintaining peace

26:17

there. Victory speech

26:20

from incoming President Lai, to me at

26:22

least, seemed like it was also committed

26:24

to the status quo. How confident are

26:26

you that he's going to do

26:29

that when he is inaugurated in

26:31

the coming weeks? Well, I

26:33

learned a long time ago, Ian, never

26:36

to answer a hypothetical question about what may happen a

26:38

couple of months from now, but I can say this.

26:41

Obviously, it's our view that

26:43

both sides have to be responsible about

26:46

what they say and about their

26:48

actions, and that certainly goes for the government

26:50

in Beijing, which is where I focus my

26:52

attention. My job, obviously, is to

26:54

be point of contact with

26:57

the government here on Taiwan, on South

26:59

China Sea, on North Korea, on all

27:01

these very difficult national security

27:03

interests that we have,

27:05

and that's our mantra to the

27:08

government here. But it applies, and I think we've

27:10

been even-handed for 50

27:12

years in saying both sides of

27:15

the strait have a responsibility to keep the

27:17

peace. Obviously, we have

27:20

specific commitments to

27:22

Taiwan in the Taiwan

27:24

Relations Act, and that's to provide a

27:27

defensive weaponry. That's

27:29

to provide sufficient

27:31

American capability in

27:34

the region to ensure the peace. And so

27:36

we have a very specific set of legal

27:38

commitments that come out of the Taiwan Relations

27:41

Act passed in 1979, the year

27:43

that we normalized fully our relationship with

27:45

the People's Republic of China. So

27:47

that's something we take very seriously as well.

27:49

And obviously, Taiwan is a thriving

27:52

democracy, with an

27:54

extraordinary economy, and that economy is very

27:57

important. As you know, think

27:59

about TSM-C. sea and semiconductor, the

28:01

most advanced semiconductors in the world,

28:04

it's really a critical place for global

28:06

economic as well as political stability.

28:10

Absolutely. Absolutely. I will say that

28:13

I'm a little more concerned these days about

28:16

the status quo not holding in the South

28:18

China Sea, at least near

28:20

term than I am in Taiwan.

28:22

I'm in Taiwan, both sides know

28:24

each other's red lines and have

28:26

for decades. That's less clear when

28:29

we talk about the Philippines. Certainly

28:33

I've seen from Chinese officials

28:35

a zero tolerance in terms

28:37

of Philippines sailors

28:42

being able to shore up this

28:45

show that is falling apart. Do

28:49

you believe that we are closer to

28:51

conflict between the United States and

28:53

China on this issue than we have been before? Our

28:56

policy is that China

28:59

should not seek to

29:01

coerce or intimidate the government

29:03

of the Philippines at second time at Seoul.

29:06

The rest of the world, nearly all

29:08

countries support the Philippines, including the United

29:10

States. We regularly

29:12

talk to the government of China about

29:14

this and suggest to

29:17

them that they should cease

29:19

their intimidation of the Philippines. We

29:21

also have said, you've heard Secretary Blinken say this

29:23

just a couple of weeks ago when he was

29:25

in Manila, that the mutual

29:27

defense treaty that we have with

29:29

the Philippines from 1951, including Article

29:32

4 of that treaty,

29:34

applies. We hope

29:36

very much that the Chinese are going to

29:38

understand there is acute international

29:40

interest here and the

29:43

Philippines has an absolute right

29:45

to resupply their forces in that

29:47

particular shoal and other areas where they

29:49

have part of their

29:51

exclusive economic zone or their sovereign territory.

29:55

Is it fair to say that there

29:57

is more risk given the lack

29:59

of pressure? precedent and the

30:01

lack of an existing structure between

30:04

the United States and China on 2nd Thomas-Scholes

30:06

and there is around Taiwan right now? It's

30:09

hard to compare the two. I think they're

30:11

both very important for stability

30:13

in this region. We're always concerned

30:16

and have been always concerned about Taiwan

30:18

and that's why we message that to

30:21

the government of China routinely. But

30:23

Ian, I would grant you the tensions

30:27

around 2nd Thomas-Scholes over the last

30:29

several months have been really palpable

30:32

and it is worrisome to us.

30:34

So the United States and the rest of

30:37

the world expect China, the People's Republic of

30:39

China, to commit to

30:41

a peaceful resolution of

30:43

this problem on 2nd Thomas-Scholes.

30:45

We have no doubt that the Philippines

30:48

is in the right and so we

30:50

expect China to act responsibly here. So

30:53

before I close, you're working

30:56

with, engaging

30:58

with a government run

31:01

arguably by the most

31:03

powerful man in the world. Xi

31:06

Jinping has consolidated an incredible amount

31:08

of power since he first took

31:10

over the Communist Party and

31:14

it's, on the one hand,

31:16

that can be incredible

31:19

because he can make decisions very, very quickly

31:22

and push them through, as we saw at

31:24

the end of zero, COVID, for example. On

31:27

the other, it can be really, really

31:29

hard to know what's coming

31:31

next. The opacity in such a system

31:34

can be significant. I'm

31:36

wondering, what's it like? What's it been like

31:38

for you to be America's

31:41

lead diplomat engaging

31:43

in that system? Well

31:46

it's a really compelling

31:48

time here in China because

31:50

it's been clear since the 20th Party

31:53

Congress that the rise of the party

31:55

here is quite significant

31:57

in terms of recent Chinese

31:59

history. And certainly we're

32:01

dealing, I'm dealing on a

32:04

day-to-day basis with an extraordinary powerful government

32:07

and as you say a powerful leader. And

32:10

so it's incumbent upon us to

32:13

be talking with them about all these

32:15

challenges to global security as well as

32:17

to the challenges of our bilateral relationships.

32:19

So my role is to be point

32:21

of contact on a daily basis with

32:24

ministers here, with vice ministers, with

32:26

members of the National People's Congress, with

32:28

leading business people. I mean, one

32:31

job that we have obviously is to be keenly

32:33

analytical about what's happening here. But

32:36

a top order priority is to communicate

32:38

the kind of messages that we've been talking

32:40

about in this show on

32:43

very difficult issues so that they

32:45

clearly understand our policies,

32:47

our motivations, and

32:49

where our red lines are. So

32:52

I think this is a largely

32:54

competitive relationship. If I think about

32:57

the US-China relationship, it's a systemic

32:59

rivalry. It'll likely to

33:01

be a systemic rivalry well into the

33:04

2030s between the two largest economies

33:06

in the world, the two strongest

33:08

militaries in the world, the

33:11

two strongest technology and AI societies in

33:13

the world. And so

33:15

what happens here is very consequential. And

33:18

I hope that we'll be able to conduct

33:20

this relationship in such a way that we

33:22

defend our interests, obviously. But

33:25

as President Biden often says,

33:27

that we act responsibly and

33:29

drive down the probability of any kind of

33:31

conflict, because that would be, of course, catastrophic.

33:34

So that's how I see

33:36

my job representing President Biden and

33:38

our government here. But to live here, it's

33:41

been fascinating to see the changes just in

33:43

the two years that my wife, Libby, and

33:45

I have been here on the streets of

33:48

China to see the

33:50

fact that we've

33:52

had so few Americans here because

33:54

of zero COVID, the policy that

33:56

they had here during the pandemic

33:58

of quarantines. and

34:01

forcing daily

34:03

testing, twice a

34:06

week testing on many of us over

34:08

the last couple of years. That's over

34:10

now, but China is struggling

34:12

in a way economically to reassert itself.

34:15

And the United States has an interest in

34:18

making sure that our interests are met here

34:20

on all these national security issues. So fascinating

34:23

time to be ambassador here. And

34:25

I must say, Ian, I want to say this. We

34:28

have one of the largest embassies in the world here. We

34:31

have 48 US government agencies,

34:34

government and diplomacy are a team sport. I

34:37

have a terrific and highly motivated

34:39

and highly skilled group

34:41

of people working with me. And

34:44

that gives me confidence when I get up in the morning to

34:47

negotiate all these complex issues with the Chinese.

34:50

Ambassador Nick Burns, thanks so much for joining us. Ian,

34:53

thanks so much. That's

34:57

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