0:00

The Avengers assemble once

0:02

again. Rave of

0:04

the rhodium group JP Kleinens of

0:06

the Think Tank SNV, Jay Goldberg

0:10

of

0:10

digits and dollars and Dylan Patel

0:12

who writes the semi-analysis sub

0:14

stack here to talk about

0:16

chip sack, tech

0:19

cold war, uh, Euro

0:21

chips act, AI, China

0:24

retaliation, autonomous driving,

0:26

and whatever else we get into. Welcome to China

0:28

Talk, everyone. So

0:31

a few weeks ago, the CHIP's Act released

0:33

its first request for

0:36

funding. So all the industry

0:38

who's doing the entire

0:41

global semiconductor industry who's interested in getting

0:43

money to make manufacturing in America

0:46

now has their guidelines

0:48

of what they're going to have submit in

0:50

order to hopefully come

0:52

away millions or even potentially

0:55

billions of dollars in support

0:57

for building in the US? What were everyone's

0:59

impressions of that

1:01

What did the priorities seem to be about

1:04

what the administration is most focused on trying

1:06

to get built in the US? To

1:08

me, it seemed like a lot of the priorities were around

1:11

leading edge and packaging, advanced

1:13

packaging, and maybe so much

1:15

traditional packaging and trailing

1:17

edge process technology, at least. It seemed I

1:19

mean, it certainly are gonna be, as

1:22

efforts in that direction, to me,

1:24

it just felt like they were a lot more concerned about

1:26

the leading edge, which is just an interesting

1:29

to down.

1:31

Yeah, when they say two leading edge

1:33

networks or hubs, that's a lot

1:36

of money and, and getting,

1:38

you know, two places in America up and

1:40

running on leading edge is like committing a

1:43

not insubstantial portion of the $40 billion,

1:46

which is going to be up for My sense

1:48

was that they're still kind of leaving their

1:50

options open and there almost weren't

1:52

a ton of choices that were made in this document.

1:55

it kind of listed like everything

1:57

that you could think of them ever

1:59

wanting to do. So you saw leading edge,

2:01

you saw lagging edge, you saw packaging.

2:04

And the sort of hierarchy

2:06

of needs was just, we

2:09

want you to address national security and economic

2:11

objectives. And you don't really have the rubric of, we're

2:15

giving 50%

2:16

to leading edge and 50% to everything

2:18

else. You didn't quite get

2:20

all the way to that level of thinking.

2:22

Anyways, Jay, did anything strike out to you

2:25

about the broad funding priorities?

2:27

I mean, it looked to me

2:29

a lot like a policy document

2:31

as opposed to a technology document.

2:35

It didn't strike me that it was really clear, strategic

2:37

on which technologies really mattered. But

2:39

I mean, there is an interesting negotiation

2:43

dynamic thing here when you say, 100%, I want

2:47

leading edge and nothing else, then all of a sudden

2:49

the TSMCs and Samsungs of the world, their bargaining

2:51

position all of a sudden gets a lot better, right? Yeah,

2:54

but that again, it speaks

2:56

to almost a political dynamic

2:58

where it's like,

2:59

they clearly negotiated a bunch of deals ahead

3:01

of it for TSMC and some of the others.

3:04

And that's why those are seem prominent. It's

3:06

not from a sort of best practices technology

3:08

perspective. It's just like, hey, we have this deal.

3:11

Let's make sure that there's language in the policy

3:13

that covers deals we've already closed. And

3:16

then everything else is sort of like, here's our priority

3:18

list. I think they didn't

3:21

negotiate because they say two leading edge fabs,

3:23

right? Well, San Antonio's got a huge announcement in

3:25

Texas, right? Intel's got a huge announcement

3:27

in Ohio and TSMC's

3:29

got a huge announcement in Arizona. And

3:31

so all three of those could be significantly

3:33

paired back

3:35

or you know, actually go through depending on

3:37

how these negotiations go through. I don't actually

3:39

think they negotiated these deals yet,

3:41

right? I think they're gonna play each other off

3:43

of them and in the end one of the three will

3:45

maybe not get the money that they want.

3:47

and they will not come up to bat. Because

3:49

I think all three are leveraging for as much hip-sacked

3:52

as possible, right? I think that's

3:54

true. I also think some of them

3:56

might not actually take the deal. I think, you

3:58

know, I have to look at Samsung, who's our.

3:59

committed a lot of this before the CHIPs

4:02

Act and they started looking at this, are

4:04

they really gonna be, I'm not sure they're gonna be excited about

4:06

it or want to take that money, which would be

4:09

an interesting choice. They're leaking

4:11

stuff for Reuters, right? Yesterday I think they

4:13

got Reuters to say that the costs went up

4:15

by X percent. It was like five

4:17

billion dollars or something, right? Versus what they had

4:20

planned a couple years ago. So I think that's just

4:22

more negotiation leverage that they're trying to put

4:24

out there, I imagine.

4:26

So So, Revo, we

4:28

have money, but there are also many, many

4:30

strings attached that these companies

4:33

are going to have to weigh whether or not they want to take the chips

4:35

act money. What were some of the more dramatic or

4:37

potentially more costly asks that the

4:40

chips act is going to make on these companies

4:42

that are considering taking this money?

4:44

Yeah, from a policy perspective, industrial

4:47

policy provides a fantastic

4:49

opportunity for governments to impose

4:52

conditions on industry. And

4:54

you can see that in the language of

4:57

the CHIPS Act and in the provisions

4:59

that we see coming out now in

5:01

this implementation phase. So

5:04

one line that really stood out

5:06

is on the clawback provision,

5:09

which said that commerce can clawback

5:12

funding if recipients, quote,

5:14

knowingly engage in any joint research or technology

5:17

licensing effort with foreign entities of concern

5:20

that

5:20

raise national security concerns. obviously

5:24

very broad and the Secretary

5:26

of Commerce has the remit

5:28

to interpret that, adjust

5:31

that definition over time.

5:33

And that should make companies of course nervous,

5:35

right? Samsung and SK-Hynix are already in

5:38

a really uncomfortable position just

5:40

being beholden to BIS

5:43

licenses to continue operating

5:45

their fabs in China. And

5:48

the signal has already been sent, right? steer

5:50

your leading edge memory chip production out

5:52

of China, you're on a timeline, go. So

5:55

I think part of the reticence you're

5:57

seeing from companies like Samsung is

6:00

Well, how tight are these conditions

6:02

going to be? How will that US

6:04

interpretation evolve over time?

6:07

And then you see TSMC is

6:10

like, yeah, no, this is all very reasonable.

6:13

We're good. We're going to go for it. So

6:16

it's really interesting to see kind of middle

6:18

power balancing manifested

6:20

through these companies' policies as

6:23

they're reacting to what's coming out. Sure,

6:25

sure. So there's a provision of

6:27

the ChIPSCAC that basically says that

6:30

any excess profits would be shared with

6:32

the government,

6:33

which is very interesting

6:35

because I don't know policy, but I don't think

6:37

that's happened a lot with prior sort of subsidies

6:40

to companies in various

6:42

industries that the US government has subsidized. So

6:45

like, what's up with that? Yeah, I don't know.

6:47

Yeah.

6:48

I read that as they

6:50

pasted that on in the last minute because it emerged

6:52

that the Eurochips Act had those

6:55

provisions in it. And I think some of the US policymakers.

6:57

So we thought, oh yeah, we should have that too.

6:59

That sounds like a good idea. Actually,

7:02

depending on your reading, I would

7:04

say some of the provisions

7:06

in Europe are even a little bit

7:09

more drastic. So in the

7:12

one subsidy vehicle,

7:14

it is negotiated that for companies,

7:16

they have to make the financial gap

7:19

analysis and tell the government this is

7:21

kind of the delta that we are looking at

7:23

and this is why we need subsidies.

7:25

And then some governments argue

7:28

that, well, obviously

7:30

you have a lot of knee-way with this

7:32

financial gap analysis because if you

7:34

calculate extremely conservatively

7:37

how profits will develop in your market,

7:40

then your financial gap analysis might

7:42

be extremely big,

7:44

even though the market is

7:47

extremely profitable for you. So

7:49

over the seven year period that the

7:52

subsidies are going out,

7:54

if your profit is

7:57

above a certain percent, You

7:59

have to... pay back the entirety

8:01

of the subsidy.

8:03

So some

8:05

companies have to put back

8:07

money

8:08

or put aside money because

8:11

depending on how the market develops, they

8:13

might have to pay back

8:15

all of the subsidies that

8:17

they have received. And I mean,

8:19

this is definitely

8:20

an interesting situation, I think, for companies

8:23

where you receive subsidies, but at

8:25

the same time, you have to put aside money because if

8:28

your investment is too profitable. And if the

8:30

market develops too nicely, you

8:32

might have to pay back all of those subsidies.

8:35

How have companies responded to that on the

8:37

European side so far? And Peter? I

8:40

mean, interestingly, there's

8:42

not a huge discussion about it in Europe

8:44

on the public level. But

8:47

there's a very

8:49

active conversation among member

8:51

states because as always in Europe, say

8:54

it's different on their perception of how

8:56

subsidies should be used, how stringed

8:59

the rules should be and so on. So

9:01

to use a cliche you can imagine that

9:03

the more frugal

9:04

Scandinavian countries are more opposed

9:07

to the idea to just give away subsidies

9:09

freely

9:11

and want to have strings attached in

9:13

terms of profit margins

9:15

whereas other countries including

9:17

the one where I'm have a

9:20

different idea of how to give

9:22

away subsidies to companies. It's

9:24

a little bit of a mess, but it's interesting to

9:26

see that for this particular regard, apparently,

9:29

as Jay put it, the US government got

9:31

maybe some inspiration from Europe,

9:33

which is definitely interesting. Maybe

9:36

just as a side note to the previous conversation,

9:39

for me, kind of the big underlying

9:41

question in all of this,

9:43

because Jay, you mentioned before that for you

9:45

it read more like a policy document document and

9:47

less like a technology document.

9:49

For me the underlying question is to what

9:51

extent can governments

9:54

be reasonable technology pickers?

9:57

Because ultimately if you look at industrial policy

9:59

and

9:59

the implementation of the US chipsec, the implementation

10:02

of the EU chipsec,

10:03

governments

10:05

want to be the winning

10:07

technology pickers.

10:08

And I'm simply looking

10:11

at the financial sector and how tricky it

10:13

is to pick a winning technology for VC.

10:16

I'm just wondering how the

10:18

government's best place to

10:21

make decisions, for example, should

10:23

we subsidize the silicon carbide fab

10:25

or should should we subsidize the gallium nitride

10:27

fab? Or what's up with all

10:29

the analog processors for AI?

10:32

Should we give subsidies to chip design for analog

10:34

processors? Or is it really about

10:37

wafer level packaging? Or like is government

10:39

in the right place to make those

10:42

rather intricate and long-term decisions

10:45

on the technology level when the

10:47

sector itself already struggles to identify

10:50

winning technologies in the long term? My

10:52

knee-jerk reaction to that is

10:55

no, but if you think historically,

10:57

there

10:57

have certainly been a lot of instances

10:59

in which the US government has had a technologically

11:03

savvy policy towards tech

11:06

and what technology is to prefer. And usually it's

11:08

rooted in some basic

11:10

need of the government,

11:12

usually around defense and military.

11:15

And so I'm just wondering to what extent some

11:17

of these priorities are reflected

11:19

in the in the CHIPS Act. But certainly the

11:22

CHIPS sanctions back in October were

11:24

clearly heavily influenced by the Defense

11:27

Department and adjacent agencies.

11:30

I don't get the sense from

11:32

this latest document around the CHIPS

11:35

Act. You know, this sector of the

11:37

US economy or the US government needs this

11:39

technology and we're going to favor it. It

11:41

feels broader to me.

11:43

And I think that's reflective of it coming out of commerce,

11:45

which itself, the Commerce Department doesn't have

11:48

a big need need for

11:49

advanced chips the way that the Defense Department does.

11:52

I don't get the sense that we have a clear laundry

11:55

list of technologies that we need. But

11:58

it can evolve over time, right? I mean that's. Part

12:00

of the design of this

12:02

is to stay ahead

12:04

in that innovation curve. I

12:06

mean, we'll see how that evolves,

12:09

but the trailing edge

12:11

policy debate still seems to be very much in

12:13

play.

12:14

I mean, yes, the emphasis is on leading

12:17

edge, but you've still got $10 billion

12:19

for

12:20

legacy chip manufacturing.

12:23

There's still big gaps there. Of course,

12:25

policymakers want to steer sourcing

12:28

away from China. That's hard to do,

12:30

just given market dynamics. But

12:33

it's interesting to see where some emerging policy

12:35

areas are cropping up to,

12:37

to try to address that. For

12:40

example, in demanding

12:42

more transparency on subsidy

12:45

disclosure. This is where the

12:47

EU is already a couple of steps ahead of the

12:49

US

12:50

in throwing up procurement

12:53

investment restrictions around subsidy

12:56

driven just market distortions,

12:58

the US is playing around with that now too.

13:00

So there are there are still ways for the US

13:03

to, I think, try to steer

13:05

some of that policy and diversification,

13:08

although it's again, the economics of this is

13:10

really hard for us companies, companies

13:13

to reconcile with.

13:14

But it's this flexibility built

13:16

into these latest policies. And my question is,

13:19

do

13:19

we think that's a feature or a bug? Because

13:22

the glass

13:24

half full version is like what you said, which

13:26

is they're going to adapt with

13:28

time depending on needs. The glass

13:30

half empty view of that is they

13:32

don't really know what they want and it's going to be come down to

13:35

backroom deals and last minute horse

13:37

trading

13:38

as opposed to a coherent policy objectives.

13:41

You got to have a sense that there's been more strategy

13:44

thinking within the CHIPS Act than just

13:46

what we saw in the vision document

13:48

and the notice of funding opportunity.

13:51

Yeah, so I question to this,

13:53

what's your reading to what

13:55

extent, I mean,

13:57

in Europe the conversation about subsidizing

13:59

chips.

14:00

from the beginning was focused

14:02

on front end and very much focused on cutting

14:04

edge front end because that's the stuff we don't have at

14:07

all. But then over the 18 month or so, it

14:12

got a little bit more nuanced that policymakers

14:15

understood, oh, there's this thing called

14:17

packaging and oh, there's backend and packaging

14:19

is advancing. And then you call it advanced packaging

14:21

and maybe we need that. And I still remember

14:24

in one of the requests for comments

14:27

from DOC, a couple

14:29

of US PCB manufacturers

14:32

also replied and said, you know what, if you're worried

14:34

about national security, don't forget

14:36

about us. And with PCBs,

14:40

printed circuit boards, the interesting thing is

14:42

actually that China is not lagging behind.

14:44

Actually, the most cutting edge stuff is in

14:46

China for PCBs.

14:48

And it is more that the US and Europe

14:51

are way behind in PCB

14:53

manufacturing.

14:54

So what's your reading from conversations,

14:57

also looking at UJ, hypothetically,

15:01

if I am a really cool

15:04

PCB startup or a small

15:06

PCB company, do

15:09

I get anything out of the chip set?

15:11

Because out of the EU one, you don't get anything out.

15:13

So I don't know the answer to that,

15:15

but I will say that being

15:18

an advanced PCB manufacturer

15:21

is not as exciting as it sounds. That's

15:23

a pretty miserable business,

15:25

very low margin, fairly

15:27

labor intensive. Right. And

15:30

for sort of standard packaging, I don't,

15:33

I don't know how much that's going to come back to the U S now, advanced

15:36

packaging, that's important. And Dylan

15:38

can talk about this way more than I can,

15:40

but there's, you know, some of the manufacturing stuff

15:42

is super, super hard to do,

15:44

and it's going to be done by the foundries,

15:46

but the bulk of the business in the place where.

15:49

Where we're really talking about PCBs. That's, you

15:52

know, that business is not coming to the US. like

15:54

putting stuff on a board. If it's not

15:56

in China, it's going to go

15:58

to Malaysia.

15:59

But I mean, at the same time, for

16:02

me, the weird thing is, since we

16:04

are all doubling down on national security,

16:07

if you are worried about national security,

16:09

the PCB should be of concern

16:12

to you. Like maybe even more

16:14

so

16:14

than the 15

16:16

billion transistors

16:19

in your cutting edge processor, but

16:22

hiding

16:23

or compromising a chip that then ends

16:25

up on the PCB is much

16:28

more viable in terms of an attack

16:30

vector

16:31

than trying to infiltrate Intel's

16:33

or NVIDIA's next cutting edge processor

16:36

and hiding a backdoor among the

16:38

billions of transistors. I'm just

16:41

I'm just I just find it interesting that

16:44

for

16:44

some reason with PCBs, whether

16:46

US government forgot to think about

16:49

the national security angle. The question

16:51

is, if the policymakers believe

16:54

that there is a certain level of minimal

16:56

minimum production that is in the US, or

16:59

in Europe for various technologies, right?

17:02

Should we be able to make a,

17:04

you know, an advanced Nvidia AI server

17:06

and the networking equipment to connect them all together,

17:09

even if it's a small amount? And to Jay's

17:11

point, right, that's not economically viable, right?

17:13

There's too much labor involved. A front end fab

17:15

requires very few people and labor

17:17

is, you know, less than 20% of the cost of

17:20

a final chip. It's all capital, right? And

17:22

so that's something that maybe makes more sense and

17:24

is more automated, at least from an economic

17:26

standpoint. But then our policymakers going

17:28

to subsidize, hey, actually, we want to be able

17:31

to have, you know, 3% of the world or 5% of

17:33

the world

17:33

or 10% of the world's PCB manufacturing here.

17:36

But remember, there are multiple policy

17:38

tools in play, right? So your industrial

17:41

policy is your incentive, but

17:44

then the other huge whopper

17:47

of a policy that's emerging now

17:49

post October 7th, I think the next big

17:51

thing is now the restrict act,

17:53

which last week was unveiled.

17:56

Senator Mark Warner is

17:58

behind this. of course a very serious

18:01

player in Congress.

18:02

And it's really interesting because this is

18:04

something that focuses on ICT

18:06

supply chains. Remember, commerce

18:09

already has ICTs rules.

18:11

In effect, this was something that was

18:14

introduced on the last day of the Trump

18:16

administration, and then

18:18

went into effect a little bit

18:20

after that by the Biden administration where

18:23

they carried through.

18:24

And we've been waiting to see, okay,

18:27

will this be fully utilized? The

18:29

TikTok debate has just catalyzed

18:31

this. But if you look at the text of

18:33

the restrict act, it is really,

18:35

really deliberately wide

18:38

ranging.

18:39

And it's meant to cover hardware,

18:42

software, services, you know,

18:44

just the provision of, you

18:46

know, those those services, anything

18:49

around ICT supply chains that

18:51

has a nexus with a foreign entity

18:53

of concern.

18:54

So,

18:55

you know, to your point, Peter, on, okay,

18:58

well, what about,

18:59

you know, printed circuit boards and the national security

19:02

risk?

19:02

Well, this is the catchall for

19:05

something like that, potentially. I'm

19:07

struggling to think of a significant

19:10

domestic PCB maker.

19:13

And I'm sure I'm going to get some angry comment,

19:15

I forgot somebody, but I don't think there is a constituency

19:17

in the US who's advocating for this, because

19:19

we, we, I don't think we make many of them any

19:22

PCBs anymore. So maybe coming

19:24

up from PCBs for a second, every

19:27

single company at any point

19:29

in the value chain is going

19:31

to do the sort of thing that whichever

19:33

PCB manufacturer

19:36

hired a smart lobbyist

19:38

to help them frame their thing as a national

19:41

security perspective, such as to

19:43

get JP and Jay and us talking about

19:46

this on China Talk. And the, you

19:48

know, having to sort

19:50

of sift through all of

19:53

those hundreds, I mean, potentially

19:55

even like thousands of companies

19:58

that are going to be asking for support saying look,

20:01

maybe you weren't aware of this, but our thing

20:03

is really important to national security.

20:06

So give me a slice of the pie. And

20:08

I'm sure there's actually going to

20:10

be a lot of learning and processing.

20:13

And interestingly, in the NOFO as well, there

20:15

was a lot of

20:16

room for back and forth, where

20:19

they would send an initial 20 pages, and

20:22

then the Commerce Department would say, oh, we want to learn more about

20:24

this, that, and the other thing. So I imagine

20:28

over that iterative process, there

20:30

will be maybe priorities

20:33

that the government will get convinced

20:35

of that aren't necessarily the

20:37

ones that policymakers have already

20:39

internalized around, say,

20:42

leading edge logic, for instance.

20:44

Should we talk about childcare for a second? The

20:48

interesting thing about that is those provisions

20:51

that got thrown in on childcare

20:54

have kind of reopened some of the

20:56

partisan vibes around

20:59

this, you know, where the Republicans

21:01

are saying, wait, you can't just throw that

21:03

in there. I thought there was some consensus around

21:05

this, like how many standards do you want to

21:07

pile on? Then there's, of course, a legitimate

21:10

argument about, you know, what kind

21:12

of labor standards the US wants to lead

21:14

with here. But then you've got Morris Chang over

21:16

here in TSMC saying, Oh, my

21:18

God, the labor costs are so expensive to Bruce

21:21

in China and in the US and globalization

21:24

is dead, but this

21:25

is the new world we live in.

21:27

So, I mean, I don't think

21:30

it stops this in its tracks or anything.

21:32

It's just a revealing

21:34

kind of political element to

21:37

the policy evolution. I

21:39

mean,

21:40

you spend money and you're gonna push as far

21:42

as you can and you're gonna get some sort

21:44

of return on your investment from sort

21:47

of economic security, national

21:49

security, securing the future

21:51

of the industry creating an ecosystem

21:53

or whatever. And like, you know, there's

21:55

a give and take with all of this. and maybe it was

21:58

surprising to me.

21:59

that it made it in there.

22:02

And then it was kind of like the one thing

22:04

that the national media picked up on with

22:06

this because we've just been talking for 30 minutes

22:09

about lots of other things that I think are gonna

22:11

be far more consequential than whether like a

22:13

thousand employees in the US

22:16

end up having

22:17

more subsidized childcare than they would otherwise,

22:19

which is like important. And I

22:22

think everyone should have childcare in America, but

22:24

I'm not sure that like the future of

22:27

America's semiconductor ingos ecosystem

22:29

is going to hinge on whether or not TSMC's

22:33

Arizona FAB has like

22:35

C plus or A minus preschool.

22:39

What is tracking to me, and I'm wondering

22:41

what you make of this,

22:44

the Department of Commerce is on a hiring

22:46

spree for the implementation of the

22:48

US chipset. And some

22:50

of those hires are really impressive.

22:54

Right, like the Department of Commerce

22:56

got, among others, the

22:59

chief economist from one of the

23:01

largest semiconductor companies

23:03

in the world

23:05

to now be the chief economist

23:07

for the implementation of the US chip check.

23:10

These are people who know what they talk about

23:12

when they talk about chips, right?

23:15

So I find this pretty

23:17

impressive in terms of not just

23:19

talking the talk, writing

23:22

regulations and paper, but also

23:24

working with the work and trying exactly

23:27

what you mentioned before, Jordan, how

23:29

do we spend this money most meaningfully?

23:31

And how do we sift through

23:33

probably hundreds of applications

23:36

where some of them might be sketchy? I

23:38

don't see the same happening

23:40

in Europe where we even though

23:42

the EU chip tech talks almost

23:45

about the same amount of money for theoretically 43

23:48

billion euros. But

23:51

I don't see a hiring spree in the European

23:53

Commission. I don't see a hiring spree in member

23:55

states to kind of step up the game

23:57

of industry knowledge. So to me.

24:00

it is, if we compare the two regions, to

24:02

me it is really increasing me about who

24:04

puts the money behind government

24:07

resources to actually implement

24:09

all the stuff.

24:10

So during the Great

24:12

Depression and the New Deal, there was this

24:15

sort of new class of dollar a year

24:17

men, and they were all men back then, who

24:19

basically came in from industry and

24:22

were there to spend all the money that FDR

24:25

got appropriated to rebuild America.

24:27

And I think it's

24:28

worth acknowledging on this podcast

24:31

that the pay cuts that all

24:33

these people from industry are taking by

24:35

doing these jobs are factors of 5 or 10.

24:40

I mean, the CIO spent 30

24:43

years or something at KKR, and

24:45

he probably isn't making more than $200K

24:47

to do this job.

24:48

And this is public service. And

24:51

this is kind of like because

24:53

our government hasn't figured out how to pay talent

24:56

appropriately, this is sort of what we need

24:58

to make a real national

25:00

push in something where the sort of like,

25:03

the alternate employment opportunities are just so

25:05

much more lucrative. So it has been

25:07

really encouraging for me to see the type of folks

25:09

that the administration has been able to persuade to take

25:12

some of these opportunities because they're

25:13

not doing it to get rich. We've talked for 30

25:16

minutes, like these are incredibly difficult

25:19

things to weigh and trade offs to make that

25:21

you can't just figure out

25:24

by having looked at these things for like a few

25:26

months making a decision. Because if you do that,

25:28

then like the lobbyists will beat you and

25:31

you won't be able to get the best bang for your

25:33

buck. So we're recording this on Friday,

25:35

March 17th.

25:36

Yesterday, I

25:38

watched Microsoft's Windows 365

25:40

demo like three times

25:43

and was

25:44

also just screaming in delight

25:46

at what these potential applications

25:49

for Word, Microsoft, Excel, and Outlook

25:51

could do.

25:52

Dylan, what's your take on

25:54

how these sorts of applications of generative

25:56

AI can change the world.

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26:24

I mean, the consequences

26:27

of the world are huge. All I was thinking

26:29

about was, hey, all

26:31

these applications of AI being pushed forward

26:34

are huge. There's already a shortage

26:37

of AI chips from Nvidia and such

26:40

in the market today, even after

26:42

the China ban. It's like, there's

26:44

a serious amount of hardware that's

26:46

needed to run all these applications. For

26:48

example, if you put large language models in search, you're

26:51

going to need tens of billions of dollars of GPUs.

26:53

If you put these large language models into every

26:55

word, I'm typing into Microsoft Word or Excel,

26:58

like, what? This is going to be ridiculous

27:00

amounts of compute

27:01

needed. And the question

27:03

is, what can you run on

27:05

those? Well, generally, the systems are

27:07

either banned or they're just about at the banning

27:10

threshold, right? NVIDIA modified some of the specs.

27:12

But as we go forward, there's a real question

27:15

if China will even be able to deploy these at

27:17

anywhere close to the same scale that the US can.

27:20

And then that's the question

27:21

of like, hey, does Microsoft

27:23

Word and Excel and Outlook and teams

27:25

with this AI meeting recognition

27:28

and all. I mean, you guys just need to watch this. Everyone needs

27:30

to watch the Microsoft event. But does that

27:32

make me 40% more productive? Yeah, it

27:35

absolutely does. So if I'm 40% more

27:37

productive, does that close a lot of the gap of

27:40

pure population advantage that China has? And

27:43

then when you add in allies and such, it's

27:45

a tremendous question of

27:47

does large language models and AI make

27:49

the whole like China is going

27:51

to take over the world because they of a bigger country with

27:53

more people, with more STEM graduates, break

27:56

that down a little bit.

27:58

So I took my five-year-old daughter.

27:59

to this event at the University

28:02

of Texas in Austin. It was a big science event.

28:04

And they did one of those demos. Have you

28:06

ever seen where they do the mouse trap demo

28:08

for an uncontrolled nuclear

28:10

chain fission reaction?

28:12

It's really cool. Like they drop a ping pong

28:14

ball into this box and then it like sets

28:17

up all the mouse traps and it's

28:19

an uncontrolled reaction. Like, right, one goes off

28:21

and then they all go off. And in my

28:23

head immediately I was thinking, holy

28:26

crap, like open AI. Like this

28:28

is what China sees, right? When

28:31

generative AI is out into the world,

28:33

right?

28:34

I'm sure it's like all around our dinner tables,

28:37

all of the discussions going

28:39

on around, well,

28:40

what is this gonna lead to in this innovation?

28:43

What business model can emerge out of this? How

28:46

do, you know, our own companies need

28:48

to stay ahead of the curve and how can they utilize

28:50

it?

28:51

Think about that conversation on

28:53

the Chinese side, right? Because this is,

28:55

it's out there. It's out into the world. You

28:58

need to innovate fast to

29:01

take advantage of it. And as you said, Dylan,

29:03

you need vast amounts of compute

29:05

power here. And China has

29:08

just been cut off from that in

29:10

a very big way. So all

29:12

of a sudden, we're just looking at this escalation

29:15

ladder when the tech

29:17

controls theme

29:18

catalyzed to a huge degree,

29:21

which really makes you wonder at this point

29:24

what the political decisions are going to be in

29:26

Beijing, like, yes, you can come out of the two sessions

29:28

and say, we got to focus on

29:30

basic R&D. And

29:32

we just need to kind of double down

29:35

and put our resources into this.

29:37

But these are

29:38

really hard constraints that

29:40

you're up against. And if you want your companies

29:43

to innovate, you can't be all over them

29:45

to censor these large language

29:47

models, right? And what they're going to churn out to your

29:49

populace, it's only going to slow you

29:51

down even more. So some really hard

29:54

choices I think going to need to be made here? And

29:57

geopolitically, that's a fascinating

29:59

question to me.

29:59

over the next three years or so. Yeah,

30:02

I mean, it's interesting because

30:04

when the October 7th restrictions were laid out,

30:06

it was, look, we're stopping supercomputers

30:09

to model nuclear bombs or whatever. It was very

30:11

much like, look, this is a national security thing.

30:13

And the messaging out of the administration was,

30:15

look, we're not trying to

30:17

slow down China's economy or whatever.

30:20

But

30:21

we now see the technology

30:24

that is going to be built on the exact same

30:26

chips that are being controlled, which

30:28

is going to produce significant

30:31

productivity gains for years

30:33

and years to come, which China might

30:35

be able to access through the cloud

30:37

in Singapore.

30:39

But it's, I think, very different.

30:41

And one of the really interesting things that has

30:44

seemed really clear in the way Microsoft

30:46

and OpenAI are working together is that you

30:48

really need to be deeply integrated

30:51

with your cloud provider. And

30:54

there's a lot of work that is going together

30:56

or between the model development and

30:58

scaling inference, which is not just

31:01

something you could hook in halfway

31:03

across the world with a cloud provider that already

31:05

has more than enough business than they can handle

31:08

dealing with Western clients that they don't have to be stressed

31:10

out about are potentially violating some

31:12

export controls which could really get you in trouble. So even

31:15

if the pain initially

31:18

with those export controls was only on the

31:20

margin, and yeah, some companies

31:21

were trying to rejigger their chips

31:24

to just get under these thresholds, now

31:26

that generative AI is really going to hit

31:28

in the next coming months and years, it

31:30

ends up likely having a much larger,

31:33

sort of broader public commercial impact

31:35

than just the dual use things that

31:38

the original regulations were ostensibly

31:40

focused on.

31:42

Coming back to you, Reva, with the sort of like

31:45

cold war stuff,

31:47

one of the most concerning

31:49

upsetting lines I saw thinking about whether

31:51

or two particularly concerning things

31:54

I've seen over the past few

31:56

weeks, which raises my expectations that

31:58

we're going to start to see.

31:59

retaliation from China is first,

32:02

you know, all of this reporting, which we've covered

32:04

on in China talk about the Biden administration,

32:07

again, telling China not to

32:09

give arms to Russia. And

32:11

then this one line from some

32:13

anonymous Chinese government official in the

32:16

Straits Times basically saying the

32:19

exact same thing that the Chinese government

32:21

started saying right before it started putting

32:23

tariffs on in retaliation

32:26

to the US tariffs back in what it was a 2017 or 2018, saying,

32:28

look,

32:31

we don't want a Cold War, but

32:33

we're ready to have one.

32:35

And whatever that ends up meaning

32:37

is going to have a real impact

32:40

and put back some of the things on the table that

32:43

we've been talking about and try to talk over the past year, that

32:46

China, for whatever reason, hasn't decided to

32:48

deploy to strike back in semiconductors or

32:51

any other industry. So

32:54

any thoughts, reflections on the risk of

32:57

the tit for tat kicking off in

32:59

an even more dramatic way than

33:02

it has so far?

33:03

Things are getting existential really

33:06

fast, right? I mean, you're already

33:08

seeing this dynamic

33:10

in play

33:11

where the US is

33:13

very consciously escalating

33:16

in tech and investment controls, boosting

33:19

defense support to Taiwan, all these different

33:21

fronts,

33:22

knowingly doing that but saying we need

33:24

guardrails, right, to prevent this from descending

33:27

into hot conflict.

33:29

Beijing's response, not having

33:31

much leverage here, just given the

33:34

state of its economy and needing to preserve foreign

33:36

investment, is, oh, you want guardrails?

33:39

Well, come and get it, right? It's

33:41

basically a balloon affair. You want

33:43

your military to military dialogues? Well,

33:46

you're going to need to de-escalate

33:48

if you want to get to a more stable state.

33:50

So we are

33:52

in a really dangerous phase

33:54

of the competition.

33:55

And I don't know if you saw, this

33:58

was also flagged by Trivium but but

34:00

there's ICY is

34:02

a semiconductor research and advisory firm based out of

34:04

Shanghai.

34:05

There was a really interesting opinion

34:08

piece where they did this classification

34:10

of

34:11

American chip offenders. There

34:13

were instigators,

34:15

which seemed to be alluding to the

34:17

big USIC companies

34:19

that they

34:20

talk about preventing the loss

34:22

of talent and technology, but they actually use

34:25

their judicial power to suppress competitors,

34:27

seek their own interests. That was one class. Then

34:29

there were

34:30

what they called white-eyed wolves, the

34:33

memory chip makers that can take advantage of controls,

34:35

and then pawns. There was a specific reference

34:38

to Dell,

34:39

which recently announced that they're going to diversify

34:41

their sourcing of chips away from

34:44

China that are basically trying

34:47

to steer out of China but are

34:49

being forced to from these political controls.

34:52

The conclusion was you need to create a

34:54

blacklist for the good companies

34:57

that are helping China China's tech

34:59

indigenization goals and

35:01

punish those that are not.

35:04

Now in practice, we know that's really

35:06

hard to do in this economic, in

35:08

this geopolitical climate where

35:10

China needs all the help it can get. It

35:13

can't afford to alienate foreign

35:15

investors in a big way, but there may be some easy

35:17

targets along the way as it's

35:19

tempted to retaliate.

35:21

Maybe on that note, because if

35:23

we look at the recent, not so

35:25

recent any water and also for Volkswagen

35:27

to have a joint venture with Horizon Robotics

35:30

for

35:31

I think two and a half billion US

35:33

dollars.

35:34

I mean that

35:35

certainly should put a smile on China's

35:38

face because it's in a critical

35:40

sector, it's by one of the largest

35:43

foreign companies. It's I think

35:45

also for Volkswagen one of the largest investments.

35:47

But if we combine that what you

35:50

just said before, what does it mean

35:52

for Volkswagen's competitiveness

35:54

in autonomous

35:56

driving down the road when

35:59

the China market, Volkswagen most

36:02

likely does not have the luxury anymore

36:04

to access generative AI. How

36:07

risky is it for international companies

36:10

to

36:11

agree to join ventures with Chinese

36:13

companies

36:14

in the area of semiconductors? Because

36:17

it seems like there are so many headaches

36:19

involved in this,

36:20

not just on the side of

36:22

export controls, but also especially if we

36:25

take into account,

36:26

can I still be competitive if

36:29

access to the Chinese market means

36:32

I have to separate my business

36:35

in the stuff

36:36

that's a Western stuff that still has access

36:38

to competitive generative

36:40

AI

36:41

and the China stuff where

36:44

I am out of the generative AI

36:46

ecosystem because I simply cannot I

36:48

cannot access it anymore so I feel

36:50

like for yeah

36:51

I'm just wondering what's the future both

36:54

for this particular sectors or autonomous

36:56

driving in China, does it actually stand a chance?

37:00

Even on ignoring the generative

37:02

AI part, non-generative

37:04

AI, China is ahead and envisioned in audio

37:07

networks by a large amount. And

37:09

if we talk about self-driving, it's most likely

37:12

not a generative AI model that's running it.

37:14

There is talk about certain types of transformers,

37:16

but for the most part, those types of models

37:18

are not that one. So maybe we're

37:20

going down this this

37:21

one path, path A, where we're way

37:24

better at, we as in the Western world

37:26

is better at generative AI, but the other path, self-driving,

37:28

does that also get impacted? Well, as

37:31

you mentioned on the Verizon robotics

37:33

chips, the current generation Nvidia

37:36

chip, shipping in Mercedes soon, all the 24 model

37:38

year, Mercedes

37:40

are gonna have this current generation Nvidia chip

37:42

for self-driving, the next generation one

37:44

is actually, I believe it's past

37:46

the threshold

37:47

of the export restrictions,

37:49

right? So we're talking about 2020, 2022-ish type timeframe, training

37:54

chips, but this restriction, if it doesn't

37:56

get moved forward, actually starts impacting

37:58

their self-driving right as soon as I'm assuming Nvidia's right

38:01

on the amount of compute and all that needed

38:03

to actually run self-driving.

38:07

I presume others are going to be down the same path.

38:09

And if that's the case, then 2025 year

38:11

technology is actually going to be, maybe

38:13

call it 2026 to get implemented in a car,

38:16

is restricted. And so that's another, I

38:18

think there's what, 2 million people who drive for a living in

38:21

the US. We're going to have those people

38:23

unlocked, right? Is China going to be able to unlock

38:25

those people for other productive tasks?

38:28

Yeah, this is the heart of it. This is the heart

38:30

of the October sanctions, unquestionably.

38:33

Were those sanctions put in place to limit China's

38:35

military capabilities,

38:37

as the document says, or is the intent

38:39

to cripple China's manufacturing capacity

38:42

and their whole broader economy? Because

38:47

autonomous driving and automotive is just

38:49

one, is the easiest of

38:51

those to grasp. But if you look at just

38:53

broadly, deploying AI in industrial

38:56

systems and cars and planes

38:58

and everything, that's a big, big

39:01

part of any modern economy. Right. Autos

39:03

are clearly very important to China. As

39:05

you take away the ability for

39:07

them to access leading semiconductor

39:09

manufacturing processes, that's

39:11

the end of autonomous driving in China,

39:14

right? Which is the end of China's automotive

39:17

industry. And so then it's you're talking about

39:19

a much, much broader scope of impact

39:21

for what went down in October. And

39:23

I

39:24

certainly think everybody in China assumes

39:26

it's if that's the case. It's not just about

39:29

holding back China's military. It's about holding

39:31

back China full stop.

39:33

Think about how insanely frustrating

39:36

that is for Beijing too, right? Like China

39:38

is the first mover and NEVs,

39:41

right? And battery technologies

39:43

and it's intent was to go and

39:46

deploy this to the world. Right. But

39:48

look at the IRA in the

39:50

U S and the extremely stringent provisions

39:53

that that imposes, arguably unrealistic,

39:55

but treasury will get creative with it. and

39:57

undergoing this transition. Now you've

39:59

got...

39:59

got these ICT rules getting

40:02

way harsher on top of the October 7

40:05

controls. We haven't even talked about biotech

40:07

too. That's another area where

40:09

we're going to see a lot more restrictions. So

40:12

yeah, this is an active

40:14

degradation in many ways of

40:16

China's development, its tech innovation, and

40:19

there is no easy way to transcend

40:21

those constraints. Something's got to give here.

40:24

We're two years away from election year. And

40:26

regardless of the ambiguity that

40:29

maybe in these potentially unintended second

40:31

order effects that were in the October 7th things, I think

40:34

a Republican president come 2025 is going

40:37

to look at these types of issues

40:39

in a much more aggressive way,

40:41

which is going to be something that Beijing and

40:44

Chinese companies are really going to have to grapple

40:46

with.

40:47

Can I be the European here for one second?

40:50

Because, I mean,

40:51

yes, it's nice to look

40:53

at everything from the lens of long

40:55

term competition with an adversary.

40:58

But escalating that would also make

41:00

retaliation from China much more likely

41:03

and much more severe.

41:04

Plus, forget all hopes about

41:06

engaging with China where you actually

41:08

need it.

41:09

You as in we need it for climate

41:12

change.

41:13

Because it's not just a loss, like

41:15

having no access to,

41:17

let's say, the most competitive AI

41:20

or ICT

41:21

doesn't just mean you lose productivity,

41:24

it also means you lose

41:26

a chance to have a

41:28

greener economy. So I

41:30

think in the, not in the next five

41:32

years, not in the next two elections, but

41:35

in the long term down the road, I'm

41:37

wondering if with this focus

41:40

on competition and looking

41:42

at every piece of technology through

41:44

an economic security lens, we

41:47

are sacrificing making a real

41:49

way in something that actually matters,

41:51

which is climate change and global warming.

41:53

It's interesting, right? is

41:56

dealing still with a war

41:59

on the continent.

41:59

with Russia, it sees some

42:02

level of engagement with China as

42:04

a way to prevent

42:07

a worst case scenario. But

42:09

you could argue those same arguments were

42:12

made around Nord Stream,

42:13

right? And that didn't work out so well.

42:15

But Europe is seeing the US

42:18

escalating at a very rapid clip.

42:21

So naturally, it's going to want to tap the brakes

42:23

on it and use economic engagement as a

42:25

means of doing so. But But then that in

42:27

turn compels the US to reach for

42:29

longer armed provisions, to try to steer

42:32

its partners in place. We've already seen

42:34

that on logic chip controls, but

42:36

really interesting to see where the partners are drawing the line,

42:39

to say, no, no, no, memory chips, you're going

42:41

too far there. And

42:43

Jan-Peter

42:43

and I are working on something

42:45

now, which will be out

42:47

soon, but we are looking at areas

42:51

in more mature tech nodes and

42:53

process nodes for where China can

42:55

compete, where European companies will

42:57

still be engaged with

42:59

China in the IC space. So that's going

43:01

to be an interesting point of divergence

43:04

potentially with the US.

43:06

That's a good point. And I want to go back to something

43:08

JP was talking about before, which was Volkswagen.

43:12

I think it's an interesting case study, because I don't

43:14

know if you all remember this, but there was a report

43:16

for a while that Volkswagen

43:19

was looking to actually buy the automotive

43:22

business out of Huawei. There was a rumor going

43:24

around that they wanted to do that.

43:25

And then it just it quietly went away. And

43:28

I always wondered like, what happened

43:30

there? Because in the end, I think Volkswagen

43:32

just hired a bunch of people out of Huawei. And now they're

43:34

looking to do this deal with Horizon Robotics. Did

43:37

somebody come to approach Volkswagen

43:39

and say, hey, that's a really bad idea. Let's stay away

43:42

from Huawei. Because I think

43:43

it speaks to the larger question of, you

43:45

know, we're reaching a point where there will be signs of of

43:47

light in between divergence between

43:50

what the US and the EU want. Yeah,

43:53

the action reaction here is really interesting

43:55

because from Beijing's perspective and

43:57

needs to steer its tech champions toward.

43:59

its big priorities, which means

44:02

they're involved in a lot of stuff from

44:05

very benign consumer applications

44:07

to legitimate military

44:10

civil fusion dual use type things

44:13

where the US is going to want to target.

44:15

And you see in the US how Huawei

44:17

has been cast as a bad actor,

44:20

and you're seeing now

44:22

even tightening restrictions on existing

44:25

controls with a

44:27

policy debate underway on whether to revoke

44:29

existing licenses to Huawei for,

44:32

for example, sub 5G components. So yeah,

44:35

that makes it hard to

44:38

engage with entities like that when

44:40

the US is going this

44:41

hard and against many

44:43

of them. One assumption

44:46

I think we've had in our conversation,

44:48

which isn't necessarily in the law yet,

44:50

is

44:50

the idea that Western

44:53

companies that have really fancy models

44:56

can't just sell access in China. So

44:58

right now, open AI, it's just

45:00

like their company policy. But

45:03

to my understanding, there's no law

45:05

that says Facebook or Google

45:08

or Microsoft can't just turn this

45:10

stuff on within China. So the

45:12

question of export controls

45:14

around these really powerful

45:17

models is something that I'm

45:19

really interested in. And if and

45:21

when they come on, to

45:23

what extent you can industrial

45:26

espionage your way past those

45:28

sorts of controls. All these are are

45:31

weights. And that's like a file.

45:33

That's like a few dozen gigs,

45:35

it seems to me to be. And deploying

45:38

it across an economy of a billion

45:40

and a half people is a whole other

45:43

ballgame, which is when you start getting into the chips,

45:45

the sort of like chip control angle

45:47

that we've been talking about.

45:49

But as these sorts of technologies

45:51

become even more critical

45:53

and strategic and sort of key your economic future

45:56

is the industrial espionage strategy

45:58

likely going to be.

45:59

and how effective could it be

46:02

to get some of the gains that you'd

46:05

want to have, even if the Western firms

46:07

just won't sell to you?

46:09

But I mean,

46:10

the path dependency kicks in, right?

46:12

Because if you want to deploy

46:15

with a cutting edge large

46:17

language model, you still need

46:19

high performance

46:21

AI accelerators to do anything

46:23

with it. So

46:25

in that regard, the current

46:27

controls that are in place would still

46:29

mean that whatever Google

46:32

or Facebook or any other hyperscaler

46:35

want to do in China, it would still

46:37

be increasingly

46:39

far behind what they can do outside

46:42

of China simply because they have only

46:44

access to 2020 AI accelerator technology.

46:49

But it doesn't have to be done in China. Baidu has, I

46:52

think, 2000 employees in Silicon Valley. So

46:56

they could easily run all of that

46:58

on AWS San Jose.

47:01

They don't have to have a deployment in

47:03

Beijing.

47:04

But this is where those ICTS

47:07

rules are going to be so interesting to

47:09

watch, because if there is any nexus,

47:12

you can be on a US cloud platform.

47:15

But if there's a nexus to to

47:18

Chinese entity of concern that the US

47:20

wants to target. And there's more

47:22

protectionism around data sets.

47:25

For example, as we start to see this

47:27

evolve over time, that's gonna be really

47:29

interesting to watch.

47:30

I wanna pick up something

47:33

that you mentioned before, Jordan, I think, because

47:35

from your take,

47:37

would it be viable for, if we think,

47:39

for example, of more neutral players in

47:41

Asia? So let's pick Singapore,

47:44

right? more

47:46

compared to Japan, a more

47:48

ambivalent and kind of serving

47:50

both sides attitude between

47:53

US and China.

47:54

There were rumors that

47:56

some of the

47:58

semiconductor supplier markets...

47:59

specifically EDA software

48:02

and equipment suppliers, move some

48:04

of their production to Singapore, specifically

48:07

for the reason to serve the Chinese

48:09

market. Could that be also viable

48:11

for cloud and AI where

48:14

we have suddenly huge service centers

48:17

in Singapore for Western hyperscalers

48:19

to serve the

48:21

Chinese market?

48:22

Or is that too much of a stretch?

48:25

Well, I mean, the Chinese government,

48:28

I think would have to get over their data

48:30

security concerns.

48:32

There's been

48:35

enormous blowups, which have taken

48:37

huge chunks out of the market

48:40

cap of some of China's leading players

48:42

because they've been accused of playing

48:44

fast and loose with sending Chinese

48:46

citizens data abroad and sort of exposing

48:49

the PRC to national

48:51

security risk cover, much that like, you know, makes

48:53

sense in a DD context. This is clearly something

48:56

that people with power and influence

48:59

in the system have been able to get their way

49:01

on in policy debates in

49:03

Beijing over the past few years. So

49:05

to be comfortable with the Singapore

49:07

solution, that is a

49:10

big hurdle to cross

49:13

if you're betting your

49:16

path to future productivity

49:18

growth over the next 10 years on

49:20

sending everything out to

49:22

Singapore and working with American

49:26

companies on their cloud servers.

49:28

I mean, that's like a pretty aggressive trust fall,

49:30

which, you know, maybe come GPT-5

49:33

once America's growing at 7% because

49:36

of all this crazy AI, the calculus

49:38

starts to change. But I think you

49:40

probably need to get a little further

49:43

in the,

49:44

not just perceived, but like actual gap

49:47

for those sorts of calculations to

49:49

really start shifting, to allow Chinese firms to

49:51

access the sort of, you know, to put

49:53

themselves in a situation which like absolutely

49:55

would not be kosher today.

49:58

Well, there's a lot of ground to cover. but it's

50:01

a good round of clever. Okay.

50:03

Thanks so much for being a part of chat talk, everyone. Thank

50:06

you. Thanks for having me. Always a pleasure.

50:09

Thank you. Same

50:40

sugar that I'm food

50:44

Same sugar that I'm

50:46

food Only

50:49

the new sugar that

50:51

I'm food High

50:55

is high, low is low

50:58

Everybody wanna go to heaven

51:01

But nobody wants

51:03

to die Nobody

51:07

wants to die

51:10

Nobody wants to

51:13

do the dance Don't

51:16

the dance of color outside the

51:19

lines And nobody

51:21

wants to cry Nobody

51:25

wants to cry Nobody

51:31

wants to push you forward Don't

51:35

the same truth as I'm moving Don't

51:40

the same truth as I'm

51:42

moving Don't

51:44

the same truth as I'm

51:48

moving I

51:51

can feel it all over me right now

52:00

Girl, it felt so good Got

52:03

me on screen locked down

52:06

Yo, I can't shut

52:09

up It's taking me and

52:11

spinning me I can't shut

52:13

up It's making me wanna

52:15

be With someone

52:19

Tonight Make

52:22

her feel your

52:26

eyes Shoo-Bah

52:29

boy you fool, yeah I'm gonna

52:31

send you back Said I'm fool

52:35

I'm gonna send you back Said I'm fool

52:39

Yeah, I'm gonna send you

52:41

back Shoo-Bah boy Up

52:46

the street, round the corner, down the block Round

52:48

the clock, it's time to stop Our

52:50

easy lease, I completed this My brain release,

52:53

pain relief Paraleaf is

52:55

the same belief that make it seem the chief And

52:57

insane as schliff, so obtain a spliff Cellophane

53:00

of reef, trade your beef for these

53:02

magic beans Crying to stalk, ride

53:05

the clouds, surf the waves Unearth

53:07

the caves, expose your soul, never

53:09

close your soul Snow your wall, never

53:11

overload your soul Hold your goals, never

53:13

lose sight of the host I suppose, we can

53:16

all float away as it goes We

53:18

can all know the way, if we pose We

53:20

can all shoot away, no one knows We

53:22

can all go today, if we chose, we

53:25

can all roll away Until

53:28

you're truly ready to say fuck

53:30

your fear You are

53:33

not a ally You

53:38

have to settle and be stuck right

53:40

here You cannot

53:43

be glad

53:48

I'm gonna ride the roller

53:50

coaster Give

53:52

all the troubles of the wild music

53:56

at least come see ya Come see

53:58

the artist I

54:00

say, this may be the way you want your

54:03

ride a bit, oh Shoo

54:05

bop, shoo bop, boo Shoo

54:10

bop, shoo bop, boo You