Episode Transcript
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0:00
What were you listening to before we hopped on?
0:02
It's your walkout music. New Beyonce. Oh,
0:05
new Beyonce. I haven't heard it yet. How is it? I
0:07
really like it. Nice. I think
0:09
it is reductionist to call it country. Ah.
0:13
I was appropriately enough listening to Start Me
0:15
Up through the ages. Of course you were.
0:18
But I kind of feel like David
0:20
Rosenthal move is that you might've
0:23
been listening to Start Me Up whether we
0:25
were doing Microsoft or not. That's a very
0:27
squarely in your genre song. The Stones though,
0:29
man. It's crazy. They're
0:32
in their 70s, 80s. Amazing. Man.
0:35
I hope we're in our 70s and 80s
0:37
dancing on stage. Season 126. Yeah.
0:41
All right. Let's do it. Let's
0:43
do it. Who got the truth? Is
0:47
it you? Is it you? Is it you? Who
0:50
got the truth now? Is
0:52
it you? Is it you? Is
0:54
it you? Sit it down. Say
0:57
it straight. Another story on the
0:59
way. Welcome
1:01
to season 14, episode four of
1:03
Acquired. It's a podcast about great
1:05
companies and the stories and playbooks
1:07
behind them. I'm Ben Gilbert. I'm
1:09
David Rosenthal. And we are your
1:11
hosts. We often remark
1:13
that selling software is the best
1:16
business model of all time. Well
1:18
today, finally, we tell
1:20
the story of the company
1:22
that created that business, Microsoft.
1:26
Finally. We're like 10 years into Acquired.
1:28
We're finally doing it. It's been daunting.
1:31
We wanted to do it for a while,
1:33
but it takes some chutzpah to tackle Microsoft.
1:35
I'm so fired up. We're ready. It's
1:37
time. Yep. Well listeners, Microsoft
1:40
today is sprawling and massive.
1:42
It is the world's most
1:44
valuable company worth over $3
1:47
trillion. They have
1:49
49 years of history making
1:51
software for consumers and enterprises,
1:54
making hardware, gaming systems, gaming
1:56
studios, Windows apps, iPad apps,
1:58
Mac apps, operating systems, mobile
2:01
operating systems, MP3 players, search engines,
2:03
cloud computing services, on cloud computing,
2:05
programming languages, development environments, the list
2:08
goes on. But it
2:11
did not start out that way. Today,
2:13
we will tell the story of the
2:16
desktop software company. Before
2:18
the enterprise, before IT, before
2:20
the internet, before being
2:22
a trusted partner to governments around
2:24
the free world. And
2:26
really before people even knew what
2:28
to do with personal computers, this
2:31
is the story of a bunch of ragtag
2:33
geniuses in their 20s pushing
2:35
what was possible. Welcome
2:38
to Microsoft, the PC era.
2:41
Well listeners, if you wanna know every
2:43
time an episode drops, you can get
2:45
hints at the next topic and follow
2:47
up, you can sign up at acquired.fm
2:49
slash email. Come talk about this episode
2:51
with the community at acquired.fm slash Slack.
2:54
If you want more from David and I, you should check
2:56
out our second show, ACQ2, where
2:58
we interview founders, investors, and experts often
3:00
as a deeper dive into topics we
3:03
cover on the main show. And
3:05
before we dive in, we wanna briefly
3:07
thank our presenting sponsor, JP Morgan Payments.
3:09
Yes, just like how we say every
3:11
company has a story, every company's story
3:13
is powered by payments and JP Morgan
3:16
Payments is a part of so many
3:18
journeys from seed to IPO and beyond.
3:20
So with that, this show is not investment advice.
3:22
David and I may have investments in the companies
3:25
we discuss and likely all of you if you
3:27
hold any index funds and the
3:29
show is for informational and entertainment purposes
3:31
only. David,
3:34
where on earth do we start the Microsoft
3:36
story? We're right down the middle
3:38
on this one. We're gonna start in 1955 in Seattle, Washington with
3:42
the birth of Bill Gates III or
3:44
Trey as he's known. Yes.
3:48
Growing up, it's so confusing because his dad
3:50
is the second but he goes by senior
3:52
and Bill is junior slash the third slash
3:54
Trey. So Bill in 1955 is
3:56
born as the second of three children
3:59
to Bill and and Mary Gates. Now,
4:01
Bill Gates, senior,
4:04
his father, is from Bremerton, the
4:06
Navy town just across the Sound from
4:08
Seattle, where he grows up in a
4:11
family that owns and runs a furniture
4:13
store there, a long way from
4:16
the software king of the world here. Now,
4:18
Bill Gates, senior slash the second, after high
4:20
school, he joins the army during World War
4:22
Two, serves during World War Two. And then
4:25
he goes, I presume on the GI Bill
4:27
to the University of Washington, where he's the
4:29
first member of his family to go to
4:31
college. And there he gets an undergrad and
4:34
a law degree in four years, and
4:36
then decides to stay in Seattle with
4:38
his new family and become a practicing
4:41
attorney. Now, I say family because
4:43
at the UW, he meets and marries
4:45
one Mary Maxwell.
4:48
And Mary, I don't know how
4:51
to put it other than that she is a force. Yes.
4:54
So Mary's family had founded
4:56
National City Bank. And
4:58
her father was a senior executive at First
5:01
Interstate Bank, which later became a big part
5:03
of Wells Fargo. Now, Mary,
5:05
despite being the daughter of a
5:07
successful business family in that day and
5:10
age was not cast aside like
5:12
so many other daughters we've talked about on
5:14
the show, New York Times, Hermes, where
5:16
it was sort of passed to the son in
5:18
law to continue to run the business. That was
5:20
not the case with Mary Maxwell. No.
5:23
So after she graduates from the UW,
5:25
she becomes first
5:27
the president of the Seattle Junior League.
5:29
And she starts joining nonprofit boards in
5:31
Seattle as a very young woman, she
5:34
joins the Seattle Symphony Board, the Chamber
5:36
of Commerce, the Children's Hospital, the King
5:38
County United Way. And she's
5:40
such a force on these boards that
5:42
she starts getting asked by her fellow
5:44
board members to join their company's
5:46
boards to like the corporate boards, they're so
5:49
impressed with her. So first, she
5:51
joins the board of First Interstate Bank, the bank
5:53
that her family's a part of. Then
5:55
she joins the board of Cairo Television
5:57
in Seattle, she even ends up joining
6:00
the Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Board.
6:02
That's right, part of the AT&T
6:04
breakup. Yeah, eventually she joins the
6:06
Board of Regents of the University
6:08
of Washington and the whole entire
6:11
National United Way Board. So she
6:13
never works full-time in a corporate
6:15
setting, but it is not an
6:17
overstatement at all to say that Mary Gates became
6:20
one of the most powerful business
6:22
people in the Pacific Northwest, period.
6:25
Absolutely, and Bill Gates Sr. was
6:27
the prominent attorney in the region,
6:29
and so it's quite the power couple.
6:32
Ben, it's like you're reading my script here. Yes, we
6:34
don't want to give Bill Sr. the short shrift
6:36
here either. He becomes a
6:38
superstar lawyer, and he becomes a co-founding
6:41
partner of the firm Preston, Gates and
6:43
Ellis, which today, I didn't even
6:45
realize this till I dug in the research.
6:47
That is K&L Gates today, one of the
6:49
largest law firms in the world. Yep.
6:52
And another fun fact that you probably know
6:54
about Bill Gates Sr., but we got this
6:56
being acquired, we'll talk about, do
6:58
you know what corporate board he joined later
7:00
in life? I do not. Costco.
7:03
Ah ha ha, of course. Bill
7:06
Gates Sr., we should say, too, basically
7:08
galvanized the entrepreneurial community
7:11
in Seattle. He started
7:13
the Tech Alliance. He was a huge
7:15
angel investor. He really did organize, you
7:17
know, angel investors, people who want to put
7:19
high-risk capital to work into startups, and
7:22
his heart was there, obviously, through his
7:24
law practice, long before Bill
7:27
Gates III became the prodigy he
7:29
became. Totally, and that's the point
7:31
we want to land here, is for young Bill,
7:33
Trey, growing up here, he
7:35
is growing up in like a pretty unique
7:38
household. He would later talk about being like nine
7:40
or 10 years old, and most
7:43
nights at dinner at his house, there would
7:45
be a CEO or a senator or a
7:47
governor or somebody who's just over
7:50
for dinner, and Bill would sit there and
7:52
absorb the business conversation. It's
7:54
like the Hermes family, the Dumas family
7:56
that we talked about on that episode. This
7:59
whole thing, it makes me think. of Paul's main character
8:01
in the Dune movies in the book.
8:03
He's kind of bred from birth to
8:05
be this incredible
8:08
business mind. I mean, at age 13,
8:11
with his best friend, who we will
8:13
talk about very soon, he brought up
8:15
the idea, I wonder what company I
8:17
will be the CEO of when I
8:19
grow up. What industry will I go
8:21
after? What problems will I tackle? It
8:23
wasn't a question of if, but which.
8:26
Yes. And it just turned out that he
8:28
would be the CEO and founder of the biggest
8:30
company in the biggest industry ever to
8:32
exist. The other thing that we've
8:34
got to say about Bill growing up, he
8:37
is insanely competitive. So he did
8:39
not and does not like to
8:41
lose at anything. And that is
8:44
putting it mildly, whether it's sports,
8:47
or swimming, or computers, or school, or
8:49
the classroom. There's a quote in one
8:51
of the books we read from a
8:53
childhood friend of his who says, everything
8:56
Bill did, he did competitively and never
8:58
simply to relax. I
9:00
think this used to be more than today. There's kind
9:02
of this image of Bill Gates that he was a
9:04
computer nerd, that he was like this shy little skinny
9:07
kid. And the way he looks doesn't help this. But
9:09
that is not the case at all. This
9:11
guy had a competitive fire in him,
9:13
I'm sure still does, like
9:16
none other. Both things can be true.
9:18
He was the number one math student
9:20
in the state of Washington. He was
9:22
a nerdy kid and a brilliant kid,
9:24
and also fiercely competitive. His childhood friend
9:26
and co-founder of Microsoft, Paul Allen, would
9:28
say about him, you could tell three
9:30
things about Bill Gates pretty quickly. He
9:32
was really smart. He was really
9:35
competitive. He wanted to show you
9:37
how smart he was. And he was
9:39
really, really persistent. That sounds
9:41
about right. So famously, speaking
9:44
of Paul and where Bill and Paul
9:46
meet, when Bill is
9:48
in seventh grade, his parents enroll
9:50
him at the Lakeside School, Which
9:53
now I think is internationally famous because
9:55
of Bill. But It is a super
9:57
rigorous college prep school, middle school, and
9:59
high school. An Bill ends
10:01
up writing the scheduling software
10:03
for class scheduling that he
10:05
puts himself in the classes
10:07
with all the girls like
10:09
this. Like
10:13
this bill: Thirteen years old,
10:16
seventh grade lakeside. This.
10:18
Is when it starts I missing Microsoft
10:20
as instead but during that year. Those.
10:22
Thirteen years old. But. Lakeside
10:24
Mothers Club. Raises.
10:27
Money. To. Buy the school
10:29
a teletype. And connected
10:31
up and rent complete or time
10:33
from a deck Pdp ten. That.
10:36
Is located in downtown Seattle and
10:38
owned by the branch office their
10:40
of General Electric. Now.
10:43
Probably a bunch of the relic. I
10:45
have no idea what any of those
10:47
nerds me and so we gotta set
10:49
some contexts. This is Nineteen, Sixty Eight
10:51
Banks, Sixty Eight of the Beatles, Vietnam,
10:53
The Summer Of Love. This is Not
10:55
the computer. Age Two thousand and one
10:57
A Space Odyssey had just come out.
10:59
Nolan Bushnell has not sounded Atari yet.
11:02
Bob Noise and Gordon Moore are only
11:04
just leaving Fairchild Semiconductor to start Intel.
11:06
Silicon Valley Still dominated by Law T.
11:08
there's no such thing as a microprocessor.
11:10
The United States would land on the
11:12
moon. One year later, totally.
11:15
The Wake Computing. Works.
11:17
Back then it was basically still be
11:19
any act days like a computer met
11:21
two things in either meant. A
11:24
massive room size. Must seek
11:26
The had a bout the
11:28
computing power of a calculator.
11:31
Or. It meant a human. People. Talked
11:33
about computers as humans. Do.
11:35
You ever see the movie Hidden Figures about
11:38
this Black women who did the calculation. Those
11:40
women were that computers. They were called the
11:42
computers. Yes, because they would sit there and
11:44
compute. This. Was a totally different
11:47
era. So the idea that a thirteen
11:49
year old kid to say school this
11:51
middle school would get access to. Share.
11:54
Computer time. I. Can
11:56
imagine there are many other secondary schools in the
11:58
country that we're doing as. This
12:00
is a very early place to make the
12:02
plenty. Microsoft. Is the
12:05
result of tremendous intelligence,
12:07
brilliant strategy, fierce competition,
12:09
And an unbelievable amount of luck.
12:12
Bill Gates was born in Nineteen
12:14
Fifty Five, the same year as
12:17
Steve Jobs to come into adulthood
12:19
just as the Personal Computer Ways
12:21
is starting. And. The.
12:24
Fact that he was at a middle
12:26
school and had this much privilege where
12:28
he could get access to a Pdp
12:31
ten at this point in his life
12:33
to help him understand how important computers
12:35
would be. I mean. There.
12:37
Are. Dozens. Of people
12:39
in America who were as well
12:41
situated as Bill is and that
12:44
might be overly generous, He and
12:46
Paul got a sneak peek into
12:48
the future there at Lakeside. Now
12:50
it's funny You said the personal computer era.
12:52
We are not that far away from the
12:54
personal computer hill. I mean we got us
12:56
of the state what is computing I mentioned
12:58
any act in this room size things. Computers
13:01
did not have screens. You know, curses
13:03
is never late sooner. pixels. Everything
13:06
was done on a teletype,
13:08
the kind of like typewriters
13:10
and. They. Were wired
13:12
up remote. we either in the same
13:14
facility or like went Lakeside is doing.
13:16
You could be remote m and it's
13:19
almost like the cloud today and it
13:21
cold over a phone line. but I
13:23
was the tele type. Yeah exactly. Got
13:25
wired over the phone line, hooked up
13:27
to these mainframes and see you typed
13:29
commands into this teletype and then the
13:31
response team back over the phone line
13:33
or of or whatever table. From.
13:35
The mainframe. And. It got printed
13:37
out on a spool of Keep on The Teletype.
13:40
But. This. Is Power Live
13:42
Normal thirteen year olds don't come
13:45
anywhere near access. Yeah. What?
13:47
Is the computing market at the time? It
13:50
is. Pretty much more compact the
13:52
pretty much in a minute. a
13:55
hundred percent dominated by i b
13:57
m oh yes i b m
13:59
big blue, you know, big iron is
14:01
what it was referred to, like the products
14:03
that they would produce. They
14:06
were the industry. Yes,
14:09
Ben Thompson has a fantastic quote on
14:11
this. He has an article called What
14:13
is a tech company? And here's his
14:15
comment. 50 years ago,
14:17
what is a tech company was an easy
14:19
question to answer. IBM was the tech company,
14:22
and everybody else was IBM customers. That may
14:24
be a slight exaggeration, but not by much.
14:26
IBM built the hardware at that time, the
14:28
system 360. They wrote the
14:31
software, including the operating system
14:33
and the application and provided
14:35
services, including training, ongoing maintenance
14:37
and custom line of business
14:39
software. Yeah, system 360
14:42
was a line of solutions, I
14:44
would say offered by IBM. And it consisted
14:46
of the thing, the room
14:48
size thing, the mainframe, and
14:50
the software, which was system 360, and
14:52
the consulting and the implementation. You know,
14:55
you couldn't just call up UPS and forklift
14:57
one of these things into a company and
14:59
expect it to work. No, you got to
15:01
operate this thing to totally like ASML machines,
15:03
you don't just go ship them off to
15:05
TSMC and say, Good luck making semiconductors. Exactly.
15:07
It's a full solution, full service thing. But
15:09
an important thing that was also happening this
15:11
year 1968, was
15:13
that IBM was undergoing
15:16
some antitrust scrutiny over that huge
15:18
bundle that I just told you
15:20
about. I mean, doesn't it smell
15:22
like antitrust? They do everything
15:24
from the hardware to the software, the
15:27
operating system, the service, the support, they
15:29
are the whole market, they're starting to
15:31
get concerned. And so proactively, they
15:33
unbundled hardware, software and services, and
15:36
they started selling those separately for
15:38
the first time, which was not
15:40
a problem at first. But what
15:43
it did was it cracked the door for customers
15:45
to say, Oh, I can buy
15:47
hardware from IBM and software from someone else.
15:50
And other people were not explaining this, but
15:52
it was possible. Yeah, interesting.
15:55
It cracks the door for Microsoft like 15 years later, 20
15:57
years later. Yeah. But
16:00
this is where the seeds are sown
16:02
of what is the exploitable opportunity when
16:04
Bill Gates is ready to do something.
16:06
Interesting. Now, back to the timing
16:09
thing for Bill and Paul and Microsoft. I
16:11
mentioned when we were setting this up that there's something
16:13
else to talk about here. IBM
16:16
was facing a disruptive force at
16:18
this moment. I think probably for
16:20
the first time in its history,
16:22
certainly in the computing era of
16:24
IBM's history, and that was
16:26
the Digital Equipment Corporation or DEC.
16:29
Just when we said earlier that
16:31
Lakeside is renting computer time from
16:34
the General Electric Computer in downtown
16:36
Seattle, I said it's a
16:38
DEC PDP-10. It's not an
16:41
IBM product. So what's DEC? They're
16:44
the mini computer company. Mini
16:46
in quotes. Yeah, mini, quote unquote. Mini
16:48
meaning it was the size of a closet, not
16:50
the size of a room. It's
16:53
all relative. DEC had been started
16:55
by this guy, Ken Olson from MIT. What
17:00
they did, he had this brilliant insight that would
17:02
play out over and over and over again in
17:04
technology. I'm not going to
17:06
go compete with IBM head on. I'm not going
17:08
to make any DEC. I'm not going to make
17:10
mainframes. But computing
17:13
has advanced enough that
17:16
there's an opportunity to make
17:18
something smaller, less powerful, more
17:21
toy-like. And
17:23
there's enough demand out there that I think I can
17:25
find some new markets for people
17:27
who will buy those types of
17:30
computers. And it's smaller businesses, but
17:32
in particular, it's like branch offices
17:34
of the big company. So I
17:36
am sure General Electric bought
17:39
lots and lots and lots of
17:41
IBM mainframes and products at their
17:43
headquarters. But the GE
17:46
field office in Seattle, they're
17:48
Not going to truck in a mainframe..
17:50
And In 1968, Seattle, I mean, this
17:52
is like a provincial little town. I'm
17:54
standing here right now. It's a major
17:56
city and a huge economy in the
17:58
United States. But at the time, kind
18:01
of.. a podunk, forgotten, sleepy, faraway place.
18:03
Totally. At. Microsoft would go
18:05
a long way to changing that overtime.
18:08
And we should say this is the classic
18:10
low and disruption playbook and in this is
18:12
what Clayton Christensen was talking about. Going from
18:14
mainframe to many computers, I'm in to make
18:17
something that's worse for most things, but better
18:19
for some new things that new customers and
18:21
new markets are gonna care a lot about
18:23
an I B M gonna look at it
18:26
and gulps that can't do any of the
18:28
things that are important to our customers. And
18:30
that's exactly why it works. and specifically, why
18:32
are they not going to care about. I
18:35
don't know exactly what An I B
18:37
M mainframe system system. Three sixty, three,
18:39
seventy whatever costs. I'm imagining tens of
18:41
millions of dollars all in total cost.
18:43
Maybe hundreds of millions of total dollars
18:45
to. Run. A system like that? I'm by
18:47
it. So. The First Deck
18:50
Machine when it comes out the Pdp
18:52
one a few years before this time.
18:55
It was priced at one hundred and twenty
18:57
thousand dollars so like an order of magnitude
18:59
may be to below a system that you
19:02
had by from I B M. Obviously
19:04
still a long, long, long way from the personal computer.
19:06
People are not buying these things for their houses. But.
19:09
You know yet? Zeal? Buy one
19:12
for the field office in Seattle
19:14
or universities will buy them for
19:16
research for their students, for their
19:18
professors. and so deck. China
19:21
creates a new market
19:23
for computing. And. Bill.
19:26
He so studied in business history. The.
19:28
Founder: Ten Olson. Ten his
19:30
bills hero T totally looks up.
19:33
To. Deck and What Deaths Done. Now.
19:36
The deck and mini computer you eyes is
19:38
still the same as the mainframe. You're still
19:40
using a teletype. There's no innovation in terms
19:43
of what the computing is or how use
19:45
it's It's just cheaper and more people have
19:47
access to it. So. Back
19:49
to Leak Side and the Mothers Club raising
19:51
money for. This. Access here for the
19:54
school. Bell. Armor he started
19:56
he's in seventh grade and Lakeside is in
19:58
middle school high school. The. is actually
20:00
in a separate building. The
20:02
computer room that gets installed with the
20:04
teletypes, that's over in the high school.
20:07
But Billy, he doesn't care. He gets exposed to it, I
20:09
think, in a math class one day and he's like, oh,
20:12
I'm hooked. So he goes
20:14
over, he's hanging out with the high schoolers,
20:17
teaches himself how to program. And
20:19
pretty quickly, he becomes known as one of
20:21
the very best programmers there.
20:23
And he and three other kids
20:26
form what they call themselves the
20:28
Lakeside Programmers Group. And
20:30
one of his buddies who he forms it with is,
20:32
of course, the high schooler,
20:34
I think the 10th grader at the time,
20:36
Paul Allen. There is a
20:38
fantastic photo listeners that we will tweet
20:41
of Bill and Paul sitting in the
20:43
computer room at Lakeside. And Bill, I
20:46
think he's like 13, 14,
20:48
he looks like he's about eight. I think on
20:50
the wall, there's this, almost like, printed
20:52
out magazine thing that says the bugs
20:54
slayer that they've hung up over the
20:57
wall. It's amazing. So these
20:59
high school kids, they start the Lakeside
21:01
Programmers Group. They call it
21:03
the Programmers Group because they are programmers.
21:05
This is another super important thing to learn
21:07
to use a computer at this
21:09
time meant to be a programmer. Right.
21:11
There was no packaged software that you
21:14
bought. The software that IBM was selling
21:16
was the operating system to
21:18
make the machines actually function. And
21:20
it was the programming languages
21:22
that you could then program
21:25
on. But you weren't clicking around and using
21:27
Excel or like, you know, pulling up apps.
21:30
Everybody who used the computer wrote their
21:32
own software. Right. There was not this
21:34
multi sided network of you've got developers
21:36
making applications, and then you've got users
21:38
of those applications. No, everybody who used
21:40
the computer was a programmer. So
21:42
the goal of the Lakeside Programmers Group,
21:45
remember, Bill is this business prodigy, is
21:47
to use their very valuable and
21:50
very rare skills as programmers at this
21:52
time to, you know, make
21:54
money. Yep. Do a business. So
21:57
turns out, at the same time, I mean,
21:59
they coincidentally. There
22:02
is a local startup
22:04
coming out of the University of
22:07
Washington called the Computer Center Corporation
22:09
or C-Cubed. The
22:11
business plan behind C-Cubed was that they were
22:13
going to get a bunch of decks, a
22:16
bunch of PDPs, 8s, 10s, 11s, whatever, and
22:19
they were going to be like AWS.
22:21
They were going to just be a
22:23
computer time-sharing company. C-Cubed
22:26
hires the Lakeside
22:28
Programmers Group, these kids, to
22:30
come in and find and
22:32
document bugs in the system,
22:35
and they're going to pay them directly in computer time. So
22:38
when they come into C-Cubed, they
22:40
learn Fortran, they learn Lisp, they
22:42
learn machine language for the PDPs.
22:45
Back at Lakeside, they were just using BASIC,
22:47
the programming language. Which is
22:49
reasonably high level in terms of how abstract
22:51
it is. You're not writing machine language. You
22:54
don't have to know how to
22:56
address memory and registers and all that.
22:59
It reads kind of like English. You know how to
23:01
add numbers together. It's not an elegant
23:03
language, and it's a very verbose language, but
23:05
if you sort of look at it with
23:07
your eyes as a person who speaks English
23:10
and knows BASIC math, you're like, I kind
23:12
of understand what this program does. So there's
23:14
a meaningful amount of translation done by a
23:16
BASIC interpreter that takes you from the BASIC
23:18
code you have to write to what is
23:20
actually running on the machine. Yes,
23:23
but BASIC, we don't want to give
23:25
the impression that it is just BASIC
23:27
or just for kids. No, it's widely
23:29
used. It's going to become hugely, hugely
23:31
important. It is both
23:33
the gateway programming language for everybody, but it's a
23:35
real programming language and a lot of stuff is
23:37
done in it. It's sort of the Python of
23:39
its day. I think the way Python is now
23:42
where you sort of joke that Python
23:44
is so flexible, you can accidentally write
23:46
a program by writing English, and it can kind
23:48
of forgive a lot of mistakes, and it reads
23:50
kind of like English. It's a reasonable
23:52
parallel to draw it way back when with BASIC
23:54
where you say, look, you can
23:56
understand it as a layman, but also it's used
23:58
in a broad set of business applications.
24:01
Totally. When Bill and
24:03
Paul and their buddies come into C cubed,
24:06
they're now getting access to
24:08
learn real hardcore systems programming
24:11
languages, including machine code
24:13
for the PDP-10.
24:16
They're becoming pretty prolific engineers
24:19
here. They're handwriting assembly
24:21
code. Yes. And
24:23
they're getting mentored. One
24:25
of the executives at C cubed
24:28
is a guy named Steve Russell. Did you find
24:30
this, Ben? Do you know about this? No. Uh-uh.
24:32
This is amazing. You're going to die. Steve
24:35
Russell was the guy
24:38
who wrote Space War when he
24:40
was at MIT on the first
24:42
PDP, the PDP-1. He's
24:44
like a computer science legend. Nolan Bushnell told
24:46
us about that. Yes. Space War was the
24:48
first video game, first computer
24:50
game ever written. It was written as
24:53
a fun side project by some MIT
24:55
engineers in the early days of DEC.
24:57
And then that became Nolan Bushnell's inspiration
24:59
for starting Atari and Pong and Space.
25:01
Yeah, Steve Russell, that guy. He mentored
25:04
Bill Gates. And he was here at
25:06
the University of Washington? He
25:08
had come out to the University of Washington and then
25:10
left and was part of one of the execs starting
25:12
this company. C cubed? Wow. That's like a mile from
25:14
my house. Right? Crazy. Wow.
25:18
So, after a little while at C cubed, all of
25:20
this real expertise that these kids
25:23
are getting leads to another
25:25
opportunity at another timeshare computing company
25:27
based down in Portland. They
25:29
ask the kids to write a real
25:32
piece of software to write a payroll
25:34
billing program for all
25:36
their clients that are using the
25:38
timeshare system. And Bill
25:41
now, who's the de facto leader of this
25:43
group, he negotiates a deal with the help
25:45
of his dad, Bill Gates, senior, prolific corporate
25:48
attorney in Seattle, that rather than
25:50
just being paid hourly for their time, they're
25:52
going to get a royalty on the revenue
25:54
that their client makes on the software. I
25:57
can't believe it. These kids are teenagers. They're figuring out the whole
25:59
software business. this model here, they end
26:01
up making at least $10,000 from
26:04
these royalties, which the average
26:06
household income in the US at the time
26:08
was below $10,000. These kids are rolling in
26:11
money. Wow.
26:14
So the next year, Paul graduates from
26:16
Lakeside and goes off to college at
26:18
Washington State. But he and
26:20
Bill decide to team up on a new
26:23
venture that they're going to do together called
26:26
Traf-O-Data. They've identified
26:28
a market opportunity, and that opportunity
26:30
is reducing traffic. Yes. So
26:33
the business plan is that municipalities
26:35
count cars that go through intersections, use
26:37
that to make decisions about how they're
26:39
going to do city planning. Bill
26:41
and Paul are like, we can take this
26:44
new thing that's coming out of
26:46
Intel, a microprocessor, which is promising
26:48
to be a full computer on
26:50
one chip, and we can use that.
26:52
We can build a machine that is
26:54
going to be a computer and it'll process
26:56
and analyze that data, and then we can
26:58
sell it to governments. Like, great, big market.
27:00
And listeners, are you sensing what's happening here?
27:03
Mainframe, mini computer, microprocessor. We
27:05
have to keep using smaller
27:07
and smaller words to represent
27:09
the fact that the computer
27:11
is getting smaller and smaller
27:13
here. It wasn't until we started
27:16
doing research for this episode that I finally
27:18
realized, oh, microcomputers, which
27:20
is the original term for the personal computer
27:22
for the PC, it was called microcomputers before
27:24
PC caught on. They're called microcomputers because they're
27:26
based on the microprocessor. Yes, absolutely. It's not
27:29
just that micro is smaller than mini. And
27:31
it is funny that it kind of stopped
27:33
there. The computers that are sitting on all
27:35
of our desks are microcomputers. Right.
27:39
Yeah. So while they're waiting for
27:41
the AD-08, this new first microprocessor
27:43
from Intel to come out, or at
27:45
least for them to get access to it, they
27:47
want to get a head start on programming
27:50
their traffic data machine and programming
27:52
this microprocessor. So Paul's like,
27:54
I got this. I can find a way to make
27:56
this happen. He takes the
27:58
PDP-10 at Washington. Washington State, and
28:01
he writes a whole emulator
28:04
program to mimic the
28:06
instruction set for the 80-08
28:09
from the manual, and they get
28:11
a full emulator up and running, and they can code
28:14
even without the microprocessor actually
28:16
being there and having access. It's just like
28:18
NVIDIA, you know, like when Jensen was like,
28:20
no, we've got to build an emulator and
28:22
simulate this, and then we're going to ship
28:24
it site unseen. They're doing the same thing.
28:26
It's funny, in many ways, at this point
28:28
in history, getting a manual was actually much
28:30
more valuable than getting the processor itself, because
28:33
the processor would arrive, and unless there was
28:35
documentation, you would have no idea how to
28:37
interact with it to take advantage of its
28:39
power. But if you had a manual, well,
28:42
sure, you couldn't actually test the stuff you
28:44
wrote for it on the hardware, but
28:46
if you wrote an emulator on a
28:48
bigger, more powerful computer that could sort
28:50
of mimic the computer that you're actually targeting,
28:53
you could go years before actually
28:55
ever running the software on
28:57
the target device and just work off
28:59
of what the manual says, as long
29:01
as the manual is correct and matches
29:03
how it actually works. Yes, and
29:06
this is going to become very important
29:08
to Microsoft in just a second.
29:11
So traffic data is not a huge
29:13
success. I think I read a few places, they
29:15
make about $20,000 in revenue from it. So
29:18
like, again, great money for high school and
29:20
college kids, but, you know, not world-changing
29:22
stuff here. Not what Bill aspires to
29:24
for the company he's going to start.
29:27
But Bill and Paul are getting
29:29
experience with the microprocessor. Bill
29:32
actually has the idea for Microsoft when
29:34
they're working with it. He's like,
29:37
oh, this is a computer,
29:39
why don't I go off and write
29:41
an interpreter for BASIC here, and we
29:43
can sell the BASIC interpreter for the
29:45
microprocessor and build a big business. The
29:48
AD-08 just wasn't powerful enough
29:50
yet to do that. But
29:52
spoiler alert, that totally becomes
29:55
Microsoft. The seeds of Microsoft
29:57
are selling language interpreters for...
30:00
new processors, new hardware, new computers
30:02
that enable you to write familiar
30:04
programming languages on that new hardware.
30:07
Yeah. And Bill and Paul
30:09
are not the only ones having this insight here
30:11
too. Another Seattle guy
30:14
named Gary Kildall, who they had intersected
30:16
with, who they knew from CQ in
30:18
the University of Washington, he kind
30:21
of had the same idea here. We're going to
30:23
bring up Gary and his company Digital Research a
30:26
little bit later. Yeah, he cared a little bit
30:28
less about programming languages and a little bit more
30:30
about operating systems. So that's how they diverge for
30:32
the few years here. Yep. But
30:35
Bill and Paul, they absolutely
30:38
see the vision for what this
30:40
can grow into and become. Bill
30:42
has a great quote. Paul
30:44
and I had talked about the microprocessor. And
30:47
it was really his insight that
30:49
because of semiconductor improvements, things would
30:52
just keep getting better. I said
30:54
to him, oh, exponential phenomena are
30:56
pretty rare, pretty dramatic. Are
30:59
you serious about this? Because this
31:01
means, in effect, that we can think of
31:03
computing as free. It was
31:05
a gross exaggeration, but it was probably the easiest
31:07
way to understand what it means to cut costs
31:09
like that. And Paul was quite
31:11
convinced of it. Yes. Is
31:13
this in the Smithsonian interview? Yes, so good.
31:15
It's so good. This quote is incredible because
31:18
basically Paul Allen brings up Moore's law to
31:20
Bill Gates. They don't use that language there.
31:23
And in 1971, that is what's happening. And
31:26
for Paul, this is just an observation of, hey,
31:28
there's an exponential thing happening here. Seems
31:30
like it's going to keep happening. It's been happening. And
31:33
Bill's shaking. And he's like, what? Exponential
31:36
phenomena don't just happen. That's
31:38
incredibly, incredibly rare and immediately
31:40
gets Bill's wheels turning on. What does this mean
31:42
for the world? If that's actually
31:45
true, we need to act and
31:47
do something profoundly different than anyone's ever done
31:49
before, because this enables new things that no
31:51
one ever thought could be possible. This
31:54
moment is the genesis of the vision for
31:56
Microsoft. Even though Bill doesn't say the words
31:58
in this quote. division of a computer
32:01
on every desk in every home.
32:04
That's the famous part and the part
32:06
that got left off later when the
32:08
DOJ started sniffing around was running Microsoft
32:10
software. But that is the
32:12
vision here and it is crazy at
32:14
the time like a computer on every
32:17
desk and in every home.
32:19
Bill sees that this is what this exponential
32:21
phenomenon what Moore's law means that that is
32:24
going to happen. You know, we're still in
32:26
the era of teletypes. Nobody
32:28
else sees this. Yeah. And it's also
32:30
the reason why Microsoft is going to
32:32
form into such a different type of
32:34
company that's ever come before it. Why
32:36
they can break all the rules, why
32:38
they can sell just software, even though
32:40
that's never been a thing before, why
32:43
their business model can be so much different
32:45
than everyone else's business model. I mean, in
32:47
prepping for this episode, we got to talk
32:49
with Pete Higgins, who ran Excel and was
32:52
an executive overseeing office for a long time
32:54
in the early days. And he had this
32:56
great quote to us, which was, compute on
32:58
every desk was wackadoo stuff. People laughed at
33:00
it. It was absolutely wild. People thought, I
33:02
don't know, maybe one in 10 people in
33:04
their finance group or something will have one
33:07
at some point. This is the profoundness of
33:09
an exponential decrease in price or increase in
33:11
power of computing is it's going to become
33:13
universal. So all that said, even
33:17
Bill and Paul know the 80-08. It's
33:20
not there yet. It's not powerful enough to
33:22
really be a general purpose computer on a
33:24
chip, but they know it's coming. So
33:27
in the fall of 1973, Bill goes
33:29
off to college at Harvard famously.
33:31
It's funny at Harvard, you know, kind
33:33
of like Jim Simons that we talked about
33:36
at MIT on the RENTEC episode, Bill thinks
33:38
he's going to be like a world class
33:40
mathematician and set the world on fire. It's
33:43
literally a quote from Paul Allen. So Bill was
33:45
the number one math student in the state of
33:47
Washington. And he gets there and he does this
33:49
theoretical math class, Math 55, and
33:51
gets a B. And Paul says, when it
33:54
came to higher mathematics, he might have been
33:56
one in 100,000 or better, but
33:58
there were people who were one in a million. one
34:00
in ten million and some of them wound up
34:02
at Harvard. Bill would never be the smartest guy
34:04
in the room and I think that hurt his
34:06
motivation. He eventually switched his major to applied math.
34:10
Yes. So while Bill's at Harvard, he's
34:12
also doing a bunch of the typical college kid
34:15
stuff. He's playing poker, he's cutting classes, he's making
34:17
friends. And one of the friends he
34:19
makes there is a kid down the hall from him named
34:21
Steve. Steve, bomber.
34:24
And bomber, even everybody knows bomber. He's
34:26
kind of everything that Bill is not.
34:28
He's super social. He's super outgoing. He's
34:30
in a final club, which is like
34:33
a big thing in the social scene
34:35
at Harvard. He's gregarious. Anyone who's ever
34:37
met Steve or seen a video of
34:39
Steve, you are well aware that this
34:41
man has presence. But the thing
34:43
that people don't know about him is he is
34:46
so unbelievably analytical.
34:50
Steve is the guy that outscored
34:52
Bill Gates on the Putnam exam.
34:54
Which is the annual math competition
34:56
for college students. Yeah, Steve
34:58
isn't a programmer, but he is every bit the
35:01
mathematician that Bill Gates is. And that is one
35:03
of these things where I think when people try
35:05
to set it up as well, you know, you've
35:07
got the brilliant programmer
35:09
genius and the marketing guy. It's
35:11
just like, those are the
35:13
roles they took. But I think when you're
35:15
getting a sense of who the original crew
35:18
was at Microsoft, they were all brainiacs and
35:20
they were all wildly analytical. So
35:23
then, in the spring of 1974, Bill's
35:25
freshman year, Electronics Magazine
35:28
publishes big news about
35:30
a new Intel chip, the next generation, the
35:32
next turn of the crank on Moore's law,
35:35
the 8080. And in
35:38
Bill's words here, all at once
35:40
we were looking at the heart of a
35:42
real computer and the price was
35:44
under $200. We
35:46
attacked the manual. I
35:49
told Paul, Dec can't sell any
35:51
more PDP-8s now. It seemed obvious
35:53
to us that if a tiny
35:55
chip could get so much more
35:57
powerful, the end of big unwieldy
35:59
machines. was coming. And
36:02
this is really where Bill Gates commits to computers
36:04
to be his life's work. I think what's
36:07
often lost in the story is, Bill,
36:09
even though he was good at computers
36:11
and spent tons of time programming computers,
36:13
he never fancied himself a computer guy
36:15
until this moment in history, he went
36:17
to Harvard because he felt like, hey,
36:20
if I ever want to be a lawyer or something
36:22
else, like they've got a lot of great programs there.
36:24
And this was the moment where I think it really
36:26
clicked for him that I'm just in
36:28
the middle of the right place at the right time
36:30
with the right skill set. And this is my way
36:32
of having the most impact on the world. So
36:35
they think, okay, what's clearly going to happen here
36:38
is all the big computer companies, you know, IBM,
36:40
deck, the big Japanese computing
36:42
companies, they see this,
36:44
they're going to get into this business, they're
36:46
going to make machines, and they're
36:49
going to make micro computers, surely, they
36:51
will jump on this opportunity, right? If
36:54
it didn't destroy their existing business model,
36:56
sure they would. Exactly.
36:59
So Bill and Paul kind of are
37:01
sitting around waiting through 1974 and 1975 and like,
37:06
hey, when are the 8080 computers going to
37:08
come out? Where are they?
37:10
It's just crickets. Yep. Paul
37:12
is so convinced that the revolution
37:15
is coming that he actually drops
37:17
out of Washington State, moves
37:19
to Boston to be close to Bill so that they
37:21
can be ready when it happens. And
37:24
that summer, they both get summer jobs at
37:26
Honeywell as programmers. Paul stays
37:28
on into the next school year when Bill
37:30
goes back to school, he's just like waiting,
37:32
waiting, waiting. And then in
37:35
December 1974, Paul
37:38
is walking across Harvard Square,
37:40
and he sees
37:43
in a newsstand the January
37:45
issue of Popular Electronics on
37:48
whose cover is the all-tier 8800, the world's first real,
37:56
honest to God, commercially available
37:58
for sale. microcomputer.
38:02
And the legend has it that Paul grabs
38:04
the magazine, runs over
38:06
to Bill's dorm, throws open the door,
38:09
throws the magazine on the desk and is
38:11
like, it's here. And Bill just says,
38:13
oh my God, it's happening without
38:16
us. We need to get on
38:18
this right now. What's so funny,
38:20
he thinks they're already behind because clearly they're not
38:22
history would show I think Bill Gates even says
38:24
we might have actually started a year or two
38:26
too early. The market actually hadn't materialized yet. And
38:29
the funniest thing is the starting gun went off and
38:32
Bill and Paul ran and everyone else
38:34
is still standing around. And
38:36
this is it. This is the moment
38:38
the revolution is here. Microsoft is about to
38:40
be founded. But first, this
38:42
is a great time to thank our presenting
38:44
partner this season, JP Morgan payments. Yes,
38:47
just like Bill's vision of Microsoft to
38:49
put a computer on every desk and
38:51
in every home, JP Morgan has a
38:53
vision for making payments real time 24
38:56
seven everywhere in an every currency.
38:59
So JP Morgan has experienced a
39:01
massive digital transformation and is now
39:03
much more than just a global
39:06
bank. They invest $15 billion a
39:08
year into technology and R&D. So
39:11
with JP Morgan payments, you are getting their
39:13
history of service stability and scale, but
39:15
also innovation and new technology. And
39:18
scale is really the key word here. Every
39:20
episode we talk about Hamilton, Helmer
39:23
seven powers and boy, does JP
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Morgan have scale. What's
39:27
unique about their position in payments is
39:29
that they can make massive infrastructure investments
39:31
that benefit their customers in the near
39:34
term. In addition to the long term
39:36
technology bets like blockchain or quantum computing,
39:38
since they move $10 trillion a day in
39:40
160 countries, these investments create a
39:44
lot of shared value across their large
39:47
customer base. Yeah, not to mention the
39:49
second of the seven powers network economies.
39:51
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39:53
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39:58
This is a set of third party integrations
40:00
across virtually every industry and payment use
40:02
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40:04
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40:13
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40:15
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Visa, for example, which listeners may remember.
40:31
We talked a lot on that episode
40:33
about the power of a network. Well,
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Oracle, American Express, MasterCard, Accenture, and
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many more, including Friends of
40:54
the Show, Modern Treasury. Across
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any industry, the most successful companies
40:58
we've talked about are the ones
41:00
who think and invest strategically through
41:02
a long term lens. Like Hermes,
41:04
durability and reliability are paramount for
41:07
building hundred year companies that can
41:09
reinvent and continue to grow. And
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41:23
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41:25
Microsoft who essentially wrote the Modern Playbook
41:27
on building platforms, be sure to check
41:30
out JP morgan.com/acquired or click on the
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link in the show notes. So
41:35
David, they're like, it's happening without us.
41:37
What do they do? Well,
41:39
they do the natural thing
41:41
that to super excited, ambitious,
41:44
high octane college kids would do.
41:47
They call up the main
41:49
phone number of Altair's manufacturer,
41:51
a company called MITs MITS
41:54
and ask for the president, a
41:57
man named Ed Roberts and
41:59
Bill and Paul They get him on the phone and
42:01
they say we have a basic
42:04
interpreter Ready to go
42:07
ready to ship for the 8080 Intel
42:09
chip and we want to provide it
42:12
for you for your machine Which
42:14
of course they don't they don't have a single lot of
42:16
code written. They don't have anything but it's a market test
42:19
They want to know like what's the response if this were
42:21
true? Exactly, and
42:23
he's a bit of a character himself. He
42:25
says okay Well guys a lot of other people
42:27
are calling me and saying the same thing what
42:30
I'm telling them and I'm gonna tell you too is
42:33
that anybody who can come here to my
42:35
office in Albuquerque, New Mexico and demonstrate
42:38
a working version of basic
42:40
on My Altair
42:43
will get a contract with us to distribute
42:45
it when they go on sale And
42:47
so Bill and Paul they say okay
42:50
great. We'll see you soon Hang
42:53
up and by see you soon.
42:55
They mean let's go get to work And
42:58
this is a big deal for myths too if
43:01
this works because right now they've just announced a
43:03
machine For which you
43:05
can't really do anything on it the hardware
43:07
is powerful But they're not gonna have a
43:09
lot of customers unless there's stuff you can
43:12
do on the machine and a basic interpreter
43:14
running on it You know, it's
43:16
quite valuable to then make the claim you can
43:18
program basic on our computer So they're very excited
43:20
about this even though they're kind of playing coy
43:23
I was gonna talk about this in a minute, but let's
43:25
talk about what the Altair is What
43:28
did they just announce in the magazine here? This
43:31
is the Altair is the first mass
43:33
market commercially available personal computer again
43:36
No screen or anything. Yeah does
43:38
not have a screen does
43:40
not have a keyboard doesn't have a display of any
43:42
kind what it does have is
43:45
it has a set of 16 lights on
43:47
the front of the machine like Christmas lights and
43:51
16 switches and you can flip
43:53
the switches to flip bits and then the
43:55
machine will respond by lighting up different Patterns
43:57
of lights. It doesn't come with any thought
44:00
There's nothing. That's all it is. 16 lights,
44:02
16 switches. So
44:04
in order to use it, you got to hook
44:06
up your own teletype. You got to get the manual. You
44:09
got to hope that the manual is right. And
44:11
you got to code to the machine instructions, like
44:13
literally the assembly language for the chip
44:16
inside, for the Intel 8080. Now,
44:19
back to the TRAFO data days and
44:22
Paul writing the emulator for
44:24
the 8008 at Washington State.
44:27
Paul's like, we got this. I'll just write
44:29
an emulator on the Harvard PDP-10
44:31
for the 8080 instruction set. So
44:34
he does the same thing again. They get the
44:36
manual and they have an emulator and they write
44:38
it against an emulator. Yep. Bill
44:41
writes the basic interpreter. And
44:43
in a couple weeks, they've
44:45
got it working. And that's
44:47
like, okay, come on out to Albuquerque.
44:50
So Bill and Paul, remember Bill still
44:53
looks like he's 12 at this point in time.
44:55
They decide that just Paul should go. And does
44:57
Paul have like a rocking beard at this point
44:59
yet? Paul is super 70s. He
45:01
is like into it. And as we'll
45:03
see, he's going to fit right in
45:05
at Albuquerque and MIT. So
45:07
Paul gets on a plane, flies
45:10
from Boston to Albuquerque. And,
45:12
you know, in a total like epic
45:14
legend moment, they didn't have
45:17
a bootloader written for the basic interpreter.
45:19
So they had the basic. It was
45:21
all written. They'd done it on the
45:23
emulator. And Paul's flying out with the
45:25
tape, the computer tape with the code
45:27
of the basic interpreter on it. But
45:30
he's like, oh, shoot, we
45:32
can't just feed that right into the
45:34
machine. There's got to be a bootloader
45:36
to load up this thing. So he
45:39
writes the bootloader on the plane. On
45:41
paper by hand, he is hand coding
45:44
octal, not even assembly language instructions.
45:46
Like he's hand coding in
45:49
pure octal the instructions
45:51
to load their basic
45:53
interpreter program into memory.
45:56
Yep. So he lands in
45:58
Albuquerque. drives out to MITS,
46:01
they load the bootloader onto the
46:04
prototype Altair there that loads up
46:06
the basic interpreter, and
46:09
it fails. It doesn't work. Paul's
46:12
like, oh, let's try it again. Let's try it again. So
46:14
they try it again. This is how early computing is.
46:16
It works the second time. Who knows what the bug
46:18
was the first time? It didn't change anything. It just
46:20
didn't work the first time, and it worked
46:22
the second time. So it loads
46:24
up. Paul writes in the
46:27
instructions, print 2 plus 2. It
46:29
spits out 4. And by spits out, I mean
46:31
the lights light up and say 4. And
46:34
both he and Ed, the jaws are
46:37
on the floor. Paul's like, oh my god,
46:39
the basic works. And Ed's like, oh my god,
46:41
the Altair works. Neither of them believed this was
46:43
actually going to work. And
46:45
Ed actually has more eggs in this
46:47
basket than he sort of let on,
46:50
because when Bill and
46:52
Paul call and say, hey, can you
46:54
give us the teletype instructions, he
46:57
reveals they're actually the only ones who called about
46:59
that. So everyone else who said they were writing
47:01
a basic never got far enough to ask, how
47:03
do we actually interact with your computer?
47:06
Yes. So now
47:09
is the time to say a few words
47:11
about Ed and Mitt. Like, what is this
47:13
company? Bill and Paul originally
47:15
thought that it was going to be the
47:18
IBM's, the DEC's, the Japanese companies who are
47:20
going to make the first microcomputers.
47:24
Mitt's is about as far away from
47:26
IBM as you can
47:28
possibly imagine. Mitt's basically
47:31
was a model rocket company.
47:34
Which Albuquerque is a great place to do that. Ed,
47:37
Robert's the founder. He had
47:39
been in the Air Force and stationed in
47:41
Albuquerque. And that's how he got involved in
47:44
model rocketry. And the reason
47:46
that they're introducing the Altair and
47:48
they made this big splash in
47:50
the magazine was this is a
47:52
last ditch gambit to try and
47:54
save the company. So you got
47:56
like a bankrupt model rocketry company.
47:58
And their little gambit worked and got
48:00
a couple of college kids to pounce. Totally.
48:03
And like, why did it work? They
48:05
had two things going for them that
48:08
really Ed, I think probably
48:10
personally made happen. One,
48:13
they got this splashy popular electronics
48:15
magazine cover. That was through a
48:17
relationship that Ed had. And two,
48:21
the sticker price was $397, which
48:25
is about $2,300 in today, $20,
48:28
$24. Yes, that's a lot of money, but
48:32
the next cheapest computer that anybody could
48:34
buy at this point in time was
48:36
like a deck, you know, like $120,000
48:38
mini computer. So
48:42
the idea that somebody could buy
48:45
a computer for $400,
48:48
I don't care who's selling that thing. Like, I
48:50
want that. So what did they get some kind
48:52
of sweet deal from Intel? Yes. So this
48:55
is all Ed's doing. The list
48:57
price from Intel for the 8080 chip
48:59
was $360. So like, I
49:03
think this is part of what was deterring
49:06
the market of how would anybody sell a
49:08
kit that was affordably priced when
49:10
so much of the cost of
49:12
goods would go to Intel with the processor
49:14
deal. He managed to negotiate a
49:17
volume deal with Intel to get 8080 chips
49:19
at $75
49:21
a pop. Whoa. And that was
49:23
the key unlock. That's like a
49:26
5x price reduction. Totally. Huh. I
49:28
wasn't able to find how that negotiation went
49:31
down or why like Ed Roberts in Albuquerque,
49:33
New Mexico got this sweetheart deal from Intel.
49:35
I mean, either the list price is
49:37
like wildly wrong or they were cutting
49:40
deals all over the place or one
49:42
thing it could have been is just that I'm
49:44
totally speculating, but chips are
49:46
the ultimate high fixed
49:48
cost investment, low marginal costs
49:50
next to software. You
49:53
could imagine maybe Intel had already put all the
49:55
money into the fixed cost of spinning up the
49:57
fabs and was
49:59
expecting. a certain amount of market demand
50:01
and they weren't seeing it. They were like, crap, we got
50:03
to recoup our investment. I don't know, lower the price, let
50:05
them just maybe we'll make it up in volume. I
50:08
like that. I have no idea. But that's
50:10
a totally viable, I think, train of
50:12
thought here. Either
50:14
way, he gets the sweetheart deal. And
50:17
not only does it make computer history
50:20
and enable and create Microsoft, it saves
50:22
the company of myths. So they were
50:24
on the edge of bankruptcy after
50:26
the popular electronics article comes out,
50:29
they get 4000 preorders
50:31
in the first month or two, which
50:33
is one and a half million dollars
50:36
in revenue cash
50:38
paid upfront. That is
50:40
pure cash hitting the bank account.
50:42
That'll save a company. And also
50:44
just proves, hey, 4000 people just
50:46
paid cash sight unseen for
50:49
16 lights and switches. There's a
50:51
lot of demand for a home computer here.
50:53
And at decent margins, too, I mean, if
50:55
they're getting the processor for 72
50:57
bucks and they're selling it for what did you say? Yeah.
51:01
So I mean, everything else in there is much cheaper
51:03
than the processor. So I don't know, depending
51:05
on how much they have to give to the sales channel they're
51:08
selling through, if it's retail or
51:10
distributors. I think they're selling direct. I
51:12
think people are just sending money orders.
51:14
Yeah. So it's decent margin business. Unlike
51:17
what the PC business would become over
51:19
time, they managed to have nice margins.
51:22
So Paul and Ed, they kind of hit
51:24
it off. Paul decides to move
51:26
out to Albuquerque to be close to
51:28
the action here. And he actually joins
51:30
MITs as their vice
51:32
president of software. Now,
51:34
he's vice president of a software department of one.
51:36
He is the software department. Yeah,
51:40
software department of one. But, you know, he's got
51:42
his buddy Bill Gates, who is not employed. But
51:44
Bill's definitely working on software for the altar as
51:46
well. Yes. So Bill
51:49
stays at Harvard, but keeps
51:51
cranking on enhancing the basic
51:53
interpreter and adding more functions
51:55
and functionality to the version
51:57
of basic that they had just written for the altar.
52:00
Altair and then once the
52:02
school year is over, he comes out to
52:04
Albuquerque too for the summer. Now, the Altair
52:06
is getting ready to ship with the basic,
52:08
the Microsoft basic included in it. Bill
52:11
and Paul need to set up a company, but
52:13
Paul is an employee of MITs at
52:15
this point. So what did they do?
52:17
They set up a partnership. So
52:20
the founding of Microsoft,
52:22
at this point, Micro-Soft
52:24
is a two-person partnership between Bill
52:27
and Paul. As we record
52:29
this, that was 49 years and one day ago. So
52:32
we are sitting here on April 5th recording that was April
52:34
4th, 1975. It
52:38
is very funny to look back at
52:40
some of the original signatures when Bill
52:42
writes on letters. It's Bill Gates, the
52:45
general partner of Micro-Soft, which is great.
52:47
I think it's actually a Paul Allen
52:49
name where he wants to put together
52:51
microcomputer and software and Bill's like, that's
52:54
perfect, we're immediately just going to run
52:56
with it. As it was
52:58
a partnership, originally they were going to call it something
53:00
like Allen and Gates. And then
53:02
they ultimately are like, no, Microsoft is
53:05
perfect. Microsoft has become
53:07
like Kleenex. But like, no, no,
53:09
it's like Microsoft means microprocessor software.
53:13
I will say like it's a nice
53:15
clarifying North Star because it
53:17
really draws the line in the sand
53:19
and says, we're in the software business.
53:21
And Gates makes this really clear to
53:23
Paul Allen, who is often tempted to
53:25
do hardware stuff. And Bill is very
53:27
hardcore about saying, no, what
53:29
we're uniquely good at in the world is
53:31
software. And we should stick to that. I
53:34
also suspect Bill is starting to realize there's
53:37
an amazing business model here, if we can
53:39
pull it off, where we don't have to
53:41
make the hardware and we can charge for
53:43
every copy of the software sold. But
53:45
that insight, I would say, has not
53:47
yet fully materialized. Yeah. OK. Well, let's
53:49
talk about business model here in one
53:51
second. First, though, on the partnership, again,
53:54
we've been saying all along that Bill is clearly
53:56
the leader here. They set up the partnership initially
53:58
at 60. 40 ownership, Bill
54:01
is 60%, Paul is 40%. Later
54:03
it gets changed to Bill is 64%, and Paul is 36%.
54:07
So, yep. Bill is the leader here.
54:10
Yeah. And Bill's case that he makes on
54:12
that to Paul is, hey, you took a job, and
54:14
you were doing this on the side, I was all
54:16
in. And Paul's an agreeable guy, and
54:18
36 is still a nice percent. And so he says,
54:20
Sure. You know, in the long run here, everybody
54:23
gets. It's all sort of a rounding error.
54:25
But to
54:28
that point, back to the business model. So
54:30
once the partnership is set up, they
54:33
sign an exclusive
54:35
licensing arrangement with MITS.
54:38
This is super important.
54:40
This is a big lesson that young
54:43
Bill and Paul are going to learn here. So
54:45
MITS gets exclusive
54:47
license to the basic
54:50
interpreter to the basic as they
54:52
call it for the 8080.
54:55
And MITS is the one
54:57
that can then decide whether to
54:59
sub license the basic out to other
55:02
companies or not. Huh?
55:04
Essentially, this is a distribution
55:06
deal with MITS
55:08
where MITS becomes the exclusive
55:10
seller and distributor of Microsoft's
55:14
basic. Microsoft doesn't
55:16
have any direct sales
55:18
control here. That's going to
55:20
become a big, big, big issue. And
55:23
the terms of the deal are Microsoft
55:25
is to get $30 for each copy
55:27
of basic that MITS sells, plus
55:29
50% of the revenue that comes
55:32
from the sub licensing deals that MITS may
55:34
or may not do with other companies who
55:36
want to use the basic. Which why would
55:38
they ever do any sub licensing deals? Like,
55:40
why would you give it to your competitors?
55:43
Well, that is a really good question, Ben. So
55:46
let's just round that part of the
55:48
revenue to zero. Yeah, this is a
55:50
big, big, big diverging of interest between
55:52
Microsoft and MITS. And
55:55
the kicker on this contract is
55:57
that the total amount of lifetime
55:59
revenue that Microsoft can make from
56:02
the basic. Oh, it's capped? From MITS is
56:04
capped at $180,000. Ha.
56:08
So, and in MITS really
56:10
have the upper hand in this deal.
56:12
Or phrased another way, it's we will
56:15
give you $180,000 for
56:18
you to hand over exclusive rights to all that
56:20
cool basic stuff you just wrote to us. But
56:23
if we sell fewer than X machines, we're actually gonna pay
56:25
it out to you on a prorated basis at $30 a
56:27
pop, rather than giving you
56:29
the full $180,000. Yeah, that
56:31
is another way to frame it. So,
56:34
definitely a great deal for MITS. On
56:37
the other hand, what are Bill and Paul
56:39
gonna do here? Right, kind of a great
56:42
deal for them too, given the position they're
56:44
in. Right, MITS is the industry. Yeah. Now,
56:47
there is one very,
56:49
very important clause in the contract
56:51
though, protecting Microsoft's
56:54
interests. And that
56:56
clause is that MITS must
56:58
use its best efforts to
57:01
license, promote, and
57:04
commercialize the basic, broadly
57:07
in the marketplace. And that any
57:09
failure to do so by MITS would
57:11
be grounds for termination of the
57:14
contract by Microsoft. Hmm,
57:17
thank God Bill's dad is a lawyer. Indeed,
57:20
indeed. So,
57:22
the Altair comes out for sale later in
57:25
1975. Microsoft
57:27
does $16,000 in revenue that year from
57:31
there, $30 a pop, the
57:33
basics that are getting sold with the
57:35
Altair. Which is
57:37
great, especially the first year that they're starting. And
57:40
the next year in 1976, everybody's so excited about
57:44
this new market, the vision that's happening,
57:46
the demand, the Altair, the sales, that
57:49
Paul Allen resigns from MITS
57:51
to join Microsoft full-time. Bill
57:54
drops out of Harvard officially. He moves
57:56
to Albuquerque. They're all in on this.
57:59
But... For the year in 1976, Microsoft's
58:01
revenue is still only $22,000. So
58:05
it was $16,000 the year before, $22,000 in 1976. Not
58:10
a high growth company. This is less
58:12
than they were making in high school. What is
58:14
going on here? One, it's sort of like
58:16
MITS is the one at the controls of sales, not
58:18
Microsoft. But two, MITS
58:21
is selling 1,000 computers a month.
58:23
This is taking off. This is creating a
58:25
new industry. Despite MITS
58:27
selling thousands of computers a month, only a
58:29
few hundred copies of BASIC are selling per
58:32
month. What's going on? People
58:34
are pirating the software. This is
58:36
the discovery of software piracy. And
58:39
this is a pretty interesting time
58:41
to pause and say, well, are
58:43
they pirating software? Because this is 1975.
58:48
So piracy implies that you are
58:50
running afoul of some particular legal
58:53
protection for the good. And
58:56
you might say, well, with today's legal
58:58
frameworks in hindsight, you would say, of course, if they're
59:00
copying the software and not paying the money for it,
59:03
it's piracy. That was actually
59:05
not established yet. And this
59:07
is the craziest thing. So Bill basically
59:09
has an opinion that it's piracy. And
59:11
he writes letters to the computer community.
59:13
He writes an open letter to hobbyists.
59:15
Yes. And tries to basically
59:17
guilt trip people. He tries to use
59:20
that as a recruiting method and say, if you're so
59:22
excited about pirating our software, maybe you should just come
59:24
work with us. And nothing would make me happier than
59:26
making the best software in the world. And please join
59:28
us on this mission. But ultimately, the
59:30
legal standing that he has to say, hey,
59:32
what you're doing is illegal is not fully
59:34
established. And so it would actually take a
59:37
couple of years for the courts
59:39
to look at software and say, what
59:42
about this is protectable? And
59:45
if you think about it, it is a little bit weird.
59:47
So you've got source code that looks kind
59:49
of like English, you know, basic, it's letters
59:51
and numbers. It gets
59:54
translated to machine code. That
59:56
machine code ends up running
59:58
and it's basically a lecture. It's
1:00:01
voltages that are flipped up and down.
1:00:03
And so what about that are
1:00:05
we trying to protect? Ultimately, the way it
1:00:08
gets litigated through some case law from court
1:00:10
cases is that the
1:00:12
source code is a
1:00:14
copyrightable creative work
1:00:16
that is expressed through some
1:00:18
sort of tangible medium. That's
1:00:21
the important thing about copyright law. It's a
1:00:23
creative work expressed through a tangible medium. So
1:00:25
a book, the creative work is the words
1:00:27
and the tangible medium is printed
1:00:30
on paper. And so with software, it
1:00:32
actually took until 1980, Congress
1:00:36
changed the law. We'll put a link
1:00:38
in the show notes to the literal
1:00:41
congressional change that happened. And
1:00:44
it is in Title 17, Copyrights
1:00:46
Chapter 1, Subject Matter and Scope
1:00:48
of Copyright. And in
1:00:50
1980, they include a defined term,
1:00:52
which is a quote unquote computer
1:00:54
program is a set of statements
1:00:56
or instructions to be used directly
1:00:58
or indirectly in a computer in
1:01:00
order to bring about a certain
1:01:02
result. And once you have that
1:01:04
passed by Congress codified into law,
1:01:06
you now have the standing legal
1:01:08
framework that all the whole computer
1:01:11
industry used going forward, in particular
1:01:13
the software industry, a computer program
1:01:15
is copyrightable work. Wow,
1:01:18
I didn't know all that's awesome. It's totally
1:01:20
crazy how recent that is. But when you
1:01:22
think about it, why would that have any
1:01:24
legal, you know, software is such an abstract
1:01:26
idea before the whole business model of computers
1:01:29
was good luck, just replicating an IBM PC
1:01:31
and everything that comes with it. You don't
1:01:33
need any legal standing. But if you're going
1:01:35
to pursue this software only business model, what's
1:01:38
the protection around your abstract product? That's
1:01:40
exactly what I was going to say here. This is
1:01:42
the other element of what's going on. This
1:01:45
is the first time software has
1:01:47
ever been sold. Right. Other than
1:01:49
the IBM accounting machinations to protect
1:01:52
themselves from antitrust, which was
1:01:54
just accounting, nobody had ever sold
1:01:56
software before. This is the first
1:01:58
time. Right. Certainly. to
1:02:00
build like a legitimate business around it. The other
1:02:02
thing that's useful to know is when
1:02:04
you're selling an IBM PC, you're literally selling
1:02:07
a PC to a customer. The same way
1:02:09
that when I'm selling you this glass from
1:02:11
Crate and Barrel, I am selling
1:02:13
you the glass and the glass is now
1:02:15
yours. I've transferred property to you. Software
1:02:18
is not that. So the whole
1:02:20
world of software is built on
1:02:22
a license agreement. So the source
1:02:24
code that computer program, the actual
1:02:26
right of that is retained by
1:02:29
the creator and you license the
1:02:31
copyright to your customer to be
1:02:33
able to use that on their
1:02:35
machine. So there's this dual idea
1:02:37
that computer software is copyrightable
1:02:39
and you can grant a license
1:02:41
under certain conditions for customers to
1:02:43
use it. That is the
1:02:45
legal framework for which the next 50
1:02:47
years of technology at
1:02:50
large would operate under. For the moment
1:02:52
though, they got a piracy problem. Right.
1:02:55
The law isn't going to change until 1980. Microsoft
1:02:57
would be dead if they didn't figure out
1:02:59
a solution to this before 1980. So
1:03:03
this is when Bill ultimately kind
1:03:05
of realizes, shoot, we did the
1:03:08
wrong business deal with MITS here.
1:03:11
MITS has to sell and customers
1:03:13
have to make the decision to
1:03:15
buy our basic. It
1:03:19
is a key critical part of the
1:03:21
value of the computer. It's like the
1:03:23
whole thing. It makes that machine useful.
1:03:26
Right. Without it, it is not
1:03:28
useful. It's totally setting up the
1:03:30
wrong incentives and value equation that customers
1:03:33
should be buying this
1:03:35
themselves. It should be included by
1:03:37
the hardware OEM in the
1:03:39
machine that they are selling and in the
1:03:41
total purchase price. And then if that happens,
1:03:44
we no longer have a piracy problem because
1:03:46
we're just getting paid as part of the
1:03:49
purchase of the machine. Right. It
1:03:51
should be a royalty. Right. The problem is that
1:03:53
is not the deal that they had with MITS. Right. Or
1:03:56
framed differently. Instead of saying, hey, consumer,
1:03:58
do you want to buy something? else
1:04:00
too and make a new purchase decision,
1:04:02
they should be saying, hey computer manufacturer,
1:04:05
we make your thing actually useful, so pay
1:04:07
us for it. Yes. So
1:04:10
during 75 and 76, MITS
1:04:14
pretty much had this
1:04:16
new microcomputer market all to
1:04:18
themselves. There were a couple
1:04:20
other competitors who sprung up, but nothing
1:04:23
made. The Altair and MITS
1:04:26
was the microcomputer company. All
1:04:29
of that changes though in a big way in 1977 when what
1:04:31
Bite magazine calls the 1977 Trinity
1:04:37
hits the market. And that is
1:04:40
three machines, the Radio
1:04:42
Shack TRS-80, Tandy slash Radio
1:04:44
Shack TRS-80, the Commodore
1:04:47
Personal Electronic Transactor or
1:04:49
the acronym PET, and
1:04:52
the Apple II. All
1:04:56
three of which machines were like
1:04:58
the Altair, low cost, mass
1:05:01
market, unlike the Altair,
1:05:04
they were not kits. They were fully
1:05:07
assembled, fully functional, right out of the
1:05:09
box. And they
1:05:11
each had their own major distribution
1:05:13
advantages. And in Bill's words, these
1:05:15
three machines, the 1977 Trinity ignite volume in the
1:05:17
market. Bill
1:05:22
loves these really dramatic verbs. We attacked
1:05:24
the manual. They ignite the volume in
1:05:26
the market. Oh, and the press just
1:05:28
latches onto them. Whenever Bill has a
1:05:30
leaked memo or something where he talks
1:05:32
about all this war terminology, those
1:05:34
all become headlines. So great. Now,
1:05:37
earlier during 1976, Microsoft
1:05:39
had started getting approached by a
1:05:42
few of the bigger computing companies
1:05:44
like NCR, National Cash Register, GE,
1:05:47
Control Data Systems. I
1:05:50
want to license Microsoft Your
1:05:52
Basic for the 8080 microprocessor here
1:05:54
so that we can experiment with these things.
1:05:58
And each of these deals... would
1:06:00
have been revenue to Microsoft of like $100,000-ish.
1:06:04
But Ed and Mitts, they
1:06:06
keep dragging their feet on negotiating these.
1:06:08
They've got the exclusive license. Everything's got
1:06:11
to go through Mitts. And
1:06:13
most of them, they're turning down, because Ben, like
1:06:15
you said, they don't want anybody to come in
1:06:17
and compete with them. Yep. There's
1:06:19
the misaligned incentive. There's the misaligned
1:06:21
incentive, and there is the clause
1:06:24
that Bill and Microsoft, and I presume
1:06:26
Bill Sr., put in the original agreement,
1:06:29
is Mitts using its best
1:06:32
effort to commercialize
1:06:34
the basic and gain
1:06:36
adoption in the market. And you can
1:06:38
make a pretty strong argument that they're not. So
1:06:41
Ed, though, unbeknownst to Bill and Paul, he has
1:06:43
another reason that he's dragging his feet on these
1:06:45
deals, which is that he's about to sell
1:06:47
the company. So in May of 1977, Mitts gets acquired by
1:06:52
the tape drive manufacturer, Pertech,
1:06:54
for $6.5 million, and Ed
1:06:56
kind of rides off into the sunset. And
1:06:59
Pertech, they know about this
1:07:01
dispute with Microsoft, and they
1:07:03
sort of come in and they figure out, who is
1:07:06
this Bill Gates? He's a 21-year-old kid,
1:07:08
a college dropout, like we're a big
1:07:10
company. We can deal with this. And
1:07:13
Robert says an amazing quote later. He
1:07:15
says, Pertech kept telling me they could deal with
1:07:17
this kid. It was a little like
1:07:20
Roosevelt telling Churchill that he could deal with Stalin. Oh,
1:07:23
my God. Oh,
1:07:26
boy. And I also don't think they realize that
1:07:28
this kid's dad is one of the best corporate
1:07:30
attorneys in the country. Yeah.
1:07:32
Well, Bill Gates was just constantly underestimated,
1:07:34
which kind of worked to his advantage
1:07:37
in those early days. Yes,
1:07:39
totally. That's the thing
1:07:41
about Microsoft. People kind of forget
1:07:43
how insanely young Bill was. He
1:07:46
was just 20. And to put
1:07:48
that in context, he's only
1:07:50
seven years older than Jensen
1:07:53
Huang, but they
1:07:55
feel an entire generation apart since
1:07:58
Microsoft was started almost. 20
1:08:00
years before Nvidia. When you
1:08:03
start bending your mind around like, oh,
1:08:05
Bill Gates is still pretty young, considering
1:08:08
what an institution Microsoft has become in
1:08:10
the world. Right. I mean, Microsoft
1:08:12
next year is going to have
1:08:14
its 50th anniversary. And I
1:08:17
believe that also be the same year that Bill
1:08:19
turned 70. That's wild.
1:08:21
Yeah. So that
1:08:23
fall in 1977, the
1:08:26
dispute between MIT slash per
1:08:28
tech and Microsoft goes to arbitration
1:08:30
in Albuquerque. And
1:08:32
the interim months while this arbitration is happening
1:08:35
are the only moment in Microsoft's
1:08:37
history where like cash gets tight.
1:08:40
They're sort of running out of money because they
1:08:42
can't really make any sales
1:08:44
here. Right. They don't control their
1:08:46
destiny. People aren't paying MIT for
1:08:48
the basic, their quote unquote, pirating
1:08:50
the software. They can't do
1:08:52
deals with all the other computer companies
1:08:54
that want to come license directly. And
1:08:57
so things get a little tight. Microsoft
1:08:59
ends up winning the arbitration, I believe
1:09:01
in maybe like November 1977,
1:09:05
meaning they are now totally free to
1:09:07
go license basic to anybody who wants
1:09:09
to buy it on any
1:09:11
terms that they want. So they
1:09:14
turn around, they immediately license it
1:09:16
to the Trinity, you know, Apple,
1:09:18
Commodore, Radio Shack and Tandy. They
1:09:20
license it to all the big
1:09:22
companies, the GEs, the NCRs who
1:09:24
want to experiment with micro computers.
1:09:27
There's a really funny story with
1:09:29
Apple that apparently
1:09:31
was had more or
1:09:33
less written like 95% of their own
1:09:37
basic, their own basic, but it
1:09:39
didn't have floating point numbers. It
1:09:41
only had integer numbers and jobs
1:09:43
is like totally writing was
1:09:45
like the basic is really important. Like can
1:09:47
you just finish it? Can you do floating point and
1:09:50
was just doesn't do it. So
1:09:53
jobs has to go license Microsoft's
1:09:55
basic. Amazing.
1:10:00
The first feel that happens within the company
1:10:02
is a me. There's so many deals done
1:10:04
both directions, commercial deals, equity deals, legal disputes
1:10:06
in both directions, and this is the very
1:10:09
first time that they do something together. Job.
1:10:12
So. Bill. And
1:10:14
Paul Microsoft did you all. These deals may do
1:10:16
them all as cash up front. Fixed
1:10:19
Costs: All you companies you're going pay us
1:10:21
and then you include the basic in
1:10:23
the machines that you're selling and were going
1:10:25
to get all the money upfront. Super.
1:10:28
Presently though, Bill.
1:10:30
Does not. Value. Maximize
1:10:32
on these deal. So like the
1:10:34
Apple deal, Is thirty one
1:10:37
thousand dollars for eight years.
1:10:39
Of. Whoa Access for Apple for
1:10:41
the Apple to Heart and Microsoft
1:10:44
Basic. They're. Not price gouging
1:10:46
here because Bill sees he's like.
1:10:49
The play here is we want
1:10:51
to make it a no brainer
1:10:53
for everybody everybody who's selling and
1:10:55
microcomputer to have Microsoft Basic on
1:10:57
it because we want to set
1:10:59
the standard if we are the
1:11:01
standard. Programming. Environment
1:11:03
That anybody who's using these computers and
1:11:05
can anybody who is using these computers
1:11:07
is programming them. There. Used
1:11:10
to the Microsoft version of basic. Were.
1:11:12
Going to have so much power that you
1:11:14
become a self fulfilling prophecy. All of our
1:11:16
competitors will just. Wither. Away nobody a
1:11:19
want them because it's not going to be
1:11:21
compatible with the language everybody knows and them
1:11:23
once people start trading and and ultimately. Developing.
1:11:26
And selling software that they've written.
1:11:29
It's. Only gonna run on our basic
1:11:31
interpreter. not anybody else is sasson eating
1:11:33
actually didn't know that started this early.
1:11:36
And one cracks in there. You don't know
1:11:38
for a fact it's only gonna run on
1:11:40
Microsoft Basic interpreter, but you do know for
1:11:42
a fact that it will run on Microsoft
1:11:44
Basic Interpreter. And so it's It's cheap enough.
1:11:47
Why would you take the chance on a
1:11:49
clone that might have one or two things
1:11:51
wrong with. It. Just. Basically his
1:11:53
vision is I want to remove
1:11:55
any oxygen from. Any. Argument
1:11:57
anyone could have about not using.
1:12:00
Microsoft Basic on a microcomputer who.
1:12:02
He thinks about this concept as
1:12:04
a positive spiral that he really
1:12:06
in his mind is the reason
1:12:09
for Microsoft success. He says success
1:12:11
reinforces success in a growing my
1:12:13
gift. One. Way of doing something
1:12:15
gets a slight advantage over it's competitors.
1:12:17
This is most likely to happen with
1:12:19
high technology products. They can be made
1:12:21
in great volume for a very little
1:12:24
increase costs and as he get that
1:12:26
slight advantage in on compound and this
1:12:28
is what he's playing for here and
1:12:30
it's interesting In the earliest days. What?
1:12:32
Was stopping someone else from writing a
1:12:34
basic interpreter and licensing get to Apple
1:12:37
or Radioshack? Nothing. There were other smart
1:12:39
people out there and so was just
1:12:41
a. Very good business decision to
1:12:43
say. We're. Close That door. We
1:12:45
just gotta make this a no brainer for people
1:12:47
to buy from us because if we're value maximizing
1:12:49
and it's starting to feel expensive, they're going to
1:12:51
turn elsewhere in till we get a lead. Race
1:12:54
the Apple Store is the perfect example. you
1:12:56
know the was thing is cute and makes
1:12:58
for good story and like all he didn't
1:13:01
finish the basic but when make a sauce
1:13:03
sold them the basic which was already getting
1:13:05
established as the standard for thirty one thousand
1:13:07
dollars serve my not no brainer. Apple could
1:13:10
have gone out and hired another programmer to
1:13:12
finish the basic. The daily quip. Boot.
1:13:14
Do that are I could just get the standard one for thirty
1:13:16
one thousand dollars on a do that. Just. Because
1:13:18
it's important to establish there's tree asr everything.
1:13:21
If you're running a start up right now,
1:13:23
you might think to yourself, oh great, I'll
1:13:25
just run that exact strategies. The important thing
1:13:27
here is a most of the work was
1:13:29
already done for the original basic. Be.
1:13:32
Bill was doing it himself Bill and
1:13:34
Paul So the importance of technical cofounders
1:13:36
and their overhead was crazy low and
1:13:38
so they could do these deals where
1:13:40
they don't make very much money because
1:13:42
they were I think at the end
1:13:44
of seventy seventy or five employees. So.
1:13:46
Their overhead was just so unbelievably low
1:13:49
that they couldn't take a really long
1:13:51
lens. So. Yes, even though it
1:13:53
takes until the very end of Nineteen seventy
1:13:55
Seven when the Mets dispute gets resolved and
1:13:57
Microsoft can actually. Make money, In.
1:14:00
May and Nineteen seventy seven with three
1:14:02
hundred and eighty one thousand dollars in
1:14:05
revenue despite zero for the first like
1:14:07
eleven months as. They
1:14:10
just rolling in task. This is when
1:14:12
Bill famously goes out and buys agree
1:14:14
and person nine eleven and is motoring
1:14:16
around. Albuquerque Journal sense of speeding ticket
1:14:18
said. you know hilarious stuff. This is
1:14:20
when he got his mugshot right? Yeah,
1:14:22
the good. So this is a classic.
1:14:24
Bill Gates or not, They? yeah this
1:14:26
is just. Amazing because he got
1:14:28
i think three speeding tickets in one day,
1:14:31
two of which were some the same police
1:14:33
officer. Yeah. And there's funny stories
1:14:35
of the Albuquerque Police thought this: You know
1:14:37
how his kids driving a Porsche nine eleven?
1:14:39
He must be like a drug dealer or
1:14:41
something, because even when he was five twenty
1:14:43
twenty one, he looked seventeen. right? Is
1:14:45
like do you even have a driver's
1:14:47
license Wilde Ah, But back to what
1:14:50
you're saying. It's a really, really important
1:14:52
point. To make
1:14:54
this dynamic works he needs
1:14:56
to be able. To.
1:14:59
Afford the investment in the
1:15:02
fixed costs for the software,
1:15:04
for the technology. To. Make
1:15:06
it that little bit superior. Like
1:15:08
Bills talking about the slight advantage
1:15:10
over the competitors, and at this
1:15:12
moment in time the industry is
1:15:14
completely brandy like the software industry
1:15:17
is brand new. So. The
1:15:19
amount that that six costs seats,
1:15:22
the cost is quite low really.
1:15:24
It's just. Bill. In Paul's
1:15:26
time and dedication to this
1:15:28
industry that nobody else is
1:15:31
making that investments. You. Can't
1:15:33
run this playbook today because. In
1:15:35
any market, even a brand new market,
1:15:37
even a speculative Martha, the minimum viable
1:15:39
fixed cost is. Billions. Of
1:15:42
dollars, right? Yeah, it's interesting.
1:15:45
I. also think this moment galvanize
1:15:47
something important which is bill and
1:15:49
paul could sort of look around
1:15:51
and see there is gonna be
1:15:53
so much value created by microcomputers
1:15:55
and by software they really found
1:15:58
religion around saw is magic. The
1:16:00
things that people can create now
1:16:02
that we've done this basic interpreter
1:16:05
and these machines are cheap and plentiful,
1:16:08
the magic will take care of itself as
1:16:10
long as we ensure this industry can just
1:16:12
exist and do its thing. And so they
1:16:14
flipped from this mode of we need to
1:16:16
bite and scratch and claw and make sure
1:16:18
that we win in deals to, huh, how
1:16:22
can we enable software as a thing
1:16:24
to thrive? And I'm sure we can
1:16:26
position ourselves well to capture some or
1:16:28
a lot of that. And
1:16:30
I think they became almost stewards of
1:16:33
the software industry and evangelists from this
1:16:35
point forward. Yes. They
1:16:37
also do another really prescient thing the next
1:16:39
year in 1978, which is they
1:16:43
go global. Yes. Nobody
1:16:45
else is going global yet. And the way that this happens
1:16:47
is so fun. Bill gets a
1:16:49
call one day. Also, how crazy is it you've
1:16:51
got five people, you're operating out of Albuquerque, you
1:16:53
just finally expanded from having one customer and you're
1:16:56
like, you know what we should do this year?
1:16:58
Let's open in Japan and become an international
1:17:00
company. Yes. Now the
1:17:02
way this happens is one day, Bill
1:17:05
gets a call from a guy
1:17:07
named Kazuhiro Nishi or Kay
1:17:09
Nishi, who's a computer enthusiast
1:17:12
in Japan, has gotten
1:17:14
a hold of Microsoft's
1:17:16
basic totally shares the same vision
1:17:18
as Bill and Paul. He doesn't have a
1:17:20
Paul, you know, nor is he technical himself.
1:17:23
He's like, I'm going to bring you
1:17:25
guys to Japan. I'm going to bring you to all
1:17:27
the big computer companies. They agree
1:17:29
that Kay will become Microsoft's
1:17:31
exclusive distribution partner in Japan.
1:17:34
And by the next year in 1979, half
1:17:38
of Microsoft's revenue is coming
1:17:40
from Japan, which is
1:17:42
wild. It's unbelievable. And it stayed
1:17:44
at that very high run rate
1:17:46
of international being a huge chunk,
1:17:48
you know, close to half always,
1:17:51
basically forever. This is
1:17:53
a huge cornerstone of Microsoft's success that
1:17:55
they were an international company from year
1:17:57
three of their existence. Yes.
1:18:00
Totally. So, revenue in 1977, that
1:18:02
last month of revenue was almost $400,000. 1978
1:18:07
revenue is $1.3 million. They
1:18:10
have 13 employees at this point. 1979
1:18:13
revenue is $2.4 million. And
1:18:15
at the end of that year, they're like, all
1:18:17
right, we got to get out of Albuquerque.
1:18:20
And they've got 25 employees, I believe,
1:18:22
at that point? Yeah, something like that. And
1:18:25
this is when they moved to Seattle. And
1:18:27
it's interesting to hear Bill talk
1:18:29
about this. He actually really liked
1:18:32
Albuquerque. And specifically, there
1:18:34
weren't any distractions there. No distractions,
1:18:36
weather was great. Yeah. Everybody
1:18:39
was happy there. But the big problem was
1:18:41
recruiting. Yeah. He was like, you know, if we're
1:18:43
going to build this into the opportunity that
1:18:45
I see, the vision that I see and
1:18:48
that Paul shares with me, there's no way
1:18:50
we're going to do that in Albuquerque. We
1:18:53
got to move to a hub. Right. And
1:18:55
so he's got three reasons for why Seattle in
1:18:57
particular. By the way, it worked. Every single person
1:18:59
except for his secretary did make the move. So
1:19:02
one, he grew up in Seattle. He's like, I just
1:19:04
want to go home. And then
1:19:06
he justifies it in two other ways, which I found
1:19:08
pretty fascinating. This is from an interview in the early
1:19:10
90s that he did. He said
1:19:13
it basically came down to Seattle or
1:19:15
Silicon Valley. And in
1:19:17
Silicon Valley, it's hard to keep secrets because there's
1:19:19
a rumor mill. And in Seattle, we can be
1:19:21
a little bit more removed. And we can announce
1:19:23
things when we want to announce them. And
1:19:26
two, in Silicon Valley, people switch around
1:19:28
companies. I don't want that. I want people
1:19:30
to just work at Microsoft. There
1:19:32
was a disadvantage to not being able to recruit from
1:19:34
your competitors. But for a
1:19:36
while, they were really the only game in
1:19:38
town in Seattle. Right. But not
1:19:40
really, though, because pretty quickly, Microsoft is such an
1:19:42
important part of the industry. They recruit from Silicon
1:19:44
Valley, too. We're going to talk about some of
1:19:47
the people who come up. But
1:19:49
you're totally right. People stay at
1:19:51
Microsoft. They don't leave. This
1:19:53
continues right through to this day. And
1:19:55
the other thing that I think is really important
1:19:57
to say that makes it work for Seattle.
1:20:00
in a way that I don't know that this could
1:20:02
have worked in too many other places in the country
1:20:05
is the University of Washington. The
1:20:07
computer science department there was really
1:20:09
good. There were great people, Steve
1:20:11
Russell had come out there, there
1:20:13
was real talent and they were
1:20:15
churning out graduates out of
1:20:18
the U-Dub that would go on
1:20:20
to populate Microsoft for decades to come. Oh,
1:20:22
and then Bill of course reinvested in
1:20:25
that flywheel, donating tons of money to
1:20:27
the university. I mean, there's buildings, there's
1:20:29
whole new schools. Yes, absolutely,
1:20:31
they played right into it. And so today,
1:20:33
I mean, it's always a top 10, if
1:20:36
not top five computer science program in the
1:20:38
country, but unlike other top computer
1:20:41
science programs, it's a state school, so it
1:20:43
just has huge volumes. I think more students
1:20:46
come out of the University of Washington and go
1:20:48
to big tech than any other program
1:20:50
in the country. That has stayed this
1:20:52
amazing advantage. Yeah, I think the only
1:20:54
thing even close to it
1:20:56
is Berkeley in the Bay Area with a lot
1:20:59
of the same dynamics, but there's Stanford there too.
1:21:01
So it's kind of like a dual university system
1:21:03
in the Bay Area, but yeah, cannot overstate
1:21:06
how important the University of Washington was to
1:21:08
this decision and then the ultimate success of
1:21:10
coming to Seattle. Yep. So
1:21:13
this brings us to 1980, in
1:21:16
the beginning of the year when they move to
1:21:18
Seattle, just in time for,
1:21:21
I think you can make a
1:21:23
very strong argument, the single
1:21:26
most important deal ever
1:21:28
done in the history of
1:21:31
technology. Absolutely. The Microsoft
1:21:34
IBM, I mean, it's crazy
1:21:36
to even say it now, the Microsoft
1:21:38
IBM PC partnership.
1:21:42
It's crazy. You have this absolute
1:21:45
behemoth partnering with someone
1:21:47
that's not really relevant.
1:21:49
And if you're standing here today, it
1:21:52
sounds like I'm talking about Microsoft partnering
1:21:55
with IBM, but at the time it was IBM
1:21:57
partnering with Microsoft. computer
1:22:00
company that mattered in the entire
1:22:02
world got themselves into a particular
1:22:04
situation where they came to Microsoft
1:22:06
looking for help. It's the
1:22:09
craziest set of events that made
1:22:11
this possible and I can't wait to dive into
1:22:13
it. Oh me too. But before we
1:22:15
do this is the perfect time to
1:22:17
talk about another one of our favorite enterprise
1:22:19
software platforms, ServiceNow, who is one of our
1:22:22
big partners here in season 14. Yes, ServiceNow
1:22:25
is the AI platform for your
1:22:27
enterprise, helping automate processes, improve service
1:22:29
delivery, and increase efficiency. Over 85%
1:22:31
of the Fortune 500 runs on
1:22:33
them and they have quickly joined
1:22:35
the Microsofts and the NVIDIAs as
1:22:37
one of the most important enterprise
1:22:39
technology vendors in the world. And
1:22:42
just like those companies, ServiceNow has
1:22:44
AI baked in everywhere in their
1:22:46
platform and they're also a major
1:22:48
partner of both Microsoft and NVIDIA.
1:22:50
I was at NVIDIA's GTC last
1:22:52
week which by the way
1:22:54
was insane. I felt like a VIP
1:22:57
at a Taylor Swift concert. It was
1:22:59
crazy. And Jensen brought up ServiceNow
1:23:01
and their partnership many times throughout the
1:23:03
keynote. So why is
1:23:05
ServiceNow so important both to NVIDIA
1:23:07
and to Microsoft? Well, AI in
1:23:09
the real world is only as
1:23:12
good as the bedrock platform infrastructure
1:23:14
it runs on and for enterprises
1:23:16
around the world, ServiceNow manages that
1:23:18
infrastructure. So all the AI applications
1:23:21
for enterprises, whether that's supercharging developers
1:23:23
with generative AI, empowering and streamlining
1:23:25
customer service, allowing HR to deliver
1:23:27
better employee experiences, ServiceNow has already
1:23:29
done the hard technical work to
1:23:32
make rolling them out not just
1:23:34
possible but easy and fast. Yeah,
1:23:37
employees can get answers quickly
1:23:39
with smarter self-service like changing
1:23:42
401k contributions directly through AI-powered
1:23:44
chat or developers can
1:23:46
build apps faster with AI-powered
1:23:48
code generation and service agents
1:23:50
can use AI to notify you that someone's
1:23:53
product needs replacing before they even chat with
1:23:55
you about it. With the ServiceNow platform your
1:23:57
business is a hundred percent ready for AI.
1:24:00
simply turn it on and it all works. They've
1:24:02
built AI directly into their platform. So
1:24:04
all the integration work to prepare for
1:24:06
it that otherwise would have taken you
1:24:08
years is already done. So
1:24:10
if you wanna learn more about the ServiceNow platform
1:24:13
and how it can turbo charge the time to
1:24:15
deploy AI for your business, go on over to
1:24:17
servicenow.com/acquired. And when you get in touch, just tell
1:24:19
them that Ben and David sent you. So
1:24:22
the IBM PC. Why
1:24:26
is IBM getting into
1:24:28
the personal computer here in 1980?
1:24:31
A fun quote we heard in our research
1:24:34
was that IBM was the sun, the moon,
1:24:36
the stars of the computing industry. And that
1:24:38
meant the hardcore enterprise
1:24:40
mainframe computing industry. Yes.
1:24:43
David, are you gonna attribute that quote? Are you
1:24:45
gonna leave listeners just hanging? All right, I think
1:24:48
it's time. We talked to probably 10 early
1:24:51
Microsoft people in research
1:24:53
and preparation. And one of
1:24:55
those folks was Steve Bomer himself. And
1:24:57
he used those words in describing IBM.
1:24:59
Yes, and it's hard to imagine a
1:25:02
better person to get their perspective on
1:25:04
what IBM meant to the world at
1:25:07
this point in time. Because 1980 was
1:25:10
also the year that Steve joined
1:25:13
Microsoft. So literally at the same
1:25:15
time in 1980, you've
1:25:18
got the management team coming together
1:25:20
with Steve and Bill and Paul
1:25:22
Allen. And you've got the IBM
1:25:24
thing going on. And you've got
1:25:27
them moving to Seattle. And we
1:25:29
haven't even talked about Charles Simone yet, but
1:25:31
this was the year he joined. This is
1:25:33
the year. Yes. I mean, every
1:25:35
year for Microsoft until this point is the year, but like 1980 is
1:25:37
big. Okay,
1:25:40
so why is IBM the sun, the
1:25:42
moon, and the stars of computing? Why
1:25:44
are they getting into this PC? It's
1:25:46
way cheaper than anything else they sell.
1:25:48
It seems to be like a totally
1:25:50
different business strategy, a different customer set.
1:25:52
What's going on? So all
1:25:55
the early micro computers we were just
1:25:57
talking about, you know, it's all ter-
1:26:00
Thappel II, the TRS-80,
1:26:03
these are all 8-bit machines. They're
1:26:06
running the Intel 8080 processor or
1:26:09
competitor making a similar
1:26:12
8-bit processor. The problem
1:26:14
with an 8-bit processor
1:26:17
is that the maximum data
1:26:20
size for a given instruction cycle
1:26:22
in the processor, this is called
1:26:24
a data word in computer
1:26:26
science terminology, is 256, 2
1:26:28
to the 8th. You can't represent any number greater than
1:26:33
256 in any given
1:26:35
CPU clock cycle in an 8-bit
1:26:38
machine. Right, it's effectively a bandwidth
1:26:40
limitation where if you're in a
1:26:42
single clock cycle trying to do
1:26:45
some particular instruction, it's a
1:26:47
very, very small amount of data that you
1:26:49
can move through the arithmetic logic unit or
1:26:51
that you can move through the processor in
1:26:53
that clock cycle. Totally, you can think of
1:26:55
it like an hourglass or something. There's like
1:26:57
all the data sitting there in memory at
1:26:59
the top of the hourglass and
1:27:02
then there's this small little funnel that it
1:27:04
goes through, that's the processor and then it
1:27:06
comes out. That's a good analogy. It's going
1:27:08
to take forever. Yeah, into the application of
1:27:11
software that the user sees. You're just not
1:27:13
really going to process it that fast. Very
1:27:15
primitive machines. Yes.
1:27:18
And so for a company like IBM,
1:27:20
they eclipsed the 8-bit computing
1:27:22
cycle a long, long, long
1:27:24
time ago. Mainframes, even mini
1:27:26
computers with DAC, all these
1:27:28
machines are at least 16-bit,
1:27:30
if not 32-bit computing
1:27:33
machines. So 8-bit is not
1:27:35
interesting. Which is why they only cost 375 bucks
1:27:37
or whatever for an Altair. Right. In late 1979,
1:27:39
Intel announces that they're coming
1:27:45
out with the 8086
1:27:48
processor, which is a 16-bit microprocessor.
1:27:50
With 16-bits, you
1:27:57
can really start to do some
1:27:59
damage here. in terms of the applications
1:28:01
that you could put on this thing to eat
1:28:03
into business software
1:28:05
use cases. In
1:28:07
16 bits, you can represent numbers up to
1:28:09
65,536. So
1:28:13
that's two to the 16th. You
1:28:15
can do interesting things passing 16
1:28:18
bits around at once. There's some really, really
1:28:20
fun aspects to this. If you
1:28:22
look at pictures of these processors,
1:28:25
what did the 8080, the 8-bit
1:28:27
processor look like? And
1:28:29
then you look at what did the 8086, the
1:28:31
16-bit processor look like? You can see this in
1:28:34
the 808 processor that's only 8 bits.
1:28:37
You see only nine pins coming off
1:28:39
of the little chip. There's
1:28:41
the eight pins for the data bits, and then I
1:28:43
think there's one more control pin. If
1:28:45
you look at the 8086 processor,
1:28:48
it's a much longer rectangle
1:28:50
with 16, 17, maybe 20 pins
1:28:54
coming off of it. You see this physically represented
1:28:56
in the chip. The further we get
1:28:58
in the computing world, the more abstract stuff
1:29:00
becomes. So it's always fun to go back
1:29:02
in history when these concepts were
1:29:04
so grounded in our physical reality that's
1:29:07
sort of easily observable since everything was
1:29:09
so much bigger too. Yeah.
1:29:12
Back to 1980. The 8086 has
1:29:15
been announced. 16-bit microprocessor
1:29:17
is coming. IBM
1:29:19
has already lived through
1:29:22
missing a computing expansion era
1:29:25
once with DEC and the mini
1:29:27
computing computer. They just
1:29:29
let DEC take that market. Of
1:29:31
course, that didn't really hurt IBM, but man,
1:29:34
it would have been nice to also have that
1:29:36
market too. And the thing that
1:29:38
they're observing about the microcomputer market is it's
1:29:41
exploding. People in our
1:29:43
industry know about DEC. People in the broader world
1:29:45
never knew about DEC. But
1:29:48
I think it's a very different
1:29:50
rate of adoption and rate of
1:29:52
demand with microcomputers where IBM
1:29:54
started to kind of look at
1:29:56
and go, oh, this might
1:29:59
be like a real market, like a really
1:30:01
big computer market for people.
1:30:04
They're finally observing the same thing that Bill
1:30:06
and Paul did, you know, all the way
1:30:08
back in the traffic data days of this
1:30:10
is an exponential cycle. Like
1:30:13
Moore's law, this is exponential, and
1:30:15
exponential gets real big very
1:30:17
quickly once you get a few years in. Yep.
1:30:20
And the mini computer cycle never was that. So
1:30:23
it's hard to remember today, but just to underscore
1:30:25
this again, in 1980, IBM was the most
1:30:28
valuable company in the entire world.
1:30:31
The highest market cap company, bigger
1:30:33
than all the oil companies in
1:30:35
1980. The
1:30:38
sun, the moon, and the stars. Yes.
1:30:41
Do you know what their market cap was? In
1:30:43
1980? $150
1:30:45
billion? You are
1:30:47
almost an order of magnitude off. $34
1:30:49
billion. That
1:30:52
was the most valuable company. It is wild
1:30:54
what a different world we live in today.
1:30:56
Yeah, even inflation adjusted. It's interesting that the
1:30:58
rate of growth of the most valuable companies
1:31:00
in the world in terms of
1:31:02
market cap has far outpaced inflation. So
1:31:05
that company, the most valuable in the world, they're
1:31:07
going to tiny little Microsoft that's just moved to
1:31:09
Seattle for this partnership. What's
1:31:11
going on here? So when
1:31:13
IBM decided, this is just
1:31:16
so amazing, like they deserve
1:31:18
so much credit here. They
1:31:21
got the Clay Christensen, disrupt
1:31:23
yourself, disruptive technology thing intuitively
1:31:25
decades before Clay writes any
1:31:28
of this stuff. The
1:31:30
way that they decide to compete is they're like, all
1:31:33
the things that Clay wrote about are
1:31:36
working against us here. What we need
1:31:38
to do is we need to create
1:31:40
essentially a skunkworks division, just like our
1:31:42
Lockheed episode. We need to do something
1:31:45
outside the company, completely removed from the
1:31:47
politics, sure, but like the business
1:31:49
incentives not to disrupt ourselves and
1:31:52
create a new division. They call it the
1:31:54
entry level systems division. Actually, it may have
1:31:56
existed before, but they repurpose it. This is
1:31:58
in Boca Raton. In Boca Raton. Florida. Very
1:32:00
nice place. We were just there a
1:32:02
couple months ago, but not a technology
1:32:04
hotbed in the world. And they
1:32:07
create a secret project called Project
1:32:09
Chess. Secret from the rest
1:32:11
of the company, the whole world. And
1:32:13
the goal is to develop the IBM
1:32:16
microcomputer or the personal
1:32:19
computer as people are starting to
1:32:21
refer to microcomputers. Yeah. And this
1:32:23
is wild. They're going to do
1:32:25
it in secret with a small
1:32:28
team with no other IBM resources.
1:32:30
And so that means this small
1:32:33
team, the only way they can do it is
1:32:35
to use all off the
1:32:37
shelf components from technology providers,
1:32:40
basically play on the same level
1:32:42
playing field as all the other
1:32:44
microcomputer manufacturers out there. And
1:32:47
oh, yeah, one more thing. IBM
1:32:49
leadership tells this team in Boca, they
1:32:52
have to ship the PC
1:32:54
to customers within one year.
1:32:56
It's a crazy constraint. Is
1:32:58
a total crazy constraint. A couple quotes
1:33:00
on this Don Estridge, who was one
1:33:02
of the leaders of Project Chess, he
1:33:04
would later say that the company realized
1:33:06
that if you're going to compete against
1:33:08
people who started in a garage, obviously
1:33:10
a reference to Apple here, you
1:33:13
have to start in a garage yourself. And
1:33:15
then Lou Gerstner, who later would take over IBM,
1:33:18
would describe this whole Boca
1:33:20
project as the way
1:33:22
you get an elephant to tap dance. And
1:33:25
the question is, are they
1:33:27
playing from behind and thus have to
1:33:29
adopt a flawed strategy? Or
1:33:31
is this strategy of assembling with all off
1:33:34
the shelf components actually a good strategy if
1:33:36
it works? Hmm. Well, let's
1:33:38
tell the story and then come back to it.
1:33:40
Great. Okay. So what do they do? The
1:33:43
hardware aspect of this is trivial,
1:33:46
basically. Hell, Ed Roberts could put
1:33:48
together the hardware to sell a
1:33:50
microcomputer and do this deal with
1:33:52
Intel. I think IBM can do
1:33:55
a deal with Intel. Not
1:33:57
necessarily trickier, but
1:33:59
the The more important part is
1:34:01
the software. And thanks to
1:34:03
Bill's genius strategy about be the volume
1:34:05
player, don't optimize on per unit price,
1:34:07
set the standards out there. They were
1:34:10
like the world's leading provider of programming
1:34:12
language interpreters, right? A hundred percent. There
1:34:14
is one game in town and one
1:34:16
game in town only, and that is
1:34:19
Microsoft in Bellevue, Washington at this
1:34:21
point in time. Now interpreters are
1:34:23
notably different than operating systems, but
1:34:26
Microsoft definitely had sort of raised the
1:34:28
flag and everyone could see if I
1:34:30
want to go buy software for my computers,
1:34:32
broadly, they're an interesting group to talk to.
1:34:34
Oh, yeah, obviously operating systems are going to
1:34:36
become really, really big here in just a
1:34:39
sec. But again, the
1:34:41
8-bit generation operating systems weren't that important because
1:34:43
people were writing their own software. The
1:34:46
standardized software packaged application software
1:34:48
doesn't happen until the 16-bit
1:34:51
era and the IBM PC.
1:34:53
So that's why the basic, the interpreter is
1:34:55
so important. So what happens? IBM
1:34:58
calls up Bill Gates and by August 1980, the two
1:35:00
companies are in serious talks to partner
1:35:06
and work together on the IBM PC. And
1:35:08
we referenced Steve Bomer a minute ago. The
1:35:11
timing is just crazy. Steve had just joined the company
1:35:13
in June, the first time he had
1:35:15
ever met a company. Which
1:35:18
is crazy. Steve had just joined the
1:35:20
company in June of 1980. He's
1:35:24
employee number 30. The Microsoft
1:35:26
team of 30, which the whole
1:35:28
company of Microsoft pivots to like
1:35:30
work on the IBM PC partnership
1:35:32
is bigger than the project
1:35:35
chess team in Boca. It's
1:35:38
amazing. Wow. So okay,
1:35:40
Bill has just convinced Steve to drop out of
1:35:42
business school at Stanford and come help
1:35:45
him and Paul run the company. So
1:35:47
Microsoft at this point in time is still a partnership.
1:35:50
Steve is the first person besides
1:35:53
Bill and Paul to get equity in
1:35:55
the company when he joins and
1:35:57
it's eight and a half percent and it's a handshake.
1:36:00
at this point. Yes, Bill really, really
1:36:02
wanted to bring Steve on, knew
1:36:04
him from the Harvard days, knew
1:36:06
what an asset he could be. He is
1:36:09
the end of Bill Yang. Yes. And so I
1:36:11
mean, frankly, eight and a half percent, it's a
1:36:13
big grant. Who's out there
1:36:15
running a 30 person company, and you're giving
1:36:17
away eight and a half percent slugs? It
1:36:20
just doesn't happen. Those are founder shares. And this
1:36:22
is really a sort of reflection that the way
1:36:24
that Bill thought about Steve was as a founder.
1:36:27
In fact, it created some tension with Paul Allen,
1:36:29
where Bill asked Paul if they could go to
1:36:31
5%. Paul said, Sure. And then Bill actually offered
1:36:33
him eight and a half percent. And Paul got
1:36:35
upset and Bill said, I'll eat the three and
1:36:37
a half percent, it can come out of my
1:36:39
share because I want him that bad. But
1:36:42
he's the perfect person for this point
1:36:44
in time. Bill was like the only
1:36:46
salesperson doing these OEM deals. Now
1:36:48
they're dealing with IBM, they're entering the enterprise
1:36:50
world, this needs to be a real business.
1:36:53
Yes. So back to the IBM
1:36:55
negotiations. Obviously, Microsoft is
1:36:58
very interested. IBM is not
1:37:00
just very interested in working with Microsoft, they
1:37:02
have to work with Microsoft. They're the only
1:37:04
game in town. Yes. And specifically, they asked
1:37:06
Microsoft for programming languages. They're like, we're making
1:37:09
this great PC, we're gonna need a basic,
1:37:11
we think you guys are working on a
1:37:13
cobalt, we'd like some cobalt. Yeah, Fortran, like
1:37:15
give us the whole thing. And
1:37:17
there's some debate on whether it was the
1:37:19
Microsoft side or the IBM side that really
1:37:21
saw the vision of, hey, the 16 bit
1:37:23
generation is going to enable real business
1:37:26
software use cases on the personal computer.
1:37:28
But it doesn't matter.
1:37:30
That's the plan here. And that is absolutely
1:37:32
what happens. So these initial
1:37:35
discussions, right, are for the
1:37:37
programming language, Microsoft doesn't make an operating
1:37:39
system at this point, because in the
1:37:41
eight bit generation, the operating system, I
1:37:44
think was kind of like a glorified bootloader
1:37:47
to just get into the programming environment so
1:37:49
that you could either write
1:37:51
or load up the basic programs that
1:37:53
Microsoft was going to interpret and then
1:37:55
run. And in the
1:37:57
eight bit generation, most if not
1:37:59
all. all hardware
1:38:01
providers of microcomputers
1:38:04
just wrote their own operating system. So yeah, this wasn't
1:38:06
a big deal. Now, there
1:38:08
was one off the
1:38:10
shelf operating system out there from
1:38:13
a company called Digital Research,
1:38:15
which was run by Gary Kildall, who
1:38:18
I think as we talked about earlier, Bill
1:38:20
and Paul had actually intersected with back in Seattle.
1:38:23
Yep, I think they were reasonably friendly. Yeah,
1:38:25
I think they were quite friendly because they
1:38:27
partnered. You know, you needed the operating system
1:38:29
to get into the programming environment. It wasn't
1:38:31
that big a deal. And so, yeah, whenever
1:38:34
anybody needed one off the shelf, Bill
1:38:36
and Microsoft would just refer people over
1:38:38
to digital to get it. Yep, CPM,
1:38:41
right? Exactly, CPM, CP slash M, which
1:38:43
I think is maybe control program for
1:38:45
microprocessors, I think is the abbreviation there.
1:38:48
God, they were so bad. Every single
1:38:50
thing that's been named to this point,
1:38:53
except for the company Microsoft, was a horrible
1:38:55
name. Oh, the processor is 8008, and
1:38:58
now it's 8080, but
1:39:00
the machine is 8800 that
1:39:02
the processor is inside. Give
1:39:04
me a break, everyone. It's horrible
1:39:06
naming. Bill, and
1:39:09
I'm sure Paul too, but Bill is the
1:39:11
only person in this industry that has the
1:39:13
vision for what this can
1:39:15
become. Even Intel, and you know, Bill talks about
1:39:17
this. He doesn't think that
1:39:19
Intel even realizes what's happening here. They're
1:39:22
just like, oh, we're just making more chips, you
1:39:24
know, and like people use them for stuff. Yeah,
1:39:26
it does seem like very few people are thinking
1:39:29
about their products as something
1:39:31
they really need to build a brand around
1:39:33
with consumers, yes, hence the naming
1:39:35
schemes. Okay, so the IBM
1:39:37
Microsoft discussions are going along, and IBM's like,
1:39:40
oh, hey, yeah, we need an operating system.
1:39:43
So Bill, I
1:39:45
think from everything we've read and folks we've talked to,
1:39:48
kind of in good faith just does the standard
1:39:50
thing he's always done in these situations. He's like,
1:39:52
oh yeah, go talk to Gary. Go talk to
1:39:54
digital research. He
1:39:57
can probably do that. Right, we don't have an operating system, so this
1:39:59
guy does. So what
1:40:01
happens next is unclear.
1:40:05
But what is clear is
1:40:07
however it goes down, this is one of if
1:40:09
not the biggest business blunder
1:40:11
in history. IBM,
1:40:15
that team from Project Chess, flies
1:40:17
down I think directly from Seattle and talking with
1:40:19
Bill and Steve to Monterey, California,
1:40:21
where digital research is based at this
1:40:24
point, to meet with Gary
1:40:26
and his wife, Dorothy, who run the business
1:40:28
together. And Bill's called them, he's like, hey,
1:40:31
got a big OEM client, coming down,
1:40:33
needs an operating system. And
1:40:35
he signed hefty, hefty NDAs, so he cannot
1:40:37
say who it is. But he's like, you
1:40:39
really should take this seriously. Right.
1:40:42
So the team comes down, obviously they show up there from IBM.
1:40:46
There's a big snafu where Gary
1:40:49
does not attend the meeting. And
1:40:51
there's conflicting reports about what happened. Wasn't
1:40:54
one of them that he's out flying
1:40:56
an airplane? Yeah, so I'm pretty sure
1:40:58
he was flying his personal airplane while
1:41:00
this happens. Some reports are
1:41:02
he was just out joyriding and missed it.
1:41:05
Some reports are, no, he was like on a
1:41:07
business trip, knew it was happening, but he had
1:41:10
another important business meeting and he didn't know that
1:41:12
this was IBM that was coming. Regardless,
1:41:15
it doesn't really matter because IBM
1:41:17
just wants the operating system. Dorothy
1:41:21
does meet with them. She's unwilling
1:41:23
to sign their NDA. There's
1:41:25
a lawyer from digital research who gets involved and
1:41:27
he doesn't really understand what's going on. The
1:41:30
punchline is that IBM sort
1:41:33
of leaves this interaction with
1:41:35
the belief that Gary and digital
1:41:37
research aren't up for working with
1:41:40
them and aren't capable
1:41:42
of producing here. And producing
1:41:44
is important because it's not like the
1:41:47
existing CPM OS that they made
1:41:49
would work here. They
1:41:51
would have to write a new version,
1:41:53
a 16-bit version. Yes, and they hadn't
1:41:55
done that yet. And in particular, they
1:41:57
would have to do some customizing. Part
1:42:00
of what IBM wants is a customized
1:42:02
version of an operating system for the
1:42:04
IBM PC. They don't want this to
1:42:06
be fully off the shelf. Yes.
1:42:10
And just to add one more stir
1:42:12
the pot of history here, there is another
1:42:14
version of this story where
1:42:16
Gary does actually have a conversation
1:42:18
with IBM and it
1:42:20
blows up over licensing terms that
1:42:23
what Gary really wants is a
1:42:25
significant royalty of every IBM
1:42:27
PC sold and IBM walks over that.
1:42:30
So whether that happened or whether it's just
1:42:32
an NDA issue, either way, I think we
1:42:34
all know the IBM PC did not end
1:42:37
up running the CPM operating system. Oh,
1:42:39
that's amazing. I didn't know that. We'll talk
1:42:42
about that when we get to the business
1:42:44
terms of the Microsoft IBM deal in a
1:42:46
minute. Yes. But for the moment,
1:42:48
there's no deal yet because an operating
1:42:51
system needs to be provided here.
1:42:53
So IBM goes back to Microsoft and they're like, hey, this
1:42:56
guy you referred us to ain't going
1:42:58
to work. The way that I
1:43:00
read some quotes from the IBM people here
1:43:02
were like, we just threw the problem back
1:43:04
in Microsoft's lap of you guys deal with
1:43:06
this, you source an operating system. Yep. Well,
1:43:10
I'd like to say that Bill and Steve
1:43:12
and Microsoft, you don't need to give them
1:43:14
an opportunity twice. In this case, you kind
1:43:16
of did need to give them an opportunity
1:43:18
twice because they almost flubbed it and
1:43:20
sent IBM down to see Gary. This
1:43:23
time they don't flub it. They're like, okay, we'll
1:43:25
get you an operating system. And
1:43:27
so enter Seattle computer
1:43:29
products. Yes. So it just
1:43:31
so happens that right down the road from
1:43:33
Microsoft in the Seattle area, I
1:43:36
think they, despite being named Seattle computer
1:43:38
products, I think this company was actually
1:43:40
based in Tukwila, Washington. A
1:43:42
programmer named Tim Patterson
1:43:45
had just written a 16 bit
1:43:47
operating system for the 8086
1:43:50
that Intel had just announced. And
1:43:52
he was calling it the quick and dirty 16
1:43:55
bit operating system or QDAS
1:43:57
for short. and
1:44:00
had it ready to go. Now, why had
1:44:03
he written this? What was this company Seattle Computer
1:44:05
Products? Why did they have an operating system? They
1:44:08
were a component provider to
1:44:11
microcomputer manufacturers. They
1:44:13
essentially made motherboards. And
1:44:16
so when Intel now has announced this
1:44:18
new 16-bit processor generation that they're coming
1:44:20
out with, well, Seattle
1:44:22
Computer Products, they wanna sell motherboards and
1:44:25
have them ready for 16-bit. They
1:44:28
kinda need to test and play around with these things. And
1:44:31
their customers are asking for it. So they
1:44:33
had been going to Kildall and Digital Research
1:44:35
too and badgering them to like, hey, write
1:44:37
the 16-bit version of CPM. And
1:44:40
Gary just didn't. So Tim's
1:44:42
like, fine, I'll do a quick and
1:44:44
dirty version myself. Amazing. And thus DOS
1:44:46
is born. Incredible. Which of
1:44:48
course later they would drop the queue
1:44:50
and call it DOS, the Disk
1:44:53
Operating System. Something about dirty
1:44:55
didn't have a ring to it when you're selling it to
1:44:57
IBM. No, no, no, no, no, no.
1:45:00
So Bill and Paul and Microsoft, they've learned
1:45:02
about this. They know Seattle Computer Products. They know Rod
1:45:04
Brock, who's the guy who owns the company. They get
1:45:06
in touch with him and they say, hey,
1:45:09
can we license QDOS from you and
1:45:11
Tim? We've got a big OEM customer
1:45:13
that wants a 16-bit operating
1:45:16
system. So they worked out
1:45:18
a deal whereby Microsoft pays Seattle Computer
1:45:20
Products $25,000 for
1:45:23
the rights to adapt and sell
1:45:25
QDOS to the one unnamed
1:45:28
original equipment manufacturer who they're working
1:45:30
with. Tim actually,
1:45:33
he's jazzed about this. He ends
1:45:35
up leaving SCP Computer Products and joining
1:45:37
Microsoft. And so he, with the rest of
1:45:39
the team, he's part of building DOS, taking
1:45:41
his initial work and turning it into real
1:45:43
DOS. Later on, before
1:45:45
this all gets announced
1:45:47
and the PC chips, Microsoft would pay
1:45:50
Seattle Computer Products another $50,000 for
1:45:53
full rights to own 86QDOS, sell
1:45:57
and license it to anybody else indefinitely.
1:46:00
So I believe the total amount of
1:46:02
dollars that change hands here is $75,000.
1:46:06
Unbelievable. This is DOS.
1:46:09
Now, look, one programmer
1:46:11
wrote a, quote, quick and dirty
1:46:14
operating system, and Microsoft bought the
1:46:16
license to that and adapted it
1:46:18
into DOS. Tim,
1:46:20
when he was at Seattle Computer Products,
1:46:22
definitely did not write DOS as DOS
1:46:24
becomes. It's not like Microsoft bought
1:46:26
all of DOS for $75,000. They did a
1:46:28
lot of work on it. But
1:46:30
yeah, this is how it all goes down. So
1:46:33
Microsoft would eventually generate
1:46:36
billions of dollars on
1:46:39
DOS-based products. Now, you're
1:46:41
exactly right in the same way that
1:46:43
Instagram today is a much
1:46:46
different code base than Instagram and much larger code
1:46:48
base than Instagram when it was purchased. But
1:46:50
my God, $75,000 to buy DOS to get this
1:46:53
whole thing started. I
1:46:58
mean, until Windows 95,
1:47:01
all of the Windows operating systems were
1:47:03
DOS-based. It's just crazy. I mean, it
1:47:06
really illustrates how fast things were moving,
1:47:08
how much all this was getting invented
1:47:10
and discovered real time that even
1:47:13
to this point, Bill Gates isn't thinking that
1:47:15
operating systems are that important. This
1:47:17
is just a shortcut to get the deal done with IBM
1:47:20
to make it happen. Yep. Also,
1:47:22
David, I got to say, I just looked it up. The
1:47:25
address of Seattle Computer Products
1:47:28
on the original business card for
1:47:30
Seattle Computer Products, where I presume
1:47:33
QDOS was written, the space
1:47:35
is available. So I know
1:47:37
where our next studio needs to be.
1:47:40
And it's in Tequilla? And it's in Tequilla. All
1:47:42
right, well, the rent can't be like that
1:47:44
expensive then. So like, let's do it. Correct.
1:47:46
Hell yeah. Well,
1:47:50
you know, we've been joking for years about making
1:47:52
the acquired museum. We might have
1:47:54
a location. Okay,
1:47:57
so now that we've got the operating system.
1:48:00
They've got. To dass
1:48:02
das. In. Place to licensed I
1:48:04
B M. The. Only thing that
1:48:06
is left. To. Formalize the
1:48:08
partnership is. The. Business terms.
1:48:11
And. Ben. Affleck he
1:48:14
said is. right? About the
1:48:16
Gary killed All I B
1:48:18
M negotiations. This. Is
1:48:20
just a masterstroke from. Bill.
1:48:23
Here in the licensing with I B
1:48:25
M. Yeah. Because there's to really
1:48:27
really big levers that it looks like
1:48:29
Bill is giving big time on one
1:48:31
of them, but he is winning big
1:48:33
time on the other one. What
1:48:36
Are they? So. The one
1:48:38
that it looks like he's giving on. His.
1:48:41
He. Does another fixed cost O
1:48:43
E M deal with I B
1:48:45
M? Yes, so this is in
1:48:48
Paul Allen's memoir. I B M
1:48:50
paid Microsoft Seventy five thousand dollars
1:48:52
for testing and consultation. Thirty Five
1:48:54
thousand dollars for dos. Forty.
1:48:57
Three hundred and Ten thousand dollars
1:49:00
for an array of sixteen bit
1:49:02
language interpreters and compilers, So all
1:49:04
told, bundled together. that is Four
1:49:06
hundred and Thirty thousand dollars. Six
1:49:09
that I B M paid Microsoft
1:49:11
with no ongoing obligation. Yes,
1:49:13
No. Per. Copy
1:49:16
Royalties. Yes. Every copy
1:49:18
of Dos. That. I
1:49:20
B M cells either included as
1:49:23
part of systems that they're selling
1:49:25
or their free the charge independently
1:49:27
for dos. Whatever amount they want,
1:49:30
Microsoft gets zero dollars. At.
1:49:32
If it's true that this is where
1:49:34
things fell apart with their killed all
1:49:36
crazy the bill is willing to do
1:49:38
this. and you might say what didn't
1:49:40
fill? Learned his lesson. Why would he
1:49:42
ever agree to this. On. One hand,
1:49:45
this is what he was doing with Apple and
1:49:47
others he was doing these fixed costs deals You
1:49:49
think like man, I B M like this is
1:49:51
the time people are going to pirate I B
1:49:54
M software. Now's the time to really grab the
1:49:56
money bags. But Bill saw something that no one
1:49:58
else did. In it. The things I
1:50:00
don't have. It was directly in exchange in
1:50:03
the negotiations, but the other lever that he
1:50:05
saw that he pulled. Was.
1:50:08
Microsoft. Retained.
1:50:11
The. Rights. To dos
1:50:13
and to own their languages. And.
1:50:16
License it and them to
1:50:18
anyone else they wanted at
1:50:20
any price on any terms.
1:50:22
It's so interesting because what ended
1:50:25
up happening? that Bill Gates masterminded.
1:50:27
Was. Once we distribute
1:50:30
are operating system through I
1:50:32
B M T Seats, that's
1:50:34
going to become the thing
1:50:36
everyone buys and now in
1:50:38
the sixteen bit generation when
1:50:40
there are people building programs
1:50:42
for computers, not just developers,
1:50:45
Once those application developers who
1:50:47
are writing programs are targeting
1:50:49
an operating system. Then.
1:50:52
That is the operating system that
1:50:54
every other oh iam, every other computer
1:50:57
maker is also going to want and
1:50:59
really need and we're gonna be the
1:51:01
ones that they have to come to
1:51:04
to buy it. and I can't figure
1:51:06
out. Did I B M
1:51:08
miss this? Sacked. Or. Did
1:51:10
they know it? Basically what I
1:51:12
B M did was they were in
1:51:14
the one place where every business needed
1:51:17
to go for their computer needs and
1:51:19
what they did in this negotiations was
1:51:21
they actually handed that over to Microsoft
1:51:23
and they said we are going to
1:51:25
become a commodities just like every other
1:51:27
hardware manufacturer and you are going to
1:51:30
be the point of integration for the
1:51:32
whole ecosystem. You're going to be the
1:51:34
linchpin that everyone has to target for
1:51:36
their applications. So. I think there's
1:51:38
two things going on here, one small
1:51:41
and one bit. The small thing is
1:51:43
actually related all the way back to
1:51:45
the beginning of the episode. What you
1:51:47
Said Ben about the antitrust concerns with
1:51:49
an I B M to hear them.
1:51:52
Say. If they actually didn't
1:51:54
want. ownership of the software they
1:51:56
wanted it to be separate because it would
1:51:58
start on what fellow cause And they have
1:52:00
the sort of plausible deniability of how could
1:52:02
we possibly have a monopoly? We're buying off
1:52:04
the shelf. Part of an ecosystem,
1:52:07
blah, blah, blah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah. From
1:52:09
a vendor who can sell to anybody else. We have no lock-in. And
1:52:11
that may well be true. I think the bigger
1:52:13
thing that just wasn't in their
1:52:16
consideration or mindset was they,
1:52:20
I think, assumed that
1:52:22
once they entered the PC
1:52:25
market, IBM was
1:52:27
going to be the dominant player.
1:52:30
So it didn't matter. Once IBM is selling
1:52:32
PCs, who's going to buy a PC from anybody
1:52:35
else? IBM is going to win this market. Just
1:52:37
like they have in every other line of business
1:52:39
they've been in. And what Bill saw was he
1:52:41
really made a bet that the same dynamics that
1:52:43
played out with the Altair were also going to
1:52:46
play out with the IBM PC. That
1:52:48
there would be a million hardware
1:52:51
manufacturers, flowers blooming here. Building
1:52:53
to the same spec. And building to
1:52:55
the same spec. Using the same processor.
1:52:58
Which of course they could because it was
1:53:00
all off the shelf components. And
1:53:03
IBM either didn't see or didn't believe
1:53:05
that that would actually happen.
1:53:07
IBM failed to see the value
1:53:10
of software. And they certainly
1:53:12
failed to understand what a
1:53:15
software platform business model would
1:53:17
be. Which makes sense. I
1:53:19
mean, why would they? Right. It's
1:53:21
almost like their experience. They are the computing company. Yes. Their
1:53:24
experience in selling mainframes with everything bundled
1:53:27
in was the wrong
1:53:29
experience to go off of in
1:53:31
understanding the way the future would
1:53:33
unfold. And Bill's very modest
1:53:35
experience watching the Altair and all these
1:53:38
sort of Altair clone type machines. Or
1:53:40
even if they're not Altair clones, just
1:53:42
more microcomputers that need more software.
1:53:46
That actually was the useful experience
1:53:48
to pattern match off of what
1:53:50
does the world of microcomputers look
1:53:52
like and how is that fundamentally
1:53:54
different than the world of mainframes.
1:53:57
Totally. And in a way that
1:53:59
the minicomputers generally... The reason, like we've been saying
1:54:01
like a have to enter isn't it wasn't It
1:54:03
wasn't actually fundamentally that difference. Other. Than. Deck.
1:54:06
Gained a foothold. Yeah, the deal
1:54:08
the Bill Gates made with I B
1:54:10
M C I B M P C
1:54:12
is the greatest deal in at least
1:54:15
computer industry history, if not all business
1:54:17
history. Full stop, right? So. Let's say
1:54:19
a little bit about why. I mean maybe it's obvious been
1:54:21
here now as I B M most valuable company in the
1:54:23
world. They're. Gonna come out
1:54:25
with the Pc platform. They are going
1:54:27
to build the market. And.
1:54:30
Microsoft. Is gonna own the
1:54:33
Linchpin sorted. Hamilton Helmet terms like
1:54:35
where the power is in the Martha and they're
1:54:37
going to be free. To. Licensees or whatever
1:54:39
terms they want to any other player who wants to
1:54:41
enter. So. They signed this agreement
1:54:43
in November nineteen eighty. The. I
1:54:45
B M P C Sips in August
1:54:48
Nineteen Eighty One. Just incredible. Not exactly
1:54:50
a year. A little more than a
1:54:52
year. from the time projects test starts
1:54:54
to where they actually sip the Pc
1:54:56
mean truly incredible. They upon us. Truly
1:54:59
incredible. It changes the world plated over
1:55:01
that sort of raping disabling everything that
1:55:03
everybody's imaginings happens. I B M was
1:55:05
right that it was by far and
1:55:07
away the most successful person computer on
1:55:09
the market as soon as they released
1:55:12
it. Totally. They sell thirteen thousand, five
1:55:14
hundred Ib and Pcs within. The first
1:55:16
couple months after they announce it,
1:55:18
over the next two years they
1:55:20
sell half a million of them,
1:55:22
make them unquestionably the largest personal
1:55:24
computer micro computer manufacturer Market leader.
1:55:26
Everybody, it I B M is
1:55:28
celebrating. the clones haven't arrived yet
1:55:30
and maybe they won't play out
1:55:32
like the think it's he Not
1:55:34
exactly. Now. Before we talked about
1:55:36
the clones, This. Is really just
1:55:38
a footnote because of course. ah, the
1:55:41
incentives are aligned for I B M
1:55:43
to push Das as the operating system
1:55:45
for the Pc. I mean, they've. Done.
1:55:47
This whole deal with Microsoft. They have
1:55:49
a royalty free to deal with them.
1:55:52
When. They wants the Pc.
1:55:55
Customers actually have a choice.
1:55:58
Of Wit operating system. they
1:56:00
want on their IBM PC. They
1:56:02
don't have to go with DOS. Consumers
1:56:05
can choose between DOS,
1:56:08
16-bit CPM. By this point in time, Gary
1:56:10
and digital research have gotten their act together.
1:56:12
They've written a 16-bit version of the CPM
1:56:14
operating system. Or another 16-bit operating
1:56:17
system called Pascal that came out of the
1:56:19
University of California at San Diego. And
1:56:23
the price sheet for the operating system
1:56:25
option is Pascal is an
1:56:27
extra $450 with your IBM
1:56:30
PC. CPM is
1:56:33
an extra $175 with your
1:56:35
IBM PC. And DOS,
1:56:38
which was developed specifically for the PC, is the
1:56:40
best way to run it, is only $60. So
1:56:42
IBM is making $60 a full
1:56:44
100% margin
1:56:48
on top of their hardware for the PC by selling
1:56:50
DOS because they don't have to pay Microsoft any of
1:56:52
that. And they've set up the
1:56:54
incentives that like, obviously, everybody's going to choose DOS.
1:56:56
It's fascinating. And you know what,
1:56:59
to give them a little bit more
1:57:01
credit to, they did try to enforce
1:57:03
that there's some amount of lock-in to
1:57:05
the IBM PC. And they do that
1:57:07
in two ways. One is worth
1:57:10
simplifying and calling it DOS. It was
1:57:12
PC DOS, which is different than MS
1:57:14
DOS, which would get licensed to other
1:57:16
computer makers. I don't know
1:57:18
exactly what happened, but it basically seems
1:57:21
like it just wasn't different enough to
1:57:23
be meaningful to application developers. So that's
1:57:25
one piece of it. The second is,
1:57:28
IBM did actually have
1:57:30
proprietary BIOS. So
1:57:33
that was another part where they kind of
1:57:35
thought that that might provide them some protection
1:57:37
where they could stay a linchpin in the
1:57:39
ecosystem. And it wasn't just all
1:57:42
off the shelf. They actually did have something
1:57:44
that was theirs that was proprietary. It
1:57:46
just turned out that the effort required
1:57:48
to reverse engineer the IBM BIOS
1:57:51
was trivial, basically. Oh,
1:57:53
do you know the story of the compact BIOS? Ooh,
1:57:56
well, I know the compact story, but I don't know
1:57:58
the story of the BIOS specifically. significantly enlighten us.
1:58:01
It is basically why Compaq worked
1:58:03
is what it comes down to.
1:58:06
So Compaq was formed basically
1:58:08
to clone the IBM PC. They
1:58:10
saw the market opportunity and
1:58:12
they realized they could buy from all the same equipment
1:58:14
vendors. So let's go eat their margin
1:58:16
is basically the plan. However,
1:58:19
the one thing that was not off the
1:58:21
shelf is the BIOS, the basic input output
1:58:24
system, which is effectively the thing that decides
1:58:26
to load the operating system when you turn
1:58:28
the machine on. And so there's some proprietary
1:58:31
magic that happens to call upon the operating
1:58:33
system to do its thing. So
1:58:36
Compaq reverse engineered the
1:58:38
BIOS and the
1:58:40
way that they did it was very
1:58:43
similar to Trip Hawkins and the story
1:58:45
that he told us about his reverse
1:58:47
engineering at Electronic Arts. Of
1:58:49
the Sega Genesis. Yes. So Compaq
1:58:52
had two engineers and
1:58:54
one engineer went in
1:58:57
and fully dissected the
1:58:59
code for the IBM
1:59:02
PC BIOS and basically
1:59:04
saw all the proprietary calls
1:59:07
that it made and documented
1:59:09
each of those calls without
1:59:11
writing the implementation steps. Then
1:59:14
he handed, hey, here's what
1:59:16
the BIOS needs to interface with over to
1:59:18
the other engineer and the other engineer on
1:59:21
their own just went through and thought of an implementation
1:59:24
and they have no idea if it's
1:59:26
the same implementation. So it's not breaking
1:59:28
any sort of infringement. They're basically saying,
1:59:30
I'm just seeing the requirements for this
1:59:33
product and I'm coming up with my
1:59:35
own implementation of that product. They
1:59:37
basically figured out how to
1:59:40
exactly clone the IBM PC
1:59:42
and buy the very same
1:59:44
operating system and to go
1:59:46
back to quoting Ben Thompson because this is
1:59:48
from his great piece again. The result was
1:59:50
a company that came to dominate the market.
1:59:53
Compaq was the fastest startup to ever hit
1:59:55
100 million in revenue than the youngest firm
1:59:57
to break into the Fortune 500. then
2:00:00
the fastest company to hit a billion
2:00:02
in revenue. And by 1994, Compaq was
2:00:04
the largest PC maker in the world.
2:00:07
The Compaq story is amazing.
2:00:09
So the three people who start
2:00:11
Compaq in 1982 are
2:00:14
actually Texas Instruments engineers who
2:00:16
left and they wanted to start a company. And
2:00:19
I believe as the legend goes, they were like trying
2:00:21
to decide what to start. They were
2:00:23
considering like a restaurant chain and like
2:00:25
a bunch of different business ideas. And
2:00:28
then the IBM PC comes out at
2:00:30
the end of 1981 and
2:00:33
they're like, oh, we
2:00:36
can clone this and do everything, the story you
2:00:38
just told. So yeah, it's wild. They start the
2:00:40
company in 1982 and within the first year, they
2:00:44
do 111 million dollars of revenue of
2:00:48
selling IBM PC clone hardware. Is it
2:00:51
just cheaper? Like basically this is the
2:00:53
IBM PC, but for less money? Yes,
2:00:55
exactly. Same thing, cheaper. And so begins
2:00:57
the race to the bottom of PC
2:01:00
hardware. Completely undifferentiated, all the value accrues
2:01:02
to the software layer. Totally.
2:01:04
Compaq went public the very next year in
2:01:06
1983. Well
2:01:08
before Microsoft, which is funny. But yeah, Compaq,
2:01:10
all these other clone companies that get started,
2:01:13
Microsoft licenses DOS to
2:01:16
all of them, importantly, critically,
2:01:19
on a per machine sold
2:01:22
basis. This is when
2:01:24
they grab the money. The operating
2:01:26
system is so deeply embedded and
2:01:29
needs to get shipped with the
2:01:31
computer itself. Yeah, consumers can go
2:01:33
buy operating systems to upgrade and
2:01:35
whatnot, but no hardware manufacturer is
2:01:37
gonna ship a 16-bit PC without
2:01:40
an operating system. So piracy
2:01:42
is not an issue here. Microsoft
2:01:45
can now do a per copy
2:01:47
sold, per machine sold license
2:01:49
with all these clones. My
2:01:51
God, it's just like a geyser of
2:01:53
money. Microsoft use IBM to generate demand
2:01:56
for their software and then they used
2:01:58
every other PC manufacturer to... capture
2:02:00
the value that all that demand
2:02:02
created. Yeah. So I think
2:02:05
I have these numbers and timeframes right. I believe
2:02:07
that for calendar year 1982, Microsoft's
2:02:11
revenue was $25 million. And
2:02:14
I think this must have been when they switched to
2:02:17
fiscal year end and June 30th. So
2:02:19
Microsoft's fiscal year end starting
2:02:21
then and up through now is June 30th. So
2:02:24
their fiscal 1984, so the year ended June 30th
2:02:30
it's 1984, so 1983 midpoint to 1984 midpoint. Microsoft
2:02:35
does $98 million. In
2:02:37
an 18 month period from the end of 1982, they
2:02:40
go from 25 to 98. It's
2:02:42
all on the back of the clones. And
2:02:45
unlike Compaq that, you know, yeah, they
2:02:47
did 111 million of revenue their first
2:02:49
year. They're selling hardware, which has serious
2:02:52
cogs associated with it. Microsoft,
2:02:55
100% essentially gross margin. Software
2:03:00
revenue, more than doubling
2:03:02
year on year. I
2:03:04
mean, it's the best business of all
2:03:07
time. Yes. And they combined two magical
2:03:09
principles together. This infinite replicatability, zero marginal
2:03:11
costs of software and becoming
2:03:13
the linchpin of the ecosystem. They are now
2:03:15
the software that everyone needs to target, which
2:03:17
gives them pricing power. Totally. So
2:03:19
that pricing power raises your top line and
2:03:22
you have no costs. It's
2:03:24
unbelievable. So meanwhile, in
2:03:26
the computing industry background,
2:03:29
while all this is going on with the launch of
2:03:31
the IBM PC and then the clones, Apple
2:03:35
had gone public at the end of 1980 in
2:03:38
I think the biggest and most
2:03:40
successful IPO of all time at that
2:03:42
point. Remember we talked about Genentech on
2:03:44
the Novo Nordisk episode. They went public like right
2:03:47
before Apple and then Apple was bigger. So
2:03:50
they're valued at $1.8 billion at IPO. Steve
2:03:54
Jobs is this multi-hundred millionaire,
2:03:56
like media darling, all this
2:03:58
stuff. The next. year in
2:04:00
1981, Microsoft reorganizes
2:04:03
from the partnership
2:04:05
between Bill and Paul with the handshake deal
2:04:07
that Steve's going to be cutting in on
2:04:09
the partnership into a stock company,
2:04:11
a C corporation. And as
2:04:14
part of doing that, the venture firm
2:04:16
Technology Venture Investors, or TVI, invests $1
2:04:18
million, I believe, for 5% of the
2:04:20
company? Yup.
2:04:24
This is crazy. That's a $20 million
2:04:26
post money valuation. So one on 20 post
2:04:28
when Microsoft is doing how much in revenue?
2:04:31
That year, they did $17 million in revenue,
2:04:33
and they're about to do the IBM
2:04:35
deal. This is absolutely
2:04:37
absurd. It says a
2:04:40
lot about this period of time that you
2:04:42
could do a 1x revenue deal in
2:04:45
a high margin software company. I actually
2:04:48
don't think this shows
2:04:50
a weakness in Microsoft. Oh, they didn't have leverage
2:04:52
or something like that. That wasn't it at all.
2:04:54
It was just the deals sucked. Yeah.
2:04:57
Venture capital sucked back then.
2:04:59
Yes. There's no other way to put it. Now, you
2:05:01
know, it's only 5%. So good
2:05:03
on Microsoft. Spoiler alert, this is the
2:05:06
only dilution that they would ever take.
2:05:08
So that's also extremely different than today.
2:05:10
But yes, a $20 million
2:05:12
valuation at this stage is
2:05:15
frankly ludicrous. You know, even
2:05:17
among people who should be in the know, the
2:05:21
beauty of the software business model still is
2:05:23
something people don't understand. That's exactly right. The
2:05:25
hotness is the hardware. It's like Apple just
2:05:27
IPO'd Apple's worth $1.8 billion. Like, ooh,
2:05:30
that's the industry. Ooh, it's IBM, etc,
2:05:32
etc. When Microsoft itself
2:05:34
would go public a few years later
2:05:36
in 1986, they actually
2:05:39
go public the same week that they moved to the
2:05:41
big campus in Redmond where they are to this day,
2:05:43
their market cap at IPO is only $750 million. Despite
2:05:46
having done
2:05:49
$200 million of very high margin software
2:05:51
revenue in the trailing 12 months up
2:05:53
to that growing 100% year over year.
2:05:55
It's insane. Hey, that's Forex multiple expansion
2:05:57
off the last time they raised money.
2:05:59
money. Right.
2:06:02
But it's just crazy that
2:06:05
people don't yet appreciate the
2:06:07
power. So Bill Gates and
2:06:09
Warren Buffett did a conversation at the
2:06:11
University of Washington in 1998. So this
2:06:13
is as late as 1998. This
2:06:16
thing that we're talking about the magic of
2:06:19
the software business model, and how it should
2:06:21
be reflected in a company's valuation, especially when
2:06:23
it's a high growth company, was still not
2:06:25
understood, even by Bill Gates himself. So here's
2:06:28
the quote. Bill Gates says, I
2:06:30
think the multiples of technology stocks should be
2:06:32
quite a bit lower than the multiples of
2:06:34
stocks like Coke and Gillette, because we are
2:06:37
subject to complete changes in the rules. I
2:06:39
know very well that in the next 10
2:06:41
years, if Microsoft is still a leader, we
2:06:44
will have had to weather at least three crises.
2:06:46
So Bill Gates is essentially making an argument. Now
2:06:48
granted, this is in the middle of all the
2:06:50
antitrust stuff. So he's very primed for this. And
2:06:53
the Internet. And the Internet. He's basically making
2:06:55
the argument that disruptive forces
2:06:58
come at you so fast in
2:07:00
the technology industry, that
2:07:03
even though you can grow extremely
2:07:05
fast, and it's this extremely scalable
2:07:07
thing distributing software at zero distribution
2:07:09
costs, and even though the margins
2:07:12
are unbelievable because you have zero
2:07:14
marginal costs, they still shouldn't be
2:07:16
valued as highly as like a
2:07:18
CPG company, which is so different
2:07:20
than the way that people think about it today. Well,
2:07:23
it's funny, you know, I've thought about this a lot.
2:07:26
And I actually watched that interview years ago. It's so
2:07:28
good. There are elements of truth to this too.
2:07:31
And I think it's that for most
2:07:33
technology companies, that is totally true.
2:07:36
Yep. And then for a
2:07:38
few technology companies that have true
2:07:40
power and true scale, the exact
2:07:43
opposite is true. Microsoft is
2:07:45
still the most valuable company in
2:07:47
the world today. Companies that are
2:07:49
less susceptible to disruption,
2:07:52
more predictable in terms of high
2:07:55
growth, high margin revenue
2:07:57
deserve a premium. But Gates is basically arguing
2:08:00
everyone else doesn't. So let's flash
2:08:02
all the way back to
2:08:04
1981 and talk about this venture capital investment, this one
2:08:06
on 20 that TVI does.
2:08:09
Good work if you can get it, man. How does
2:08:11
this come to be? So even a whole year before
2:08:13
in the fall of 1980, Dave Markwort, one
2:08:16
of the partners and the founders at TVI flies
2:08:19
up to Seattle, not to meet Bill
2:08:21
Gates, but to meet Steve Ballmer. Because
2:08:23
they were classmates at GSB, right? They
2:08:26
weren't quite classmates, but because I think they were two
2:08:28
years apart, so they didn't overlap, but they had some
2:08:30
of the same social circles. And Steve
2:08:32
was effectively the screener for anyone who wanted
2:08:34
to come and talk to Bill and try
2:08:36
and invest in the business. TA
2:08:38
Associates had been up, Sutter Hill had been up,
2:08:41
Handbricked and Quiz had been up, Xerox Ventures, and
2:08:43
all of them only ever got to meet with
2:08:45
Steve Ballmer and never got passed on to Bill
2:08:47
Gates. Steve would basically just bounce him off. And
2:08:50
I know all this because there's a great oral
2:08:52
history from the Computer History Museum where this whole
2:08:54
thing's in a transcript with an interview with Dave
2:08:56
Markwort kind of recalling the whole thing. So,
2:09:00
Dave flies up to meet with Steve
2:09:02
and Steve says, you're asking really interesting
2:09:04
questions. You're thinking about our strategy
2:09:06
the right way. You don't just want
2:09:08
to do a transactional deal. Like you really think
2:09:10
this is something special. Why don't you meet with
2:09:13
Bill? Bill, of course, doesn't have any extra time
2:09:15
in his schedule. He says, but I am
2:09:17
going to the UW Arizona football game at Husky
2:09:19
Stadium. Why don't you come and talk to me
2:09:21
there? So of course they go. Bill doesn't
2:09:23
pay attention to the game at all. He's just
2:09:26
laying out the strategy and grilling Dave and talking
2:09:28
about software the whole time. So this is
2:09:30
fall of 1980. So that's a whole
2:09:32
year before the deal gets done. And Dave's remarking
2:09:34
at this point in 1980, they're doing 5 million
2:09:36
in revenue, 2 to 3 million
2:09:38
in profit. They don't need VC money.
2:09:41
And yet he was able to get in. So here's the
2:09:43
quote, I was just sort of
2:09:45
helping them out with the business. In the venture business
2:09:47
you're buying and you're selling at the same time, you're
2:09:49
trying to figure out. are these guys crazy? Are They
2:09:52
ever going to do anything really interesting? And If so,
2:09:54
how do I get myself positioned to be able to
2:09:56
help them do it? And So I Spent a lot
2:09:58
of time up there helping recruit people. The Ball
2:10:00
I helped to recruit Charles Simonyi who was
2:10:02
an early T guy alone he would go
2:10:04
on to. This is an aside to write
2:10:07
Microsoft Word and Charles was at Xerox Parc
2:10:09
inventing the gooey always regret thousands of fact
2:10:11
Yes, yes and he says and I was
2:10:13
working with Steve on business strategy. They had
2:10:16
these O E M customers, the Pc manufacturers
2:10:18
and he has started to engage with I
2:10:20
B M on this operating system. And.
2:10:22
Then are we just gonna become a low
2:10:24
cost contract programming shop for I B M,
2:10:26
an outsourced sweatshop Are some way we can
2:10:29
build a business out of this which led
2:10:31
to the Sixty Feet I B M the
2:10:33
retention of the code which is then we
2:10:35
could saw the other people and that's what
2:10:37
created the Pc industries. Basically. So. That
2:10:39
his his recollection of the whole thing.
2:10:42
that he was sort of very helpful
2:10:44
and this transformative time for the company.
2:10:46
Now. At the same time we
2:10:48
have to like everyone else is and said
2:10:51
how can I be helpful them So days
2:10:53
is only twenty nine years old but everyone
2:10:55
else is like twenty three and so he
2:10:57
actually is kind of adult supervision. At.
2:11:00
The same time the partnership. Was.
2:11:02
Still, just a partnership in there was a handshake
2:11:04
deal for the equity. And so if you're Steve
2:11:06
Bomber at this point in history, It
2:11:08
would be nice to have a forcing functioned actually
2:11:11
turned this into a corporation so that we can
2:11:13
get some shares granted here, so there's a little
2:11:15
bit of incentive to say hey, if we take
2:11:17
on an outside investor, we're going to have to
2:11:19
restructure. And that's what I had always read about
2:11:22
the Tv I Investment. Yeah. Obviously, Microsoft
2:11:24
and need the money they like. They've
2:11:26
both also a big part of it
2:11:28
was before the catalyzing function to do
2:11:30
the conversion into a C. or yes,
2:11:32
so this would create a little bit
2:11:34
A and governance. So it's not just
2:11:36
Bill all the time. Now Bill, of
2:11:38
course I think is still a controlling
2:11:40
shareholder just by the about of stock
2:11:42
that he owns. But there's a board.
2:11:44
It's Bill and it's Dave And it's
2:11:46
teeny. See, it's a three person board.
2:11:48
Yeah, we should say to feasibly Paul.
2:11:51
Tragically and I believe it was Nineteen
2:11:53
Eighty two, eighty three. He's diagnosed with
2:11:55
Hodgkin's Disease and he ends up taking
2:11:58
a leave of them fully, leaving. I
2:12:01
think he did go on and off the
2:12:03
board at various points in time. Yeah, that's
2:12:05
true. But yeah, he's no longer a full-time
2:12:08
member of the company after his diagnosis. Yep.
2:12:11
So on this venture investment, it's
2:12:13
pretty fascinating. None of
2:12:15
these are terribly compelling reasons other than like,
2:12:17
I guess it would be nice to have
2:12:19
a little bit of capital associated
2:12:22
with us
2:12:24
formalizing the corporation, but
2:12:26
they don't need money at all.
2:12:29
Well, they're printing cash. They've been printing
2:12:31
cash ever since that one tight period
2:12:33
in Albuquerque. Dave charmed
2:12:35
them. I think that's kind of the answer.
2:12:37
And I've always heard wonderful, wonderful things about
2:12:39
Dave, and I think everybody really did love
2:12:42
him and see his value. But man,
2:12:44
ah, to be a venture capitalist in the 1980s
2:12:47
and 1990s, like, oh man, you
2:12:49
couldn't lose. It's pretty crazy.
2:12:51
I think part of it, too, had to
2:12:54
do with the fact that Microsoft was up
2:12:56
in Seattle. So the VCs just weren't traveling.
2:12:58
Right. And Dave was young and he was
2:13:00
single. Oh, Don Valentine famously had the rule
2:13:02
they didn't invest in any company that you
2:13:04
couldn't bicycle to from Sand Hill Road. It's
2:13:08
crazy. Dave Marquardt, I think most weekends is
2:13:10
flying up to Seattle to hang out with
2:13:12
Bill and Steve. It was a
2:13:15
real sell. And he said I was young and I
2:13:17
was single and I had nothing better to do and
2:13:19
it was really fun and intellectually interesting. So I did
2:13:21
it. I bet. And that resulted in, depending how long
2:13:23
TV I held, one of the best
2:13:26
venture capital return in history. Hard
2:13:28
to argue with that one. Okay, back
2:13:30
to the story. There's a couple more really,
2:13:33
really key things that happen in
2:13:35
the PC era. And particularly now,
2:13:38
once we're into the IBM PC
2:13:40
era and the clones, the 16
2:13:42
bit era. And let's
2:13:44
start with applications. So,
2:13:46
you know, kind of like we've been saying
2:13:48
all along, the 8 bit era applications package
2:13:51
software aren't really a
2:13:53
thing. In 1979, kind of the tail end
2:13:55
of the 8 bit era, two
2:13:57
programs come out for the Apple II.
2:14:00
VisiCalc and Wordstar. VisiCalc
2:14:02
is the first software
2:14:05
spreadsheet application and Wordstar
2:14:07
is a word processor. These
2:14:10
applications by today's standards are super
2:14:12
simple, like stone age type stuff.
2:14:15
But they're the first in their kind, particularly VisiCalc
2:14:17
and the spreadsheet. They sort
2:14:19
of established the potential for business applications
2:14:21
on personal computers. There's a joke at
2:14:23
one point in the industry that the
2:14:26
Apple II was a quote unquote VisiCalc
2:14:28
accessory for small businesses. And
2:14:31
I think that is part of what IBM is
2:14:33
seeing and why they're deciding to now get into
2:14:35
the industry with the personal computer. Around
2:14:38
this time, Microsoft starts
2:14:40
the quote unquote consumer products
2:14:42
division to compete and make
2:14:45
application software themselves. And
2:14:47
it's quite telling it's called the consumer
2:14:49
products division to make applications, even
2:14:51
though they're competing to make these applications
2:14:53
that today we would view as business
2:14:55
tools, spreadsheets and word processing. That
2:14:58
is not how they referred to it. Right. So
2:15:01
one of the first people that they hire
2:15:03
into this new division to get it going
2:15:06
is an engineer, Ben, who he referenced
2:15:08
just a minute ago named Charles Simone.
2:15:11
And they poach Charles, perhaps with Dave
2:15:13
Markhart's help, away from
2:15:17
the legendary Xerox
2:15:20
Palo Alto Research Center,
2:15:22
or Xerox PARC. And
2:15:25
I think this is one of the great
2:15:27
misconceptions in technology history. Yes. Hopefully we can
2:15:29
set the record straight a little bit here.
2:15:32
Yes. If you ask anybody
2:15:34
in our ecosystem, save
2:15:36
for the 1% of people who actually know this, what
2:15:39
happened at Xerox PARC? They will tell
2:15:41
you they invented the mouse,
2:15:44
they invented the graphical user interface. And then Steve
2:15:46
Jobs walked in and he saw it all and
2:15:48
he said, Oh, my God, we have to have
2:15:50
it. And then he went off and he made
2:15:53
the Lisa, which had a graphical user interface and
2:15:55
a mouse and then that failed.
2:15:57
But what succeeded was the Macintosh and
2:16:00
It's a wholesale ripoff of Xerox Park that lives
2:16:02
on today in Apple. And
2:16:04
that is the story that you will hear
2:16:06
from basically everyone. I've heard it characterized as
2:16:09
something like, Xerox hosted a
2:16:11
picnic in Silicon Valley, and Steve
2:16:13
Jobs attended and dined lavishly at
2:16:15
the feast. Which
2:16:17
all of this is true. Which is true. That
2:16:20
is true. All of that is true. But it's half
2:16:22
the story. He was not the only person who dined
2:16:24
lavishly at the feast. Microsoft
2:16:27
did just as much directly
2:16:29
from Xerox, and Charles was one of
2:16:32
the main vectors by which this happened.
2:16:35
So here is the list of things that
2:16:37
were invented or basically invented
2:16:39
at Xerox Park. The
2:16:42
graphical user interface, the
2:16:44
desktop, the mouse, object-oriented
2:16:47
programming, Ethernet, laser
2:16:49
printing, along with a whole host
2:16:51
of other things. Like this is everything
2:16:53
about modern computing invented there. Who
2:16:56
were the people who were at Xerox Park? Well, there was
2:16:58
Alan Kay. There was Bob Metcalf, who
2:17:00
would go on to found 3Com. He
2:17:03
invented Ethernet, you know, Metcalf's law.
2:17:05
Yeah, the value of a network
2:17:07
scaling proportionally to the square of
2:17:10
the number of inputs. Yeah, Bob
2:17:12
Metcalf, Xerox Park. Larry
2:17:14
Tesler, who would join Apple. John
2:17:16
Warnock, who started Adobe. Eric
2:17:19
Schmidt worked at Xerox Park. Everybody
2:17:22
was there. It was a lavish picnic. And
2:17:25
Charles Simone. And Charles Simone. Now,
2:17:27
the thing about Park and
2:17:29
the computer that they built there to
2:17:31
instantiate all these concepts which was named
2:17:33
the Alto, is it
2:17:35
really was a research center. So the
2:17:38
Alto, go look it up on Wikipedia, go look
2:17:40
it picturely, it's the Mac. The Alto is the
2:17:42
Mac. It's the Mac with the monitor turned on
2:17:44
its side. Yes, it's a vertical Mac. It's a
2:17:46
3x4 display, not a 4x3 display. They
2:17:50
start making it in 1973. So
2:17:53
you might be like, wait a minute, what's going on here? The Mac doesn't come out until 1984.
2:17:56
11 years earlier. How
2:17:59
on earth Xerox making the
2:18:01
mack in like. The.
2:18:03
Pre Eight bit era. The
2:18:05
Pre microprocessor era. Well, it's
2:18:08
not a microprocessor. The Alto
2:18:10
is not. A. Microprocessor Architecture
2:18:12
Minute Mini computer. So what you see when you
2:18:14
look at photos of the Alto as you see
2:18:16
the max would you don't see is under the
2:18:19
table or behind it is a mini computer. Oh
2:18:21
I never realized that so it is not a.
2:18:23
Personal. Computer architecture at all.
2:18:26
It. Is a sixteen bit essentially mini
2:18:28
computer that cost. Tens. Of
2:18:30
thousands of dollars to make each one
2:18:33
of them saw. It's. A science
2:18:35
project, right? So the use of a
2:18:37
little bit more generosity for the East
2:18:39
coast management at Xerox for failing to
2:18:41
commercialize this. Told the time was
2:18:43
not right, it was not possible. it
2:18:46
wasn't even conceive does indeed, microprocessor architects
2:18:48
or as the microprocessor basically didn't exist
2:18:50
when they made it. interesting. So.
2:18:53
And. Ninety Me Get them and this year
2:18:55
from Microsoft. Same year Microsoft join, Same year
2:18:57
they signed the I B M Partnership. Charles.
2:19:00
Money comes up from Xerox Parc. And
2:19:03
he's of course, bringing all the same
2:19:05
knowledge, all the same experience that Steve
2:19:08
Jobs is bringing. and Apple. He's bringing
2:19:10
all that right into Microsoft. And
2:19:12
the first thing that he gets tasked
2:19:14
with is working with this new consumer
2:19:17
products to miss and to build. Application.
2:19:19
Software to compete with Miss A Calico
2:19:22
and Word Start compete with spreadsheets and
2:19:24
to compete in word processing and so
2:19:26
he leads the teams that Greek, Word
2:19:28
and. Multiplayer. Synthesis
2:19:30
of make a sauce first
2:19:32
spencer. Now memory or so
2:19:35
at the end of the a bit era. The.
2:19:37
Graphical user interface doesn't exist
2:19:39
yet other then on the
2:19:41
Alto hidden Xerox Parc know
2:19:43
he's er das applications it's
2:19:45
all character mode. Yes, It
2:19:47
is command line interface. So. The
2:19:50
vector that they think they're gonna
2:19:52
compete and least in spreadsheets with
2:19:54
visit Out is that they're gonna
2:19:56
be. On every platform
2:19:59
out there. I believe was
2:20:01
more or less basically only on the Apple II.
2:20:03
Well, that doesn't end up working too
2:20:06
well. And then the next
2:20:08
generation, the IBM PC era, they
2:20:10
sort of make the same mistake. The
2:20:14
application business stays
2:20:16
focused on being on lots of machines,
2:20:18
making software that's compatible with everything. A
2:20:21
new company pops up called Lotus.
2:20:23
Oh yes. And Lotus makes the radical
2:20:26
decision that they are gonna make a
2:20:28
spreadsheet only for
2:20:31
the IBM PC. And this
2:20:33
is genius. This is the one,
2:20:35
two, three spreadsheet. And it
2:20:37
goes on to become at that
2:20:40
point in time, the most successful software
2:20:43
ever. This is wild. I can't even
2:20:45
believe I'm about to say this and it blew my mind when I found
2:20:47
it in research. There are a couple of years
2:20:50
in the late 80s where
2:20:52
Lotus has more
2:20:54
revenue than Microsoft and is
2:20:56
valued higher. In
2:20:58
fact, the year that Microsoft went public, Lotus
2:21:00
had more revenue than Microsoft at the IPO.
2:21:03
Yes, wild. Yeah,
2:21:05
it's crazy. So Lotus one, two,
2:21:08
three had some graphics but it
2:21:10
was still in character mode.
2:21:12
There was a powerful spreadsheet that could
2:21:14
start to do some graphics even
2:21:16
though there wasn't actually a GUI operating system
2:21:19
yet which is interesting. So Lotus one, two,
2:21:21
three was faster and had bigger spreadsheets and
2:21:23
it was just more powerful. Microsoft multi-plan was
2:21:25
still targeting the older 8-bit. And
2:21:28
so multi-plan despite Microsoft's best efforts
2:21:30
is completely left in the dust.
2:21:32
Microsoft's trying to figure out what should we learn from
2:21:34
this? And then talking with Pete Higgins and Mike
2:21:37
Slade who were both early leaders in the
2:21:39
development and the marketing of the applications division.
2:21:41
Actually Mike Slade went on to work directly
2:21:43
for Steve Jobs at Next and Apple for
2:21:45
many years. But in chatting
2:21:47
with both of them, what basically
2:21:49
became apparent is Microsoft learned with our
2:21:51
applications, we should not be targeting the
2:21:53
current platforms at all. The
2:21:56
lesson to learn is never leave yourself open
2:21:58
to the next generation of tech. They're
2:22:00
learning the Moore's law lesson again. Yes.
2:22:04
And how it applies to applications. Yes. You
2:22:06
always got to target the next platform. Right. Even
2:22:09
if that platform is not the one
2:22:11
you own. Right. That's the
2:22:13
interesting thing about when they're evaluating Multiplan and
2:22:15
they say, how do we not get Lotus
2:22:18
1, 2, 3'd again? Basically,
2:22:20
the applications team gets the freedom
2:22:22
to look around and say, okay,
2:22:24
no matter what our overall company
2:22:26
strategy is right now, or no matter what the
2:22:29
systems division is doing, what is the
2:22:31
most cutting edge platform that is going
2:22:33
to be so interesting to people that
2:22:35
we can develop the most envelope
2:22:38
pushing technology for it? And that
2:22:40
becomes the mandate for applications. This
2:22:43
is the dawn of horizontal software. You
2:22:45
can have a whole company or a whole division of
2:22:47
a company in Microsoft's case that makes this tool. And
2:22:51
that tool will be so
2:22:53
much better than anything that even the
2:22:55
largest companies could have their own software
2:22:57
developers write. General Electric isn't
2:23:00
going to write a better spreadsheet than 1, 2, 3. Right.
2:23:04
And then so I think that the technology complement
2:23:06
to this sort of law is
2:23:09
the killer app. You kind of have to counter
2:23:11
position. If 1, 2, 3 is the
2:23:13
best spreadsheet out there for the current technology generation, you
2:23:15
just can't compete with them. You need to wait for
2:23:18
the next big leap forward in order to find a
2:23:20
new competitive vector. You need to be
2:23:22
the killer app on the next platform. And
2:23:24
that's what Lotus 1, 2, 3 did with the
2:23:27
spreadsheet on the IBM PC and IBM compatible PC.
2:23:30
And that's what Microsoft decides, hey, we got to
2:23:32
do this in the graphical
2:23:34
interface. And who's about to
2:23:36
come out with the very best instantiation
2:23:39
of a graphical user interface? Apple
2:23:42
Computer. Well, that would be Steve
2:23:44
Jobs. Yes. The next
2:23:46
chapter of our Microsoft story is
2:23:48
the Macintosh in 1984. So
2:23:51
fun. But before we do that,
2:23:53
this is the perfect time to talk about
2:23:55
another one of our favorite companies and longtime
2:23:58
acquired partners who are back. pilot.com.
2:24:00
For startups and growth companies of
2:24:02
all kinds, Pilot handles all of
2:24:04
your company's accounting, tax, and bookkeeping
2:24:07
needs, and is in fact now
2:24:09
by far the largest startup-focused accounting
2:24:11
firm in the entire U.S. Also,
2:24:14
we have to give our good
2:24:16
buddy and Pilot CEO, Wasim Dacher,
2:24:18
a special shoutout here because I
2:24:20
think he is now the only
2:24:22
acquired sponsor CEO who is
2:24:24
also a source for an episode. Because
2:24:26
back when Wasim was a student at
2:24:28
MIT, he interviewed Bill Gates for the
2:24:31
school paper and he dug up
2:24:33
the PDF and sent it to us and we're
2:24:35
going to link to it in the episode sources.
2:24:37
Yes, very fun. Well,
2:24:39
back to Pilot and speaking
2:24:41
of incredibly successful Seattle business
2:24:43
people, we talk all
2:24:46
the time on acquired about Jeff
2:24:48
Bezos' AWS-inspired Axiom that startups should
2:24:50
focus on what makes their beer
2:24:52
taste better, i.e. only spend
2:24:54
your limited time and resources on what is
2:24:57
actually going to move the needle for you,
2:24:59
your product, your customers, and outsource everything else
2:25:01
that you need to do as a company
2:25:03
but doesn't fit that bill. And accounting is
2:25:06
example number one of what he's talking about.
2:25:08
Every company needs this, but it needs to
2:25:10
be done by a professional and you don't want
2:25:12
to take any risk of something going wrong. But
2:25:14
at the same time, it actually has zero impact
2:25:16
on your product or your customers. Yep.
2:25:18
So enter Pilot. Pilot both sets up
2:25:21
and operates your company's entire financial stack.
2:25:23
So finance, accounting, tax, even CFO services
2:25:25
like investor reporting from your general ledger
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all the way up to budgeting and
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financial sections of your board decks. And
2:25:32
they've been doing this now for years
2:25:35
across thousands of startups in Silicon Valley
2:25:37
and elsewhere. There's nobody better who you
2:25:39
can trust to both get finance right
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and make it easy and painless for your company. Yep.
2:25:45
These are now companies like OpenAI, Airtable,
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Scale, as well as large ecommerce companies.
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So it's not just that they have
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the experience across startups, they can also
2:25:53
keep working with you as you scale
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to the growth phase and beyond. So
2:25:58
if your company back
2:26:00
to focusing on what makes your beer
2:26:02
taste better, going over to pilot.com/acquired, and
2:26:04
tell them that Ben and David sent
2:26:06
you. All right. So David,
2:26:09
why are we talking about the Mac? Because
2:26:11
I think it's fair
2:26:13
to say that the Mac
2:26:16
made Microsoft Office and Microsoft
2:26:18
Office made the Mac. I
2:26:21
don't think that is actually a controversial
2:26:23
statement. No. Although it probably sounds crazy
2:26:25
to many of you listening. Totally. Far
2:26:27
and away the first thing to point out is, the
2:26:30
first version of Microsoft Excel was
2:26:32
for the Mac. It's
2:26:34
especially crazy for all the finance people today
2:26:36
who are like, oh, Mac Excel isn't real
2:26:39
Excel. Excel has to happen on Windows. No.
2:26:41
Excel was on the Mac. That was it.
2:26:43
Yes. The logic basically was, Microsoft
2:26:46
was really coming around to the idea that
2:26:49
the next big thing in
2:26:51
computing was a graphical user interface. The reason
2:26:53
they were coming around to this was because
2:26:55
they knew from Xerox Park
2:26:57
just as well as Apple did, and
2:27:00
they were rapidly trying to figure out
2:27:02
how to get all of that Xerox
2:27:04
Parkiness into their product line
2:27:06
too. That's the other half of
2:27:08
this untold Xerox Park
2:27:10
story. One
2:27:13
of the first ways that they
2:27:15
see to bring the graphical user
2:27:17
interface to their products is launching
2:27:19
Excel for the Mac. Because they
2:27:21
basically see the way that
2:27:23
we got destroyed with Lotus 1, 2, 3. We
2:27:26
can't compete with Lotus on the IBM PC.
2:27:29
We're going to shelve multi-plan and start over,
2:27:31
and Excel is going to come out in
2:27:33
the graphical user interface. We're going to try
2:27:35
to be first and best on
2:27:38
the GUI. One thing just to underscore here,
2:27:41
Excel is the world's first
2:27:43
graphical spreadsheet program. That's
2:27:45
why it wins, and that's why it's so
2:27:48
important. Imagine trying to use Excel in
2:27:50
the command line interface. That's what VisiCalc
2:27:52
was, that's what even 1, 2, 3 was. Yeah,
2:27:55
useful better than nothing, but Graphical
2:27:58
charts, cells, visual. Relationships:
2:28:00
This is so important and
2:28:02
Excel is where it all
2:28:04
starts. Yeah. And of
2:28:06
course Apple was this. The Macintosh came
2:28:09
out nineteen Eighty Four and everybody
2:28:11
remembers the great intro video and that
2:28:13
hello scraps. And I've watched that Steve
2:28:15
Jobs keynote because of course I have.
2:28:18
and it's this magical moment in computing
2:28:20
history. Were finally something that's insanely great
2:28:22
comes out and it's like. The
2:28:25
beginning of Steve Jobs is unbelievable presentation
2:28:27
prowess. It's so fun to watch it
2:28:30
and it's a of course a product
2:28:32
that eventually people really loved When at
2:28:34
first it doesn't have the killer app
2:28:36
know it's a product that was supposed
2:28:39
to ship in eighty two, it didn't
2:28:41
It shipped in Eighty Four and so
2:28:43
at the time what they were targeting
2:28:46
for eighty Two was like a pre
2:28:48
great set of technologies by Eighty Four
2:28:50
sentiment aging set of technologies. So it
2:28:52
debuts with a hundred and Twenty eight.
2:28:55
K. Of Memory which basically isn't
2:28:57
enough to create an interesting applications
2:28:59
and so developers are kind of
2:29:01
ignoring it as an interesting platform
2:29:03
to develop on. Within twelve
2:29:05
months a kind of figure it out and
2:29:08
come out with a better version that five
2:29:10
hundred and twelve K and that kind of
2:29:12
the version that people now really think about.
2:29:14
your deck of Cut a rechristened as like
2:29:16
that's the original back array and of original.
2:29:19
or it's always the back when. Twenty years
2:29:21
of the like that? Yes, exactly. But in
2:29:23
the meantime, Microsoft the Applications Group is work
2:29:25
in their ass off to make something really
2:29:28
great for the Macintosh. And they come up
2:29:30
with Excel. And so what ends up happening
2:29:32
is Apple's really trying to promote sales. This
2:29:34
machine. And. The. Kind
2:29:36
of You excel and Pagemaker as the killer
2:29:39
apps as reasons that people said by this
2:29:41
thing because once you run through a lot
2:29:43
of the demo apps and stuff that Apple
2:29:45
belt you're like, okay, what else is here?
2:29:47
It's a kind of crickets. Right
2:29:50
writing. Hello and script is, you
2:29:52
know, cool but. Colleague. a
2:29:54
lot of vr stuff you know don't have a
2:29:56
cool demo been like you can do that everyday
2:29:58
would right now and so I'm not
2:30:00
sure this has ever been publicly
2:30:02
disclosed before, but Apple spent just
2:30:04
as much marketing Excel as Microsoft
2:30:06
did. They matched Microsoft's marketing spend
2:30:08
with their own campaign for it
2:30:10
and split the bill. That's
2:30:13
amazing. So you've got
2:30:15
a couple concurrent things going on in applications
2:30:17
land. You've got Excel coming out for Mac
2:30:19
to take advantage of the GUI. Meanwhile, and
2:30:21
this strategy is just all over the place.
2:30:23
I think that's an interesting thing to underscore
2:30:26
about Microsoft in this era. They're trying a
2:30:28
ton of stuff because they're paranoid.
2:30:30
They don't want to miss the next wave. Meanwhile,
2:30:32
also in the applications group, Charles Simone
2:30:34
has written Word. This is about a
2:30:37
year before in 1983. Microsoft
2:30:40
Word comes out for DOS.
2:30:43
Right. And they ship it with a mouse. Yes.
2:30:46
So this is like, okay, we see the
2:30:48
Xerox Park stuff coming out in the Mac.
2:30:50
Great. Excel will be for that. We
2:30:52
want to develop Word. We're going to do that for DOS. No,
2:30:55
but I can imagine how useful the mouse is going to be
2:30:57
in a word processing environment.
2:30:59
So they actually ship a mouse
2:31:01
tied to the application that's not
2:31:03
a part of DOS. And
2:31:06
so this is how early we were
2:31:08
in figuring out kind of what the
2:31:10
split between applications and platforms were at
2:31:12
this point in history. Microsoft
2:31:15
thought maybe a mouse makes sense just for
2:31:17
this one application, even though it doesn't do
2:31:19
anything else for the rest of the command
2:31:21
line interface. Right. Yeah,
2:31:23
it was all being figured out. I
2:31:25
think it is also really fair to
2:31:28
say Microsoft was right
2:31:30
there with Apple in the
2:31:32
Mac development phase. Obviously,
2:31:34
they're working on Excel, working on other, you
2:31:36
know, what would become the Office Suite applications,
2:31:39
you know, together for Mac. Steve
2:31:41
Jobs shows Bill Gates the
2:31:43
Mac project in 1981, three years before
2:31:46
it ships. When
2:31:49
Microsoft and Apple signed an agreement to
2:31:51
work together on applications for it in
2:31:55
1982, they were very deeply embedded
2:31:58
on this. It's amazing. which
2:32:00
is going to make the lawsuit and what comes up in
2:32:02
a minute here all the more sort of funny. Yes.
2:32:06
So the decision for the Excel team is
2:32:08
to focus on GUI. The whole marketing message
2:32:10
is Excel on a Mac is better than
2:32:12
Lotus 1, 2, 3 on a
2:32:14
PC. You're starting to see truly divergent
2:32:16
cultures at Microsoft between the systems group,
2:32:18
which is currently making DOS and will
2:32:20
soon make Windows or soon partner with
2:32:23
IBM or soon do something else that
2:32:25
we're getting into here in the next
2:32:27
chapter of the story and the applications
2:32:29
group, which is also currently
2:32:31
a bunch of disparate applications and
2:32:33
teams targeting disparate platforms, but is
2:32:36
also about to become unified in
2:32:38
their next chapter. And
2:32:40
within the applications group, that next
2:32:42
chapter is Microsoft Office. So
2:32:45
in 1985, in January,
2:32:47
the bundle is released. And
2:32:50
it was originally called the business pack
2:32:52
for Microsoft. And it started on
2:32:54
the Mac. It really rolls off the tag.
2:32:56
Totally does. Now, they haven't acquired PowerPoint yet
2:32:59
or forethought, as we talked about eight
2:33:01
years ago on acquired way
2:33:03
back in history. So there's no PowerPoint part of
2:33:05
the bundle. And so what you've got
2:33:07
here on the Mac, in the first version of
2:33:09
Office is Word, which they've developed in house, file,
2:33:13
chart, and multi plan. This
2:33:16
is this first notion of a suite.
2:33:18
So today, we're very familiar with suite
2:33:20
creative suite over at Adobe software is
2:33:22
sold this way. This was kind of
2:33:24
the first time. And so what was
2:33:26
actually happening is all of the bundling
2:33:28
was happening in pricing, in
2:33:30
marketing and in manufacturing. And so you sort
2:33:32
of had a single box that they would
2:33:35
ship with the different applications by 1988
2:33:37
or 89. It was Word, Excel, PowerPoint, they're
2:33:42
very different things, but they're getting sort of
2:33:44
bundled together in a way to be sold
2:33:47
to customers. But there's no product integration. And
2:33:49
so you don't have the ability to do
2:33:51
this like very nice copy paste from an
2:33:54
Excel table and just paste that
2:33:56
into Word that whole idea is
2:33:58
pretty far away. So in
2:34:00
this earliest Microsoft Office, it was just
2:34:03
how can we bundle something
2:34:05
for a cheaper price if you buy
2:34:07
all three and make marketing easier for
2:34:09
us to kind of have this unified
2:34:11
message. Yeah, and soon
2:34:14
to come, we'll get into Windows here in
2:34:16
a second. One of the big
2:34:18
killer app for productivity in
2:34:20
particular for business productivity with
2:34:23
a graphical user interface like
2:34:25
Windows and true multitasking, you
2:34:27
can get copy paste from
2:34:29
Excel into PowerPoint. You
2:34:31
know, Lotus and the world back in the command
2:34:34
line interface where you've got these programs running on
2:34:36
top of DOS, that is
2:34:38
like a completely foreign concept. Right,
2:34:40
none of those verbs exist. Exactly.
2:34:43
So we've now sort of set the
2:34:45
stage of Microsoft doing a lot of stuff. They're hedging
2:34:47
a lot of bets. They're not totally sure which strategy
2:34:50
is gonna win out. They're not sure which platform is
2:34:52
gonna win out. They're not sure if they're more of
2:34:54
a systems company or an application company. But
2:34:57
what they are unified on is we
2:34:59
make great software for personal computers.
2:35:02
And I think anything that fell
2:35:04
into that purview, they were willing
2:35:06
to explore. They didn't really
2:35:09
have hard boundaries between we'll
2:35:11
do anything to make our operating
2:35:13
systems great or we'll do
2:35:16
anything to advantage our applications. Or
2:35:18
even we think we're an enterprise
2:35:20
company, we think we're a consumer company.
2:35:23
They just didn't have well formed opinions
2:35:25
yet. It was just we make software
2:35:27
for personal computers. And at
2:35:29
this point in time, the actual boundary between
2:35:31
an operating system and an application is very
2:35:33
fluid. You've got a mouse that works for
2:35:36
one program. Totally, you know,
2:35:38
Lotus would really go down a dead
2:35:40
end evolutionary path with notes, you know,
2:35:43
later in its life and its final
2:35:45
chapter where the application was going to
2:35:47
be the operating system. Right, Lotus Notes
2:35:49
was crazy. It was a word processor,
2:35:51
an email service, and it was a
2:35:54
platform on which you could write other
2:35:56
applications. Yes, And it
2:35:58
itself was an application. Not
2:36:00
an operating system so yeah with all
2:36:02
kind of dynamic. Speaking.
2:36:04
Of though. Microsoft. Here
2:36:06
is in bed with Apple working on the
2:36:08
Mac. Bill. And the company
2:36:11
or big believers in the future the graphical
2:36:13
user interface. Started. In
2:36:15
Nineteen Eighty Three Daily. We
2:36:18
gotta. Do. Our own. Graphical.
2:36:21
Operating. System or least user enters
2:36:23
his and this is the origins of
2:36:25
the Windows product and actually announce it
2:36:27
in November, nineteen Eighty Three before the
2:36:30
Mack ends up sipping with their partner.
2:36:32
Apple is of course not happy about.
2:36:35
Now. Just like development of the back was
2:36:38
rocky. Development. Of Windows
2:36:40
was super freak and Rockies who
2:36:42
is in Microsoft to This is
2:36:44
around that same time when Paul
2:36:46
Allen gets Hodgkin's Disease and leaves
2:36:48
the company. so his presence as
2:36:50
soon as great technical leader is
2:36:52
very much missed. But. They. Bring
2:36:54
in someone from Xerox
2:36:56
to manage the development
2:36:58
of Windows. That. Person
2:37:01
and of not working out he gets
2:37:03
fired. Steve Ballmer gets drafted to come
2:37:05
in and be the Dev manager for
2:37:07
the final push to release windows. One
2:37:10
point out which is hop larry as
2:37:12
you can find amazing you tube videos
2:37:14
from the lawns and all joking about
2:37:17
how like non technical Steve committed death
2:37:19
save the day and Dev manage windows
2:37:21
the launch which is so funny of
2:37:24
I don't think at this point in
2:37:26
history. The. Lines were clearly formed among
2:37:28
the executives. yet like Steve wasn't running the
2:37:30
global sales for as the makers of wasn't
2:37:32
an enterprise company now don't to get them
2:37:34
later, Steve was one of the smart executives
2:37:36
and they were a software company and someone
2:37:38
had to manage to get the software out
2:37:40
the door. So. Windows One
2:37:42
point out comes out it's bad.
2:37:45
It's bad. November Nineteen Eighty Five
2:37:47
Windows One Point Know. Is
2:37:49
a. Very. Very different
2:37:51
thing. Than. You imagined a graphical
2:37:53
user interface is today or what you
2:37:55
know of his windows. It was filed,
2:37:58
it was not over the lapping windows
2:38:00
the you can drag around and like
2:38:02
have won over the other when you
2:38:04
opened a program in windows one point
2:38:06
know. This system created a
2:38:08
literal window of it on your screen
2:38:11
and then it dynamically resign the windows
2:38:13
as you open other applications at so
2:38:15
nothing could ever be on top of
2:38:17
each other. So as you open more
2:38:19
more stuff that we does get smaller
2:38:21
and smaller and smaller. It's. Very
2:38:24
bizarre. Yeah, their idea of windows overlapping
2:38:26
on top of each other? That was
2:38:28
a serve uniquely Mack saying anything that
2:38:30
the smart engineers at Apple figured out
2:38:32
how to do that and a performance
2:38:34
way that offers good user experience. I
2:38:37
would classify windows one point. always like
2:38:39
a half step between command line. then
2:38:41
the national graphical user says. Yes,
2:38:44
a hundred percent. And so.
2:38:46
I believe Microsoft and Apple actually did like
2:38:49
a. Licensing. Agreement while they
2:38:51
are working together during this time. That
2:38:53
said, hey, Microsoft can use a lot
2:38:55
of the stuff that's being developed for
2:38:57
Mac for Windows. One point out yes
2:39:00
that's right, Apple does do a deal
2:39:02
to license a lot of quote unquote
2:39:04
their intellectual property which of course came
2:39:06
from Xerox. To. Microsoft Apple
2:39:08
I seek was under the impression
2:39:11
that it was just for Windows
2:39:13
one point know but the actual
2:39:15
terms of the agreements. Are
2:39:18
but this and all future versions of
2:39:20
Windows which comes back to haunt Apple
2:39:22
later. But yes, they totally get the
2:39:24
license. Also. By the time
2:39:27
that disagreement actually happens, I think Steve
2:39:29
Jobs has been ousted had. So it's
2:39:31
Scully who does this agreement and people
2:39:33
and Apple would look back on this.
2:39:35
For years of I this was a
2:39:37
huge error. The other
2:39:39
important thing about Windows during this
2:39:42
sir, no awkward teenage phase is
2:39:44
it's not an operating system. It's.
2:39:47
Just a graphical interface on top
2:39:49
of Das. Yes, the original name
2:39:51
for Windows was Interface Manager. Is
2:39:53
it crazy? In all of their
2:39:55
early March thing, they referred to
2:39:58
it as Windows A graphical up
2:40:00
reading environment that runs on the
2:40:02
Microsoft M S Das operating system.
2:40:04
Yes, And. I actually wasn't
2:40:06
not until Windows Ninety Five that
2:40:09
Windows was it's own operating system.
2:40:11
It was in Windows One, Two
2:40:13
Three Three.one and Windows for Work
2:40:15
Rubes. It was a. Graphical.
2:40:18
Operating Environment. Yup,
2:40:20
but. Here's the question. Why
2:40:22
is Microsoft doing Windows?
2:40:25
Obviously here, Microsoft knows they need to
2:40:27
evolve Dos. They need to figure something
2:40:30
out for the graphical world. And so
2:40:32
David, Are you telling me that Windows
2:40:34
is the widely agreed upon seater of
2:40:37
the company? And that's just a straight
2:40:39
line. A fetish Wealth.
2:40:41
but obviously that's a set up. Their.
2:40:45
Shoes. The other thing that's happening and company of this
2:40:47
time and it's of the bigger think. It's.
2:40:49
The next phase of the I B
2:40:52
M probably since. Yup, windows.
2:40:54
Mac. All of this these are
2:40:57
hedges for the company. Microsoft.
2:40:59
And Bill in particular were masters of
2:41:02
hedging their bets in an uncertain technology
2:41:04
seats are. He was so great! The
2:41:06
company was so great of making service
2:41:08
which ever way the Apple fell from
2:41:11
the tree as Death Upon put it
2:41:13
to us in our interview Microsoft was
2:41:15
going to reposition to catch it. A
2:41:18
lot of people including Bill and met a
2:41:20
soft believe that the way babbel was gonna
2:41:23
fall from the tree here was I B
2:41:25
M A know as to Well I mean
2:41:27
the I B M P C was such
2:41:30
a big deal last time around. You would
2:41:32
think that whenever I B M wants to
2:41:34
do next is a pretty good way to
2:41:36
ally yourself. right? So.
2:41:38
What's going on here? I. B M. Obviously
2:41:41
the Pc was a huge success, but.
2:41:43
Losing dominance of ecosystems. the
2:41:46
clones. This. Was bad.
2:41:48
And. so i b m wants
2:41:50
to find a way to
2:41:53
evolve the pc ecosystem back
2:41:55
to being more i b
2:41:57
m proprietary and they're gonna
2:42:00
make Microsoft come along for the ride here. And
2:42:03
the way that they're gonna do this is
2:42:05
with the next generation of the PC ecosystem,
2:42:08
they are gonna make a whole new modern
2:42:10
operating system. They're gonna get rid of
2:42:13
DOS. They're gonna make this operating
2:42:15
system in partnership with Microsoft, and it's gonna
2:42:17
be called fittingly OS2. And
2:42:20
they're gonna lock Microsoft up that
2:42:22
they can't license it to anybody else.
2:42:25
OS2 is gonna be proprietary to IBM
2:42:27
hardware, just like the Mac operating
2:42:29
system is proprietary to Apple hardware. Ba-na-na!
2:42:32
Ba-na-na! Ha ha ha! And
2:42:37
as powerful as Microsoft's become
2:42:39
here, they're still the
2:42:41
little brother to IBM. And this
2:42:44
is not great news for Microsoft. On
2:42:46
the other hand, it's much better for them to
2:42:48
be like on the inside here
2:42:50
with IBM working in bed with them than
2:42:53
it would be to be on the outside looking in if
2:42:56
IBM's vision comes true and they
2:42:58
recapture control of the PC ecosystem.
2:43:01
Yep. So Bill and
2:43:03
Microsoft are the company, and Steve too, as sort
2:43:05
of the manager of the
2:43:07
account with IBM, commit themselves
2:43:10
to Microsoft is all in on this
2:43:12
vision of the future of OS2, and
2:43:15
IBM is our horse in the race. This is
2:43:17
such a crazy part of the story too, because
2:43:20
we just talked about how Microsoft discovered this amazing
2:43:22
business model, and with everyone needing to license DOS
2:43:24
from them, they're taking over the world, and they're
2:43:26
becoming the standard development platform. Why
2:43:29
on earth, if all that is true, are
2:43:31
they gonna develop some software that's
2:43:34
gonna be locked to IBM computers?
2:43:36
This is a re-centralization attempt. Bomer
2:43:39
has this great, great, great quote about it. He says,
2:43:42
this, the IBM partnership at this time,
2:43:44
it was what we used to call riding
2:43:46
the bear. You just had to try to
2:43:48
stay on the bear's back, and the bear
2:43:51
would twist and turn and try to throw
2:43:53
you off, but we were gonna stay on
2:43:55
the bear because the bear was the biggest,
2:43:57
the most important. You just had to be
2:43:59
with the bear. otherwise you would be under
2:44:01
the bear. And like
2:44:03
that was IBM at this point in time. I mean,
2:44:05
really, I think it was IBM essentially putting a gun to
2:44:08
Microsoft's head and being like, well, you
2:44:11
can be in bed with us on this
2:44:13
future that we're going to re-centralize everything, or
2:44:16
you can be like everybody else and not
2:44:18
be, and you'll lose. And so even though
2:44:20
Microsoft's doing all these little hedges, you
2:44:23
know, Windows is tiny little team, that's what I think
2:44:25
it's 30 people or something. Yes,
2:44:27
yes. It's not the most
2:44:29
prestigious place at the company. The people in
2:44:31
the applications division may as well be on
2:44:33
another planet by this point from the systems
2:44:36
division. They're trying all kinds of crazy stuff.
2:44:39
And the company kind
2:44:41
of motto at this point is, the
2:44:43
next big thing is OS2 and IBM, and we
2:44:45
are the software vendor for that. And certainly
2:44:48
Bill, and I think Steve too, they
2:44:50
needed to tow the party line politically of
2:44:52
expressing that, nope, OS2 is the future, and
2:44:55
what we're doing with Windows and with the
2:44:57
Mac is, you know, those are small things
2:44:59
within the company. It's a
2:45:01
super bizarre period in history.
2:45:04
But IBM had also kind of made
2:45:07
a bit of a power play too
2:45:10
with the later generations
2:45:12
of the 16-bit era
2:45:15
product. They called the PC-AT. They
2:45:18
used the Intel 286 chip
2:45:21
instead of the Intel 386 chip. And
2:45:24
the 286 chip, this was an intentional
2:45:26
decision on IBM's part. The
2:45:28
286 chip was good, but
2:45:30
it wasn't great. Well, you say it was good
2:45:33
but not great. Bill Gates said it was brain
2:45:35
dead. Yes, Bill Gates called it a brain dead
2:45:37
chip. So I think you might be
2:45:39
being charitable. I mean, I think it certainly
2:45:41
was more powerful than the 8086, 8088, but
2:45:43
it was nowhere near what the 386 could do. You
2:45:47
know, there's a bunch of technical aspects to
2:45:49
this. But The most important
2:45:51
takeaway is that the 286 was not
2:45:54
really powerful enough to do a graphical
2:45:56
user interface or to power true multitasking
2:45:58
in a way that... The Three
2:46:00
Eighty Six and later the Forty Six would
2:46:02
be. And so a big part of actually
2:46:05
the comeback story about how compact and the
2:46:07
clones leap ahead of I B M. Is.
2:46:10
There not deterred from coming out with Three Eighty
2:46:12
Six machines which are way more powerful to run.
2:46:14
Windows can do all this stuff and so that's
2:46:16
how they start to separate from I B M.
2:46:18
That's right, That was like a bet the company
2:46:21
moves were Microsoft was like a compact. Go makes
2:46:23
really sick stuff because we're going to make really
2:46:25
great Three Six Ah Square and we need someone
2:46:27
to be all in on that because I B
2:46:30
M is not. This is the thing. Bill.
2:46:32
And Stephen can be. They're having to toe the
2:46:35
party line of expressing commitment to I B M.
2:46:37
But. Really, really narrow topic. Go do the
2:46:39
Treaty six where I do when doesn't like
2:46:41
riling up the rebels, exactly? They. Are
2:46:44
the rebels versus the Empire here? So.
2:46:46
Anyway I B m of course season
2:46:48
as the me the decision not to
2:46:50
go to three to six and to
2:46:52
discourage it in the marketplace because they
2:46:54
didn't want Pcs to start. Creeping.
2:46:57
Into the core enterprise. You know,
2:46:59
Mainframe. I B M workloads their
2:47:01
core business. If that was gonna
2:47:03
happen, they wanted it to be.
2:47:06
I. B M proprietary closed system. So
2:47:08
I think that was a big part
2:47:10
of the impetus for this O S
2:47:12
to initiative. I see this is the
2:47:15
Empire Strikes Back. here. They're basically try
2:47:17
and co op the Pc movements back
2:47:19
into I B M proprietary land. Yes,
2:47:21
exactly. So. When O
2:47:23
S To finally does come out
2:47:25
in December, eighty seven. Predictably.
2:47:28
As you can imagine here. It's not very
2:47:30
good. The. Market does not like it.
2:47:33
Thank. God for Microsoft and Dagens Pally
2:47:35
was strategy along to be heads
2:47:37
to with Windows with the Mack.
2:47:39
That's clearly the future like the
2:47:41
market is not going to accept
2:47:43
O S to Anna resentful As
2:47:45
A said on I B M.
2:47:48
Microsoft is. Crossing. At
2:47:50
on the revenue side. Even though O
2:47:52
S to is a failure, I mean
2:47:54
Dos and applications were both great businesses
2:47:56
by eighty seven. Just. So
2:47:59
fiscal Eighty Seven Mike. Microsoft does
2:48:01
350 million in revenue. Fiscal 88,
2:48:03
they do 600 million in revenue.
2:48:06
Basically none of this is from OS2 and
2:48:08
the IBM world. And then
2:48:10
towards the end of 1988 is when
2:48:13
the wind starts really blowing away from
2:48:15
IBM here. In June of 1988, Microsoft
2:48:18
hires Mike Maples, who was
2:48:21
IBM's director of software strategy,
2:48:23
away from IBM to come
2:48:25
head Microsoft's application software. And
2:48:28
what is Microsoft's application software strategy right
2:48:30
now? It's the graphical
2:48:32
user interface. It's everything that IBM isn't.
2:48:35
The writing is starting to be on the wall
2:48:37
here. The divorce is coming
2:48:39
between IBM and Microsoft. And
2:48:42
then finally, a year and a half later in 1990,
2:48:44
Windows 3.0 comes out and this is when
2:48:48
they get it right. This is when there's enough
2:48:50
installed base of 386 and 486 machines out there
2:48:53
in the open PC
2:48:56
ecosystem that you can
2:48:59
have a really good, true
2:49:01
multitasking, good UI,
2:49:04
graphical user interface running on top of
2:49:06
DOS. So Windows
2:49:08
1.0 and Windows 2.0 only
2:49:11
ever achieved 5% penetration of
2:49:13
the DOS installed base. Windows
2:49:16
3.0 doubles that in the
2:49:18
first six months. PC Computing
2:49:20
magazine writes about Windows 3.0, May 22nd, 1990,
2:49:22
will mark the first day of
2:49:27
the second era of IBM-compatible PCs.
2:49:30
Microsoft released Windows 3.0 and
2:49:33
on that day, the IBM-compatible
2:49:35
PC, a machine hobbled
2:49:37
by an outmodded character-based operating
2:49:39
system and 70s-style programs, was
2:49:42
transformed into a computer
2:49:44
that could soar in a
2:49:46
decade of multitasking, graphical operating
2:49:49
environments, aka everything OS2 is
2:49:51
not. Windows 3.0
2:49:53
gets right what its predecessors got wrong, it
2:49:56
drives adequate performance, it accommodates
2:49:58
existing DOS applications, and it
2:50:00
makes you believe that it belongs on a PC. That's
2:50:03
awesome. That's what the press thought. Ben,
2:50:05
I know you talked to a
2:50:08
really important person in the Windows ecosystem and
2:50:10
Microsoft internally at this time. What do you
2:50:12
have for us? Yes, we have to thank
2:50:14
Brad Silverberg for helping us with this section.
2:50:16
Brad led the Windows 3.1 team. He
2:50:19
came in right after the 3.0 release. I
2:50:22
would eventually go on to lead the Windows 95 effort as
2:50:25
the VP of the Personal Systems Division.
2:50:29
Brad comes in, Windows 3.0 has
2:50:31
just shipped. The first
2:50:34
thing that is super, super
2:50:36
obvious is as
2:50:38
Brad observed everything going on with
2:50:41
OS2 land and
2:50:43
everything going on with the core Microsoft
2:50:45
culture, it was a complete clash. It
2:50:48
was impossible for the pace of
2:50:50
Microsoft. This is a super
2:50:53
young group, all in their 20s, some
2:50:55
people in their 30s, but mostly 20s, who
2:50:59
just want to push the cutting edge ship stuff.
2:51:01
It was almost like, think about Google in
2:51:03
the early 2000s, just hire
2:51:05
all the smartest people you can and set
2:51:07
them loose and have creativity and bump
2:51:09
up against the edge of what's possible, both
2:51:12
in terms of pushing the hardware, but also
2:51:14
pushing, even like laws, as
2:51:16
we would later see, let's just do
2:51:18
what users love and see what happens.
2:51:20
Let's just do what technology enables us
2:51:22
to do and see what happens. That's
2:51:24
like the opposite of IBM's culture at
2:51:26
this point. So there's this huge cultural
2:51:28
rift between what IBM
2:51:30
sort of needs and who Microsoft is at
2:51:33
this point. And so what ended up
2:51:35
happening with 3.0, it
2:51:37
was unexpectedly loved. Microsoft
2:51:40
was not really prepared for how much
2:51:42
people were gonna love the GUI. And
2:51:44
with 3.1, it got really good. There
2:51:46
was a small offsite of the executives
2:51:48
and Bill and Steve basically decided that
2:51:50
it was time to bet on Windows.
2:51:53
That was the new strategy. Windows had
2:51:55
always been plan B and
2:51:57
now suddenly it was plan A. And when I say
2:51:59
plan B, I don't mean like thought
2:52:01
they had a prayer of being plan A. I mean it
2:52:03
was 65 people that shipped
2:52:06
Windows 3.1 These
2:52:08
were like the misfits. It was not
2:52:10
prestigious I mean the prestigious thing to
2:52:12
work on at Microsoft was OS
2:52:14
2 and eventually Windows NT But
2:52:17
the Windows team in the Windows 3 era
2:52:19
is almost like the Mac team over at
2:52:21
Apple They were sort of flying the rebel
2:52:23
flag. They valued creativity over bureaucracy even
2:52:25
if it meant they weren't working on the
2:52:27
prestigious thing and so suddenly
2:52:30
there's this huge strategic opportunity to
2:52:32
become the standard
2:52:34
independent of IBM if the platform
2:52:37
is good enough and Then
2:52:39
boom the early reception to Windows is so good
2:52:41
It gives this glimmer of that may seem really
2:52:44
ambitious, but that opportunity is actually ours if we
2:52:46
want to go seize it So
2:52:48
everyone took a big gulp and
2:52:50
said the gooey is the next big thing users
2:52:52
love this Let's take the
2:52:55
ragtag group and promote them. This
2:52:57
was I think the moment
2:53:00
when Microsoft
2:53:02
started to believe in
2:53:04
themselves like Really like
2:53:06
you look at the facts as we told the story
2:53:08
is like oh, yeah like Bill did this great business
2:53:11
deal with IBM and anticipated the
2:53:13
rise the clones in the first PC
2:53:15
and One and
2:53:17
then like Microsoft now was the thing and IBM
2:53:19
was like the old thing But it
2:53:21
wasn't until this when like in this whole OS
2:53:23
2 thing I think you can see like they
2:53:25
sort of felt like they were still little brother
2:53:27
They had to go along with what IBM dictated
2:53:30
and now they're like, whoa. Why do
2:53:32
we again? Yeah, we're in control and
2:53:34
the press is making a big deal
2:53:36
out of Bill Gates, you know boy
2:53:38
wonder He's the youngest ever billionaire at
2:53:41
age 31 And by
2:53:43
the way when Bill Gates became a billionaire there were
2:53:45
not lots of billionaires There were like 50 billionaires
2:53:48
all this lore around the company. It's like they
2:53:50
can do no wrong But inside the company, I
2:53:53
think they're like we don't know the future of
2:53:55
technology Any wave could break against us at any
2:53:57
moment and this is all tenuous. I think
2:54:00
I think that chasm kept getting wider
2:54:02
and wider and wider of internally
2:54:04
feeling like they're screwed and externally
2:54:06
it's seeming like this is the
2:54:08
next great thing. Totally.
2:54:10
I've got some fun stats on like
2:54:12
money and revenue around all this. So
2:54:14
in fiscal 1990, the year that Windows
2:54:16
3.0 shipped, Microsoft does
2:54:18
$1.2 billion in revenue,
2:54:20
making them the first software company ever
2:54:22
to pass a billion dollars in revenue.
2:54:27
In fiscal 91, they do $1.8 billion. In fiscal 92,
2:54:29
they finally win the Apple copyright
2:54:31
lawsuit around the GUI. Which,
2:54:33
by the way, the way that they won that, a
2:54:35
judge basically looked at the paper and said, Apple,
2:54:38
you totally said in all the future versions
2:54:40
of Windows, they can use your UI paradigms.
2:54:43
And so for most of the accounts, they're
2:54:45
covered. And for these other things that you're
2:54:47
trying to ask them about, those are not
2:54:50
actually defensible. It's just widely accepted that
2:54:52
these are UI paradigms now and you can't enforce
2:54:54
any ownership over those. So basically got like thrown
2:54:56
out. Apple tried to appeal all
2:54:58
the way up to the Supreme Court who said
2:55:00
no. That's right. And like we've been saying too,
2:55:02
like they both stole from Xerox. Yes. Fiscal
2:55:05
92, though, this is when Microsoft
2:55:08
just blows the doors off. They
2:55:10
do $2.8 billion in revenue in fiscal 92, up
2:55:12
from 1.8 the year before. And
2:55:17
that year, 1992
2:55:19
in October, is when
2:55:22
Gates finally passes John
2:55:24
Clugee, acquired OG fans
2:55:26
back to the LVMH episode. Gates
2:55:29
passes John Clugee of Metro Media
2:55:31
fame, Media mogul to become the
2:55:34
wealthiest person in America. And so
2:55:36
everything you're talking about, all the press comes around that. And
2:55:39
then January 93, the
2:55:42
crowning moment it happens, Microsoft
2:55:44
passes IBM in
2:55:46
market cap. And it's like, they
2:55:49
have inherited the earth. They have inherited
2:55:51
computing. Supposedly, I don't
2:55:54
know if this is 100% true. This is
2:55:57
written in one of the books I read. I read this.
2:55:59
The folks involved. Will have to confirm or deny. Supposedly.
2:56:03
The next month after Microsoft passes I
2:56:05
B M and market cap. So.
2:56:07
We're now in February. Nineteen Eighty Three. The.
2:56:10
Ib and Board is in disarray. Of
2:56:12
the empire is going down. They.
2:56:14
Fired the Cel. Tom
2:56:16
Murphy of Capital City say in.
2:56:19
Who. Is on the I B M board.
2:56:21
Supposedly he comes out to Redmond to
2:56:23
sit down with Bill and personally asked
2:56:25
him. To com and be the
2:56:27
next cel be I'm when assists this
2:56:29
of iran Iraq has actually happened but
2:56:31
is what I read that in hard
2:56:33
tries. That's. An Hard drive? Yeah
2:56:36
wow listeners, there's some unauthorized biography is
2:56:38
that we try to corroborate as me
2:56:40
the facts as we can with the
2:56:42
ones where David saying he doesn't know
2:56:44
a source and sort of these unauthorized
2:56:46
ones and just dates obviously declines that
2:56:48
both. Whether or not that actually happened
2:56:51
spirit Sleep you could believe that happens.
2:56:53
Bill and Microsoft or the new Emperor
2:56:55
here. I mean this tears through
2:56:57
to this day. We're going to tell in
2:56:59
the next episode here. the anti Trust in
2:57:01
the Fall another. Not really. Microsoft
2:57:03
Still most valuable company in the world. They.
2:57:06
Inherited the trend for my Bm. Happens
2:57:08
right here. nuts. And so.
2:57:11
Suddenly. Microsoft seals the full
2:57:13
weight of everything that you have to
2:57:15
do to build a platform and be
2:57:17
a steward of an ecosystem. So suddenly
2:57:20
this huge effort began to try and
2:57:22
make developers successful. That's how Windows would
2:57:24
be successful as it was a great
2:57:26
platform for application developers to thrive on.
2:57:28
So Cameron Myhrvold lead the developer relations
2:57:31
group basically to try and figure out
2:57:33
what do people want out of a
2:57:35
platform and how do we provide the
2:57:37
A P eyes for them and the
2:57:39
support and everything in. Order to do
2:57:42
that, all the documentation, all the help,
2:57:44
everything and at the same time Microsoft
2:57:46
basically new. Establishing a platform is brutal
2:57:49
and requires bootstrap and a multi sided
2:57:51
network of developers, users, and Pc manufacturers
2:57:53
and so three out one at users
2:57:55
excited but it was still very early.
2:57:58
They could have lost that's road. Developers
2:58:00
were not really yet targeting Windows
2:58:02
Microsoft sort of had to show
2:58:05
we make great applications for Windows
2:58:07
to so that applications group really
2:58:09
had to start doing Windows three
2:58:11
out one right? Because. Developers
2:58:13
were. Targeting Dos at this
2:58:16
point, they were probably preparing for O
2:58:18
S to some of them were targeting
2:58:20
the Mack like Microsoft itself, but nobody
2:58:22
was targeting Winter as exactly. See Got
2:58:24
this big developer early since group effort
2:58:27
that spins ups. Meanwhile, there's a huge
2:58:29
push with Oh Yams to get them
2:58:31
to install Windows. At this point, they
2:58:33
were still installing Dos are some people
2:58:35
were actually installing nothing and require users
2:58:38
to put operating systems on. So there's
2:58:40
a conceited push to get the Oh
2:58:42
Yes to install three out one. Well,
2:58:44
Yeah in the some people installing nothing
2:58:47
we should mention here. Around
2:58:49
the same time this arrow they.
2:58:52
Move. A lot of their oh
2:58:54
yeah I'm deals to a per processor
2:58:56
licensing fee arrangement. Which. Gets
2:58:58
them in a lot of hot water with
2:59:00
and I a few years later. okay. So
2:59:02
this happened for nineteen eighty to Ninety
2:59:04
Ninety four, David explain the per processor
2:59:07
licensing agreements. Well. Here's.
2:59:09
How Microsoft I think would possess Net to
2:59:11
their oh yeah I'm Partners. You.
2:59:13
Could. Pay. Us you know
2:59:15
a licence fee for every machine you
2:59:17
sip with Das installed on it or
2:59:19
Dos and Windows. And. You know
2:59:21
you can offer other. O S
2:59:23
is too. But. Rather than data
2:59:25
arrangement will give you a cheaper per unit deal
2:59:28
because we're going to ship Das on everything. Dos
2:59:30
is the standard. We want windows to be the
2:59:32
standard and we does is going to be the
2:59:34
standard. Will. Make it more economically
2:59:36
attractive to you, give you a lower
2:59:38
per unit rate. If. We
2:59:41
just kind of change the terms and say instead of
2:59:43
every unit you sip with. Dos.
2:59:45
Or with windows. Every machine
2:59:47
you sip. Period. Every microprocessor
2:59:49
based machine that you sip, no
2:59:51
matter what. Operating. Systems installed
2:59:53
on us to pay us a purge
2:59:55
processor rates. So if you do that,
2:59:57
you'll be paying us for every missed.
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