0:00

A mutiny in Russia

0:02

to discuss I have on Camille Gallea

0:04

of my former classmate of Peking University

0:08

and formerly with the Wilson Center to

0:10

discuss. Camille, welcome back to China Talk.

0:13

Yeah, thank you so much, Jordan. Great

0:15

to see you again. So Camille, is what

0:17

we saw over the past week a coup? More

0:19

like unsuccessful attempt of a coup. But

0:22

even if unsuccessful, it is

0:24

still consequential. And

0:26

I would say it's more consequential than

0:28

it could be in many Latin

0:31

American or Asian countries of the world. Because

0:34

what many foreign observers may not

0:36

know or may underappreciate, if

0:38

that army in Russia has

0:41

not really been a factor

0:44

of big politics for the most time.

0:48

An interesting feature of the

0:50

Russian regime, including the Soviet period, is

0:54

the exclusion of the party from the

0:56

big politics. There are some exceptions,

0:58

of course, especially during

1:01

the transfer of power, for example, up the

1:04

death of Stalin. But for the

1:06

most part, the army was not a

1:08

factor of politics, and the

1:10

influence in the military was not

1:12

really converted into the faction

1:15

strife. So what

1:17

we see here, what we see or

1:19

what we have seen in the past

1:21

days, it was probably the largest attempt

1:23

to do so, the most significant attempt

1:26

to do so for the last 70 years, I

1:28

would say. Let's

1:30

take a step back. What do you think

1:32

were the main motivations of Progosion taking this

1:34

step? Great question. Obviously,

1:37

what has just happened, it looks very shady.

1:41

But things like this do usually look

1:43

shady. And attempted

1:45

or successful cuse, they

1:47

usually involve, or

1:49

often involve at least some element of four

1:52

ditches by the political leadership. So

1:54

different forces try playing their own games. So,

1:58

of course, some people, and like many

2:00

episodes in Russia or in Eastern Europe

2:02

or Ukraine would kind of write it

2:04

off or discard what happened

2:06

as kind of staged events. But, but,

2:09

even if staged, theoretically,

2:12

even if the events were staged, their

2:14

consequences were still real. For

2:16

example, consider the Cornilla Put in

2:18

1917. It's highly probable,

2:20

some would say it's almost

2:23

certain, that the

2:25

events in August, September,

2:27

1920, were

2:29

involved for the chess

2:32

by then the provisional

2:35

government, Alexander Kerensky. So

2:37

at least he somehow participated in it.

2:40

So in a sense, the attempt to focus on war

2:42

was orchestrated by the supreme leadership. But,

2:44

but, even if it was orchestrated,

2:47

even if it was staged, the consequences were

2:49

still real. So what we

2:51

are going to see now, I would say

2:53

it's very similar. So the

2:55

closest historical metaphor we can find,

2:57

find the closest historical parallel would

3:00

be the Cornilla Put. So,

3:03

so sorry. So the argument is,

3:05

is, you know, some people are saying,

3:07

actually, you know, maybe this was like a Putin

3:09

move all along for him to be able to

3:11

sort of re-exert his power. But

3:14

you're arguing that, you know, maybe

3:16

that's the case. But even if it was,

3:19

this leaves him in a way weaker

3:21

situation than he was a few weeks ago.

3:24

Absolutely, absolutely. Now, I could give

3:27

you several speculations that are based

3:29

on nothing except for like, except

3:33

for speculations. One speculation could

3:35

be that

3:37

pre-Gorgensky was kind of

3:39

an element of negotiation, not of internal,

3:42

but of external negotiation with the West

3:44

and especially with the US. So

3:46

basically, just look, if you kind of continue

3:49

pressuring me even more, some

3:51

group of crazy gangsters, crazy criminals

3:54

and Nazis can just maybe

3:56

if not take power, then at least take some

3:58

parts of our nuclear arsenal, testicles

4:00

follow. Stop pressuring me. That

4:04

is purely speculation, but it is not, but

4:07

it is itself not impossible. Another

4:10

element, another explanation could be

4:13

that it was an attempt

4:15

to scare their rationally themselves.

4:18

So basically if you, if

4:21

I fall down, you all go with me. So

4:24

some kind of horrible, absolutely

4:27

unhinged rascals are going to take power, and

4:30

that will include terrible consequences

4:32

for everyone. That is another

4:34

explanation. So, and

4:37

of course, we

4:39

could develop some more speculations like this.

4:41

It is absolutely possible, it is absolutely

4:43

possible that a few of them have

4:45

some element of truth. That is absolutely

4:48

possible. And it

4:50

is very plausible that

4:54

at least some factions of power

4:56

participated in orchestrating and staging what

4:59

we have seen. But, but, even

5:01

after orchestrated and even if staged,

5:03

the consequences still are real. First,

5:07

when we say orchestrated, when we say

5:09

staged, we should keep in mind that

5:12

complex and sophisticated 4D chess

5:15

often just does not work or

5:17

it works or it goes wrong.

5:19

Everything can go wrong. You

5:23

know, my favorite story is the

5:26

assassination of Emperor Paul. So

5:29

basically Emperor Paul in

5:31

1801, he invited

5:35

the general governor of St. Petersburg,

5:37

Count Pauline, and basically

5:39

told him, you see, there is

5:41

an attempt of coup. They

5:46

basically are preparing a coup against me. He

5:48

said, yes, your majesty, I know it. And

5:50

I participate in a coup. Like,

5:53

what? Yes, of course, I participate in

5:55

a coup. So, like,

5:58

I'm one of participants just to collect information

6:00

so everything is under control. Ah

6:03

great! said Zapper. He

6:06

was calmed down. He decided it's

6:08

okay, very soon he was killed. And

6:10

general governor, Carl Paulin, was the main organizer.

6:13

He basically said it directly. So

6:20

one element of a situation, even if the

6:22

supreme power is actually aware of everything, it

6:25

kind of keeps control. Everything

6:28

can go wrong for like too many reasons. But

6:31

that is more on tactical level. If we go

6:33

on strategic level, it looks even

6:36

more complicated. It looks more

6:38

complicated because what we have seen, it basically

6:41

legitimizes the use of

6:43

the military, of direct military force

6:47

in their internal

6:50

competition of factions, internal competition

6:52

of interest groups, which

6:57

previously they tried to avoid.

7:00

So if you look,

7:02

the previous attempt that

7:06

it never really materialized, but their previous

7:09

attempt at least to consolidate a base

7:11

for a potential military coup, it was

7:13

in Yeltsin's year with General Rochlin, but

7:16

they didn't even really start. They're still

7:18

preparing and preparing and preparing. And

7:20

what we have seen that you can actually

7:22

start it and

7:24

you can achieve very significant results.

7:28

So in a sense that normalizes the use of

7:30

the military for advancing

7:32

your basically interest of your

7:34

faction. Yeah. So

7:36

we did a show, I guess

7:38

it must have been close to a year ago now, where

7:42

we were discussing, this

7:46

vision of a future where you have all

7:48

the different governors and

7:51

private players trying to

7:53

amass their own independent

7:55

military chips

7:58

that they could then... deploy

8:00

to gain a share or

8:03

secure their place in whatever the future of Russia

8:05

is. And I thought it was really far-fetched

8:08

until we had the

8:11

rise of these private armies and

8:14

these dramatic events over the past

8:16

72 hours or so. So how

8:18

does this tangibly, how does this

8:23

sort of like the, you know, how

8:25

does everyone in the system learning that

8:27

this is possible, that sort of these

8:29

tactics are, you know, both

8:31

legitimized as well as like can take you to 200 miles

8:35

of Moscow end up sort

8:37

of changing the chess boards and the

8:39

different players' incentives as they look into

8:42

the second half of 2023. You see, I think

8:44

a very interesting aspect of this kind, I

8:47

tap at core stage, who as some would

8:49

say is who is doing it, who's doing

8:51

it? Because who's pregordan basically? He's an

8:53

agent of the power. He's an

8:55

agent. It

8:58

is not some let's say independent burden

9:00

or some person who rose independently from

9:02

Putin. It's basically a

9:04

very petty, well, gangster who

9:07

was just for the fact of his membership

9:09

in the St. Petersburg gangster to power, who

9:13

was commissioned by Putin to

9:15

do the dirty job for him. A

9:18

brute in Russia, in Ukraine, that's

9:20

really the only source of his power. So

9:23

in a sense, in a sense, it's

9:25

kind of very revealing, because

9:28

it's not, let's say, some regional

9:30

interest groups or some

9:32

regional, some provincial actors who are

9:35

taking the move against their supreme

9:38

power, but it is its

9:40

own agents. And I think it's

9:42

really, really interesting. You

9:44

know, Machavale back

9:46

in 16th century, he kind of made

9:49

a distinction between two types of regimes

9:53

and the ones like France and

9:56

the ones like Turkey, well, the Ottoman Empire.

9:59

So basically, And what was his point? That

10:02

regimes like the French one, they

10:05

are relatively easy to overthrow, but

10:08

it's very difficult to keep control

10:10

over them. Why? Because

10:13

in France there is a lot of like federal barons basically.

10:16

So on the one hand it's pretty easy to

10:18

get into alliance with some of them against the

10:21

central power. So

10:23

it's relatively easy to take control over. But

10:26

once you did it you don't really rule because there

10:28

are still lots of barons and you can't do anything

10:30

about that. So it's more a

10:33

baronial type of regime, baronial. But

10:35

the Ottoman Empire on the other hand, it would be

10:37

very different type of regime. It didn't really

10:39

have strong baronial factions to the

10:41

same extent. So on

10:43

the one hand it may be more difficult to defeat

10:45

it because you don't have any

10:47

dependent powers to get into alliance with. But

10:50

once you took control, once

10:53

you took control, it's very easy to keep it.

10:57

Because if there was no independent power

10:59

for you to conspire with, there is

11:01

no independent power that could stand

11:04

against you now. Now

11:07

it's a very important part. A

11:09

very important part is people

11:11

from baronial regimes, like naturally,

11:14

who are shaped by baronial regimes, who

11:16

grew up in baronial regimes, who know

11:18

baronial regimes, they generally fail to comprehend.

11:20

It's hard for them. Another

11:23

type of regimes, who are more like court here, and

11:25

centered around the royal court. Now

11:28

the thing is, America under this

11:30

classification, it should be a baronial like

11:32

regime, baronial run. In

11:35

a sense, I don't want to

11:37

offend anyone more like 16th century France than

11:39

the 16th century Ottoman Empire. Russia

11:42

in this regard would fall under second category,

11:44

which means that many things

11:46

happening in Russia,

11:49

they're just intuitively understandable

11:51

for Americans. So I would say

11:53

a lot of political realities of

11:55

the US, they're just incomprehensible for

11:58

most of Russians. Because

12:00

they are too different from what they used to and

12:02

the other way around. People

12:06

who lived under baronial regimes cannot comprehend courtier

12:08

under regimes and the other way around. Consider

12:11

the following. For Russians it

12:13

would be absolutely incomprehensible that

12:16

bureaucracy federal government in DC

12:18

had prepared a genius plan

12:21

of how to, let's say, reorganize

12:23

America. Maybe

12:25

some kind, some version of the Green New Deal, but

12:28

then there comes a congressman from

12:30

like West Virginia, a mountain mama,

12:33

and he basically blocks it. And he blocks

12:35

it. Unimaginable.

12:38

Now the thing is, most Russian

12:40

people, including people of their sources, people

12:42

with power, they would

12:45

not really

12:47

believe that really happened. There

12:50

should be, there could have been some place

12:52

of fortitude within the federal government. They

12:56

wouldn't believe that some

12:59

senators from West Virginia, Oklahoma, Alabama,

13:01

wherever, whom we

13:03

would designate as barons under this classification,

13:05

would really have so much saying, for

13:08

example, in how, in

13:10

whether budget passes or not. And

13:13

the other way around. So the

13:15

thing about Russia that

13:17

would be incomprehensible for Americans is

13:20

that it does not really have strong

13:22

baronial factions. They exist, but they are

13:24

very, very much weaker. It

13:27

is courtier to the extent against

13:29

unimaginable to most Americans. So

13:32

when there is a

13:35

upheaval, when there is, let's

13:38

say, betrayal, it is most

13:40

probably, will not be barons who do it, because barons

13:43

are weak. It is most

13:45

probably will be courtiers. So

13:48

paradoxically enough, paradoxically enough, Kremlin

13:52

may fear the

13:54

most dangerous, largest danger, not from some

13:56

kind of, let's say, regional separatists or

13:59

like. like even governors

14:02

or like some provincial interest groups,

14:04

but primarily from its own federal,

14:07

from its own agents on the federal level,

14:09

because there is no one else who really has

14:12

resources. Let's do the

14:14

courtiers first. So

14:16

the sort of progosions

14:19

in waiting or other folks

14:22

who are in the

14:24

inner circle and do

14:26

have sort of independent

14:28

resources or means to

14:30

do crazy things, like how does their calculus

14:34

change now that they've seen what

14:37

progosions been able to do over the past week? We

14:41

cannot answer this 100% because obviously

14:43

these guys will not share

14:46

their position out of

14:48

the court. So

14:51

we can only read the clues. But

14:53

what we can read is

14:57

that first,

14:59

first, we have seen

15:01

that the military uprising

15:03

is basically impossible. It

15:06

is not impossible, let's say, because for

15:08

the most part, most

15:10

of military structures, paramilitary structures, when

15:12

facing a coup, they don't do

15:15

nothing. I

15:17

know it's South China, but it

15:19

looks like most of military and paramilitary in

15:22

the region where the attempt took place. They

15:25

did not join them, but they did not stand

15:27

against them either. So basically,

15:29

in a sense, they acted more like a part of

15:31

the landscape. That

15:33

was. Another is that

15:35

there's quite a lot of public enthusiasm. Quite

15:38

a lot of public enthusiasm. So

15:42

if you look at what was happening

15:44

on the streets of Rostov on

15:47

dawn, when Wagner-Weis came

15:50

there, there was a

15:52

lot of cheering for them. And there

15:55

was a lot of moving to police who came

15:57

there after. And it was really,

15:59

really interesting. because those southern regions,

16:02

southern regions more like Belgrade,

16:04

Rostov, Krasnodar, they

16:06

are really conservative, socially conservative, they

16:09

are relatively well-off, they

16:12

are very much poor in war, absolutely, much

16:14

more than average in Russia, and

16:17

they have been traditionally framed as

16:19

very purporting regions in Russia, very

16:21

purporting, but it

16:24

just shows that purporting and

16:27

anti-purting likes dichotomy as kind

16:29

of some coordinates that help

16:31

us to measure their Russian

16:34

political attitudes is just wrong, because

16:37

where there comes another

16:39

force that presents itself

16:42

more brutish, patriotic, more militant

16:44

in a sense, people

16:46

to it as well. Actually,

16:49

it looks like people in regions

16:51

that have been traditionally deemed as

16:53

very, very purporting, they

16:56

prefer some kind of warlord,

16:58

this sends pregorsion to

17:01

Putin's rule, I think, this

17:04

is a very, very interesting observation. So,

17:07

these people, even if they did not

17:09

really do anything to help or to

17:11

obstruct this revolt, they are

17:14

absolutely willing to

17:16

accept their intrusion of

17:19

the military into

17:21

the political affairs, they are basically waiting

17:23

for it. Are you sick

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the ChinaTalk newsletter at chinatalk.media. Truly

17:41

one of the more remarkable pieces

17:44

of this whole story were those videos of

17:47

folks cheering the

17:50

Wagner tanks as they were rolling into the city. I

17:53

want to stay on that

17:56

insight that you made of the sort

17:58

of old map of pro-anti-Putin

18:01

doesn't make sense in this new era

18:04

of wartime. I

18:06

guess what are the broader implications

18:08

of the revealed preference of the

18:11

supposedly most

18:14

nationalist people in Russia

18:16

that you saw over the past few days? How

18:20

could we actually make more sense out of

18:22

these videos on Rostov? They

18:25

just show why these preferences of

18:27

pro or against Putin don't make

18:29

much sense. You see, there

18:32

is a lot of discourse when

18:35

people, for example, analyze the electoral

18:37

maps in Russia. Oh, this region

18:39

has traditionally voted pro-Putin or this

18:41

against. It has some sense. It's

18:44

not completely senseless or meaningless. Not

18:47

good. These

18:49

people and these analysts, they wrongly assume Russia

18:51

has elections. It doesn't know what it never

18:53

had. At least on presidential level.

18:56

Why? Because elections have not had options.

18:59

There can be different options. For example,

19:01

let's say you, during

19:04

next elections, you could potentially go

19:07

vote for one candidate or

19:09

you could potentially vote for another candidate. You cannot

19:11

be 100% sure who wins. You

19:14

see? We cannot be 100% sure.

19:18

There is still some intrigue. There

19:20

is some anticipation for results. In

19:22

Russia, because in America the

19:25

powers, the supreme executive power has changed

19:27

as a result of elections many

19:30

times. So America has elections. Russia

19:32

does not and it never had because

19:35

supreme executive power in Russia never changes

19:37

the result of elections. So,

19:40

but elections are still taking place formally.

19:42

It just means this is not the

19:45

elections. This is the acclamation. Acclamations.

19:48

You know like some acclamations for Byzantine emperor.

19:51

So basically you kind of succeed to power but you still

19:53

need to go through acclamation which you will get. And

19:57

that's like presidential elections.

20:00

Russian will be more properly framed

20:02

as presidential acclamations. Yeltsin

20:06

perfectly got his acclamations with like rate of approval

20:08

of 6%, no problem at all.

20:11

Putin got all the time, but it

20:14

shows that the crowd that

20:16

would readily claim him would acclame other

20:19

guys too. And that

20:21

must make some people's eyes really

20:23

wide, who are potentially ambitious or

20:25

frustrated with

20:29

the way things are going. Yes, yes,

20:31

yes. And also there is another moment,

20:33

is that one element

20:35

is standing of Putin, among

20:38

within the circle of the

20:40

Russian ruling elite. Because

20:43

one thing he could,

20:45

or one card he had that others

20:48

did not, he could

20:50

maybe potentially, potentially say

20:53

explicitly or more like imply, like

20:56

people hate you, every one of you, but

20:59

they love me. So I'm the

21:01

only one of you, like truly legitimate. Because

21:04

basically the only thing, the only reason for you

21:06

to enjoy your position is because of me. I

21:09

legitimize you all. People love me. And

21:12

kind of that would be very strong argument. That would

21:14

be very strong argument. But

21:17

now it looks very much weaker argument

21:19

that it would be even a few

21:21

months ago. How has Putin's

21:23

like decision space been constrained by

21:26

what's happened? Well on the one hand,

21:29

his positions are now probably somewhat

21:31

weaker because other members

21:33

of the ruling circle see that

21:38

the willingness to acclame Putin and the

21:40

willingness to chair Putin,

21:42

it's not necessarily all about Putin. People

21:46

in general and population in

21:49

the regions that were deemed

21:52

as very purputinist. It

21:55

is ready to cheer

21:57

and to acclaim pretty much

21:59

everyone. Pretty much everyone. So

22:02

it's not some unique property

22:05

of Putin which makes him

22:07

irreplaceable for the existing

22:10

elite. This may

22:12

not be a drastic change, may not

22:14

be a dramatic change, but still the

22:16

experiment has been conducted.

22:20

That's one thing. So now

22:22

he has much less of an argument that people

22:24

love me and they don't necessarily love you. That's

22:28

one element. Another

22:30

is that Putin will be

22:33

most probably forced to do

22:35

some kind of repressions against

22:38

those who kind of show

22:41

themselves prone

22:44

to supporting one, because

22:49

what the situation has revealed that

22:54

lots of military and pro-military, if

22:56

they did not outright support what

22:59

they saw as mutiny, they did not

23:01

raise a thing or either. That

23:03

includes paratroopers, that includes

23:05

much of like warrior

23:08

corps, some

23:11

like infantry, some parts

23:13

of the infantry, which means

23:15

most probably that the regime

23:17

does not seem all

23:20

these fellows as absolutely loyal when

23:22

it comes regarding facing the internal

23:24

enemy. So

23:26

there will be probably some poachers, not

23:29

necessarily bloidy, and some elements of repression.

23:31

And I believe we're already seeing them

23:33

on some of the more gruesome videos,

23:36

usually with like ch-chs like clocking on

23:38

the throat of soldiers who are

23:43

deemed to be pro-warner. Which

23:46

is, you know,

23:48

Marx sometimes wrote, Marx

23:50

once wrote, I believe it was like

23:52

Natas Bruma, that history reparts itself two

23:54

times. First as a tragedy, second

23:57

time as a comedy. So

24:00

basically it looks more like a comedy of

24:02

Carnilla Pooch. So basically

24:05

there is some kind of mutiny,

24:07

or it suppresses this mutiny successfully,

24:09

but their repressions and purges, it

24:12

has to conduct thereafter. They

24:15

make it very much weaker

24:17

against mutinies by the forces. What

24:22

do you think are the implications for the war in

24:24

Ukraine? You see when I

24:26

was just scrolling what Ukraine and

24:28

authors, including Zozary Kosto, were

24:32

there ruling the regime

24:35

in Ukraine, were writing many

24:37

were excessively optimistic. Basically

24:41

there was a lot of wish,

24:45

a lot of desire for their regime

24:47

in Raf to fall immediately and for

24:50

the water stop. I

24:53

don't think, well

24:55

it obviously did not happen, and it will not happen for

24:57

a while, but

25:00

once to move on

25:02

using the military force in

25:06

internal political games have been

25:08

broken, I think that the

25:10

regime is now very much weaker, and

25:14

perspectives, they look better. Personally

25:19

my personal prediction, my

25:21

belief is that we will see a

25:24

second attempt, not necessarily by

25:26

the same force, quite probably by another force, but

25:29

the second attempt within three, six

25:31

months. So you

25:33

mentioned earlier in 1917, and

25:36

obviously the Bolsheviks came to power on

25:38

the back of mass

25:40

frustration and exhaustion. Over

25:45

the war with Germany, and the

25:47

parallels aren't exact, but Camille you know this

25:49

stuff better than I do. What

25:51

lessons do you think

25:54

are worth reflecting on from Krensky's

25:56

fall and Lenin's rise and how

25:58

they have been? applied in today's

26:00

situation. Well,

26:03

you know many are making these panels. Puchini

26:05

himself is making these panels exactly. So

26:07

basically he compared these attempts

26:10

from mutiny to what was happening in 1917

26:12

when these dark forces stabbed in the back

26:14

of how like fighting people in the army

26:17

and stuff. So these

26:20

parallels have been already normalized.

26:24

I think

26:27

the parallel may be also. You

26:29

know Bolsheviks of course, of course they

26:31

followed the Marxist dogma, so they had

26:33

to kind of frame it as a

26:35

worker's rebellion. Well,

26:40

there could be an element, but it certainly was not

26:42

a defining element. So

26:45

I think that the moving forces,

26:47

at least what was the

26:49

actual force of Bolsheviks, was not the workers obviously.

26:53

But first and foremost the St. Petersburg garrison

26:55

and the Baltic Navy. So it

26:58

was not so much their rebellious

27:00

workers as people in

27:02

gray coats and in navy coats,

27:04

that's it basically. So,

27:09

and interestingly enough, interestingly enough, in

27:11

the first years after the October

27:14

Revolution, the Bolsheviks'

27:16

leaders, they kind

27:18

of did not even like college revolution. They

27:21

called it Krober Ku. So what we did was a Ku. And

27:24

Ku primarily relies on military and paramilitary

27:26

what happened in reality. So,

27:31

but once

27:33

Bolsheviks took power and once

27:35

they consolidated their power base and once

27:37

they consolidated their regime, they

27:40

made it their top

27:42

priority to

27:44

prevent any potential

27:47

threat from the military. Basically

27:50

from every challenge in the rule, that

27:52

was the priority number one I would

27:54

say. And actually I

27:58

would ascribe. much

28:00

of what maybe

28:03

foreign observers would see as an efficiency of

28:05

Red Army or Soviet Army. To

28:09

it being optimized for another

28:11

purpose. Optimized for other purposes. For

28:14

example, it was largely, as I think,

28:16

optimized for a purpose of not challenging

28:18

the rules of the Communist Party. So,

28:22

for example, that means you are very heavily

28:24

centralized, you don't have very much like right

28:26

of decision making, little,

28:29

relatively few of decisions are delegated, which

28:32

kind can hurt your fighting efficiency, but

28:34

it makes you less of a

28:36

political challenge. And you know what?

28:39

It was successful. So,

28:42

for many decades, the Communist

28:44

Party ruled successfully,

28:49

and until recently,

28:53

there was no attempt

28:56

or a coup from the

28:58

military that was anyway

29:02

as close from materializing as

29:04

happened just recently. Because

29:07

all other attempts, they

29:09

were suppressed on the very, very early stages,

29:11

usually even before they actually tried to do

29:13

anything. Usually on

29:15

the stage of talking. Other

29:19

sort of lessons from history that

29:23

you want to apply to this situation? So

29:26

kind of summarizing what

29:28

I said about who's just to sum it all up.

29:32

Who's are

29:34

something that happens in relatively

29:36

centralized regimes. The

29:39

precondition for a coup is usually centralization, because

29:41

it's sufficiently decentralized, you don't get a coup,

29:43

you get a civil war that's quite different.

29:47

But for a coup, you need centralization. Second,

29:50

while of course, interest

29:54

groups that takes power during a

29:56

coup, it may legitimize it

29:58

taking power through kind of a appeal to the people,

30:01

it's not necessarily the people who do it,

30:03

it's usually done by military and paramilitary forces.

30:07

People are usually sources of legitimization than

30:09

actual too. You know, I

30:11

love how like Anver Pasha did

30:14

it during the Young Turk Revolt. So

30:16

basically during the Red on

30:18

Sublime Port, I think it

30:20

was 1913, a leader of mutineers,

30:23

he came to the Grand Vizier, kind of

30:25

prime minister of the Ottoman Empire, and demanded

30:28

him to write a letter of resignation. So

30:30

he starts writing, add the suggestion of the

30:32

military and the people, tells

30:35

Anver Pasha, well, and the people writes

30:37

minister. So basically in this

30:40

regard, people play more for

30:42

all of a source of legitimization. Because

30:45

those doing the coup, they cannot just say it by

30:47

their own name. So

30:50

number three, interestingly enough, people

30:52

are usually passive. People

30:54

are usually passive, in a sense that they can

30:56

cheer for one force, they can do it another,

30:59

but paradoxically, often they centralize regime. They don't

31:02

usually do much. They don't usually do

31:04

much. So during

31:06

such events, most population, almost

31:08

all of it is usually

31:10

rather passive. And

31:13

number four, number four, is that

31:15

in a regime that are sufficiently centralized,

31:17

and sufficiently centralized also means that there

31:20

is little power, barons and a lot

31:22

of power of quarters, it

31:24

usually will be quarters, it usually

31:26

will be quarters who will do it. So,

31:29

paradoxically enough, sufficiently centralized regime

31:32

faces the greatest danger

31:34

from its own agents. Any

31:38

other final thoughts that conclude on Camille?

31:41

I think maybe final

31:43

thought about the future of Russia. You

31:45

know, I think that the parallel

31:47

was 1917 Putin was making. It

31:50

was interesting, it was interesting. In

31:53

a sense, in a sense, that

31:55

now, we're probably, as I think

31:57

we're probably saying,

32:01

the end of the regime that

32:03

naturally evolved exactly from 1917. Because in 1917 it was

32:08

indeed revolutionary, very abrupt and very

32:10

radical change in the past. Because

32:12

in 1970 the previous order was

32:15

overthrown, the previous

32:17

elites were persecuted and often

32:19

just physically slaughtered. So

32:22

whatever grew after 1917 in the

32:24

Soviet era, it was just very

32:26

different from what had

32:28

existed previously and headed by very

32:30

different elites. But after that,

32:32

after that, you didn't really have revolution,

32:34

you had evolution. So

32:37

Lenin's regime quite organically evolved into

32:39

Stalin's, Stalin's into Khrushchev's and so

32:41

forth. So while Putin

32:43

himself may have personally very negative

32:45

opinion about Lenin and his regime,

32:48

Putin's regime is eventually, it

32:51

is ultimately a result of gradual evolution

32:53

of Lenin's regime. But,

32:56

now, quite probably after Putin,

33:00

what we'll see is not

33:02

their evolution, but

33:04

their placement of elites, their placement of elites

33:07

for exceeding what we have seen in the 1990s. So

33:09

framing it,

33:15

framing it as a potential for

33:17

Putin's regime, it could

33:20

be spoiling the frame. It

33:22

could be spoiling the frame because what we'll probably

33:24

see within

33:26

the next few years is

33:28

not so much for Putin

33:30

as their replacement of elites

33:32

in Russia on a gigantic

33:35

scale. Yeah, no, you

33:37

had this incredible point in one of your threads

33:39

over the past few days that like actually,

33:41

you know, everyone makes fun of Pergosian for

33:43

being a caterer. But in

33:46

fact, like, you know, some of

33:48

Putin's ancestors got their first, you know,

33:50

their first sort

33:53

of hooks into power by also

33:56

like literally doing food service

33:58

for the Doman Klaatora. So,

34:01

yes, yes. And I think I find

34:04

it very interesting because when I say

34:06

that Putin's regime evolved

34:08

from Lenin's, it does not necessarily technically

34:10

mean that like Putin's ruling a liege,

34:12

it kind of evo- their descendants

34:14

of Lenin's commissars. That's not necessarily

34:16

true. But to

34:19

the much greater extent than most

34:21

people would be ready to accept,

34:23

they may be descendants of commissar

34:25

servants, basically. They may

34:27

not be descendants of commissars, but they're descendants of people

34:29

who served to put food on that table or

34:32

guarded them or drove them. So

34:35

that's what probably Ibn Khaldun would

34:37

frame as a severe kind

34:40

of an interconnected group of

34:42

interests and interconnected group of

34:44

families that comes to

34:46

power as a result of founding conquest.

34:50

And that leaves for a while. So

34:53

Ibn Khaldun, he

34:56

believed that as a being, he usually

34:58

leaves for four generations. There will

35:00

be usually no fifth one. And

35:02

there are very rare exceptions. Exceptions

35:05

are very, very rare. So

35:07

if we kind

35:10

of accept this interpretation, if

35:12

we follow this model, then

35:15

Putin would be third generation. Basically,

35:19

the guy who appointed him as the

35:23

director of FISB would be the fourth. And

35:25

most probably there will be no fifth one. You

35:27

know, it's a very scary thing

35:29

to contemplate, right? What

35:33

sort of an overthrow of an entire

35:36

regime, not just by changing the

35:38

man at the top, but by changing the entire sort of system.

35:43

Why do you think that's the case, Camille?

35:45

Why is your

35:48

belief that whatever happens next is going to be actually

35:50

a much more radical transformation

35:52

than just a different person

35:54

being on top? Great

35:57

question. Great question. One answer. was

36:00

give because regimes

36:03

do fall. regimes do

36:06

fall and usually we do not foresee it

36:08

until it happens. So

36:11

you know, there was one great book about

36:13

the late USR. I don't

36:15

exactly remember the author, but I

36:18

love its name. It was

36:20

forever until it ended. So

36:23

that's what usually happens. That's what

36:25

usually happens. And

36:29

it's much, it's usually impossible to

36:31

predict it exactly. But it will

36:33

be very easily to explain it

36:35

retrospectively, which everyone will be doing

36:37

once it happens. So

36:40

that's one thing. Another another

36:42

is that when we have an

36:44

interconnected group of families ruling

36:47

for decades, we

36:49

are relatively with

36:53

a relatively low rate of being selected out,

36:56

and relatively low social mobility. Perdoxically,

36:59

it makes a regime more fragile. So the

37:03

low level of being selected

37:05

out, it may secure position

37:07

of individual families of individual

37:10

interest groups, but it

37:12

makes system as a whole very much

37:14

more brutal. So I

37:16

would say I would say that the Russian

37:18

ruling regime would be very much robust, if

37:21

it would be more enthusiastic about

37:24

selecting its own members out, but

37:26

it does not. Just

37:30

I'll give you an example. I'll

37:33

not give you exact like figures right now,

37:36

but I'll just convey the general thought. There's

37:39

a rush, there's let's say, generals in

37:41

Russia. There are generals

37:43

of army or police or federal security

37:46

service and many, many other like services.

37:49

So there used to be for

37:51

them, the maximum ages

37:53

of retirement. And

37:56

I'm giving you like general direction of

37:58

how it looks not like exactly details.

38:00

For example, the retirement age used to be

38:02

60. Then Putin rises

38:04

to 65, then to 70, then

38:07

to 80, then he just abolished it at all.

38:11

So what do we have? Putin

38:13

is naturally a conservative person who

38:16

doesn't want to experiment much, who

38:18

doesn't want to experiment with kind changing

38:21

the same people. He's much more comfortable to

38:23

have the same people around. But,

38:26

but if he was just retiring them

38:28

one by one and getting new ones,

38:31

you'd have their ruling circle, including

38:33

of Selvicki, the head of military,

38:35

prime military, state security, could

38:37

be more like of mixed age. But

38:40

if you just don't do it, if you just refuse it, you

38:43

will have the same group of people who

38:46

will basically stay in power until

38:49

they die. And then

38:51

they'll be dying just one by one very quickly. And

38:55

that is a scenario some some outrageously

38:57

similar to what happened in the late

38:59

in the end of this. Should

39:01

I be how scared of how scared for the

39:04

future of humanity should I be of

39:06

that timeline? You

39:10

know, your question is quite revealing,

39:12

you know, many Russians believe that the

39:14

West and especially America conspired against Russia

39:17

and just applauding to disrupt it

39:19

to like microstates. And

39:22

as I said, they just never comprehend

39:24

how scared most

39:26

Americans, including most political chemitores, analysts,

39:29

media are about that scenario. So

39:33

I understand you. But,

39:36

but, but while

39:38

I probably cannot

39:41

assure you, it's

39:43

like completely safe perspective. I cannot

39:45

guarantee that at all. If you

39:47

are scared of a potential

39:49

scenario, maybe it

39:52

is. It

39:55

makes sense to prepare it in cases. It

39:57

just happens. This argument has been

39:59

made in the in the US-China context as

40:01

well, that just because we've

40:03

seen such less transformative

40:05

change in the US over

40:08

the past, over our national

40:10

history, that big shifts are

40:13

much more seen as crises than

40:15

they are as potential opportunities. And

40:18

folks don't necessarily internalize the

40:21

upside of

40:23

dramatic change. So fair

40:26

point, Camille. I'm

40:28

not sure you made me feel all that

40:30

much better about it. It's sort of like

40:32

giant nuclear power with undergoing its own revolution

40:34

in 2024. But

40:40

I guess it's not necessarily

40:42

something that anyone can really control. Yeah,

40:45

that's very true. So I know,

40:47

Camille, you've been doing some really cool stuff

40:49

about the Russian

40:52

military industrial base. You

40:55

want to preview some of your research briefly here? So

40:58

basically, an

41:00

interesting thing is just to look

41:03

how the US, like intelligence and

41:05

military commentary, evolves over time. So

41:08

it looks to me at this point as

41:11

if currently analysts,

41:14

observers, commenters, they just put

41:16

much lesser focus on

41:18

the issues of production, production-based military production, than

41:21

they used to do it, let's say, in

41:23

the Cold War. So

41:25

kind of if this concern peaked, probably,

41:28

probably, I would say in the 1970s, it

41:30

has been downhill since then. So

41:33

as a result, we have a pretty interesting

41:35

situation where, for

41:37

example, the nuclear status of Russia is

41:39

just discussed as

41:42

given. You know, like grass

41:44

is green, sky is blue,

41:47

sun is yellow, Russia is in the ukulele. But

41:52

usually, in most cases, Russia

41:55

being nuclear power is not being

41:57

problematized at all, for example. how

42:00

Russia, a country that went through

42:03

the post-Soviet collapse, that lost most

42:05

of its machinery, that

42:08

lost most of its

42:10

supply chains, when

42:14

it comes against machinery, to the military production,

42:17

how can it still maintain

42:20

its existing part of the weapons

42:22

of mass destruction and

42:25

their delivery systems, or

42:27

even produce

42:29

new weapons and

42:32

delivery systems. A short

42:34

answer, very short answer would be

42:37

that with Russia

42:41

losing its domestic machinery, while

42:45

the global manufacture was being

42:48

revolutionized through the implementation of

42:50

digital control, so basically

42:52

the mechatronic revolution, Russia

42:56

has just outsourced its production of

42:58

industrial equipment abroad. And

43:01

abroad in this respect it means to the

43:03

US and US allies because there are no

43:05

other alternatives in the world. So

43:07

at this point both the maintenance of the

43:10

existing part of the weapons of mass destruction

43:12

and of delivery systems and

43:15

their replacement, they now

43:17

fully depend upon the

43:19

impact. Industrial

43:22

equipment in this case is mostly

43:24

cutting machine tools, machining

43:26

equipment parts, components

43:30

from the US allies and maintenance support

43:33

by them. And this is kind of

43:35

the elephant in the room, that

43:37

to my best understanding almost no one is

43:39

discussing and when they're discussing it it's not

43:42

in the US. That

43:44

would certainly be a great topic of

43:46

discussion, a very big topic of

43:48

discussion in the Cold War, and

43:51

it gets almost zero attention nowadays. I

43:53

don't fully comprehend why. Well,

43:57

I'm looking forward to reading on that. having

44:02

you back once we have

44:04

an elite revolution in Russia

44:06

with democracy being shouted from

44:09

the hills. So

44:11

never, so never basically. Maybe we'll do one or

44:13

two before then. Camille, thanks so

44:15

much for being a part of Chatatuck. Yeah, thank you

44:17

so much for your invitation. Have a good day. But

46:01

hang on. Fudexo!

46:08

Fudexo!