2:00

such as dealing with the wars in Ukraine or

2:02

Gaza. The IMS and the

2:04

World Bank, well, they're seen as Western

2:06

institutions dealing mostly with problems in the

2:08

global South, and it's not working out.

2:11

So the question then is, is multilateralism

2:14

broken? I

2:17

put that question to Borge Brenda,

2:19

the president of the World Economic

2:21

Forum and a former foreign minister

2:23

of Norway. I usually

2:25

run into Borge either at Davos

2:27

in Switzerland, where the World Economic

2:29

Forum's annual meeting is held, or

2:32

in New York. This time we

2:34

met up in Doha in Qatar

2:36

on the sidelines of the Doha

2:38

Forum, where questions about the world

2:40

order were hot topics of discussion.

2:43

Global Reboot is a partnership between

2:46

foreign policy and the Doha Forum.

2:48

This is episode eight of season

2:50

three, our final episode this year.

2:53

Let's dive in. Borge

2:57

Brenda, thank you for joining us. Thank you so

2:59

much for inviting me. So

3:01

everyone says multilateralism is broken,

3:04

is it? It's

3:07

not in its finest moments, that's for

3:09

sure. Intergovernmental processes

3:11

are very difficult. We see

3:13

that now during COP28. We

3:16

also know that at the

3:18

heart of multilateralism, intergovernmental processes

3:20

is the Security Council at

3:23

the UN, and the mood there is

3:25

quite toxic. Even during

3:28

the Cold War, there was areas

3:31

where they could agree

3:33

on resolutions. Today

3:36

it is a lot tougher. The

3:39

challenge though with multilateralism being

3:41

under so much pressure, is

3:44

that more and more of

3:47

the great challenges of our time do

3:49

travel without passport. Climate

3:52

change, pandemics, cyber

3:55

attacks. Also, AI has a

3:58

lot of problems. huge

4:00

impact on all of us. And if

4:02

we're gonna set standards and gonna make

4:05

sure that we work in the interests

4:07

of humankind, we need to deal

4:09

with those challenges at

4:12

the right level. That's the global

4:15

level. The only way to, for

4:17

example, put out rules

4:19

for artificial intelligence

4:22

is that we agree on

4:24

some common traffic rules. And

4:27

we're not close to that. But what's changed

4:30

here? Because was there a time 20-30 years

4:33

ago when multilateralism was working better than

4:35

it is now? And if that's the

4:38

case, what's changed? I

4:41

think it was, of course,

4:44

easier just the decade after

4:46

the Cold War. Then

4:49

you were more in a unipolar world,

4:51

you had the US as kind of

4:54

a sole superpower. It's

4:56

still a superpower the US, but

4:59

maybe a superpower without superpowers. That's

5:02

what we're seeing. But that period was

5:04

a period where we

5:06

had the Rio Summit in

5:09

1992, where we got

5:11

the first new agreements

5:14

on climate change,

5:16

biodiversity, countries came together,

5:18

we saw a

5:20

world trade organization being created, we

5:23

saw doubling of global trade, tariffs

5:26

being reduced, like

5:29

a win-win approach to

5:32

things. China joined the WTO

5:34

in 2001 here in Doha. So that was

5:40

incredible moments for

5:42

a win-win thinking. So no, I think

5:44

we moved, if you use the trade

5:46

complex, I think we moved into

5:49

like a beggar-neighbor

5:51

approach instead of

5:53

prospering-neighbor approach. And

5:55

I think the challenge

5:58

is that we you'll, for

6:00

example, have no real economic recovery now without

6:03

recovery also in collaboration,

6:06

in trade and

6:08

in investments. And it doesn't

6:10

look likely very

6:13

soon. That's right. You use

6:15

the phrase win-win, but another

6:18

phrase often gets deployed a lot these

6:20

days and that's winners and losers. And

6:23

globalization, for example, created winners

6:25

and losers. There

6:28

were winners and losers from the pandemic in

6:30

terms of countries that got

6:32

vaccines quickly and other countries that

6:35

struggled to get them as quickly.

6:38

There are winners and losers in the

6:40

world of multilateralism in terms of whose

6:42

voice gets heard at places like the

6:44

UN, for example. Some

6:48

of this, as you've pointed out, has

6:50

to do with the relative change in

6:52

power of the United States as former

6:55

sole superpower to now just a

6:57

superpower. But what else? What

6:59

other things have led to

7:01

this moment where there seems to be

7:03

growing distrust in the

7:06

global order, as it were,

7:08

in the rules-based liberal international order

7:10

in the multilateral system? So

7:14

definitely we are between

7:17

orders. We had one order,

7:19

as you said, was more

7:21

of a liberal rules-based world

7:23

order. But we don't know what

7:25

the new order will be. Hopefully not

7:28

a jungle growing back, but

7:30

also with rules and

7:32

also level playing fields and

7:35

collaboration. But it will be a different cooperation

7:38

than we have seen in the past.

7:41

But when you are between orders, it

7:43

also means that there is

7:45

competition, there is unpredictability. And

7:48

we have seen that also passed

7:51

in the history. In Europe,

7:53

we have tried multipolarity.

7:56

We had multipolarity in the 19th

7:58

century. without multilateralism,

8:00

without any rules. And we

8:03

saw how that ended, not

8:06

very well. So, multipolarity

8:08

is potentially a

8:10

positive thing for the world, moving

8:13

forward, with the big caveat that

8:15

we also need multilateralism on top

8:17

of it, where we agree on

8:20

some rules. Just

8:22

imagine, like, New

8:24

York or Delhi without traffic rules.

8:26

You know, it would be total

8:28

chaos. So, I

8:31

think also globalism has

8:34

had a rough time

8:36

lately in the media and

8:38

also in the global discourse.

8:40

But we should not lose

8:43

the baby with the bathwater in

8:46

the context of what has happened

8:48

during the 30 last year. Since 1990,

8:51

we doubled the global GDP. The

8:54

driving force for that was trade, increased

8:56

four times. And in 1990, we

8:59

had 40% of the global

9:01

population living in extreme poverty. Today,

9:04

it's 10%. So, globalism, of

9:07

course, creates challenges, but we

9:10

cannot neglect or deny the

9:12

positive yields from this. For

9:14

example, on the extreme poverty,

9:17

it's also even more striking,

9:19

because in 1990, we

9:21

had 5 billion people on our

9:23

planet. Today, we are 7-8% and

9:26

then moving from 40% to 10%. So,

9:29

this wind wind thinking and using

9:31

your comparative advantages and buying where

9:34

it's cheapest also created

9:36

a lot of growth and

9:38

prosperity. We maybe went too far, but

9:41

we have to adjust it. Right. But

9:44

I don't think we should... I'm sure maybe I

9:46

would allow... Globalism is

9:49

now being blamed for everything that

9:51

is not good in the

9:53

world, even if it has been a driving

9:55

force for a lot of progress. Yeah. One

9:58

of the things the pandemic did is... it

10:00

kind of instigated

10:03

a real fear in supply

10:05

chains. So as the

10:07

story goes in early 2020,

10:10

when America suddenly realized it needed a

10:12

lot of masks, and it

10:14

realized that most of the masks were made by

10:16

China, it really changed the

10:18

mood in the United States, where there was

10:20

this rising fear of

10:22

globalization, a rising fear of

10:25

supply chains, and in

10:27

many senses American foreign policy since

10:29

then has been transformed. There's a

10:32

real appreciation for economics

10:34

through national security, a foreign policy

10:36

for the middle class, for example,

10:38

as the Biden White House often says.

10:41

And that sense of mistrust

10:43

of globalization and of supply chains,

10:47

which has led to a movement towards

10:49

nearshoring, French shoring, ally shoring, whatever you

10:51

want to call it, is

10:53

something that many countries share in Europe,

10:56

India as well, China in its own way. This

11:00

makes it much harder for smaller countries

11:03

to compete because they can't avail of

11:05

the same facilities that they

11:07

did in a much more globalized

11:09

world without protectionism. But

11:12

let me ask you about America's role

11:14

in all of this. Do you think

11:17

America is to

11:20

blame for some of this change

11:22

and mood globally? Some

11:24

of this is about protectionism, America

11:26

is often accused of being protectionist.

11:29

Some of it also more recently, and

11:31

now I'm thinking about the wars in

11:33

Gaza and Ukraine, is an accusation

11:35

from much of the countries of the global

11:37

south that America

11:40

has double standards or hypocrisy. And

11:43

that too hurts a sense

11:45

of multilateralism and who

11:47

really upholds the global order. I

11:51

think some of the

11:53

nearshoring and the

11:55

risking make sense for

11:58

countries. I think if

12:00

you get most of the

12:02

antibiotics in the world produce one

12:05

place, or you have all the

12:07

semiconductors almost produced in one

12:09

country, critical minerals

12:12

just one place, I think that's

12:14

risky. Yeah, it's not

12:16

common sense to

12:18

do that. So to be more

12:21

conscious about this, and not only have

12:23

value chains just in time, but

12:26

also just in case,

12:28

important. But what

12:31

we need to know is also if you

12:33

go too far there and start to French,

12:35

you have to define who are

12:38

your friends. That's right. And for America,

12:40

it's the largest economy in the world. Is

12:43

Nigeria a friend? Is South Africa a

12:45

friend? India

12:48

is definitely defined as a friend now.

12:51

There's the question of do you define

12:53

friends by interests or values? So

12:55

that's also a very good

12:58

comment. Let me come back to

13:00

that, because that is when it gets

13:03

really complicated. But what we

13:05

need to be aware of

13:07

is that the inflationary pressure that

13:09

we have seen, the highest inflation

13:11

now in decades, part

13:14

of that is also related to

13:16

the fact that the value chains

13:19

are being rethought.

13:23

And then the input factors, the things

13:26

that we import, gets more expensive. Because

13:30

you're not buying it necessarily where

13:32

it's cheapest anymore, but where you think it

13:36

can also de-risk. So this is putting

13:38

pressure on the prices. And

13:41

in addition, we're going through an energy transition that

13:44

we haven't seen in 200 years. We

13:47

built the whole industrial revolution on

13:49

carbon. And

13:51

now we want to build the prosperous future of

13:55

decarbonization, something that makes

13:57

sense. But it will, of course, take

13:59

a bit. bit of time, but generally

14:03

the price of inaction no far exceeds

14:05

the price of action. But it will

14:07

drive up the price of

14:10

energy and electricity in the years to

14:12

come. So those two factors will push

14:14

inflation up, so we will

14:16

not go anytime soon back in

14:19

the situation where we will have

14:21

low inflation. Hopefully in a couple

14:23

of years we can meet the

14:25

inflationary targets or interest rates and

14:27

go down. So then the role

14:29

of America. And I can understand that

14:31

you put that on the table. The American

14:34

economics are good. America

14:38

came through COVID and got

14:41

a recovery that is stronger than

14:44

most of the other big

14:46

economies. This year we're

14:48

seeing 8 trillion added

14:50

to the global economy from 100 trillion

14:52

to 108 and 45% of that growth comes from

14:56

one single country being

14:58

the United States of America. So

15:01

it's doing well economically. The

15:03

political situation in the US

15:06

is extremely polarized

15:08

and extremely unpredictable,

15:11

but America

15:14

is still a big

15:16

force. 25% of the global

15:18

economy, 5% of

15:21

the global population, and close to 50%

15:23

of the global

15:25

military force. So what

15:27

happens in America means a lot to

15:30

the rest of the world. Then it

15:32

is your question about the standing of

15:35

the US. The US has been through a

15:37

lot of tournaments. They had the

15:39

Trump presidency, a big discussion about

15:42

the election results, Biden

15:44

administration that had also

15:47

a tough start with the

15:49

Afghanistan pullout, but has now

15:51

also launched this new concept

15:54

of modern supply side economics.

15:57

It seems like it's working pretty

16:00

well, but he doesn't get a lot of

16:02

credit for it, nearer in the US, or

16:05

abroad. And the latest, of course, geopolitical

16:09

situation, with

16:11

us being isolated in

16:14

the Security Council, is also a

16:16

big challenge for

16:18

the US, and the way that a

16:20

lot of countries look at them. But

16:22

you know, US is a

16:24

democracy. A lot of the countries criticising

16:28

US now are

16:30

non-democracies. That's right. And they have

16:32

different standards. So there

16:35

is a lot to think about in

16:37

that context too. So as

16:39

we think about fixing

16:41

multilateralism, or improving it, or

16:43

rebooting it, what

16:46

are the things you think the world needs

16:49

to keep in mind? And I guess crucially,

16:51

and related to our previous parts

16:53

of this discussion, what role

16:55

will America play in such

16:58

a revitalisation of multilateralism?

17:02

First, I think we need to see the election

17:04

in the US next year. I

17:08

think the Biden administration are in principle

17:12

believers in multilateralism, and

17:15

also the UN. But of course,

17:18

if you're a superpower, you decide

17:20

a lot. So you don't want

17:22

to delegate too much to the

17:24

multilateral channels. It has always been

17:27

a dilemma even for democratic administrations

17:29

in the US. Second, Trump

17:31

presidency, I think, will

17:34

put less emphasis on

17:37

the UN and multilateralism. We

17:39

saw that also in the first

17:41

Trump presidency, that's more unilateralism and

17:44

America first policies. So

17:47

I think that's gonna be

17:49

very interesting to follow. So given how

17:52

unpredictable 2024 is going to be on

17:54

that front, let's

17:56

park the America question

17:58

aside for a minute. imagine

18:02

you have an America that does want to

18:04

engage with the world. How

18:07

then do you go about boosting

18:09

multilateralism and reversing some of the

18:11

trends we've been discussing for the

18:13

last 20 minutes? So

18:15

I think that there will be maybe

18:18

more of an ad hoc approach

18:21

to multilateralism and intergovernmental

18:23

processes, but also maybe

18:25

more coalition building in the future.

18:28

So we have seen, for example,

18:30

on the trade side that multilateral

18:32

deals are now quite in demand.

18:35

There will likely be then 80 countries

18:38

coming together that wants to

18:40

create framework for e-commerce, or

18:43

100 countries coming together, and

18:45

even if you cannot get the

18:47

agreement through the World Trade Organization,

18:49

they can use the WTO framework

18:51

to agree on the multilateral agreement,

18:53

for example, then

18:55

on services or digital

18:58

trade. I can

19:00

see this also in other

19:02

areas moving forward. On

19:04

climate, also, for example,

19:07

on AI regulations, EU

19:10

came out now with a

19:12

very interesting framework for

19:14

AI. They

19:17

could put it out on the market

19:19

and say, who wants to join this?

19:22

And then you can have

19:24

coalitions being built there. I

19:26

just think that it's harder to

19:29

see the big countries of

19:31

the world, the G7, the

19:33

BRICS, and etc. being

19:37

as willing as in the past to

19:39

negotiate for months, and

19:41

then one single country then can

19:43

stop the whole process.

19:46

I think that's not

19:49

going to be the case. Then you have

19:51

the legitimacy also of the

19:54

Bretton Woods institutions, where

19:56

they were created for

19:59

different challenges. out in the World Bank and

20:01

the IMF and others. And

20:03

the WTO and then they were

20:06

built at a different time with

20:08

different challenges and their representation there

20:10

is still tilted towards the

20:13

West. That's why you have the Briggs

20:15

Bank, the Belt

20:17

and Road Bank, etc. appearing.

20:21

You wrote an essay recently in

20:23

which you used the

20:25

word co-opetition, which is a

20:28

portmanteau of cooperation and

20:30

competition. And this is actually a

20:33

word that's, I think, emerged out

20:35

of game theory and the business

20:37

world about how companies

20:39

can compete and cooperate at the

20:41

same time. And you

20:44

used it to describe geopolitics

20:46

today and the importance of

20:48

countries doing the same.

20:51

How do you think that works out? And is

20:55

that happening more than people realize? Because

20:57

I think people tend to see big

21:00

divisions at places like the

21:02

United Nations. But what they

21:04

often don't see is the

21:07

kind of cooperation you've been describing and

21:09

that you do through the

21:11

World Economic Forum or Doha Forum where we're

21:13

sitting right now. It's

21:16

true. A more kind

21:19

of maybe

21:23

media-friendly way of saying it

21:25

is we

21:28

have a lot of frenemies out there. So

21:31

I think between the U.S. and China

21:33

being 45% of the global economy, it

21:36

means a lot when President

21:38

Biden and President Xi Jinping can meet. Even

21:42

if they don't see eye-to-eye on

21:44

all these issues, they can

21:46

have long discussions

21:48

dealing with things ad

21:51

hoc. Can they, for example,

21:53

agree on some guidelines on AI?

21:56

What can they agree on on

21:58

climate change? Can they agree on some guidelines? Can we triple,

22:01

for example, the amount of renewables

22:03

by 2030? Can we

22:05

have a total ban on methane

22:07

by 2030? And

22:10

then you can go on and on. And

22:12

it ended also in agreeing on having a

22:15

hotline. So if there is a misunderstanding approaching

22:17

on the military side, before they didn't

22:20

even know who to call. And

22:22

now they can pick up like this red phone that we

22:24

used to have between Kremlin

22:26

and Washington DC during the Cold

22:28

War. So this, I

22:30

think, realistically is

22:33

the way moving forward. You

22:35

will see more regional trade agreements too.

22:39

And you will see trade agreements

22:41

between conference and alliances that feel

22:43

that they have much more in

22:46

common. And you

22:48

will see also checks and balances being

22:50

developed. And you

22:52

will see a little bit

22:54

like the Cold War that big

22:56

nations try to quark smaller nations

22:58

to get them on their side.

23:01

And we're seeing that now with so-called middle

23:03

countries or swing states as they're known. And

23:06

so we saw that now with the elections

23:08

in the Maldives, where there

23:11

was a lot at stake and one

23:14

party was seen as more pro-India and

23:16

another one more pro-China. I think it's

23:18

more complex than that. But

23:20

election results ended with

23:23

also India being asked

23:25

to have their marine navy

23:28

leave the islands, even if, of

23:30

course, India would say it's rescue

23:32

vessels. But they're

23:35

not inviting China. No, they're saying that

23:37

we don't want on our territory any

23:39

of the big nations being represented. But

23:41

this is just the tip of the

23:43

iceberg. Look at Asia. Myanmar

23:47

is where India and China meets. Bangladesh,

23:49

Nepal is also where India and

23:52

China meet. So it's not only

23:54

the US and

23:56

China. There is also

23:59

other countries. And unfortunately, we

24:01

are also seeing more proxy situations

24:03

where it's not in the interest

24:06

of the countries and the

24:08

civilians. In Africa, I'm very

24:10

worried being the

24:12

new kind of theater for

24:15

proxy wars. I

24:18

would say Sudan,

24:21

partly Ethiopia, partly

24:24

Somalia. And I

24:27

can mention also other countries in

24:29

West Africa and the Francophone Africa

24:31

that is not looking

24:34

good. So there is not conflicts

24:36

among the big powers directly. That's

24:41

one price to avoid, but

24:43

you can use your proxies. So I guess

24:46

this brings us back to multilateralism,

24:48

right? Because what is the role

24:50

of a big multilateral

24:52

organization like the UN in a

24:54

big global conflict? Because ultimately,

24:58

if you have a pandemic or a giant

25:00

asteroid hits the earth, you

25:02

need something that goes much beyond

25:05

two strong countries or bilateral or

25:07

regional solutions. And you've

25:10

described some of this through sectoral

25:12

issues that the world can come

25:14

together and agree on. But

25:18

in terms of bigger issues

25:20

that arise, such as another

25:22

pandemic, what do you think

25:25

is the best way for the world to get

25:27

together? And is it still the UN? We

25:31

can see all the

25:34

faults with the UN, but

25:36

it's the best alternative we have.

25:39

It's all the countries of the world,

25:43

even in such a quite

25:46

toxic global geopolitical

25:48

situation. The ambassadors do

25:50

meet and also

25:53

ministers in the UN context. They

25:56

might use strong language against

25:59

each other. Sometimes they even shout,

26:01

but not as frequently as during the

26:03

Cold War. That's right. But

26:07

that is also reflecting the

26:10

reality. So when

26:12

you see this being displayed in

26:15

the Security Council, it is

26:17

really where we are. But

26:20

it's good that we have

26:22

those institutions, and those institutions are

26:25

also ready, as you say, if there is

26:27

another new, more

26:29

serious pandemic on

26:32

the horizon, that's for example,

26:35

where you can see children being

26:38

more affected, as we have seen in

26:41

the past, then

26:44

there's no other way than using

26:47

those institutions. And maybe they will

26:49

shout less and then collaborate out

26:51

of necessity. I

26:53

wish that was also the case for climate

26:56

change. It is a bit

26:59

crazy that we

27:01

are seeing now a

27:04

huge cost of climate change, but still

27:07

there's used more money

27:09

on subsidizing fossil

27:11

fuel, including coal

27:14

in the world, using taxpayers'

27:16

money to make it cheaper,

27:18

than it's used on subsidizing

27:21

introduction of renewables. So

27:23

you can say that the glass is, I don't want

27:25

to be too pessimistic here, because the glass is half

27:27

empty or half full. I would say it's half full,

27:29

because also if we met 10 years ago, and I

27:31

said that the price of solar would fall to $110,

27:35

you probably say you're really a

27:37

naive person. But today, wind

27:39

and solar is competitive

27:43

with all other energy sources, without any kind

27:45

of subsidies and are the cheapest ones, but

27:48

it's not moving fast enough. You

27:51

know, when someone says something optimistic, I always

27:53

find that it's a good moment to end

27:55

an interview. So, Bharga Brenda, thank you so

27:57

much for joining me. No, thank you so

27:59

much. for inviting me. I enjoyed our

28:01

discussion. Me too. And

28:07

that was Borga Brenda, the President

28:09

of the World Economic Forum, and

28:11

also the former Foreign Minister of

28:14

Norway. Global Reboot

28:16

is a partnership between Foreign

28:18

Policy and the Doha Forum.

28:21

Our production staff includes Rosie

28:23

Julen and Olatunji Osho-Williams. That

28:26

is it for Season 3 of

28:28

Global Reboot. It's been a pleasure.

28:30

I'm Ravi Agrawal. Thanks for listening.